

REPORT

FROM BONN TO ANTALYA: SB64 Negotiations And Türkiye's COP31 Presidency Strategy

DİLEK AĞA

NOVEMBER 2026 | NUMBER: 281

SETA

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SETA Publications 281
ISBN: 978-625-5429-00-1

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SUMMARY

This report analyzes the sixty-fourth sessions of the subsidiary bodies (SB64) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held in Bonn on June 8-18, 2026. It also analyzes the process leading from these sessions to the pre-COP in the Pacific. It does so from the perspective of Türkiye's Presidency of the 31st Conference of the Parties (COP31). At SB64, draft decisions on technology, capacity-building and administrative matters were prepared for transmission to the governing bodies. However, there was no agreement on which text would be carried forward to the next session under the mitigation work programme and the Global Goal on Adaptation.

The report assesses the Presidency against two criteria. The first is the dual position that arises because the COP President is both an impartial presiding officer and a government representative. The second is the difference in status between the formal negotiation track and the voluntary implementation track. Türkiye will preside over COP31 without being a member of any negotiating group. This position means that Türkiye, as a Party in the negotiations, does not rely on the support of a group.

In the office of the presidency, however, the same position gives Türkiye the opportunity to remain even-handed between

developed and developing countries and to act as a presiding officer who recognizes the reasoning of both sides. Whether this opportunity turns into results will depend on how the process is managed. Türkiye's visibility at SB64 was concentrated in the activities it carried out in its capacity as the Presidency. During the session, the Presidency turned four of its thematic priorities under the COP31 Action Agenda into numerical global targets. After the session, the electrification target was taken forward into a pledge open to governments. The waste target is directly linked to the Zero Waste practice that Türkiye has pursued since 2017 and to the leadership it has assumed on this issue at the United Nations level. At the same session, some Parties objected to linking outputs produced on the implementation track to the formal negotiation process. The Presidency, for its part, announced at the pre-COP in October 2026 its intention to bring a political decision text to Antalya under its own leadership. The definition of the targets and national policy steps depend on the decisions of the Presidency and the government themselves. By contrast, the move of these targets to the negotiation track and the issues of fossil fuels and finance require the consent of the Parties.

The report offers policy recommendations on the management of the negotiation process, on supporting the Presidency's agenda with national policy steps, and on the even-handed presidency profile and the post-presidency period.

INTRODUCTION

The negotiating agenda of the 31st Conference of the Parties (COP31) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which is meeting in Antalya on November 9-20, 2026, took shape in Bonn in June 2026. At the mid-year sessions of the subsidiary bodies, the technical and legal preparation of the texts to be adopted at the end of the year is carried out. The scope of the agenda items that can be concluded in Antalya is also largely determined at this stage.

At the sixty-fourth sessions of the subsidiary bodies (SB64) in Bonn, agreement was limited to technical and institutional matters. The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) adopted conclusions recommending the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as host of the Climate Technology Centre. It also forwarded a draft decision to COP31 on the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism. By contrast, under the mitigation work programme the Parties could not agree on which documents would serve as the basis for further negotiations, and on the Global Goal on Adaptation they reached no outcome.[1]

1 International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings: 8-18 June 2026", *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* 12, no. 900 (June 22, 2026): 10-11, accessed July 1, 2026, https://enb.iisd.org/sites/default/files/2026-06/enb12900e.pdf. On the forwarding of the draft decision to COP31, see "Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on Its Sixty-Fourth Session, Held in Bonn from 8 to 18 June 2026 (FCCC/SBI/2026/15)", UNFCCC, August 28, 2026, para. 104, accessed September 13, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbi2026_15_adv.pdf. On the mitigation work programme, see IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 3-4. The official name of the programme is the Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme; see FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 5. The programme was established in Glasgow in 2021 and operationalized in Sharm el-Sheikh in 2022; see IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 2. On the Global Goal on Adaptation, see IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 5-6.

This picture is the product of a debate that the regime has pursued since Glasgow. The arrangements for implementing the Paris Agreement were finalized in 2021,[2] and from then on the view that the regime's priority should shift from rule-making to implementation began to prevail. Belém wrote this process into a decision text and produced the tools for it. The Global Implementation Accelerator and the Belém Mission to 1.5, established by the Global Mutirão decision, aim to support the implementation of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and national adaptation plans (NAPs). The decision launched the Accelerator under the guidance of the COP30 and COP31 Presidencies, and the Mission under the guidance of the COP29, COP30 and COP31 Presidencies.[3]

The COP30 Presidency is also running two roadmaps, on transitioning away from fossil fuels and on halting deforestation, under its own responsibility and without relying on a negotiated decision.[4] The common feature of these tools produced in Belém is that their operation does not depend on the consensus requirement. The regime is thus moving toward a two-track structure, with one track based on negotiated decisions and the other on voluntary implementation initiatives. However, the two tracks do not have equal status. At SB64, mitigation and adaptation issues remained open on the negotiation track while the COP31 Presidency announced new targets on the implementation track. This made the difference in status between the two tracks visible.

2 "Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on Its Third Session, Held in Glasgow from 31 October to 13 November 2021. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at Its Third Session (FCCC/PA/CMA/2021/10/Add.1)", UNFCCC, March 8, 2022, Decision 1/CMA.3, para. 78, accessed September 14, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_10a01E.pdf.

3 "Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on Its Seventh Session, Held in Belém from 10 to 22 November 2025. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement at Its Seventh Session (FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/19/Add.1)", UNFCCC, March 30, 2026, Decision 1/CMA.7, "Global Mutirão: Uniting Humanity in a Global Mobilization against Climate Change", para. 41-42, accessed September 14, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2025_19a01E.pdf. On the decision's emphasis on the shift from negotiation to implementation, see the same decision, para. 14-15. On the Accelerator, see "Global Implementation Accelerator", UNFCCC, accessed August 18, 2026, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/conferences/un-climate-change-conference-antalya-november-2026/global-implementation-accelerator.

4 "COP30 Presidency Invitation to Submit Contributions to: A) the COP30 Presidency Roadmap on the Transition Away from Fossil Fuels in a Just, Orderly and Equitable Manner; and B) the COP30 Presidency Roadmap on Halting and Reversing Deforestation and Forest Degradation by 2030", UNFCCC, accessed July 2, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/COP30Presidencyinvitation_to_submit_contributions.pdf.

The Presidency operates on both tracks. In Bonn, Türkiye was present in three separate roles, as incoming Presidency and host, as owner of the Action Agenda, and as a Party to the Convention. However, these roles did not gain equal visibility during the sessions. In its first letter of April 13, 2026, the Presidency listed its thematic priorities, which it then presented in Bonn as ten areas. During the session, it turned four of them into numerical global targets.[5] Of these, the electrification target was taken forward after Bonn into a pledge open to governments. The pre-COP in the Pacific took place in October 2026. There, COP31 President Murat Kurum, who is Türkiye's Minister of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, and President of Negotiations Chris Bowen of Australia announced their intention to bring a political decision text led by the Presidency to Antalya.

The role of the Presidency should be assessed together with Türkiye's unique status in the regime's classification of Parties. Türkiye is the only Party that was removed from the Annex II list by decision 26/CP.7 but remains in Annex I, and it is not a member of any negotiating group.[6] For this reason, the country does not fully fit into either of the regime's categories of developed and developing countries. Since no other Party holds this status, COP31 will be the first presidency held by a Party that falls outside the regime's binary classification. The literature has long treated the fact that Türkiye acts in the negotiations without a negotiating group as a feature

5 "COP31 Action Agenda", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, accessed November 5, 2026, https://cop31.tr/action-plan; "Presenting the COP31 Action Agenda", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, June 9, 2026, accessed July 10, 2026, https://cop31.tr/speech-detail/bonn-action-agenda-2026; "COP31 Başkanı Kurum, BM Genel Sekreterliği ve Taraf Ülkelere İlk Mektubunu Gönderdi" [COP31 President Kurum Sends His First Letter to the UN Secretariat and Parties], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, April 15, 2026, accessed July 10, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/cop31-baskani-kurum-bm-genel-sekreterligi-ve-taraf-ulkelere-ilk-mektubunu-gonderdi-haber-4892; "COP31 Presidency Announces '35% by 2035' Electrification Target as Part of Action Agenda Launch", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, June 9, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://cop31.tr/news-detail/bonn-electrification-target-2026.

6 "Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, Held at Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties. Volume IV (FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4)", UNFCCC, January 21, 2002, Decision 26/CP.7, para. 1, accessed July 10, 2026, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a04.pdf. On the amendments to Annex II, see UNFCCC, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook* (UNFCCC, 2006), 70, accessed June 14, 2026, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/publications/handbook.pdf. For the finding that Türkiye does not belong to any of the formal negotiating groups, see "Party Groupings", UNFCCC, accessed July 12, 2026, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties/party-groupings; Jocelyn Timperley, "The Carbon Brief Profile: Turkey", Carbon Brief, May 3, 2018, accessed October 1, 2026, https://www.carbonbrief.org/carbon-brief-profile-turkey.

that made it harder for the country to make its positions heard.[7] What is at issue here is membership in the negotiating groups that produce common positions, not in the regional groups that determine the rotation of the presidency.

This position, which means negotiating alone, can be turned into an advantage during the COP31 Presidency. This opportunity rests on two grounds. First, the COP President is expected to carry out the role under the authority of the Conference of the Parties and while remaining impartial.[8] A presidency held by a group member has to meet this expectation by visibly distancing itself from the positions of its own group. A presidency without group membership, by contrast, has no group position to defend, and it can more easily avoid being perceived as identified with the interests of a particular group. Second, Türkiye shares features with both country categories in the regime. As an Annex I Party under the Convention, it is on the same list as the developed countries. Because it is outside Annex II, it has no obligation to provide financial resources. It has also declared that it will implement the Paris Agreement as a developing country.[9] On issues such as finance, where the Parties divide along group lines, this position gives the Presidency the opportunity to develop bridging proposals as a presiding officer who recognizes the reasoning of both sides. The coordination burden that comes with not being a member of a negotiating group can be met through active bilateral diplomacy.

The report asks which unresolved agenda SB64 and the period that followed handed over to the COP31 Presidency. It also asks with what tools, and within what limits, the Presidency can manage this agenda. In addressing these questions, the Presidency is assessed against two criteria. The first criterion stems from the structure of the office of the COP presidency. The

7 Semra Cerit Mazlum, "Turkey and Post-Paris Climate Change Politics: Still Playing Alone", *New Perspectives on Turkey* 56 (2017): 148; Ethemcan Turhan et al., "Beyond Special Circumstances: Climate Change Policy in Turkey 1992-2015", *WIREs Climate Change* 7, no. 3 (2016): 454, 456.

8 UNFCCC, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook*, 31.

9 United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (FCCC/INFORMAL/84), 1992, 8, 23-24, accessed August 30, 2026, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. Article 4, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Convention place the obligation to provide financial resources on the Parties included in Annex II. For the declaration Türkiye made when ratifying the Paris Agreement, see "Chapter XXVII, 7.d Paris Agreement", United Nations Treaty Collection, accessed September 17, 2026, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXVII/XXVII-7-d.en.pdf.

COP President is at once the impartial presiding officer of the negotiations and the representative of a government. The success of a presidency is determined by how it manages this dual position. This criterion has two aspects. The Presidency is expected to remain even-handed toward the negotiating groups in the negotiation process. The Presidency's global agenda, on the other hand, is assessed together with Türkiye's national climate policy. The second criterion rests on the difference in status between the two tracks. Outputs adopted by consensus on the negotiation track enter the official documents of the regime, while commitments on the implementation track remain voluntary. For this reason, it is a gain for the regime when an issue that is not on the formal agenda is taken up in the action agenda. It is also a gain when a voluntary output is moved to the negotiation track with the consent of the Parties. Leaving the follow-up of an output adopted by consensus to the action agenda, by contrast, is a step backward.

For the outputs of the session, the report relies on the final reports of the subsidiary bodies dated August 28, 2026, and the draft decisions annexed to them. For the stance of the Presidency, it relies on the letters the COP31 Presidency sent to the Parties, its official statements and the Türkiye-Australia Partnership Modalities. For the positions of the Parties during the negotiations, it draws on the records of the *Earth Negotiations Bulletin*. Minister Kurum is formally the COP31 President-Designate until his election at the opening session in Antalya. Where titles are mentioned, however, the report uses COP31 President for him and President of Negotiations for Bowen. Completed before the conference, the report does not predict its outcome and confines itself to identifying the Presidency's room for maneuver. The following sections address, in order, the institutional framework, the course and outcomes of SB64, Türkiye's position at the session, the preparatory process after Bonn, the agenda carried over to Antalya, and the room for maneuver of the Presidency strategy. The final section brings the findings together and offers policy recommendations.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: THE SUBSIDIARY BODIES AND THE PRESIDENCY

The institutional structure of the international climate regime consists of governing bodies that, as a rule, meet once a year and two permanent subsidiary bodies that provide them with continuous technical support.[10] These bodies are the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the SBI. The main function of the two bodies is to assist and advise the Conference of the Parties in their respective areas of responsibility. The texts they prepare can acquire the status of decisions upon approval by the governing bodies.[11] The SBSTA and the SBI held their sixty-fourth concurrent sessions in Bonn on June 8-18, 2026, in the period between COP30 and COP31.[12]

The position of the COP31 Presidency in this process is defined by the rules of procedure. The sessions of the subsidiary bodies are managed by the SB Chairs elected by the Conference of the Parties and by the co-facilitators whom the Chairs propose

10 United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, 10-14; UNFCCC, *Presiding Officers' Guide to the UNFCCC Process* (UNFCCC, 2025), 11, accessed July 13, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Presiding-Officers-Guide-to-the-UNFCCC-Process.pdf.

11 Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, *The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 415-417, 464-465.

12 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 1; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 1.

and the Parties approve.[13] Türkiye's role in the run-up to SB64 was not to manage the formal negotiation track. It took the form of coordinating with Brazil, which holds the COP30 Presidency, working in contact with the SB Chairs, and conducting a partnership with Australia, which took over the functions related to the negotiations.[14] On the implementation track, by contrast, the Presidency maintained an active presence through the Action Agenda. SB64 revealed, five months before the conference, the agenda that the COP31 Presidency will face in Antalya and the issues on which the Parties are divided.

Legal Basis, Functioning and Outputs of the Subsidiary Bodies

The SBSTA was established by Article 9 of the UNFCCC and the SBI by Article 10.[15] The purpose of the SBSTA is to provide the Conference of the Parties and, as appropriate, its other subsidiary bodies with information and advice on scientific and technological matters relating to the Convention. The body is open to participation by all Parties, is multidisciplinary, and comprises government representatives competent in the relevant field of expertise. It reports regularly to the Conference of the Parties on all aspects of its work. The Convention assigns the body five tasks, which it carries out under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties and drawing on the work of competent international bodies.[16] The Convention also provides that the functions and terms of reference of the body may be further elaborated by the Conference of the Parties.

The SBI, for its part, was established to assist the Conference of the Parties in the assessment and review of the effective implementation of the Convention. The body is open to participation by all Parties and comprises

13 "Preparing for the Sixty-Fourth Sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies: Joint Note by the Chairs", UNFCCC, May 29, 2026, para. 7, annex para. 6, accessed July 6, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/SB64_JointNote.pdf; UNFCCC, *Presiding Officers' Guide to the UNFCCC Process*, 12, 28-29.

14 "The Road to Antalya", UNFCCC, accessed October 17, 2026, https://unfccc.int/cop31/the-road-to-antalya; "As Türkiye Prepares to Host COP31, A Look Back at COP30's Key Outcomes", United Nations Türkiye, December 22, 2025, accessed July 6, 2026, https://turkiye.un.org/en/307475-türkiye-prepares-host-cop31-look-back-cop30's-key-outcomes.

15 United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, 13-14.

16 United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, 13.

government representatives who are experts on matters related to climate change. The SBI also reports regularly to the Conference of the Parties on all aspects of its work. The body has three tasks to carry out under the guidance of the Conference of the Parties.[17]

The Convention does not regulate the mandates of the two bodies in the same way. For the SBSTA, it explicitly provides for the obligation to draw on the work of competent international bodies and for the possibility that the Conference of the Parties may elaborate its mandate. For the SBI, no such provisions are made. Instead, the Convention assigns the SBI the task of assisting the Conference of the Parties in the preparation and implementation of its decisions.[18]

Today the two bodies serve all three treaties of the regime. Article 15 of the Kyoto Protocol and Article 18 of the Paris Agreement provide that the SBSTA and the SBI established by the Convention also serve as their own subsidiary bodies. Paragraph 2 of both articles allows States that are Parties to the Convention but not to the Protocol or the Agreement to participate as observers in the sessions of these bodies. It also provides that decisions under the Protocol and the Agreement are taken only by the Parties to the relevant treaty.[19] In Antalya, the decision-making bodies of the three treaties will meet concurrently. These are the Conference of the Parties and the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). The third is the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA). The technical preparation carried out at SB64 for the three treaties will move to the decision stage in Antalya, and a single President will preside over the sessions of the three bodies.[20]

Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention did not clearly define the boundary between the mandates of the two bodies. The regime began to draw this

17 United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, 14.

18 Yamin and Depledge, *The International Climate Change Regime*, 416-419; United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, 13-14.

19 "Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change", UNFCCC, 14-15, accessed July 16, 2026, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf; "Paris Agreement", UNFCCC, 22, accessed November 5, 2026, https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf; UNFCCC, *Presiding Officers' Guide to the UNFCCC Process*, 11.

20 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 7-8, 21; Yamin and Depledge, *The International Climate Change Regime*, 425-428; UNFCCC, *Presiding Officers' Guide to the UNFCCC Process*, 10; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 151.

boundary with decision 6/CP.1 of the first Conference of the Parties and elaborated it in decision 13/CP.3.[21] The general mandate that the first decision gave the two bodies also brought a risk of duplication on issues falling within the expertise of both.[22] The second decision set out three sequential methods to address this risk. On an issue that concerns both bodies, one of them as a rule takes overall responsibility. Where this is not possible, the agendas are sequenced so that the same issue is not taken up in parallel sessions. A joint session is foreseen only where these two methods do not work.[23] By contrast, the agendas adopted by the two bodies at SB64 contain seven joint items, and the just transition work programme is one of them.[24] Joint items are no longer an exceptional solution and have become a category of the agenda in their own right.

The election of officers is governed by the draft rules of procedure. Under these rules, the President, seven Vice-Presidents, the SB Chairs and the Rapporteur are elected at the beginning of each ordinary session and form the Bureau of the session. The authority of the SB Chairs thus derives from their election by the Parties, not from the national presidency of the host country.[25]

Negotiations are conducted mainly in contact groups and informal consultations. The management of these groups is left to co-chairs and co-facil-

21 "Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its First Session, Held at Berlin from 28 March to 7 April 1995. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its First Session (FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1)", UNFCCC, June 6, 1995, 21, accessed July 15, 2026, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf; "Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Third Session, Held at Kyoto from 1 to 11 December 1997. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Third Session (FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1)", UNFCCC, March 25, 1998, Decision 13/CP.3, 44-45, accessed July 15, 2026, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop3/07a01.pdf.

22 "Provisional Agenda and Annotations, Including Suggestions for the Organization of Work: Note by the Executive Secretary (FCCC/CP/1996/1)", UNFCCC, July 5, 1996, para. 100, accessed July 16, 2026, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/01.pdf; "Division of Labour Between the Subsidiary Bodies Established by the Convention: Note by the Secretariat (FCCC/SB/1995/INF.1)", UNFCCC, July 25, 1995, para. 1, accessed July 15, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/docs/1995/sb/inf01.pdf.

23 Decision 13/CP.3, para. 3.

24 "Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on Its Sixty-Fourth Session, Held in Bonn from 8 to 18 June 2026 (FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5)", UNFCCC, August 28, 2026, para. 5, accessed October 2, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2026_05_adv.pdf; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 5.

25 "Organizational Matters: Adoption of the Rules of Procedure, Note by the Secretariat (FCCC/CP/1996/2)", UNFCCC, May 22, 1996, 6-8, accessed August 26, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/02_0.pdf.

itators proposed by the SB Chairs and approved by the Parties in plenary.[26] SB64 showed that Parties can reject texts prepared by co-facilitators and SB Chairs. Under the mitigation work programme, none of the three documents prepared by the co-facilitators could be carried forward to the next session. Under the Global Goal on Adaptation, the revised draft presented by the SB Chairs was not taken as the basis for negotiations.[27] In both items, the objections targeted both the content of the texts and the way they were prepared. The procedural framework of these negotiations is also incomplete. The draft rules of procedure have been applied without being adopted since the first Conference of the Parties, and rule 42 on voting remains the only provision that is not applied.[28] The incoming Presidency thus inherits both an incomplete set of rules and more than thirty years of established practice.

The subsidiary bodies meet twice a year as a matter of established practice. It is not an obligation arising from the founding treaty or the rules of procedure. The Convention does not regulate how often these bodies meet. The draft rules of procedure leave the dates of the sessions to the decision of the Conference of the Parties.[29] The first session, known as the intersessional (mid-year) session, meets in the middle of the year separately from the governing bodies. The second session meets at the end of the year together with the governing bodies.[30] The fact that the mid-year session is held in Bonn, however, stems from the rules of procedure. The seat of the Secretariat was set in Bonn by decision 16/CP.1 of the first Conference of the Parties in 1995. The draft rules of procedure also provide that sessions take place at the seat of the Secretariat, unless otherwise decided or unless the Secretariat, in consultation with the Parties, makes other appropriate arrangements.[31]

The outputs of the intersessional sessions differ in legal status. Within their own mandates, the subsidiary bodies adopt only conclusions and recommendations. They forward draft decisions to the governing bodies for

26 UNFCCC, *Presiding Officers' Guide to the UNFCCC Process*, 28-29.

27 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 3-6, 19-20.

28 FCCC/CP/1996/2, para. 2; UNFCCC, *Presiding Officers' Guide to the UNFCCC Process*, 36.

29 FCCC/CP/1996/2, 8; United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, 13-14; UNFCCC, *Presiding Officers' Guide to the UNFCCC Process*, 12.

30 UNFCCC, *Presiding Officers' Guide to the UNFCCC Process*, 12.

31 FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, 53; FCCC/CP/1996/2, 3, 8.

final adoption.[32] These texts can acquire the status of decisions only when the governing bodies adopt them.

Agenda items leave the sessions in four main ways. The first is the adoption of substantive conclusions by the Parties. The second is the preparation of a draft decision for transmission to the governing body. The third is the adoption of procedural conclusions that carry the work forward to the next session on the basis of a specific text, although there is no agreement on substance. The last is that the item is left to the next session without a text to work from.[33] When the Parties cannot agree even on procedural conclusions, rule 16 applies. Any item whose consideration has not been completed is automatically included in the agenda of the next ordinary session, unless the Conference of the Parties decides otherwise.[34] Since the rules of procedure apply mutatis mutandis to the subsidiary bodies, rule 16, whose text refers to the Conference of the Parties, also applies to the agendas of the subsidiary bodies. Because rule 10(c) also provides for the inclusion of such items in the provisional agenda, both provisions are cited together at the closing session.[35]

The forms of output that agenda items take at the intersessional sessions make it possible to anticipate at an early stage whether an item will reach the decision stage at the end of the year. For an item that leaves with a draft decision, a draft recommended by the subsidiary body is forwarded to the governing body. Adoption of the draft as a decision requires the consensus of the Parties in the governing body. An item that leaves with procedural conclusions, by contrast, in some cases does no more than refer to an informal note by the co-facilitators. At the next session, the discussion starts again from documents that have not been agreed, not from a draft to be finalized. An informal note has no official document status.[36] The reference in the conclusions does not change this status of the note, but it creates a political expectation that the negotiation will start from that note at the next session. For an item carried over without a text to work from, there is

32 UNFCCC, *Presiding Officers' Guide to the UNFCCC Process*, 53.

33 UNFCCC, *Presiding Officers' Guide to the UNFCCC Process*, 53-57.

34 FCCC/CP/1996/2, 5.

35 FCCC/CP/1996/2, 4, 8.

36 UNFCCC, *Presiding Officers' Guide to the UNFCCC Process*, 53-56, 58, 61.

no such expectation. In this case, the informal notes prepared at the session lack both legal status and the political basis that conclusions provide. The difference between the two forms of handover is political, not legal, and for this reason it is decisive for the incoming Presidency. The forms of output at the intersessional session show which items the incoming Presidency will inherit, and at what stage.

These forms of output are specific to the formal negotiation track. The High-Level Champions, created by the decision adopting the Paris Agreement, and the Marrakech Partnership built on them formed a second track that gathers the voluntary commitments of actors other than States Parties. The action agendas run by presidencies began to operate on this track.[37] This difference in status between the two tracks is the institutional basis of the second criterion. The Action Agenda that Türkiye will run throughout its COP31 Presidency also operates on this implementation track.

The COP Presidency and the Division of Roles for COP31

It is the COP presidency, which takes office at the end of the year, that will bring the agenda prepared in the subsidiary bodies to a conclusion. In UNFCCC practice, the presidency and the hosting of the conference usually rest with the same country. This combination stems from established practice, not from a binding rule of procedure.[38] The COP President is usually elected according to the rotation among the regional groups. The President's role is to facilitate the work of the Conference of the Parties and to promote agreement among the Parties. The President carries out this role under the authority of the Conference of the Parties and while remaining impartial.[39]

The draft rules of procedure regulate the powers of the office of the presidency in detail. Under rule 22.3, the President cannot exercise any of the rights of a Party that belong to his or her own country in the sessions,

37 "Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session, Held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Twenty-First Session (FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1)", UNFCCC, January 29, 2016, Decision 1/CP.21, para. 121, accessed September 22, 2026, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf. On the Marrakech Partnership, see "About the Marrakech Partnership", UNFCCC, accessed August 7, 2026, https://unfccc.int/climate-action/events/about-the-marrakech-partnership.

38 Yamin and Depledge, *The International Climate Change Regime*, 409-410.

39 UNFCCC, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook*, 31.

including the right to vote. The State concerned is obliged to designate a separate representative to exercise these rights. The subordination of the office of the presidency to the Conference of the Parties is also explicitly set out in rule 23.3.[40] These rules position the office of the presidency as the authority responsible for the impartial and rule-based functioning of the negotiation process, not as a political actor that determines the content of decisions.

The powers of the COP President under the rules of procedure fall into three areas. The President reaches agreement with the Secretariat in preparing the provisional agenda, presides over the sessions and rules on points of order. These rulings stand unless they are overruled by a majority of the Parties present and voting.[41]

The separation of the presidency from the hosting of the conference dates back to the early years of the regime. At COP2 (1996), Zimbabwe held the presidency while the conference was held in Geneva. COP5 (1999) was held in Bonn under the presidency of Poland, and COP9 (2003) in Milan under the presidency of Hungary. In all three cases, the separation stemmed from administrative and logistical reasons, not from a political crisis or an institutional dispute.[42]

More recently, COP23 met in Bonn in 2017 under the presidency of Fiji, because Fiji lacked the logistical infrastructure to accommodate a large-scale conference.[43] COP25 was moved to Madrid in 2019 under the presidency of Chile, after the Chilean government withdrew as host about a month before the conference.[44]

40 FCCC/CP/1996/2, 6-7.

41 FCCC/CP/1996/2, 4-5, 7, 10.

42 UNFCCC, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook*, 30; Joanna Depledge, *The Organization of Global Negotiations: Constructing the Climate Change Regime* (London: Earthscan, 2005), 37-38; Yamin and Depledge, *The International Climate Change Regime*, 408-410.

43 "COP23", UNFCCC, accessed July 5, 2026, https://unfccc.int/event/cop-23; Harald Winkler and Joanna Depledge, "Fiji-in-Bonn: Will the 'Talanoa Spirit' Prevail?", *Climate Policy* 18, no. 2 (2018): 141-142.

44 "UN Climate Change Conference - December 2019", UNFCCC, accessed October 14, 2026, https://unfccc.int/conference/un-climate-change-conference-december-2019; Patricia Espinosa, "Message to Parties and Observer Organizations: Dates and Venue of the United Nations Climate Change Conference COP 25/CMP 15/CMA 2", UNFCCC, November 1, 2019, 1, accessed October 14, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/message_to_parties_and_observer_organizations_bureau_confirmation_of_dates_and%20_venue_of_cop_%2025_0.pdf. On the Chilean government's decision to withdraw from hosting, see "Chile Cancels Hosting Arrangement for Santiago Climate Change Conference", SDG Knowledge Hub, October 31, 2019, accessed October 14, 2026, https://sdg.iisd.org/news/chile-cancels-hosting-arrangement-for-santiago-climate-change-conference.

In all previous cases, the separation was limited to the venue of the conference, and the authority of the presidency was not divided. The COP31 arrangement differs from these cases in two respects. The arrangement is the product of an agreement reached between two candidacies within the Western European and Others Group. The division of roles has also been given a written framework through a bilateral document. Under the Türkiye-Australia Partnership Modalities, Türkiye assumes the COP31 Presidency. The representative of Australia serves as President of Negotiations, responsible for conducting the negotiations, with authority taken over from Türkiye's Presidency. The same document provides that the two sides consult each other and that, in case of disagreement, consultations continue until mutual agreement is reached. This division of authority, which is not defined in the rules of procedure, has no precedent in the history of the regime.[45]

Not calling the arrangement a co-presidency is not a choice but a consequence of the procedural framework. The draft rules of procedure provide for the election of a single President at the beginning of each ordinary session, and none of the rules allows the office of the presidency to be divided. A Vice-President can act in place of the President only during the President's temporary absence.[46] The Modalities document is also consistent with this framework. It derives the Australian representative's authority from Türkiye's Presidency, not from an independent office. The document sets up a three-step structure. The representative of Türkiye is elected President under the rules of procedure and delegates the functions related to the negotiations to the representative of Australia, who is nominated as Vice-President for the duration of COP31. The document states explicitly that this last step is intended to facilitate the transfer. In its footnotes, it refers directly to the draft rules of procedure and states that the arrangement is subject to these rules.[47] Minister Kurum has stated that there is no such concept as a co-presidency at a COP.[48]

45 "Türkiye-Australia Partnership Modalities", UNFCCC, accessed April 4, 2026, https://unfccc.int/documents/655031; "Türkiye to Host and Preside over COP31", Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, November 23, 2025, accessed April 11, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/en/turkiye-to-host-and-preside-over-cop31-news-4598; Depledge, *The Organization of Global Negotiations*, 37-42.

46 FCCC/CP/1996/2, 6-7.

47 "Türkiye-Australia Partnership Modalities".

48 "Türkiye'nin COP31 Gündeminin 5 Önemli Enerji Başlığı Açıklandı" [Five Key Energy Topics on Türkiye's COP31 Agenda Announced], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, March 12,

In sum, the resulting model is not a structure in which two presidencies stand side by side but a defined transfer of functions under a single presidency. Since the title of President of Negotiations has no counterpart in the rules of procedure, the scope of the transfer will take shape in practice. In September 2026, Minister Kurum stated that the negotiations would be conducted in consultation with the COP31 Presidency and that the final decision rests with the Presidency.[49]

The two components of the division of roles do not operate under the same conditions. The authority of the President of Negotiations covers texts whose adoption is subject to consensus. On this track, an objection by a single Party can prevent a phrase from entering a text, and SB64 provided examples of this. The Action Agenda is not bound by this requirement. The Presidency defines the targets itself, collects the commitments itself and leaves participation to the decision of individual governments and other actors. At a time when the regime has turned from rule-making to implementation, this difference also determines the meaning of the division of roles. The negotiating function is carried out by the President of Negotiations, with authority taken over from Türkiye's Presidency, while the Action Agenda remains directly in the hands of the Presidency. In the division of roles, the final say lies with the Presidency. On the negotiation track, however, the adoption of texts depends on the consensus of the Parties.

2026, accessed August 29, 2026, https://csb.gov.tr/haberler/turkiye-nin-cop31-gundeminin-5-onemli-enerji-basligi-aciklandi-304235.

49 "Bakan Kurum, Trabzon'da 17 Ülkeden Gazetecilerin Sorularını Yanıtladı" [Minister Kurum Answers Questions from Journalists from 17 Countries in Trabzon], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, September 10, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/bakan-kurum-trabzon-da-17-ulkeden-gazetecilerin-sorularini-yanitladi-haber-6000.

THE COURSE AND OUTCOMES OF SB64

Opening, Adoption of the Agenda and Organization of Work

The sixty-fourth session of the subsidiary bodies opened on June 8, 2026, and the agendas were adopted quickly. At the 62nd session of the subsidiary bodies in June 2025, the adoption of the agendas had been delayed by about two days.[50] This time, the Parties adopted the agendas of both bodies on the first day and began discussing the substance of the issues on the same day.[51] At the same meeting, however, the Parties deferred five agenda items to future sessions and held two items in abeyance.[52] The

50 IISD, "Daily Report for 8 June 2026", *Earth Negotiations Bulletin*, accessed October 13, 2026, https://enb.iisd.org/bonn-climate-change-conference-sb64-sbi64-sbsta64-daily-report-8jun2026; IISD, "Summary of the 2025 June Climate Meetings: 16-26 June 2025", *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* 12, no. 876 (June 30, 2025): 1, 3, accessed October 14, 2026, https://enb.iisd.org/sites/default/files/2025-07/enb12876e.pdf.

51 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 1, 3. For the adopted agendas, see FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, para. 5; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 5.

52 FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, para. 33; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 5, 21, 66, 90, 112, 119. The report on national greenhouse gas inventory data, the review of the Adaptation Committee, the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer and the second review of the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance were left to the 65th session. The alignment between the review of the Climate Technology Centre and Network and the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism was left to the 68th session. The items on the compilation and synthesis of biennial reports and on information contained in national communications were held in abeyance. For the item-by-item list, see Table 1.

smooth adoption of the agenda shows not that the disagreements had been resolved but that they had moved to the substantive discussions.

The opening statements set the political frame of the session. UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell warned against fossil fuel dependence and called for a focus on implementing existing commitments. Referring to calls for reform to make the UNFCCC process work more efficiently, he stated that the decision on this matter rests with the Parties. COP31 President Murat Kurum stated that the simultaneous environmental and economic crises facing communities showed the risks of dependence on imported fossil fuels and the need to accelerate the energy transition. He asked the Parties to make progress on the main items in Bonn to lighten the workload of COP31. President of Negotiations Chris Bowen drew attention to the energy crisis and advocated reducing dependence on fossil fuels by increasing electrification and clean energy supply.[53] Minister Kurum and Bowen thus presented the ongoing crises as a reason to reduce dependence on fossil fuels.

Agenda Items with Progress

The most concrete institutional output of the session came in the area of technology. In Belém, the Conference of the Parties requested the SBI to recommend, at its sixty-fourth session, a draft decision identifying the new host of the Climate Technology Centre. The SBI did not recommend a draft decision at this session. In its conclusions, it proposed UNEP, which already hosts the Centre, as host. It also requested the Secretariat to prepare, together with UNEP, a draft memorandum of understanding for consideration at the 65th session.[54] The final choice was therefore left to Antalya. Agreement

53 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 3. For Minister Kurum's emphasis on imported fossil fuels in his opening speech, see "COP31 Presidency Announces '35% by 2035' Electrification Target as Part of Action Agenda Launch". See also IISD, "Daily Report for 8 June 2026". Proposals on process efficiency (clustering mandated events, limiting the number of participants and streamlining the agenda) were discussed under the SBI agenda item on arrangements for intergovernmental meetings; see IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 16.

54 FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 99, 101-102. The Centre's mandate was extended to the end of 2041 at COP30 and CMA 7; see IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 11; "Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Thirtieth Session, Held in Belém from 10 to 22 November 2025. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Thirtieth Session (FCCC/CP/2025/12/Add.1)", UNFCCC, March 30, 2026, Decision 10/CP.30, para. 1, 11, accessed October 14, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2025_12a01E.pdf.

did not come easily. In the final stage of the negotiations, the Arab Group stated that it had no objection on substance. It said, however, that it could not move forward on the host because its proposals under the other technology agenda items had not received equal treatment. Agreement was reached on the evening of June 17 in informal talks where the technology items were addressed as a package.[55]

Under the technology heading, two further issues were forwarded to the governing bodies through draft decisions. The subsidiary bodies recommended two parallel draft decisions to COP31 and CMA 8 on the joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network.[56] This issue could not be concluded at the 63rd session. On June 17, the possibility of deferring it through procedural conclusions was raised. On June 18, the Parties agreed on the draft decisions on the basis of the agreement reached the previous evening in informal talks where the technology items were addressed as a package. The SBI also recommended a draft decision for COP31 addressing the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism. On this issue, the Group of 77 and China (G-77/China) stressed that concrete progress had been made for the first time in five years. The European Union (EU) expressed the hope that a similar willingness to agree would be seen on other agenda items.[57]

Just transition was the second issue on which the session made progress. The just transition work programme will be reviewed in Antalya. The subsidiary bodies agreed on the terms of reference of this review,

55 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 11.

56 FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, para. 90; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 88; "Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on Its Sixty-Fourth Session, Held in Bonn from 8 to 18 June 2026. Addendum. Draft Decisions Forwarded for Consideration and Adoption by the Conference of the Parties and the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5/Add.1)", UNFCCC, August 28, 2026, 2-6, accessed October 13, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2026_05a01_adv.pdf; "Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation on Its Sixty-Fourth Session, Held in Bonn from 8 to 18 June 2026. Addendum. Draft Decisions Forwarded for Consideration and Adoption by the Conference of the Parties, the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (FCCC/SBI/2026/15/Add.1)", UNFCCC, August 28, 2026, 2-6, accessed September 25, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbi2026_15a01_adv.pdf. On the course of the negotiations, see IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 11.

57 FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 104; FCCC/SBI/2026/15/Add.1, 7-9; IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 10-11.

welcomed the fifth dialogue of the programme and invited Parties to submit views for the review.[58] Discussions on operationalizing the just transition mechanism, which Belém decided to develop, also began at this session. The subsidiary bodies agreed to continue the discussion at the 65th session. They took into account the informal note by the contact group co-chairs, on the understanding that it does not form a basis for further negotiations.[59] Views diverged on the form and function of the mechanism. India argued that the mechanism should support means of implementation, while the United Kingdom opposed the creation of a new constituted body or financial mechanism.[60] The conclusions also invited the SB Chairs to consider conducting informal intersessional work before the sixty-fifth session.[61]

The technical gains of the session also include conclusions on financing the infrastructure under Article 6, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement. Noting the funding gap identified in the updated technical paper, the SBI called on the Secretariat to strengthen its resource mobilization efforts.[62] Under capacity-building, the SBI also recommended four draft decisions under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol for the fifth comprehensive review of the capacity-building framework and the sixth review concerning economies in transition.[63] On administrative, financial and institutional matters, it recommended one draft decision each for COP31 and CMP 21.[64] The Nairobi work programme and the Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on agriculture and food security closed with substantive conclusions, while the G-77/China placed on record its regret that no substantive progress had been made on agriculture.[65] The research and systematic observation item also closed with substantive conclusions. In the negotiations on this item, however, how scientific findings would be reflected in the text became a matter of political

58 FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, para. 61, 63-64, annex; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 35, 37-38, annex I.

59 FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, para. 67-68.

60 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 12.

61 FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, para. 69.

62 FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 197-207.

63 FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 121-135; FCCC/SBI/2026/15/Add.1, 10-18.

64 FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 209; FCCC/SBI/2026/15/Add.1, 19-22.

65 FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, para. 35-52, 77-88; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 51-62. For the assessment of the G-77/China, see IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 15, 17.

division. At the close, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) stressed that science cannot be negotiated.[66]

Agenda Items Left Unresolved

Despite the progress on technical and institutional matters at SB64, the overall picture of the session was shaped by the agenda items that could not be concluded. Under the mitigation work programme, the Parties could not agree on the scope of the programme, its relationship with the global stocktake and its continuation beyond 2026.[67]

In addition to content, the Parties also failed to agree on which document would record the exchange of views. The co-facilitators prepared three separate texts, namely draft conclusions, an informal note containing section headings and a document reflecting their own assessment. After objections to the last document, however, it could not be decided which of them would be carried forward as the basis for further work. The documents were revised several times, and a bridging proposal submitted by Brazil also failed to produce agreement. When the meeting of heads of delegation convened by the SB Chairs on the evening of June 18 also produced no result, the subsidiary bodies decided to continue consideration of the item at the sixty-fifth session.[68]

In the negotiations on the Global Goal on Adaptation, Parties could agree neither on substance nor on a text to carry forward to the next session. Developing country groups wanted the text to state explicitly that the goal will be implemented in line with the principles and provisions of the Convention and the Paris Agreement. They also wanted it to include explicitly the call to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035. The EU, the

66 FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, para. 18-29; IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 15.

67 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 3-4. India, Egypt, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates opposed extending the duration of the work programme. The Least Developed Countries proposed making the work programme a permanent agenda item. New Zealand and the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) argued for continuing the work programme.

68 FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, para. 53-57; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 27-31. The Like-Minded Developing Countries, the African Group, the Arab Group and the Russian Federation objected to the last document. IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 3-4. The final reports do not cite rule 16 for this item. They record that the subsidiary bodies could not complete their consideration of the item and agreed to continue it at their 65th session.

United Kingdom, Canada and Japan opposed these proposals, stating that adaptation finance is addressed under other agenda items and in constituted bodies. Parties also differed on the composition of the technical task force that will work on the indicators adopted in Belém, in particular on whether this body should be Party-driven or expert-driven.[69] When bridging proposals produced no result, the SB Chairs issued a revised draft text under their own responsibility. This step did not lead to agreement either, and the item was forwarded to the 65th session under rules 10(c) and 16.[70] At the closing plenary, AOSIS described the outcome as unacceptable and said that its trust in the process had declined. The African Group and the EU expressed concern about the way the negotiations had been conducted, and the African Group also called for a transparent, inclusive and Party-driven process.[71] These criticisms concern a problem separate from the disagreement on substance, namely trust in the way the process is conducted. This problem may also affect the negotiating environment in Antalya.

The Adaptation Fund negotiations were not concluded at SB64 either. The Fund was established in 2001 under the Kyoto Protocol. In 2018, it was decided that the Fund would exclusively serve the Paris Agreement once the share of proceeds from activities under Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement becomes available. In Bonn, Parties could not agree on whether the arrangements for this transition should be decided together with the membership of the Adaptation Fund Board or separately from it. The SBI decided to continue consideration at the 65th session on the basis of draft texts.[72] Four items, by contrast, were left to the 65th session without a text to work from. The first is the development of the online data interface through which the Secretariat brings together the greenhouse gas data reported by Parties. The others are cooperation with other international organizations, financial and technical support for non-Annex I Parties, and reporting and

69 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 5-6. For the divergence over the composition of the technical body that will work on the set of indicators, see also Chelsea Johnson Balcomb, "What Happened to the Global Goal on Adaptation at SB64? Where Do We Go from Here?", Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, July 27, 2026, accessed September 17, 2026, https://www.c2es.org/2026/07/global-goal-on-adaptation-at-sb64-where-do-we-go-from-here.

70 FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, para. 31; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 64; IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 6.

71 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 6.

72 FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 114-118; IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 8-9.

capacity support under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.[73] All four were forwarded at the closing plenary with reference to rules 10(c) and 16. Two items concerned the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures, which addresses the domestic and cross-border impacts of the implementation of mitigation policies, and emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport. On these, the subsidiary bodies only noted that consideration would continue at the 65th session.[74][75]

Events Outside the Negotiating Agenda

During SB64, the negotiating agenda was accompanied by mandated events of processes established by earlier decisions and by events organized by the Presidencies. These events do not produce conclusions, but they show at an early stage the positions of Parties on the issues carried to Antalya. The *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* recorded several main events. The first was the workshop under the work programme on climate finance. The second was the dialogue on Article 2, paragraph 1(c), of the Paris Agreement, which provides for making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. Others were the Baku Adaptation Roadmap workshop, the response measures event, the dialogue on climate change and trade, and the Action for Climate Empowerment dialogue. The list also includes the COP30 Presidency's event on the roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels, the Global Implementation Accelerator session and the Belém Mission to 1.5 consultation.[76]

This subsection examines the three of these events that relate to the main political divisions carried over to Antalya. The workshop under the work programme on climate finance concerns the scope of finance, the dialogue on climate change and trade concerns unilateral trade measures, and the roadmap event concerns fossil fuels. The Global Implementation Ac-

73 "Greenhouse Gas Data Interface: Draft Conclusions Proposed by the Chair (FCCC/SBSTA/2025/L.4)", UNFCCC, June 25, 2025, para. 2, accessed September 17, 2026, https://www.unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2025_L04E.pdf; IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 9.

74 "Impact of Implementation of Response Measures", UNFCCC, accessed September 17, 2026, https://unfccc.int/topics/response-measures.

75 FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, para. 73-75, 108, 110-112, 114; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 23, 26, 47-49.

76 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 5, 8, 9, 13, 16.

celerator session and the Belém Mission to 1.5 consultation directly concern the COP31 Presidency, so they are examined in later sections.

The first event was the participatory workshop held on June 8 under the work programme on climate finance. It revealed the basic division over the scope and method of the programme. The G-77/China defined the finance obligations of developed countries under Article 9, paragraph 1, of the Paris Agreement as the main focus of the programme. Developed countries, by contrast, interpreted the scope of the programme in the light of Article 9 as a whole and argued for a focus on implementing the new collective quantified goal.[77] This division is one of the structural disagreements carried over to Antalya unresolved.

The second event was the first session of the dialogue on climate change and trade established at COP30. In this first round of a series planned as three sessions between 2026 and 2028, Parties set out their expectations. The Arab Group proposed corrective steps toward ending unilateral measures. The Like-Minded Developing Countries asked that the dialogue make Article 3, paragraph 5, of the Convention operational in practice. They also called for compensatory approaches to be addressed if corrective and cooperative measures are not taken. The United Kingdom stressed that the series is not a negotiation and does not set rules.[78]

The follow-up procedure of the dialogue also caused debate. The SBI Chair shared the legal assessment that the founding decision does not provide for formal reports from the sessions. The Chair announced that the SB Chairs would prepare an informal note with no legal status.[79] On the Global Goal on Adaptation, the SB Chairs tabled a text under their own responsibility. That step and this debate are among the instances in which the question of the limits of the Chairs' authority took concrete form during the session.

This dialogue, in which unilateral trade measures were discussed, directly concerns Türkiye. In 2024, Türkiye sent 41.5 percent of its exports to the EU, and part of these exports falls within the scope of the EU's Carbon

77 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 9.

78 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 13.

79 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 13-14.

Border Adjustment Mechanism.[80] Although the issue is not an agenda item in Antalya, it is among the sensitive topics that the Presidency may have to manage.

The third event was the meeting held by the COP30 Presidency on June 12 on the roadmap for transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner. The COP30 President presented the initiative as a tool for implementing agreed goals and drew attention to the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels. A representative of the Presidency stated that the roadmap would be completed by COP31.[81] Because the roadmap does not rest on a negotiated decision, it is not part of the formal agenda in Antalya. However, since the roadmap is to be completed by COP31, the issue becomes one of the topics on which the COP31 Presidency will have to take a position in Antalya.

Distribution of Agenda Issues by Form of Outcome

To see what SB64 left to Antalya, one needs to look at the form in which each agenda issue left the session. For this purpose, the four forms in which agenda items left the session were used as the basis. A fifth category was added for issues that were deferred without any discussion of substance, held in abeyance or noted without discussion. The agendas of the two bodies contained 43 items in total. Seven items considered jointly were counted separately on each agenda, and the two items titled "other matters" had no specific subject. The classification was therefore made on 34 issues, with double counting removed. Chart 1 shows the distribution, and Table 1 lists the issues. Of the thirty-four issues, fourteen left the session with a substantive text. In ten of these, Parties agreed on conclusions, and in four, the subsidiary bodies recommended a draft decision to the governing bodies. On four issues, agreement remained procedural only, and Parties agreed to carry the work forward to later sessions on the basis of a specific document, either existing or to be prepared. In two of these four


80 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 13; Turkish Exporters Assembly, *İhracat Raporu 2025* [Export Report 2025] (Istanbul: TİM, 2025), 27, 56, accessed September 18, 2026, https://tim.org.tr/files/downloads/Strateji_Raporlari/Ihracat2025Raporu.pdf.

81 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 5.

(the review of the work programme on non-market approaches and the guidance on adaptation communications), the conclusions referred to an informal note. The remaining sixteen issues left the session without a text to work from or without being discussed at all. In eight of these, Parties could not identify a text to serve as the basis at the next session. In five of these eight, rules 10(c) and 16 were explicitly invoked at the closing plenary. In the other three, the subsidiary bodies confined themselves to two-sentence conclusions noting that consideration would continue at the 65th session. The other eight issues were not taken up on substance at all. Five of them were deferred and two were held in abeyance. In the remaining one, the summary reports on the technical analysis of biennial update reports were noted without discussion.[82]

82 The number of agenda items is the sum of the numbered items without sub-items and the lettered sub-items on the adopted agendas of SBSTA 64 and SBI 64. Procedural items such as the opening, the adoption of the agenda and the organization of work, as well as the closing item, were not included in the count. The "other matters" items were counted. The seven items considered jointly were counted separately on the agenda of each body. See FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, para. 5; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 5. The five-category classification was made on the basis of the final session reports FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5 and FCCC/SBI/2026/15 and the draft decisions in their annexes. A substantive conclusion is an adopted text that contains an operative paragraph with content, such as welcoming, a recommendation or an instruction to the Secretariat. The draft decision row covers draft decisions recommended to a governing body, even where conclusions accompany them. A procedural conclusion is a text that carries the work forward to later sessions on the basis of a specific document, such as an informal note, a draft text or an interim report, without addressing substance. The "No text to work from" row covers issues whose consideration was left to the next session without identifying a text to carry forward. The invocation of rules 10(c) and 16 at the closing plenary and the recording that consideration will continue are the two subtypes of this row. The "Not taken up on substance" row covers issues whose substance was never taken up. The distinction between substantive and procedural conclusions was made according to these definitions. The borderline cases are least developed countries (SBI 11), financing of the infrastructure under Article 6, paragraph 2 (SBI 17), Action for Climate Empowerment (SBI 15) and the second periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism (SBI 12(e)). These were classified according to whether the adopted text contains an operative paragraph with content. A request to the Secretariat for an interim report that would carry the work forward to a later session was not counted as an instruction with content. For the five items for which rules 10(c) and 16 were explicitly invoked at the close, see FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, para. 31, 108, 114; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 23, 26, 64. For the list by issue, see Table 1.

Chart 1. Distribution of SB64 Agenda Issues by Form of Outcome (Number of Issues)



Source: Compiled by the author from FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5 and FCCC/SBI/2026/15, following the classification in Table 1.

The meaning of the distribution in Chart 1 and Table 1 becomes clear when the issues that produced a text are compared with the issues carried forward without a text to work from. The issues that produced a text are technical and institutional ones. Examples are the selection of the host organization of the Climate Technology Centre, the terms of reference for the review of the just transition work programme, and the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism. The just transition work programme appears in the table with substantive conclusions. However, the just transition mechanism, considered under the same agenda item, was left to the 65th session without a text to work from. The issues carried forward without a text, by contrast, are issues on which Parties are politically divided, such as the Global Goal on Adaptation, the mitigation work programme and the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures. The work programme on climate finance falls outside the classification because it is not an agenda item. It, too, carried the division over its scope to Antalya unresolved.

TABLE 1. SB64 AGENDA ISSUES BY FORM OF OUTCOME

Form of outcome	Issues
Substantive conclusions	Research and systematic observation, Nairobi work programme, just transition work programme, Sharm el-Sheikh joint work on agriculture and food security, meeting of the Glasgow Committee on Non-market Approaches, least developed countries, host of the Climate Technology Centre, Action for Climate Empowerment, arrangements for intergovernmental meetings, financing of the infrastructure under Article 6, paragraph 2
Draft decision	Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network, linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism, capacity-building, administrative, financial and institutional matters
Procedural conclusions	Review of the work programme on non-market approaches, guidance on adaptation communications, Adaptation Fund, second periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism
No text to work from	Global Goal on Adaptation, greenhouse gas data interface, cooperation with other international organizations, financial and technical support for non-Annex I Parties, reporting and capacity support under Article 13 of the Paris Agreement, Sharm el-Sheikh mitigation ambition and implementation work programme, forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures, emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport
Not taken up on substance	Review of the Adaptation Committee, compilation and synthesis of biennial reports, report on national greenhouse gas inventory data, information contained in national communications, summary reports on the technical analysis of biennial update reports, alignment of the review of the Climate Technology Centre and Network with the periodic assessment, Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer, second review of the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance

Source: Compiled by the author from FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, FCCC/SBI/2026/15 and their annexes. Issues considered jointly by the two bodies are counted as a single issue, and the "other matters" items are excluded from the classification. The outcomes of the issues are taken from paragraphs 18-114 of FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5 and paragraphs 5-209 of FCCC/SBI/2026/15.

The problems carried over to Antalya concern both substance and the way the negotiations are conducted. The core political disagreements on mitigation, adaptation and finance were not resolved in Bonn. There was also the loss of trust voiced in the Global Goal on Adaptation negotiations and the debate over the limits of the authority of co-facilitators and body Chairs. On some issues, even documents that recorded progress could not be forwarded to the next session. These show that problems in the conduct of the process may also be reflected in the negotiating environment in Antalya.

The function of the intersessional sessions is to deliver draft decisions to the governing bodies in a form ready for adoption. SB64 fulfilled this

function on technical and institutional issues. On the issues where political divisions were concentrated, however, no draft reached this stage. In Antalya, the technical preparation and the political negotiation of these issues will have to be carried out within the same two weeks.

TÜRKİYE'S POSITION AT SB64

Türkiye's Three Roles in Bonn

Türkiye's first role in Bonn was as host and Presidency of COP31. In Belém, the Conference of the Parties accepted Türkiye's offer to host its thirty-first session and welcomed the arrangement between Türkiye and Australia.[83] Under the rules of procedure, the presidency will be assumed by election at the opening meeting in Antalya. Türkiye therefore held this role in Bonn as the incoming Presidency. The second role is ownership of the Action Agenda, which belongs to the implementation track run by the Presidencies and lies outside the negotiating agenda. The third role is that of a Party to the Convention, and in this capacity Türkiye has the right to defend its own positions in the negotiations. The first two roles belong to the Presidency and the third to the country, and the rules of procedure separate the office of President from the status of Party. The President cannot exercise the rights of his or her own country as a Party, and these rights are exercised by

83 "Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Thirtieth Session, Held in Belém from 10 to 22 November 2025. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Thirtieth Session (FCCC/CP/2025/12/Add.2)", UNFCCC, March 30, 2026, Decision 18/CP.30, para. 1-3, accessed October 14, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2025_12a02E.pdf.

a separate representative.[84] Because Türkiye had not yet assumed the presidency, this separation did not apply legally in Bonn. How the Party role was used at the session therefore reflects the Presidency's own choice.

The three roles were not equally visible in Bonn. The Presidency and the ownership of the Action Agenda gained visibility through an intensive program throughout the session. Minister Kurum spoke at the opening plenary on June 8. On June 9, he announced the numerical targets of the Action Agenda at a joint press conference with the Executive Secretary and the President of Negotiations. On June 12, the Presidency appeared together with the COP30 Presidency at the briefing session on the Global Implementation Accelerator. It also held open-ended consultations on the COP31 vision and priorities.[85] At SB64, which was attended by more than four thousand Party delegates and around three thousand observers, this program gave the Presidency an opportunity to introduce itself to all parts of the process.[86] The Party role, by contrast, gained no visibility in the negotiations.

Numerical Targets Announced in Bonn

The Presidency's most visible step in Bonn was to turn four of its thematic priorities into global numerical targets. The thematic areas of the Action Agenda were developed over the period from the Presidency's first letter of April 13 to the second letter of May 20, signed by Minister Kurum and Bowen. They were presented in Bonn as ten areas.[87] The Presidency announced

84 FCCC/CP/1996/2, 6-7.

85 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 3, 5; "COP31 Presidency Announces New Targets on Global Electrification, Cutting Waste, Resilient Cities; Press Conference Transcript", UNFCCC, June 9, 2026, accessed August 24, 2026, https://unfccc.int/news/cop31-presidency-announces-new-targets-on-global-electrification-cutting-waste-resilient-cities; "Global Implementation Accelerator, 12 June 2026", UNFCCC, accessed August 24, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/GIA_Bonn_12June.pdf; "LGMA Statement at SB64 Open-Ended Consultations on COP31 Vision and Priorities", Cities and Regions, accessed October 13, 2026, https://www.cities-and-regions.org/lgma-statement-at-sb64-open-ended-consultations-on-cop-31-vision-and-priorities; "Director of Climate Change Hasar Co-Chairs the 'Open-Ended Consultations on COP31 Vision and Priorities'", Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, June 17, 2026, accessed October 18, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/en/director-of-climate-change-hasar-co-chairs-the-open-ended-consultations-on-cop31-vision-and-priorities-news-4972.

86 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 1. The report records 9,206 registered participants. It counts 4,198 of them as Party delegates, 2,960 as observers and 134 as members of the media.

87 "COP31 Başkanı Kurum, BM Genel Sekreterliği ve Taraf Ülkelere İlk Mektubunu Gönderdi" [COP31 President Kurum Sends His First Letter to the UN Secretariat and Parties]; Fatma Sevinç Çetin, "Bakan Ku-

four numerical targets on June 9. The share of electricity in final energy consumption is to rise to 35 percent by 2035, and the growth of global waste is to be halved by 2035. Energy intensity in the buildings sector is to fall by at least 25 percent, and the rate of circular material use in manufacturing is to rise to at least 15 percent.[88] The Presidency's announcement stated that the electrification target is based on analyses by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). It also reported that the IEA had been asked for special reports examining the pathways to the electrification target and the benefits of halving waste growth.[89] The Presidency thus based the electrification target on analyses by two technical organizations outside the regime. In the speech presenting the Action Agenda, Minister Kurum defined the Presidency's approach through the concepts of dialogue, consensus and action.[90] According to Anadolu Agency, he announced ten priority areas and six targets in the same speech. Four of the six targets are numerical, and the other two concern climate education and the Climate Implementation Bridge.[91] At the June 9 press conference, the Executive Secretary stated that the Presidency had built on six thematic axes launched at COP30 and aligned with the outcomes of the first global stocktake.[92] A numerical target is a stronger commitment than a thematic priority. With these targets, the Presidency also set out from the start the indicators by which it can be assessed at the end of its term.

Of the four targets, the waste target overlaps most directly with Türkiye's own agenda. Türkiye has implemented Zero Waste at the national level since 2017 and brought the issue to the UN agenda in 2022. The General Assembly resolution it submitted together with 105 countries proclaimed

rum 'COP31 Eylem Gündemi'nin 10 Öncelikli Alanı ve 6 Hedefini Açıkladı" [Minister Kurum Announces the 10 Priority Areas and 6 Targets of the 'COP31 Action Agenda'], Anadolu Agency, June 9, 2026; "Joint Letter from the COP31 President-Designate and President of Negotiations", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, May 20, 2026, accessed November 5, 2026, https://cop31.tr/letter-detail/2nd-presidency-2026.

88 "COP31 Presidency Announces New Targets on Global Electrification, Cutting Waste, Resilient Cities"; "Presenting the COP31 Action Agenda". The current level of electrification was given as just over 20 percent in Bonn and as about 23 percent in the third letter of August 24. See "COP31 Presidency's 3rd Letter to the Parties", COP31 Presidency, August 24, 2026, 3, accessed September 17, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cop31_3rd_presidency_letter.pdf.

89 "COP31 Presidency Announces '35% by 2035' Electrification Target as Part of Action Agenda Launch".

90 "Presenting the COP31 Action Agenda".

91 Çetin, "Bakan Kurum 'COP31 Eylem Gündemi'".

92 "COP31 Presidency Announces New Targets on Global Electrification, Cutting Waste, Resilient Cities".

March 30 the International Day of Zero Waste.[93] Zero Waste is one of the ten areas of the Action Agenda. The Presidency's third letter of August 24 presents Zero Waste and methane reduction as a priority aimed at reducing pressure on natural resources, ecosystems and the climate.[94] Türkiye has thus turned a policy it pioneered at the national level into a global numerical target through the Presidency.

Announcing numerical targets before the conference is not in itself a new practice for a Presidency. The COP28 Presidency announced the target of tripling renewable energy capacity and doubling the rate of energy efficiency improvement in a letter sent to Parties in July 2023. The COP29 Presidency announced its storage and grid initiatives in September 2024 and set out their numerical targets in its letter of October 2024.[95]

As Table 2 shows, what distinguishes the COP31 Presidency on numerical targets is the place of the announcement and the scope of the targets. Since COP28, the COP31 Presidency is the only Presidency to have announced new numerical targets during a session of the subsidiary bodies. The COP30 Presidency presented its action agenda during the 62nd session, but it based its thirty objectives on the outcomes of the first global stocktake without setting new numerical targets.[96] In terms of scope, the targets of the COP28 and COP29 Presidencies were limited to the energy sector, whereas the COP31 targets cover four areas, namely final energy consumption, waste, buildings and material circularity. The timing of the announcement of thematic priorities also sets the COP31 Presidency apart from earlier

93 "International Day of Zero Waste", United Nations, accessed September 18, 2026, https://www.un.org/en/observances/zero-waste-day. Resolution A/RES/77/161 was adopted on December 14, 2022. Türkiye submitted the draft resolution together with 105 countries. For the start of Zero Waste implementation, see "Sıfır Atık ile 90 Milyon Ton Atık Geri Dönüşüme Kazandırıldı" [90 Million Tons of Waste Recovered for Recycling through Zero Waste], Sıfır Atık, March 30, 2026, accessed September 18, 2026, https://sifiratik.gov.tr/kutuphane/haberler/sifir-atik-ile-90-milyon-ton-atik-geri-donusume-kazandirildi.

94 "COP31 Presidency's 3rd Letter to the Parties", 3-4. For the place of Zero Waste in the Action Agenda, see "COP31 Action Agenda".

95 "Letter to the Parties", COP28 Presidency, July 2023, accessed October 13, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/COP28_Letter_July_2023_1.pdf; for the COP29 targets, see "COP29 Declarations and Pledges Letter", COP29 Presidency, October 16, 2024, accessed October 13, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Declarations_and_Pledges_Letters.pdf; "Incoming Presidency Formulates COP 29 Action Agenda, Reveals Initiatives", SDG Knowledge Hub, September 25, 2024, accessed October 17, 2026, https://sdg.iisd.org/news/incoming-presidency-formulates-cop-29-action-agenda-reveals-initiatives.

96 "Fourth Letter from the President", COP30 Presidency, June 20, 2025, accessed October 13, 2026, https://cop30.br/en/brazilian-presidency/letters-from-the-president/fourth-letter-from-the-presidency. For the dates of the 62nd session of the subsidiary bodies, see IISD, "Summary of the 2025 June Climate Meetings", 1.

Presidencies. Minister Kurum announced the priorities in his first letter to Parties, dated April 13, 2026, 210 days before the conference. For the other three Presidencies in Table 2, the time between the announcement and the conference did not exceed five months. The early announcement gave Parties and stakeholders more time to prepare for the Presidency's agenda than under the previous three Presidencies.

TABLE 2. TIMELINE OF PRE-CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF THEMATIC AGENDAS AND NUMERICAL TARGETS BY COP PRESIDENCIES (COP28-COP31)

Presidency	Announcement of the thematic agenda by letter to Parties	First announcement of numerical global targets to Parties	Place of announcement	Scope of targets
COP28 (Dubai, 2023)	July 2023, letter to Parties	July 2023, same letter. Tripling renewable capacity, doubling the rate of efficiency improvement (2030)	Outside a subsidiary body session	Energy
COP29 (Baku, 2024)	September 17, 2024, Action Agenda letter	Initiatives announced in the September 2024 letter. According to the October 2024 letter, 1,500 GW of storage, 25 million km of grids (2030)	Outside a subsidiary body session	Energy
COP30 (Belém, 2025)	June 20, 2025, fourth letter	No new numerical Presidency target	During the 62nd session	None
COP31 (Antalya, 2026)	April 13, 2026, first letter	June 9, 2026. Electrification share 35%, halving waste growth, at least 25% reduction in building energy intensity, circular material use at least 15% (2035)	During the 64th session	Final energy consumption, waste, buildings, material circularity

Source: Compiled by the author from Presidency letters and the UNFCCC and Presidency websites. The comparison covers the four Presidencies from COP28 onward, when the practice of Presidencies announcing numerical targets began, and the letters sent to Parties. The time from the announcement of the thematic agenda to the conference is 210 days for COP31, 143 days for COP30 and 55 days for COP29. The COP28 letter does not give a day, so for this Presidency the time is between 122 and 152 days.

Because the targets were announced on the implementation track, the difference in status between the two tracks means that they create no obligations for Parties and do not count as a negotiated outcome of the regime. The same feature is also what made it possible to announce the targets. In Bonn, Parties could not agree even on a text to carry forward to the next session on mitigation and adaptation, while the Presidency was able to announce four numerical targets at the same session. The first reactions in Bonn included both support and questions about how the targets are defined. Local govern-

ment constituencies welcomed the buildings target. Civil society organizations working on waste described the target as visionary and said that they expected information on its baseline, scope and implementation.[97]

The COP31 Presidency's Preparations and Its Work in Bonn

On April 13, 2026, Minister Kurum announced the Presidency's timeline and team in his first official letter to the UN Secretariat and Parties. The letter stated that the Leaders' Summit would be held in Antalya and the pre-COP in the Pacific. Deputy Minister Fatma Varank was assigned as COP31 Chief Executive Officer, Director of Climate Change Halil Hasar as Chief Climate Diplomacy Officer and Mehmet Ali Kahraman as Director of the COP31 Presidency Office. Samed Ağırbaş, President of the Zero Waste Foundation, was appointed Climate High-Level Champion, and Sally Higgins was appointed Youth Climate Champion by a decision taken jointly with Bowen.[98] The team of the Presidency of Negotiations was announced in the joint letter of May 20 from Minister Kurum and Bowen. Kushla Munro was assigned as Executive Director of the Presidency of Negotiations, Sally Box as Deputy President of Negotiations and Chief Negotiator, and David Higgins as Deputy Executive Director.[99] At the joint press conference in Bonn, Bowen also confirmed that the Action Agenda is led by Türkiye, mentioning Varank for her leadership in developing the Agenda.[100]

97 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 19; "124 Civil Society Groups Call on COP31 Presidency to Turn Zero Waste Ambition into Climate Action", GAIA, June 17, 2026, accessed October 1, 2026, https://www.no-burn.org/124-civil-society-groups-call-on-cop31-presidency-to-turn-zero-waste-ambition-into-climate-action.

98 "COP31 President-Designate Kurum Sends First Official Letter to UN Secretariat and States Parties", Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, April 15, 2026, accessed October 1, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/en/cop31-president-designate-kurum-sends-first-official-letter-to-un-secretariat-and-states-parties-news-4905; "The Road to Antalya"; "COP31 Başkanı Kurum, BM Genel Sekreterliği ve Taraf Ülkelere İlk Mektubunu Gönderdi" [COP31 President Kurum Sends His First Letter to the UN Secretariat and Parties]; "Pre-COP Closing Day Wrap", UNFCCC, October 8, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://unfccc.int/news/pre-cop-closing-day-wrap.

99 "Joint Letter from the COP31 President-Designate and President of Negotiations".

100 Chris Bowen, "Press Conference, UN Climate Meetings (SB64), Bonn, Germany", Australian Minister for Climate Change and Energy, June 9, 2026, accessed August 24, 2026, https://minister.dcceew.gov.au/bowen/transcripts/press-conference-un-climate-meetings-sb64-bonn-germany.

Before Bonn, Türkiye had also taken part as host and co-organizer in climate meetings of the UNFCCC process and at the ministerial level. In September 2025, it hosted in Istanbul the second global dialogue of the response measures process, which also addresses the impacts of mitigation policies on other countries.[101] After its offer to host COP31 was accepted in Belém in November 2025, these contacts continued in its presidency role. In February 2026, the COP31 Presidency, the Secretariat and representatives of the current and previous COP Presidencies met in Istanbul.[102] In April 2026, at the seventeenth Petersberg Climate Dialogue in Berlin, Minister Kurum and Bowen convened ministers together with German Environment Minister Carsten Schneider.[103] The Copenhagen Climate Ministerial was co-hosted by Denmark, the COP30 Presidency and the COP31 Presidency.[104] These contacts are part of the ministerial-level preparation that the incoming Presidency has carried out before the conference. What sets Türkiye apart in this preparation is that it has conducted these contacts in its presidency role without being a member of any negotiating group.

SB64 was the first negotiating session at which the Türkiye-Australia division of roles was put into practice. The session showed how the division worked in three areas, namely political representation, the Action Agenda and the negotiations. Minister Kurum took on political representation. He gave the opening speech and delivered the Presidency's public message. The Action Agenda remained under Türkiye's ownership, and the Turkish side led the development of the Agenda. In the negotiation area, the Presidency of Negotiations was visible on behalf of the COP31 Presidency. Bowen set out the expectations for the negotiations at the joint press conference. At the briefing session on the Global Implementation Accelerator, Tuğba Dinçbaş,

101 "Second Global Dialogue on Impacts of Implementation of Response Measures", UNFCCC, September 29-30, 2025, accessed October 13, 2026, https://unfccc.int/event/rm-global-dialogue-2025.

102 Decision 18/CP.30, para. 1; "On the Road to COP31: Strong Message from Istanbul for New Era of Climate Action", United Nations Türkiye, February 17, 2026, accessed August 24, 2026, https://turkiye.un.org/en/310189-road-cop31-strong-message-istanbul-new-era-climate-action.

103 "Petersberg Climate Dialogue 2026: Co-Chair-Summary", German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Climate Action, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, April 22, 2026, accessed August 24, 2026, https://www.bundesumweltministerium.de/en/download/petersberg-climate-dialogue-2026-co-chair-summary.

104 "Copenhagen Climate Ministerial 2026: Setting Expectations for Bonn and Antalya", E3G, May 18, 2026, accessed August 24, 2026, https://www.e3g.org/news/e3g-media-briefing-copenhagen2026; "COP31 Presidency's 3rd Letter to the Parties", 2.

Director of the COP31 Action Agenda, presented the Climate Implementation Bridge on behalf of Türkiye. Sally Box presented the purpose and structure of the Accelerator on behalf of the Presidency of Negotiations.[105] The COP31 Presidency and the Presidency of Negotiations took part together in the open-ended consultations in Bonn.[106] In its final report, the SBI also welcomed the preparations that Türkiye is carrying out in partnership with Australia.[107]

The division of roles worked smoothly in Bonn. During the session, no public disagreement, divergence in messaging or dispute over authority between the COP31 President and the President of Negotiations was recorded. The *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* also reports observations that the cooperation between Türkiye and Australia worked well.[108] SB64 showed that the arrangement works under normal conditions. In Antalya, disagreements will be taken up at the ministerial level, so there the arrangement will operate in a more intense negotiating environment.

From Party Identity to Presidency Identity

Türkiye attended SB64 as the incoming Presidency and built its visibility at the session through this role. The summary report of the *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* refers to Minister Kurum as the COP31 President-Designate and to Türkiye, at the closing session, as the incoming Presidency.[109] The records contain no intervention by Türkiye in its capacity as a Party on any negotiated agenda item. As a Party, Türkiye was one of the 37 Parties that took part in the working group session of the facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress held alongside the session.[110] The absence of interventions on negotiated items is consistent with the impartiality expected of a COP President.

105 Bowen, "Press Conference, UN Climate Meetings (SB64), Bonn, Germany"; IISD, "Daily Report for 12 June 2026", *Earth Negotiations Bulletin*, accessed September 13, 2026, https://enb.iisd.org/bonn-climate-change-conference-sb64-sbi64-sbsta64-daily-report-12jun2026; IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 3, 5.

106 "LGMA Statement at SB64 Open-Ended Consultations on COP31 Vision and Priorities"; "Director of Climate Change Hasar Co-Chairs the 'Open-Ended Consultations on COP31 Vision and Priorities'".

107 FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 151.

108 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 20-21.

109 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 3, 18; FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 154.

110 FCCC/SBI/2026/15, para. 15.

The rule that the President does not exercise the rights of his or her own country as a Party did not yet apply in Bonn. Even so, Türkiye's conduct at the session put its presidency role ahead of its Party role. The Adaptation Fund item shows this priority in concrete terms. In Belém, in the negotiations on this item, Türkiye placed on record as a Party that it accepts no classification other than the one in the annexes to the Convention.[111] When the same item was discussed again at SB64, however, no intervention by Türkiye was recorded.[112]

The meaning of this conduct becomes clear in light of Türkiye's negotiating history. In 1992, Türkiye was one of the countries listed in both annexes to the Convention.[113] Later, in 2001, it became the only Party removed from Annex II, by a decision of the Conference of the Parties in Marrakech, and through subsequent decisions it secured recognition of its special circumstances.[114] For a long time, it followed the negotiating agenda largely through this status issue and continued to negotiate without being a member of any negotiating group.[115] A turn toward an agenda beyond the status issue came before the presidency, with Zero Waste. Türkiye brought this issue to the UN agenda, and it later became the first of the ten areas of the Action Agenda.[116] SB64 was the first negotiating session in which this accumulated experience came together with the presidency role. In Bonn,

111 IISD, "Daily Report for 15 November 2025", *Earth Negotiations Bulletin*, accessed August 24, 2026, https://enb.iisd.org/belem-un-climate-change-conference-cop30-daily-report-15nov2025.

112 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 8-9, 18, 20. The Parties and groups whose interventions are recorded under the Adaptation Fund item are the G-77/China, Switzerland, the EU, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway and the Arab Group. The report mentions Chile at the SBI closing session and the BASIC group and the Least Developed Countries at the joint closing session. It mentions the Philippines in its analysis section.

113 United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, 23-24. In the current text of the Convention, Türkiye is listed in Annex I. A publisher's note added to Annex II states that Türkiye was removed from Annex II by an amendment that entered into force on June 28, 2002, pursuant to decision 26/CP.7.

114 Decision 26/CP.7, para. 1; UNFCCC, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: Handbook*, 70; "Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010. Addendum. Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Sixteenth Session (FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1)", UNFCCC, March 15, 2011, Decision 1/CP.16, para. 142, accessed July 17, 2026, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf. The recognition of special circumstances appears in the relevant section heading and in the introductory paragraphs of the decision. Paragraph 142 asks the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action to continue considering these issues in order to support Türkiye's access to finance, technology and capacity-building.

115 Cerit Mazlum, "Turkey and Post-Paris Climate Change Politics", 147-148.

116 "International Day of Zero Waste"; "COP31 Action Agenda"; "Presenting the COP31 Action Agenda".

Türkiye appeared not as a Party that builds its agenda around its own status but as a Presidency that defines the agenda in terms of the regime as a whole.

THE PREPARATORY PROCESS AFTER BONN

Preparations between Bonn and Antalya continued in three forms. These were (i) the Presidency's consultations with Parties and the letters it sent, (ii) the contacts Presidency officials made through thematic summits and visits and (iii) the pre-COP in the Pacific. In this period, the definitions of the Action Agenda targets were published, and the electrification target became a pledge open to participation by governments. At the pre-COP, a Presidency-led political decision text for Antalya was proposed. Figure 1 shows the timeline from the first Presidency letter of April 13 to the conference.

Figure 1. COP31 Preparation Timeline (April-November 2026)



Source: Compiled by the author from Presidency letters and the UNFCCC and Presidency websites.

Presidency Consultations and Letters

The COP31 Presidency maintained direct contact with Parties through two instruments. The first was informal consultations with heads of delegation. These consultations began virtually in March and continued with an in-person roundtable on September 24 and a further virtual consultation on October 14. Heads of delegation and the chairs and coordinators of negotiating groups were invited to this last consultation. Participants were asked for their views on which priority outcomes COP31 should deliver to accelerate the implementation of the Paris Agreement.[117] Together with the COP29 Presidency, the Presidency also hosted a high-level meeting in Shamakhi on July 22-23 that brought together the chairs of negotiating groups and heads of delegation.[118]

The second instrument was the letters sent to Parties. Minister Kurum's third letter of August 24 set out in detail the ten priority themes and the targets of the Action Agenda and announced the conference schedule. Under this schedule, the Leaders' Summit was scheduled to meet in Antalya on November 11-12, and the COP31 Business Forum on November 12-13. On the same day, the Presidency also announced the twelve thematic days of the conference.[119] The letter also invited Parties to the Istanbul Climate Finance Summit to be held in September and to the Oceans and Seas Summit to be held in Trabzon.[120]

For the negotiating agenda, the main document of the period is the fourth letter of October 5, signed jointly by Minister Kurum and Bowen.[121] The letter also notes that the second global stocktake will begin at COP31. It states that, in line with established practice, two ministers will be appointed early as co-facilitators in each of the areas of just transition, finance, mitigation and adaptation.[122]

117 "The Road to Antalya".

118 "The Road to Antalya"; "Türkiye, COP31 Vizyonuyla Masada" [Türkiye at the Table with Its COP31 Vision], TRT Avaz, July 25, 2026.

119 "COP31 Thematic Days Announced: 12 Days, 12 Priorities", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, August 24, 2026, accessed September 18, 2026, https://cop31.tr/news-detail/thematic-days-announced-2026; "COP31 Presidency's 3rd Letter to the Parties", 2-8.

120 "COP31 Presidency's 3rd Letter to the Parties", 8.

121 The letter's expectations on each issue are set out in Table 4, in the section on the agenda carried over to Antalya.

122 "Cooperation in the Face of a Changing World", joint letter of the COP31 President and the President of Negotiations, COP31 Presidency, October 5, 2026, 2-5, accessed October 13, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/4th_Presidency_Letter_signed_Kurum_Bowen.pdf.

Contacts of Presidency Officials

During this period, the Presidency did not conduct its contacts with Parties and stakeholders through formal consultations alone. Table 3 shows the main meetings in which Minister Kurum, Deputy Minister Varank, Chief Climate Diplomacy Officer Hasar and Climate High-Level Champion Ağırbaş took part between the close of SB64 and the pre-COP.[123] The table

123 For the London engagements, see "COP31 Presidency Opens London Climate Action Week with Call to Accelerate Electrification", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, June 22, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://cop31.tr/news-detail/london-climate-action-week-2026; "Governments Launch 'Electrify Now' to Accelerate the Electrification of the Global Economy", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, June 23, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://cop31.tr/news-detail/electrify-now-launch-2026; "COP31 Presidency and Bloomberg Philanthropies Announce Partnership to Advance Climate Action ahead of COP31 in Antalya", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, June 24, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://cop31.tr/news-detail/bloomberg-philanthropies-partnership-2026. For the D-8 meeting, see "D-8 Ülkeleri Temsilcileriyle COP31 Toplantısı İstanbul'da Yapıldı" [COP31 Meeting with Representatives of D-8 Countries Held in Istanbul], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, July 17, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/d-8-ulkeleri-temsilcileriyle-cop31-toplantisi-istanbul-da-yapildi-haber-4958; "D-8 Holds Landmark Meeting of Environment Ministers in Lead Up to COP31 in Antalya", D-8 Organization for Economic Cooperation, accessed October 13, 2026, https://developing8.org/news/d-8-holds-landmark-meeting-of-environment-ministers-in-lead-up-to-cop31-in-antalya. For the Shamakhi meeting, see "The Road to Antalya"; "Türkiye, COP31 Vizyonuyla Masada" [Türkiye at the Table with Its COP31 Vision]. For the Ankara summit, see "COP31 Başkanı ve Çevre, Şehircilik ve İklim Değişikliği Bakanı Kurum, 'COP31 Yolunda İklim Dirençli Şehirler Zirvesi'ne Katıldı" [COP31 President and Minister of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change Kurum Attends the 'Climate-Resilient Cities Summit on the Road to COP31'], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, August 14, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/cop31-baskani-ve-cevre-sehircilik-ve-iklim-degisikligi-bakani-kurum-cop31-yolunda-iklim-direncli-sehirler-zirvesi-ne-katildi-haber-4978. For the Ulaanbaatar engagements, see "Bakan Yardımcısı Varank, Moğolistan'da COP17 Kapsamında Düzenlenen Panelde Konuştu" [Deputy Minister Varank Speaks at a Panel Held in Mongolia as Part of COP17], Anadolu Agency, August 25, 2026; "Samed Ağırbaş Moğolistan'da Sıfır Atık Vizyonunu ve COP31 Hedeflerini Anlattı" [Samed Ağırbaş Presents the Zero Waste Vision and COP31 Targets in Mongolia], Türkiye'de İş Dünyası, August 28, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://turkiyedeisdunyasi.com/samed-agirbas-128153. For the Istanbul Climate Finance Summit, see "COP31 President-Designate Murat Kurum Issues Rallying Cry to Close Climate Finance 'Chasm' at Istanbul Climate Finance Summit (ICFS)", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, September 4, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://cop31.tr/news-detail/cop31-president-designate-calls-to-close-climate-finance-chasm. For Baku Climate Action Week, see "Bakan Yardımcısı Varank: İklim Krizini Tek Bir Ülkenin Gücüyle Durdurmak Mümkün Değil" [Deputy Minister Varank: It Is Not Possible to Stop the Climate Crisis with the Strength of a Single Country], Ihlas News Agency, September 9, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://www.ilkhaber-gazetesi.com/cevre/bakan-yardimcisi-varank-iklim-krizini-tek-bir-ulkenin-gucuyle-durdurmak-mumkun-degil-451973 (the agency report was accessed through the page of a site that republished it). For the August 13-14 workshop and the Trabzon summit, see "İklim Değişikliği Başkanı Hasar, 13 Maddelik Trabzon Okyanuslar Eylem Çağrısı'nı Açıkladı" [Director of Climate Change Hasar Announces the 13-Point Trabzon Oceans Action Call], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, September 10, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/iklim-degisikligi-baskani-hasar-13-maddelik-trabzon-okyanuslar-eylem-cagrisi-ni-acikladi-haber-6001; "COP31 Presidency Launches Marine Litter Action Platform in Trabzon", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, September 11, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://cop31.tr/news-detail/cop31-launches-marine-litter-action-platform-in-trabzon. The date of the Trabzon summit is given according to the third Presidency letter (p. 8). For the ministerial session, see "COP31'e Doğru Trabzon Denizler ve Okyanuslar Zirvesi" [Trabzon Oceans and Seas Summit Towards COP31], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, September 10, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://csb.gov.tr/haberler/cop31-e-dogru-trabzon-denizler-ve-okyanuslar-zirvesi-306606. For the Geneva session, see "Opening Remarks at the WMO High-Level Session", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, September 16, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://cop31.tr/speech-detail/opening-remarks-at-the-wmo-high-level-session. For the New York engagements, see "COP31 Presidency Launches 35-by-35 Pledge and Antalya AI Pledge in New York", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, September 21, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://cop31.tr/news-detail/cop31-presidency-launches-35-by-35-and-antalya-ai-

also includes the call that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made for COP31 at the UN General Assembly in September.

TABLE 3. MAIN CONTACTS OF THE COP31 PRESIDENCY AFTER BONN (JUNE-OCTOBER 2026)

Date	Location	Event	Representing Türkiye	Outcome
June 22-24	London	London Climate Action Week, opening of the Climate Innovation Forum	Minister Kurum	Launch of the COP31 Business Forum. Electrify Now platform through a joint statement by governments (June 23). Partnership with Bloomberg Philanthropies (June 24).
July 17	Istanbul	Meeting of environment ministers of the Developing Eight (D-8)	Minister Kurum, Halil Hasar	The Istanbul Declaration was adopted unanimously. The Declaration launched work on a D-8 Adaptation Action Framework for 2026-2030 and welcomed the proposed D-8 Environment and Climate Cooperation Platform.
July 22-23	Shamakhi	High-level meeting co-organized with the COP29 Presidency. Chairs of negotiating groups and heads of delegation attended.	Fatma Varank	According to a news report, 34 countries attended, and Ethiopia offered to co-host the next meeting.

pledges; "İklim Değişikliği Başkanı Hasar, Birleşmiş Milletler'de COP31 Yuvarlak Masa Toplantısı'nda Konuştu" [Director of Climate Change Hasar Speaks at the COP31 Roundtable Meeting at the United Nations], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, September 22, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/iklim-degisikligi-baskani-hasar-birlesmis-milletlerde-cop31-yuvarlak-masa-toplantisinda-konustu-haber-6004; "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, BM Kürsüsünden İklim Değişikliği ile Mücadele için Çağrıda Bulundu" [President Erdoğan Calls for Combating Climate Change from the UN Podium], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, September 23, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-bm-kursusunden-iklim-degisikligi-ile-mucadele-icin-cagrida-bulundu-haber-6006; "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'dan BM İklim Zirvesi'nde 'Adil Geçiş' Vurgusu" [President Erdoğan Emphasizes 'Just Transition' at the UN Climate Summit], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, September 24, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-dan-bm-iklim-zirvesi-nde-adil-gecis-vurgusu-haber-6007; "COP31 Presidency Elevates Finance and City Action in Implementation-Focused Agenda", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, September 24, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://cop31.tr/news-detail/cop31-presidency-elevates-finance-and-city-action; "COP31 İklim Diplomasisi Baş Yetkilisi ve İklim Değişikliği Başkanı Prof. Dr. Halil Hasar, COP31 Başkanlığı Adına BM'de Bir Sunum Gerçekleştirdi" [COP31 Chief Climate Diplomacy Officer and Director of Climate Change Prof. Dr. Halil Hasar Gives a Presentation at the UN on Behalf of the COP31 Presidency], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, September 25, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/cop31-iklim-diplomasisi-bas-yetkilisi-ve-iklim-degisikligi-baskani-prof.-dr.-halil-hasar-cop31-baskanligi-adina-bm-de-bir-sunum-gerceklestirdi-haber-6010; "COP31 İklim Diplomasisi Baş Yetkilisi ve İklim Değişikliği Başkanı Prof. Dr. Halil Hasar, IRENA Elektrifikasyon Günü Bakanlar Toplantısı'nda Konuştu" [COP31 Chief Climate Diplomacy Officer and Director of Climate Change Prof. Dr. Halil Hasar Speaks at the IRENA Electrification Day Ministerial Meeting], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, September 25, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/cop31-iklim-diplomasisi-bas-yetkilisi-ve-iklim-degisikligi-baskani-prof.-dr.-halil-hasar-irena-elektrifikasyon-gunu-bakanlar-toplantisi-nda-konustu-haber-6011. For the pre-COP, see "Pre-COP Closing Day Wrap"; Chris Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji", Australian Minister for Climate Change and Energy, October 8, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://minister.dcceew.gov.au/bowen/transcripts/press-conference-nadi-fiji-1.

TABLE 3. MAIN CONTACTS OF THE COP31 PRESIDENCY AFTER BONN (JUNE-OCTOBER 2026)

Date	Location	Event	Representing Türkiye	Outcome
August 13-14	Istanbul	Istanbul Oceans and Seas Workshop	Not specified	The Trabzon call built on the work of this workshop.
August 14	Ankara	Developing Climate-Resilient Cities on the Road to COP31	Minister Kurum, Halil Hasar	Work on financing packages of about 2.5 billion euros for municipal projects was announced.
August 24-26	Ulaanbaatar	17th Conference of the Parties to the Convention to Combat Desertification	Fatma Varank, Samed Ağırbaş	Synergies among the Rio conventions were emphasized.
September 4	Istanbul	Istanbul Climate Finance Summit	Minister Kurum	Istanbul Declaration on Climate Implementation and Finance. Announcement of the UN Development Programme as implementation partner of the Bridge.
September 9 (date of news report)	Baku	Baku Climate Action Week	Fatma Varank	Action Agenda targets presented.
September 10-11	Trabzon	Trabzon Oceans and Seas Summit. Representatives of Australia and the UNFCCC Secretariat also attended the ministerial session.	Minister Kurum, Minister of Transport and Infrastructure Abdulkadir Uraloğlu, Halil Hasar	Thirteen-point Trabzon Call to Consensus, Dialogue and Action. COP31 Marine Litter Action Platform.
September 16	Geneva	High-level session of the World Meteorological Organization	Minister Kurum	Support for the Early Warnings for All initiative. Pledge to train thirty technical staff from least developed countries each year for three years.
September 21-25	New York	UN General Assembly week and Climate Week NYC	Minister Kurum, Halil Hasar	35-by-35 Global Electrification Pledge and Antalya AI Pledge (September 21). Five pilot countries of the Bridge and an urban resilience finance facility (September 24).
September 23-24	New York	General Assembly general debate and climate summit	President Erdoğan	Framing of COP31 as an implementation COP. Invitation to leaders to the summit in Antalya.
October 5-8	Nadi and Tuvalu	Pre-COP and leaders' meeting	Minister Kurum	Taku Pakasoa Declaration. Announcement of a Presidency-led decision text.

Source: Compiled by the author from the websites of the COP31 Presidency, the Directorate of Climate Change, the UNFCCC and the D-8, and from news agency and press reports.

Table 3 shows that each of the meetings the Presidency organized or opened in the areas of electrification, climate finance and oceans produced a concrete output. The Electrify Now platform was announced in London for electrification, a declaration in Istanbul for finance, and a call to action for oceans and a platform for marine litter in Trabzon. The contacts were also divided among Presidency officials. Minister Kurum took on the opening of summits and the announcements. Fatma Varank attended the Shamakhi meeting and the Conference of the Parties to the Convention to Combat Desertification. Halil Hasar announced the Trabzon call and gave presentations on behalf of the Presidency in New York. All of these outputs were produced on the implementation track, and none of them is a text negotiated under the UNFCCC. The Presidency thus backed its own agenda with concrete outputs before the conference.

Definition of the Targets, the Electrification Pledge and the Climate Implementation Bridge

The third letter set out the definitions of the four targets announced in Bonn. The letter gave the current share of electricity in final energy consumption as about 23 percent and the global rate of circular material use as 6.9 percent. The waste target was defined as reducing the projected increase in municipal solid waste generation by at least 50 percent by 2035. The buildings target was defined as reducing energy use intensity in the sector by at least 25 percent. Alongside these four numerical targets, the letter also lists the other two targets announced in Bonn (climate action education for all by 2035 and scaling up the Climate Implementation Bridge). For the Food Security theme, it defines accelerating the transition to climate-resilient agriculture as a non-numerical implementation target.[124] Figure 2 shows the ten themes together with the focus areas on the theme pages of the COP31 website and the targets that the third letter links to these themes.

124 "COP31 Presidency's 3rd Letter to the Parties", 3-7.

Figure 2. Themes and Targets of the COP31 Action Agenda



Source: Compiled by the author from the third letter of the COP31 Presidency dated August 24, 2026, and from the COP31 Action Agenda web page and theme pages. The wording of the targets follows the third letter, and the names, order and focus areas of the themes follow the web pages.

After Bonn, the electrification target ceased to be a target announced only by the Presidency and became a pledge open to participation by governments. On June 9 in Bonn, Minister Kurum announced that they would work to build a strong global coalition around this target by Antalya.[125] The first step was taken in London on June 23, when governments launched the Electrify Now platform through a joint statement. The

125 Çetin, "Bakan Kurum 'COP31 Eylem Gündemi'".

European Commission, the COP30, COP31 and COP32 Presidencies, Canada, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom, together with the IEA and IRENA, joined the platform.[126] On September 21 in New York, the Presidency announced the 35-by-35 Global Electrification Pledge. Six initiatives accompanied the pledge, including a mechanism to track progress, an implementation forum and support for grid investment in developing countries.[127] The IEA prepared an electrification report at the Presidency's invitation. The report was published on September 22 to provide input to a high-level dialogue held the same day.[128] According to the report, if the cost-competitive electrification potential were fully used, the global electrification rate would rise from 23 percent in 2025 to 33 percent. This estimate is based on current technology costs, energy prices and financing conditions.[129] The target was also included in the leaders' declaration adopted in the Pacific on October 6, and Bowen announced that Australia supported the pledge.[130]

The Presidency's documents point in a clear direction on how the pledge relates to clean energy supply. On June 22 in London, Minister Kurum stated that the first of two points to be considered for the target's success was meeting rising electricity demand with clean energy supply, as the first global stocktake had also shown.[131] The announcement of the pledge emphasizes the enabling role of clean electricity, storage and grids. The leaders' declaration also notes that electrification can reduce dependence on fossil fuels, particularly when combined with renewable energy and energy efficiency.[132]

126 "Governments Launch 'Electrify Now' to Accelerate the Electrification of the Global Economy".

127 "COP31 Presidency Launches 35-by-35 Pledge and Antalya AI Pledge in New York".

128 "COP31 Presidency Launches 35-by-35 Pledge and Antalya AI Pledge in New York"; "Statement: IEA Special Report on Global Electrification Released Ahead of COP31", World Resources Institute, September 22, 2026, accessed October 18, 2026, https://www.wri.org/news/statement-iea-special-report-global-electrification-released-ahead-cop31.

129 IEA, *Electrification* (Paris: IEA, 2026), 15-16, 51, accessed October 13, 2026, https://www.iea.org/reports/electrification.

130 "The Taku Pakasoa Declaration: Strength in Unity", Australia-Pacific Partnership for COP31, October 6, 2026, para. 9, accessed October 13, 2026, https://www.cop31-pacific.com/taku-pakasoa; Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji".

131 "Opening the Climate Innovation Forum in London", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, June 22, 2026, accessed July 10, 2026, https://cop31.tr/speech-detail/london-2026; "COP31 Presidency Opens London Climate Action Week with Call to Accelerate Electrification".

132 "COP31 Presidency Launches 35-by-35 Pledge and Antalya AI Pledge in New York"; "The Taku Pakasoa Declaration: Strength in Unity", para. 9.

The framework of the Climate Implementation Bridge also took shape in the same period. The Presidency defines this initiative as a country-driven implementation tool. The initiative does not establish a new financing mechanism, implementation agency or coordination platform. It aims to turn the priorities in NDCs and NAPs into investment-ready project portfolios and to connect them with financing partners.[133] On September 4 in Istanbul, the Presidency announced the UN Development Programme as the initiative's implementation partner and, on September 24 in New York, announced Ethiopia, Fiji, Indonesia, Pakistan and Uzbekistan as the first pilot countries. It was stated that the second group of countries would be announced in Antalya.[134] Türkiye uses the concept of a bridge at two levels. It presented its candidacy as a bridge between developed and developing countries. During its Presidency, it has set up a tool under the same name that aims to close the gap between pledges and investment.[135]

The Pre-COP in the Pacific and the Taku Pakasoa Declaration

The COP31 pre-COP was held in the Pacific on October 5-8, 2026. Ministers met in Nadi, Fiji, and leaders met in Tuvalu.[136] In line with the Türkiye-Australia Partnership Modalities, Australia organized the meeting together with the Pacific island states, and Minister Kurum attended as COP31 President. Minister Kurum stated that holding the meeting in the Pacific had been decided jointly from the start of the partnership and that the Pacific had been chosen deliberately as the venue.[137] About 4,000 people from more than a hundred countries attended the four-day meeting.[138]

133 "Climate Implementation Bridge (BRIDGE)", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, accessed November 5, 2026, https://cop31.tr/action-plan/caim.

134 "COP31 President-Designate Murat Kurum Issues Rallying Cry to Close Climate Finance 'Chasm' at Istanbul Climate Finance Summit (ICFS)"; "COP31 Presidency Elevates Finance and City Action in Implementation-Focused Agenda"; "COP31 İklim Diplomasisi Baş Yetkilisi ve İklim Değişikliği Başkanı Prof. Dr. Halil Hasar, COP31 Başkanlığı Adına BM'de Bir Sunum Gerçekleştirdi" [COP31 Chief Climate Diplomacy Officer and Director of Climate Change Prof. Dr. Halil Hasar Gives a Presentation at the UN on Behalf of the COP31 Presidency].

135 IISD, "Summary of the 2025 June Climate Meetings", 14.

136 "The Road to Antalya".

137 "Türkiye-Australia Partnership Modalities", 1-2; Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji".

138 "Pre-COP Closing Day Wrap".

At the pre-COP, the Presidency drew attention to the unfavorable international environment in which the conference will convene. Minister Kurum compared the decision of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries to raise defense spending to 5 percent with the situation of Tuvalu, whose existence is under threat. Executive Secretary Stiell also said that the Antalya agenda might not have a single big headline issue, but that there are many complex and vital issues on which agreement must be reached.[139]

The main written outcome of the meeting is the Taku Pakasoa Declaration, adopted by the leaders on October 6. After its introductory paragraphs, the sixteen-paragraph text is organized under the headings of keeping the 1.5°C goal within reach, access to climate finance, and the relationship between the ocean and climate. The Declaration reaffirms the first global stocktake's call to Parties. This call covers tripling renewable energy capacity, doubling the annual rate of energy efficiency improvements, and transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner. The Declaration also welcomes the momentum to accelerate electrification toward 35 percent of global final energy use by 2035.[140] Türkiye is among those who adopted the Declaration. Fiji's Minister for Information, Environment and Climate Change Lynda Tabuya stated that the text had been endorsed by thirty regions, and Tuvalu's Climate Minister Maina Talia invited other Parties to join the Declaration before COP31.[141]

The Declaration has two implications for Türkiye. First, the Action Agenda's electrification target has entered a multilateral political text adopted as a leaders' declaration. Second, as one of the countries that adopted the Declaration, Türkiye reaffirmed the agreement reached in Dubai on transitioning away from fossil fuels. The Declaration is not a negotiated conference decision and concerns only the Parties that adopted it. Both implications should therefore be assessed at the political level.

Access to finance and the ocean also featured prominently at the meeting. Australia launched the Access to Finance Statement and Action Plan, which aims to reduce the barriers that delay climate finance from reaching

139 Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji".

140 "The Taku Pakasoa Declaration: Strength in Unity", para. 8-9; "Pre-COP Closing Day Wrap".

141 "The Taku Pakasoa Declaration: Strength in Unity"; Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji"; "Pre-COP Closing Day Wrap".

vulnerable communities. Of the more than $16 billion in climate finance pledged to Pacific countries since the Paris Agreement, more than $5 billion has not yet been disbursed.[142] Minister Kurum stressed that justice is essential in climate finance and that resources should reach those in need in a timely and accessible manner.[143] Peter Thomson, the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Ocean, reported that Türkiye had given assurances that it would work toward an Antalya Ocean Declaration.[144]

A Presidency-Led Political Decision Text

For the negotiations, the most important outcome of the pre-COP was the announcement by the COP31 President and the President of Negotiations of their intention to bring a political decision text to Antalya. At a press conference on October 8, Minister Kurum repeated the proposal he had shared with ministers at the closing session the previous day. According to Minister Kurum, the text will be prepared in an inclusive, transparent, Party-driven and Presidency-led manner and will address mitigation, adaptation, finance and implementation in a balanced way. The text will not replace the negotiating workstreams or create new obligations or commitments. It will provide political coherence across the different elements of the conference. The process will be conducted through early and inclusive consultations with Parties, not around a predetermined outcome.[145] Bowen stated that such a decision was not inevitable and that the Presidency had weighed the options for a long time. He also stated that the intention had been announced in advance so that Parties would not be faced with a surprise in Antalya.[146]

The proposal for a political decision text is directly related to the difference in status between the Action Agenda and the negotiating agenda. At SB64, some Parties objected to carrying outputs produced on the imple-

142 "Pre-COP Closing Day Wrap".

143 Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji".

144 "Pre-COP Closing Day Wrap".

145 Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji"; Serpil Çıracı, "Bakan Kurum'dan COP31 Mesajı: 'Samimiyseniz Eylem Gündemini Hayata Geçirin'" [COP31 Message from Minister Kurum: 'If You Are Sincere, Put the Action Agenda into Practice'], *Türkgün*, October 9, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://www.turkgun.com/gundem/cop31-baskani-kurum-fijideki-pre-cop-toplantilarinda-konustu/405599.

146 Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji".

mentation track into the formal process.[147] The proposal does not remove this difference. It adds a third instrument alongside the two tracks. The proposed text will be neither a voluntary agenda document nor the negotiated outcome of a specific agenda item. Its adoption, however, is subject to consensus, and the adopted text will be an output of the formal negotiation track.

At the same press conference, Minister Kurum linked transitioning away from fossil fuels to the implementation of the Action Agenda. He stressed that Parties that are sincere on this issue should ensure that the Agenda is implemented.[148] At the leaders' session on October 6, he also stated that transitioning away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly and equitable manner is necessary.[149] At the press conference, Minister Kurum further stated that there would be no backtracking at the conference.[150]

Three issues remained open as the pre-COP closed. The scope of the political decision text will take shape in the Presidency's consultations and in the contacts to be conducted by the ministerial co-facilitators. Whether the electrification target will be included in this text has not yet been announced.[151] The fourth letter set objectives for the issues on which no agreement was reached in Bonn under the mitigation work programme and the Global Goal on Adaptation. However, no document from this period was found that shows any convergence in Parties' positions.[152]

147 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 5.

148 Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji".

149 "Bakan Kurum, Pre-COP Kapsamında Fiji'deki Liderler Genel Oturumu'nda Konuştu" [Minister Kurum Speaks at the Leaders' Plenary Session in Fiji as Part of the Pre-COP], Anadolu Agency, October 6, 2026; "The Road to Antalya".

150 Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji".

151 Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji"; "Cooperation in the Face of a Changing World", 5.

152 "Cooperation in the Face of a Changing World", 3.

THE AGENDA CARRIED OVER TO ANTALYA

The issues that could not be concluded at SB64 are being taken up again in Antalya in November 2026. The provisional agendas published by the Secretariat on September 7, 2026, set out the body and the agenda item under which each of these issues will be considered. The Presidency set out the outcomes it expects from the conference on the main issues in its fourth letter of October 5.[153] This section first covers the conference's schedule of work and then the issues carried over from Bonn according to their level of preparation. Next, it examines the issues newly added to the agenda and those left off it, and finally it assesses the priorities facing the Presidency.

153 "Provisional Agenda and Annotations: Note by the Executive Secretary (FCCC/CP/2026/1)", UNFCCC, September 7, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cp2026_01_adv_1.pdf; "Provisional Agenda and Annotations: Note by the Executive Secretary (FCCC/KP/CMP/2026/1)", UNFCCC, September 7, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cmp2026_01_adv.pdf; "Provisional Agenda and Annotations: Note by the Executive Secretary (FCCC/PA/CMA/2026/1)", UNFCCC, September 7, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2026_01_adv_.pdf; "Provisional Agenda and Annotations: Note by the Executive Secretary (FCCC/SBSTA/2026/7)", UNFCCC, September 7, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbsta2026_07_adv_.pdf; "Provisional Agenda and Annotations: Note by the Executive Secretary (FCCC/SBI/2026/18)", UNFCCC, September 7, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/sbi2026_18__adv.pdf. The documents are advance versions. For the Presidency's expectations, see "Cooperation in the Face of a Changing World", 3-5.

Schedule of Work of the Bodies in Antalya

The conference in Antalya is taking place on November 9-20, 2026, and brings together five bodies. COP31, CMP 21 and CMA 8 meet throughout the conference, while SBSTA 65 and SBI 65 met on November 9-14.[154] The first items on the provisional agenda of COP31 are the election of the President, the adoption of the rules of procedure and the adoption of the agenda. Türkiye will formally take over the Presidency at this opening meeting. The high-level segment will open with the Leaders' Summit on November 11-12 and continue on November 17-18. The segment is expected to conclude on November 19.[155]

This schedule shortens the time available for technical negotiations on the items carried over from Bonn. The subsidiary bodies worked for six days on November 9-14, and two of those days overlapped with the Leaders' Summit. The fourth letter also states that the ministerial co-facilitators will begin consultations before the conference.[156] Given the short technical window, this early start will give more time for political discussions in the areas to which these ministers will be appointed.

Agenda Items Carried Over from Bonn to Antalya

Table 4 shows, from four angles, the main issues that were not concluded at SB64 or that require a decision in Antalya. The first is the outcome of the issue at SB64, and the second is the body and agenda item under which it will be taken up in Antalya. The third is the outcome the Presidency expects from Antalya in the fourth letter, and the fourth is whether any language on the issue appeared at the pre-COP.

154 FCCC/CP/2026/1, para. 1-5; FCCC/KP/CMP/2026/1, 1; FCCC/PA/CMA/2026/1, 1; FCCC/SBSTA/2026/7, 1; FCCC/SBI/2026/18, 1.

155 FCCC/CP/2026/1, para. 1, 8, 13-18, 116-123.

156 "Cooperation in the Face of a Changing World", 5.

TABLE 4. STATUS AT COP31 OF THE MAIN ISSUES CARRIED OVER FROM SB64

Issue	Outcome at SB64	Body and agenda item in Antalya	Outcome expected by the Presidency (fourth letter)	Language at the pre-COP
Mitigation work programme	No text to work from, record that consideration will continue	SBSTA 6 and SBI 6 (joint), CMA 6. Decision on continuation of the programme expected at CMA 8	An outcome that respects the programme's facilitative mandate and the nationally determined nature of climate action	Declaration reaffirmed the energy call of the first global stocktake. Political decision text announced to cover mitigation
Global Goal on Adaptation	No text to work from, rules 10(c) and 16	SBSTA 4(a) and SBI 10(a) (joint), CMA 9(a)	Full operationalization of the Belém-Addis Vision, technical task force for the indicators	Political decision text announced to cover adaptation. No topic-specific language
Just transition mechanism	Substantive conclusions (work programme). Consideration of the mechanism deferred to the 65th session without a text to work from, informal note not treated as a basis	SBSTA 7 and SBI 7 (joint), CMA 5. Review and continuation of the work programme also at this session	Agreement on the functions, governance and modalities of the mechanism	No topic-specific language
Adaptation Fund	Procedural conclusions, work to continue on the basis of draft texts	SBI 14(a), CMA 11(e), CMP 21	Completion of the transition to arrangements under which the Fund serves exclusively the Paris Agreement	No topic-specific language
Host of the Climate Technology Centre	Substantive conclusions, UNEP recommended	SBI 13(b), COP 9(b), CMA 12(b). Memorandum of understanding at the 65th session	Finalization of the arrangements for UNEP to continue as host	No topic-specific language
Work programme on climate finance	Workshop outside the negotiating agenda, no conclusions	CMA 11(g). Added at the request of the COP30 President, received by the Secretariat on June 12, 2026	Identification of common ground on the future direction of the programme before the conference. Delivery of the new collective quantified goal and tripling of adaptation finance	Australia launched the Access to Finance Statement and Action Plan. Political decision text announced to cover finance

TABLE 4. STATUS AT COP31 OF THE MAIN ISSUES CARRIED OVER FROM SB64

Issue	Outcome at SB64	Body and agenda item in Antalya	Outcome expected by the Presidency (fourth letter)	Language at the pre-COP
Forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures	No text to work from, record that consideration will continue	SBSTA 8 and SBI 8 (joint), COP 12, CMA 15, CMP 21	No topic-specific outcome in the letter	No topic-specific language
Greenhouse gas data interface, cooperation with other organizations, support for non-Annex I Parties, reporting support	No text to work from, rules 10(c) and 16	SBSTA 12(a) and 14, SBI 4(b) and 5, CMA 8	No topic-specific outcome in the letter. The letter stresses the submission of the second biennial transparency reports by December 31, 2026	No topic-specific language
Items arriving with draft decisions (joint annual report on technology, linkages between the Technology and Financial Mechanisms, capacity-building, administrative matters)	Draft decision	COP 3(b), 9(a), 10 and 17(a), CMA 12(a), CMP 21	No topic-specific outcome in the letter	No topic-specific language

Source: Compiled by the author from FCCC/SBSTA/2026/5, FCCC/SBI/2026/15, the provisional agendas of September 7, 2026, and the fourth letter of the COP31 Presidency dated October 5, 2026. The column on language at the pre-COP is based on the Taku Pakasoa Declaration, the UNFCCC closing announcement and the transcript of the press conference of October 8, 2026. The entry "No topic-specific language" indicates that none of these three documents contains language specific to the topic. No agenda item number is given for CMP 21.

Table 4 shows the fourth letter's expectations for each issue alongside the level of preparation that each issue carried over from Bonn. For the work programme on climate finance, the letter states that the Presidency will work with all Parties before the conference to identify common ground on the

future direction of the programme. It specifies no outcome for the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures, for the items arriving with draft decisions, or for the four technical items carried over without text under rules 10(c) and 16.[157] The relationship between expectations and level of preparation varies from issue to issue. For the Adaptation Fund and the Climate Technology Centre, the letter describes a procedure to be completed. These two issues left Bonn with draft texts and with conclusions proposing UNEP as host, respectively. For the mitigation work programme and the work programme on climate finance, the letter's expectations are more general. No text was carried over from Bonn on the mitigation work programme, and the work programme on climate finance was not on the negotiating agenda in Bonn. For the just transition mechanism and the Global Goal on Adaptation, by contrast, the letter expects concrete outcomes. It aims for agreement on the functions, governance and modalities of the mechanism and for the establishment of the technical task force for the indicators. SB64 did not produce a draft text to work from for either of these two issues. The gap between the letter's expectations and the preparation carried over from Bonn is widest on these two issues.

Agenda Items That Have Reached the Decision Stage

The draft decisions recommended by SB64 arrive in Antalya as texts agreed in the subsidiary bodies. The provisional agenda of COP31 notes that drafts have been recommended for consideration and adoption. They concern the joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network, the linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism, the reviews of the capacity-building frameworks, and administrative, financial and institutional matters.[158] The hosting of the Climate Technology Centre is also close to the decision stage. The SBI proposed UNEP as host, and what remains is to complete the memorandum of understanding and the draft decisions at the 65th session.[159] These items can be concluded in the first week of the conference, and

157 "Cooperation in the Face of a Changing World", 3-5.

158 FCCC/CP/2026/1, para. 35, 76, 88, 112.

159 FCCC/SBI/2026/18, para. 89-94; FCCC/CP/2026/1, para. 79-80.

their early adoption will allow negotiating time to be devoted to the issues on which divergence persists.

Agenda Items on Which No Agreement Was Reached

The mitigation work programme arrives in Antalya without a text to work from. However, the programme has been extended until CMA 8, and a decision on whether it will continue is to be taken at this session. The subsidiary bodies are expected to recommend a draft decision for CMA 8.[160] At SB64, Parties diverged on the scope and continuation of the programme and also failed to agree on a document that would record the exchange of views.[161] For Antalya, the fourth letter seeks an outcome that respects the programme's facilitative mandate and the nationally determined nature of climate action and that makes the programme more effective. The letter leaves the scope and duration of the programme to the Parties' discussions in Antalya.

The Global Goal on Adaptation arrives in Antalya as an open item in terms of both substance and process. Under rules 10(c) and 16, the item has been placed again on the agendas of both subsidiary bodies, and the provisional agenda expects the bodies to determine the next steps. Under the CMA 7 decision recalled in the provisional agenda, the subsidiary bodies will carry out technical work on the metadata and methodologies of the Belém Adaptation Indicators for consideration by CMA 9. They will also set up a technical task force for this work. In 2026-2027, they will also prepare the terms of reference for the review of the UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience, which also covers the indicators.[162]

The fourth letter aims for the full operationalization of the Belém-Addis Vision on Adaptation and the establishment of the technical task force. The divergence in Bonn, however, had centered on the composition of the task force and on whether to refer to the call to triple adaptation finance. The letter leaves the composition of the task force to the Parties to discuss and refers to tripling adaptation finance under the finance heading. Because of

160 FCCC/PA/CMA/2026/1, para. 26-27; FCCC/SBI/2026/18, para. 36-39; IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 20.

161 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 3.

162 FCCC/SBI/2026/18, para. 58-65; FCCC/SBSTA/2026/7, para. 17, 19-21. For the divergence in Bonn, see IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 5-6.

the trust problem raised at the close of SB64, the way the negotiation is conducted will determine the outcome of this item in Antalya as much as its substance.

The Adaptation Fund and the just transition mechanism arrive in Antalya at different levels of preparation. For the Adaptation Fund, the SBI will continue its consideration on the basis of the work at its 64th session and the draft texts published on the UNFCCC website. The aim is to recommend draft decisions for CMP 21 and CMA 8. The consideration covers membership of the Adaptation Fund Board, the arrangements for the Fund to serve exclusively the Paris Agreement and the launch of the fifth review of the Fund.[163] For the just transition mechanism, by contrast, there is no draft text to work from. The informal note prepared by the contact group co-chairs in Bonn was taken as input to the discussions, but it was recorded that the note does not constitute a basis for further negotiations. In Antalya, the subsidiary bodies will continue their consideration with a view to recommending a draft decision on the process of operationalizing the mechanism. They will also conduct the review of the work programme, whose terms of reference were prepared in Bonn, and CMA 8 will in addition consider the continuation of the programme.[164] For the mechanism, the fourth letter aims for Parties to agree on its functions, governance and modalities. The differing views that India and the United Kingdom expressed in Bonn on the form and function of the mechanism show that these elements have not yet been determined.

Items Newly Added to the Agenda and Issues Left Outside the Agenda

Two of the items newly added to the provisional agendas stand out for the Presidency. The first is the work programme on climate finance. The programme was added to the provisional agenda of CMA 8 as a separate sub-item at the request of the COP30 President, received by the Secretariat on June 12, 2026.[165] In Bonn, the G-77/China and the BASIC group (Brazil,

163 FCCC/SBI/2026/18, para. 98-99; FCCC/PA/CMA/2026/1, para. 65-70.

164 FCCC/PA/CMA/2026/1, para. 19-24; FCCC/SBI/2026/18, para. 40-45.

165 FCCC/PA/CMA/2026/1, para. 74-76.

South Africa, India and China) also requested that the programme be placed on the agenda of that session.[166] The divergence over Article 9, addressed only in a workshop in Bonn, will thus become part of the negotiating agenda in Antalya. Under the Convention, Türkiye is an Annex I Party not included in Annex II, and it has declared that it will implement the Paris Agreement as a developing country. The scope of Article 9 therefore also directly concerns Türkiye. For this reason, the issue is discussed separately under the finance heading in the next section. The second is the item placed on the provisional agendas of both subsidiary bodies at the request of the Comoros, received by the Secretariat on June 26, 2026. It covers the promotion of sustainable dietary practices, the reduction of diets based on animal products and the shift to plant-based diets.[167] The provisional agenda of COP31 also includes, under rules 10(c) and 16, three items held in abeyance at previous sessions and the seventh review of the Financial Mechanism, which has remained unresolved since COP26.[168] The new items and the items held in abeyance may make the adoption of the agenda more difficult.

Some issues expected to be addressed in Antalya, on the other hand, do not appear as separate items on the provisional agendas. The fourth letter notes that the second global stocktake will begin at COP31. The relevant item on the provisional agenda of CMA 8, however, is limited to the report on the annual global stocktake dialogue.[169] The trade dialogue, the COP30 Presidency's roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels and the Presidency-led political decision text are not items on the provisional agendas either. These issues may be addressed in settings outside the negotiating agenda, such as the Presidency's consultations and high-level sessions.

Priorities Facing the Presidency

In terms of how the Presidency will allocate its negotiating time and its ministerial-level contacts, the issues carried over to Antalya fall into three

166 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 16, 18.

167 FCCC/SBI/2026/18, para. 116-117. The item was included in the provisional agenda under rule 10(d).

168 FCCC/CP/2026/1, para. 73-74, 105-110. The items held in abeyance are the proposals to amend the Convention by the Russian Federation (on Article 4, paragraph 2(f)) and by Papua New Guinea and Mexico (on Articles 7 and 18), and the second review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b).

169 "Cooperation in the Face of a Changing World", 5; FCCC/PA/CMA/2026/1, para. 16-18.

groups. The first group consists of the technology, capacity-building and administrative matters that arrive with draft decisions, together with the hosting of the Climate Technology Centre, for which the memorandum of understanding is to be finalized. The second group consists of the Adaptation Fund and the just transition mechanism, for which the institutional arrangements of a fund or a mechanism are expected to be completed. For the Adaptation Fund, discussions will continue on the basis of draft texts. For the just transition mechanism, Parties will have to agree for the first time on a text on functions, governance and modalities. The third group comprises the mitigation work programme, the Global Goal on Adaptation and the work programme on climate finance, on which political divergence persists. These issues arrive in Antalya without a text to work from or as agenda items for the first time, and they are the most likely to be elevated to the ministerial level. Because the continuation of the mitigation work programme and of the just transition work programme is to be considered at this session, a deferral on these two issues would leave the future of the programmes uncertain. The areas for which the fourth letter announced the appointment of ministerial co-facilitators, namely just transition, finance, mitigation and adaptation, overlap with these issues in the second and third groups. The Presidency will need to devote its ministerial-level contacts primarily to the just transition mechanism and the third group.

THE PRESIDENCY STRATEGY'S ROOM FOR MANEUVER

In Bonn and in the period after Bonn, the COP31 Presidency's strategy has rested on three elements. These are the numerical targets of the Action Agenda, the conversion of the electrification target into a pledge open to participation by governments, and a Presidency-led political decision text to be taken to Antalya. This section examines five factors that shape the strategy's room for maneuver. The first factor arises from the difference in status between the Action Agenda and the negotiating agenda. The second concerns the measurability of the numerical targets announced by the Presidency. The third stems from the President's dual position and concerns the relationship between the Presidency's agenda and national climate policy. The fourth and fifth factors are fossil fuels and finance, the two issues on which the Presidency's own position will come up most directly in Antalya. Identifying these factors aims to show under which conditions the Presidency's room for maneuver can widen.

The Difference Between the Action Agenda and the Negotiating Agenda

The first factor shaping the room for maneuver of the Presidency's strategy is that the targets and pledges produced under the

Action Agenda do not create obligations for Parties. The Agenda operates on the implementation track, and the Presidency confirms this character in its own documents. The third letter states that the targets are not prescriptive and are not intended to create new obligations for individual countries. The fourth letter defines the Action Agenda and the negotiations as two complementary spheres.[170]

At SB64, Parties took explicit positions on whether the outputs of the Action Agenda could be brought onto the negotiating agenda. These positions emerged in the sessions of two initiatives launched in Belém. At the Global Implementation Accelerator session on June 12, the COP30 President described the initiative as part of a second layer of climate multilateralism that operates outside the negotiations. The COP30 President also stressed that, unlike negotiated outcomes, implementation does not require consensus. At the same session, the Like-Minded Developing Countries asked that the initiative remain Party-driven, facilitative and voluntary, and that it not produce policy recommendations. At the Belém Mission to 1.5 consultation held the same day, Saudi Arabia stated that the initiative was voluntary and was not linked to any work programme or constituted body. Egypt stated that proposals to link the outputs of this initiative, or of any component of the Action Agenda, to the formal process were unacceptable and unhelpful. The EU, for its part, supported continuing the Mission's work after COP31 and linking it to the second global stocktake.[171] The Parties' objections are directed at bringing the outputs of voluntary initiatives into the negotiation process, not at the existence of these initiatives. This distinction does not narrow the Presidency's room for maneuver. It divides it between two tracks. On the implementation track, the Presidency can set targets, gather pledges and establish monitoring mechanisms. All of the concrete outputs produced between Bonn and the pre-COP came from this second track.

The same factor also became visible in Bonn with regard to the content of the targets. In the negotiations on the research and systematic observation item, the EU supported work on the transformation of the energy system, and on deep electrification in particular. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, objected to references to electrification and emphasized nationally determined path-

170 "COP31 Presidency's 3rd Letter to the Parties", 7; "Cooperation in the Face of a Changing World", 7.
171 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 5; Decision 1/CMA.7, para. 41-42.

ways.[172] The difference of views among Parties on electrification thus also appeared in a negotiating text at the very session where the target was announced. In a system where decisions are taken by consensus, the objection of a single Party can prevent a phrase from entering a text. Whether the electrification target appears in a text negotiated in Antalya therefore depends on persuading the objecting Parties, not on the number of countries that support the target.

Two developments related to this factor took place after Bonn. The electrification target was included in the Taku Pakasoa Declaration, and a Presidency-led political decision text was proposed at the pre-COP. Neither development removes this factor. The Declaration concerns only the Parties that adopted it, while the adoption of the decision text remains subject to consensus. The inclusion of Action Agenda targets in the decision text with the consent of the Parties would be a gain for the regime. By contrast, monitoring an output adopted by consensus on the negotiation track only through the Action Agenda amounts to a step backward.

Measurability of the Targets and the Definition of Implementation

The second factor is the extent to which the targets announced by the Presidency are measurable. A Presidency that announces numerical targets itself sets the indicator by which it will be assessed. That indicator can be used only if the targets are fully defined. The third letter gives the current level for the electrification and circular material use targets. Providing the same information for the waste and buildings targets would make it easier to monitor the four targets together.[173] The electrification target has been set at an ambitious level. Based on the calculation in the IEA report, the 35 percent target requires going beyond the potential that is competitive under today's cost conditions. The report, however, states that using today's cost-effective potential would bring the world within reach of the 35 percent target.[174]

172 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 15.

173 "COP31 Presidency's 3rd Letter to the Parties", 3-5.

174 IEA, *Electrification*, 3, 15, 47.

The same applies to statements about the combined effect of the targets. At a press conference on October 8, Minister Kurum stated that emissions could be reduced by 20 percent if the four targets were achieved. Publishing the calculation method and the baseline would make this target easier to monitor as well.[175] On September 21, the Presidency announced a mechanism to track global progress on electrification. Publishing, by Antalya at the latest, how this mechanism works and the data that complete the definitions of the other targets would allow the targets to be assessed after the conference as well.

The concept of implementation that the Presidency has put forward for Antalya can be used in two different senses. The joint letter of Minister Kurum and Bowen dated May 20 described Antalya as both an Implementation COP and a COP of the Future.[176] At the pre-COP, Minister Kurum repeated the description of an implementation COP. The Executive Secretary stated that the rulebook of the Paris Agreement had been completed and that the shift to implementation had become clear.[177] The third letter uses the concept to describe the need to move from target setting to implementation.[178] Clarifying the content of the concept will also determine the indicator by which the success of the conference is assessed. In the first sense, implementation means that Parties put into practice the commitments they have made in their NDCs. In that case, the success of Antalya will be measured by the progress made in national policies. In the second sense, implementation refers to the voluntary pledges made by governments and other actors under the Action Agenda. In that case, the indicator of success will be the number and scope of these pledges. If the Presidency states which sense it adopts by the start of the conference at the latest, everyone will be able to assess the outcome by the same indicator.

The Relationship Between the Presidency's Agenda and National Climate Policy

The third factor arises from the dual position of the COP President. Because the President is also the representative of a government, the Presidency's

175 Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji".

176 "Joint Letter from the COP31 President-Designate and President of Negotiations".

177 Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji".

178 "COP31 Presidency's 3rd Letter to the Parties", 2, 7.

global agenda is open to being assessed together with the national policy of the host country. For COP31, this assessment centers on four areas where the Presidency's own agenda intersects with national policy. These are national Zero Waste practice in relation to the waste target and the source mix of electricity generation in relation to the electrification target. The other two are the NDC in relation to the emphasis on implementation, and methane pledges in relation to the methane priority.

The first is Zero Waste. This is the area where the Presidency's agenda and national policy overlap most strongly. In Türkiye, the Zero Waste movement was launched on September 27, 2017, under the patronage of Emine Erdoğan, wife of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Its implementation gained a legal framework with the Zero Waste Regulation of July 12, 2019.[179] The recovery rate rose from 13 percent in 2017 to 36.08 percent in 2024.[180] According to data from the Zero Waste website, 90 million tons of recoverable waste were recycled between 2017 and the end of 2025, contributing TL 365 billion to the economy. To date, 217,000 buildings and campuses have joined the Zero Waste Management System, and 180 million tons of greenhouse gas emissions have been avoided.[181] Türkiye has also carried this experience to the UN level. According to the briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General on the first International Day of Zero Waste, Secretary-General António Guterres announced that he would establish the UN Advisory Board of Eminent Persons on Zero Waste. He also thanked Emine Erdoğan for agreeing to chair the Board.[182] The Presidency's global waste target is in line with this national and international experience.

The second is the source mix of electricity generation. According to Ember's data, the combined share of wind and solar in Türkiye's electricity

179 "Sıfır Atık ile 90 Milyon Ton Atık Geri Dönüşüme Kazandırıldı" [90 Million Tons of Waste Recovered for Recycling through Zero Waste]; Sıfır Atık Yönetmeliği [Zero Waste Regulation], *Resmi Gazete*, July 12, 2019, no. 30829.


180 "Geri Kazanım Oranımızı Yüzde 36.08'e Çıkardık" [We Have Raised Our Recovery Rate to 36.08 Percent], Sıfır Atık, March 30, 2025, accessed September 17, 2026, https://sifiratik.gov.tr/kutuphane/haberler/geri-kazanim-oranimizi-yuzde-36-08-e-cikardik.

181 "Sıfır Atık ile 90 Milyon Ton Atık Geri Dönüşüme Kazandırıldı" [90 Million Tons of Waste Recovered for Recycling through Zero Waste].

182 "Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General", United Nations, March 30, 2023, accessed September 18, 2026, https://press.un.org/en/2023/db230330.doc.htm.

generation reached 22 percent in 2025. Solar power generation doubled over the past two years, and the 1.9 GW of wind capacity commissioned in 2025 was the largest annual increase on record.[183] Chart 2 shows how the share of wind and solar has developed since 2023. This increase in the share of renewable sources points in the same direction as the Presidency's electrification target. The contribution of electrification to emission reductions depends on meeting rising demand from clean sources. For this reason, if the Presidency defines its electrification target together with clean energy supply, it will also strengthen the national counterpart of the target.

Chart 2. Share of Wind and Solar in Türkiye's Electricity Generation (2023-2025, %)



Source: Compiled by the author from Ember's Türkiye Elektrik Görünümü 2025 and 2026 reports [Türkiye Electricity Review 2025 and 2026]. The 2023 values in the chart are the shares given for the previous year in the 2025 report.

The third is the NDC. In its second NDC, submitted in November 2025, Türkiye committed to limiting its 2035 emissions to 643 million tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, a reduction of 466 million tons relative to the reference scenario.[184]

183 Ufuk Alparslan, "Türkiye Elektrik Görünümü 2026" [Türkiye Electricity Review 2026], Ember, April 8, 2026, accessed October 1, 2026, https://ember-energy.org/tr/analizler/turkiye-elektrik-gorunumu-2026.

184 "Türkiye Submits Its Second Nationally Determined Contribution to the United Nations", Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, November 10, 2025,

The fourth is methane. The third letter notes that methane is responsible for about 30 percent of current global warming, and Minister Kurum counts Zero Waste and methane reduction among the main priorities of the Presidency.[185] Türkiye has endorsed the Declaration on Reducing Methane from Organic Waste, announced at COP29.[186]

Regulatory steps that support the Presidency's agenda have also been taken in national policy. Climate Law No. 7552, adopted in July 2025, provides the legal framework for these steps. The Law aims to combat climate change in line with the net zero emissions target and provides for the establishment of an emissions trading system.[187] The Türkiye Emissions Trading System Regulation (Türkiye Emisyon Ticaret Sistemi Yönetmeliği) was published in August 2026. It aligned the provisions on monitoring, reporting and verification and the market provisions with the EU Emissions Trading System. The Türkiye Green Taxonomy Regulation (Türkiye Yeşil Taksonomisi Yönetmeliği) entered into force in September 2026. It set six environmental objectives and introduced a reporting obligation for financial institutions from January 1, 2029.[188] The emissions trading and taxonomy regulations were published in the run-up to the Presidency, and they show that national policy is moving in the same direction as the Presidency's agenda. The weight of the Presidency's global targets will grow as steps in this direction continue during the Presidency.

accessed October 1, 2026, https://www.iklim.gov.tr/en/turkiye-submits-its-second-nationally-determined-contribution-to-the-united-nations-news-4640.

185 "COP31 Presidency's 3rd Letter to the Parties", 4; Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji". For Minister Kurum's statement in Bonn, see "COP31 Presidency Announces New Targets on Global Electrification, Cutting Waste, Resilient Cities".

186 "COP29 Declaration on Reducing Methane from Organic Waste", Climate and Clean Air Coalition, accessed October 2, 2026, https://www.ccacoalition.org/content/cop29-declaration-reducing-methane-organic-waste.

187 "7552 sayılı İklim Kanunu" [Climate Law No. 7552], *Resmi Gazete*, July 9, 2025, no. 32951, accessed October 17, 2026, https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2025/07/20250709-1.htm.

188 "Türkiye Emisyon Ticaret Sistemi Yönetmeliği Yayımlandı" [Türkiye Emissions Trading System Regulation Published], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, August 27, 2026, accessed September 30, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/turkiye-emisyon-ticaret-sistemi-yonetmeligi-yayimlandi-haber-4996; "Türkiye Yeşil Taksonomisi Yönetmeliği Yayımlandı" [Türkiye Green Taxonomy Regulation Published], Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change, Directorate of Climate Change, September 24, 2026, accessed September 30, 2026, https://iklim.gov.tr/turkiye-yesil-taksonomisi-yonetmeligi-yayimlandi-haber-6008.

Fossil Fuels

The fourth factor is the relationship between the Presidency's agenda and fossil fuels. The Action Agenda addresses the energy transition through electrification, which aims to increase the share of electricity in final energy consumption. The Presidency's third and fourth letters follow the same framework, and the fourth letter refers to the goal of tripling renewable capacity and doubling the rate of efficiency improvement.[189] Minister Kurum gave an explicit justification for this choice in an interview published on April 30, 2026. He said that all countries depended on fossil fuels, that simply telling countries to quit fossil fuels was not realistic, and that what was needed was to work on clean and renewable energy. In the same interview, he stated that the clean energy transition would be one of the main topics of COP31.[190]

In this period, the issue of transitioning away from fossil fuels advanced in two processes outside the negotiation track. The COP30 Presidency received 268 submissions from Parties, observers and other stakeholders for the roadmap it is running under its own responsibility. Those making submissions include 115 countries, counting those represented through the Least Developed Countries and AOSIS negotiating groups. The COP30 Presidency states that the roadmap is not a document negotiated under the Convention.[191] Fifty-seven countries took part in the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, held by Colombia and the Netherlands in Santa Marta in April 2026. Türkiye and Australia were among the participants. The Conference did not produce a negotiated outcome document. It set up voluntary workstreams and a coordination group, and it decided that the second conference would meet in Tuvalu in 2027.[192] The

189 "COP31 Presidency's 3rd Letter to the Parties"; "Cooperation in the Face of a Changing World", 6.

190 "Just Telling Nations to Quit Fossil Fuels 'Not Realistic': COP31 Chief", Agence France-Presse, April 30, 2026, accessed September 17, 2026, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260430-just-telling-nations-to-quit-fossil-fuels-not-realistic-cop31-chief.

191 "Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels Roadmap", COP30 Brasil, July 1, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://cop30.br/en/2026-priorities/transitioning-away-from-fossil-fuels-roadmap.

192 Daisy Dunne, "Santa Marta: Key Outcomes from First Summit on 'Transitioning Away' from Fossil Fuels", Carbon Brief, April 30, 2026, accessed October 13, 2026, https://www.carbonbrief.org/santa-marta-key-outcomes-from-first-summit-on-transitioning-away-from-fossil-fuels; Sebastian Rodriguez, "Sixty Countries Head to Santa Marta to Cement Coalition for Fossil Fuel Transition", Climate Home News, April 23, 2026, accessed October 11, 2026, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2026/04/23/sixty-countries-head-to-santa-marta-to-cement-coalition-for-fossil-fuel-transition.

Dutch government's statement says that the outcomes of the Conference will be aligned with the "COP31 roadmap" and the Action Agenda. In June 2026, the Colombian and Dutch ministers also reported that the COP31 Presidency was open to proposals on reflecting the Santa Marta outcomes in the process.[193]

Türkiye's position on fossil fuels became clearer after Bonn. The declaration on transitioning away from fossil fuels announced in Belém in November 2025 goes beyond the language adopted by consensus in Dubai. Australia was among the first signatories of the declaration.[194] Türkiye, for its part, joined the Taku Pakasoa Declaration in October 2026 and thereby reaffirmed the call of the first global stocktake for transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems. Minister Kurum also stated that there would be no step back in Antalya and linked the issue to the implementation of the Action Agenda.[195]

The Presidency's approach thus consists of two elements. The agreement reached in Dubai is reaffirmed at the political level. However, no new negotiating goal on fossil fuels is proposed, and the issue is addressed through the Action Agenda's targets on energy consumption. As long as the Dubai outcome keeps its place on the negotiation track, this approach does not amount to a step backward.

Two points will shape how this approach unfolds in Antalya. The first point is the difference in position between the two components of the division of roles. Australia, the country of the President of Negotiations, signed the Belém declaration, and Fiji and Tuvalu, where the pre-COP was held, as

193 "Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels Conference Concludes with 5 Key Deliverables", Government of the Netherlands, April 30, 2026, accessed September 17, 2026, https://www.government.nl/latest/news/2026/04/29/transitioning-away-from-fossil-fuels-conference-concludes-with-5-key-deliverables; Chloé Farand and Sebastian Rodriguez, "COP31 Presidency 'Open' to Reflecting Santa Marta in UN Climate Process, Ministers Say", Climate Home News, June 24, 2026, accessed September 18, 2026, https://www.climatechangenews.com/2026/06/24/ministers-say-cop31-open-to-reflecting-santa-marta-conference-climate-talks.

194 Mark Tilly, "COP30: Countries Sign on to Belem Fossil Fuel Transition Declaration", Carbon Pulse, November 21, 2025, accessed October 13, 2026, https://carbon-pulse.com/460224; "Colombia and The Netherlands Announce First International Conference for Fossil Fuel Phase Out", Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative, November 21, 2025, accessed October 18, 2026, https://www.fossilfueltreaty.org/first-international-conference; "Australia Joins Belém Declaration to Transition from Fossil Fuels; Now Must Fight for COP30 Roadmap", Greenpeace Australia Pacific, November 22, 2025, accessed October 13, 2026, https://www.greenpeace.org.au/news/australia-joins-belem-declaration-to-transition-from-fossil-fuels-now-must-fight-for-cop30-roadmap.

195 "The Taku Pakasoa Declaration: Strength in Unity", para. 8; Bowen, "Press Conference, Nadi, Fiji".

well as Vanuatu, are also among its signatories.[196] Tuvalu will also host the second conference of the Santa Marta process.

The second point will arise if there are calls in Antalya to bring the roadmap and the outcomes of the Santa Marta process onto the negotiation track. In that case, under the division of roles, the President of Negotiations will conduct the negotiations in consultation with the Presidency. The Presidency will keep its position as impartial presiding officer on an issue on which there is no agreement. On this issue, the Presidency's contribution will lie less in proposing a new text than in offering a consultative setting that remains even-handed toward the proposals of the Parties.

Finance

The fifth factor is finance. In its fourth letter, the Presidency describes climate finance as a critical element that enables ambition and implementation in climate action. The letter refers to delivering on the new collective quantified goal and to tripling adaptation finance by 2035.[197] SB64, however, showed that Parties could not agree on the scope of obligations under these two headings. In the Article 9 divergence that emerged at the workshop of the work programme on climate finance, the G-77/China took paragraph 1 as its basis, while developed countries took the Article as a whole. The G-77/China also did not accept the work plan prepared by the programme's co-chairs as a basis for discussion, and Switzerland asked that the scope of contributing countries also be addressed. In the Global Goal on Adaptation negotiations as well, references to the call for tripling adaptation finance met with objections from a group of developed countries.[198] At the closing plenary, Azerbaijan, which held the COP29 Presidency, expressed concern about attempts to misinterpret or weaken the decisions on the new collective quantified goal and on tripling adaptation finance. Civil society assessments raised the same issue.[199]

196 "Colombia and The Netherlands Announce First International Conference for Fossil Fuel Phase Out".

197 "Cooperation in the Face of a Changing World", 3.

198 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 5-6, 9.

199 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 19; "What Did SB64 Actually Deliver?", Power Shift Africa, accessed October 13, 2026, https://www.powershiftafrica.org/in-the-news/what-did-the-sb64-actually-deliver-jun26. The page carries no date. The organization's director, Mohamed Adow, claimed that

The Presidency's tools in this area are concentrated on the implementation track. According to the fourth letter, the Climate Implementation Bridge is not a new climate fund. It aims to match country priorities with project portfolios and financing institutions. At the Istanbul Climate Finance Summit, the Presidency announced the Istanbul Declaration on Climate Implementation and Finance. At the pre-COP, Australia launched a statement and action plan aimed at reducing barriers to accessing finance.[200] The Presidency's concrete contribution in this area is to place finance at the center of the implementation agenda and to announce the first pilot countries of the Bridge. These tools, however, aim to improve access to existing resources and project preparation, not to create new resources. The amount of finance, and who will provide it, is determined on the negotiation track, in the Article 9 discussion.

On the negotiation track, the Presidency's position has two features. First, under the division of roles, the negotiating function lies with the President of Negotiations, who will also conduct the finance discussion in consultation with the Presidency. Second, Türkiye's own status touches both sides of the Article 9 divergence. As an Annex I Party outside Annex II, Türkiye is not among the Parties on which the Convention places an obligation to provide financial resources.[201] Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, by contrast, rests on the term "developed country Parties", not on the annexes. Paragraph 1 of the Article requires developed country Parties to provide financial resources for developing country Parties, in continuation of their existing obligations under the Convention. Paragraph 2 encourages other Parties to provide, or continue to provide, such support voluntarily. When ratifying the Agreement, Türkiye declared that it would implement it as a developing country.[202] The recognition of Türkiye's special circumstances was also addressed within a framework aimed at supporting its access to finance, technology

developed countries tried to strike from the record the commitment made in Belém to triple adaptation finance.

200 "Cooperation in the Face of a Changing World", 7; "COP31 President-Designate Murat Kurum Issues Rallying Cry to Close Climate Finance 'Chasm' at Istanbul Climate Finance Summit (ICFS)"; "Pre-COP Closing Day Wrap".

201 United Nations, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, 8, 23-24.

202 "Paris Agreement", 13; "Chapter XXVII, 7.d Paris Agreement".

and capacity-building.[203] Türkiye thus sits in the same annex as developed countries in the Convention's classification, while it places itself among developing countries in its own declaration. This two-sided position in the classification means that Türkiye knows from its own negotiating experience the reasoning behind both approaches. These are the developed country approach, which takes the Article as a whole, and the developing country approach, which calls for predictable and accessible finance.[204]

This experience gives the Presidency the opportunity to develop bridging proposals that would bring the positions of the two groups closer. Such proposals could include recording the obligation under paragraph 1 and the voluntary contributions under paragraph 2 separately, facilitating access to existing resources, and tracking the implementation of the new collective quantified goal. The Presidency could offer this contribution through the ministerial co-facilitators on finance and through Presidency consultations, while keeping its position as impartial presiding officer. Rule 22.3, under which the President does not exercise the rights of the President's own country as a Party, is the procedural safeguard of this position. This position, however, does not produce results by itself. Convergence on the Article 9 divergence is possible through changes in the positions of the Parties on the negotiation track, not through voluntary tools.

Expanding the Room for Maneuver

The five factors cannot all be addressed with the same tools. The definition of the targets and national policy steps depend on the decisions of the Presidency and the government themselves. By contrast, the other three factors, namely the status difference between the Action Agenda and the negotiating agenda, fossil fuels, and finance, require the consent of the Parties and agreement on the negotiation track. This distinction also sets the order of the steps. If the steps that the Presidency and the government can take directly are taken first, the Presidency's room for maneuver will widen on the issues that require the consent of the Parties. The Presidency and the government have shown in their own documents and practices the step that can be taken

203 Decision 1/CP.16, para. 142.

204 IISD, "Summary of the 2026 June Climate Meetings", 6, 9.

for each factor. The proposal for a decision text provides the framework to be put forward for consensus, and the monitoring mechanism provides the tool for measurability. Zero Waste practice and the emissions trading and taxonomy regulations set the direction of national steps. The Taku Pakasoa Declaration provides the political reaffirmation on fossil fuels, and the Climate Implementation Bridge provides the tool for access to finance. The weight of these factors in Antalya will depend on how far these steps are advanced before the conference.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

At SB64, progress was made on technical and institutional matters, while the issues on which political divisions were sharpest remained unresolved. Of the session's thirty-four issues, fourteen concluded with substantive conclusions or a draft decision, four were limited to procedural conclusions, and sixteen left the session without a text to work from or without being discussed at all.

The first criterion of the report is the dual position of the office of the presidency. Türkiye does not fully fit into either the developed or the developing country category and is not a member of any negotiating group. In Bonn, it appeared as an incoming Presidency that defined the agenda in terms of the regime as a whole, and the records show no intervention by Türkiye in its capacity as a Party on the items under negotiation. This picture in Bonn shows that Türkiye, which the literature long defined by its demand for the recognition of its special circumstances, now holds a new position within the regime. The absence of interventions by Türkiye as a Party is consistent with the first aspect of the criterion, which is the expectation of even-handedness toward negotiating groups. As for the second aspect of the criterion, in the areas where the Presidency's agenda intersects with national

policy, Zero Waste practice and the emissions trading and taxonomy regulations are moving in the same direction as that agenda. Supporting electrification with clean sources, preparing for the next NDC and joining the Global Methane Pledge are steps that could be taken during the Presidency.

The second criterion of the report is the status difference between the negotiation track and the implementation track, and SB64 made this difference visible. In the formal negotiations on mitigation and adaptation, Parties could not agree even on a text to carry forward to the next session, while the Presidency turned four of its thematic priorities into numerical global targets during the session. At SB64, some Parties objected to bringing the outputs of the implementation track onto the negotiation track. At the pre-COP in October 2026, the Presidency, for its part, announced its intention to take a political decision text under its own leadership to Antalya. Under the second criterion, bringing the Action Agenda targets onto the negotiation track through this text and with the consent of the Parties would be a gain for the regime. On fossil fuels, Türkiye reaffirmed at the political level, through the Taku Pakasoa Declaration, the agreement reached in Dubai. As long as this agreement keeps its place on the negotiation track, the Presidency's approach of addressing the issue through the Action Agenda's targets on energy consumption does not amount to a step backward.

The Presidency and the government can define the targets and take national policy steps on their own. If these steps are taken before action on the issues that require the consent of the Parties, namely the move to the negotiation track, fossil fuels and finance, the position of the Presidency will be stronger. Three features of the Antalya agenda will affect how the Presidency uses its room for maneuver on the negotiation track. The continuation of the mitigation work programme and the just transition work programme will be taken up at CMA 8. The work programme on climate finance, whose workshop in Bonn exposed the Article 9 divergence, will be considered as an agenda item for the first time. The technical work of the subsidiary bodies will be limited to six days.

The recommendations take into account that Türkiye has declared it will implement the Paris Agreement as a developing country, and that the Presidency cannot solve the climate crisis on its own. The first five recommendations concern the management of the negotiation process. The next

four concern the measurability of the Presidency's targets and their support through national policy steps. The last three concern the profile of an even-handed presidency and the period after the Presidency.

- In the divergence between the G-77/China and developed countries on Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, which governs climate finance, the Presidency could use the position that arises from Türkiye's status to bring the positions of the two sides closer. The G-77/China takes paragraph 1 of the Article as its basis, while developed countries take the Article as a whole. The bridging proposals that the Presidency develops for this purpose should be presented through Presidency consultations and the ministerial co-facilitators on finance.
- Consultations on the adoption of the agenda should be held before the conference. The new item proposed by the Comoros and the items held in abeyance on the COP agenda may make the adoption of the agenda harder. The Presidency should hold these consultations in coordination with the SB Chairs and should seek agreement with the heads of delegation on deferring these items or on a way of considering them. Adopting the draft decisions on technology, capacity-building and administrative matters in the first days will leave more negotiating time for the mitigation work programme and the Global Goal on Adaptation.
- For the two work programmes whose continuation will be taken up at CMA 8, the fourth letter announced contacts by the ministerial co-facilitators starting before the conference. These contacts should be intensified from the first days in Antalya. A deferral would leave the future of both programmes uncertain. In the mitigation work programme, the divergence in Bonn centered on the scope of the programme, its relationship with the global stocktake and its continuation after 2026. Because the fourth letter leaves the scope and duration of the programme to the Parties to discuss, the Presidency will need to offer a concrete option on the continuation of the programme.
- In the Global Goal on Adaptation, the Presidency should pay as much attention to how the process is run as to its content. A work schedule announced in advance, a formula for the composition of the task force

that accommodates both Party-driven and expert-driven approaches, and limited use of closed meetings would build trust before agreement on content is reached. On references to the call for tripling adaptation finance, the Presidency should also seek common language together with the ministerial co-facilitators on finance. This language should take into account both the demand of developing country groups and the position of the Parties that say adaptation finance is addressed under other agenda items.

- The political decision text should be drafted so that all Parties can accept it and so that it preserves the agreement reached in Dubai. Because adoption is subject to consensus, the inclusion of the targets in the text depends on persuading the objecting Parties. The Presidency should hold consultations first with the Parties expected to object, and it should include in the text only the targets on which there is agreement. The text should reaffirm the call in the Dubai agreement for transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems. The COP30 roadmap and the Santa Marta process are not on the negotiating agenda in Antalya. If there is a request to bring the outcomes of these two processes onto the negotiation track, the Presidency should handle it through consultations that seek the consent of the Parties and remain even-handed toward differing views.
- The baselines and monitoring method of the targets should be brought together in a single document by Antalya at the latest. This document should include the growth projection on which the waste target is based and the baseline of the buildings target. It should also include the calculation of the emission reductions that the four targets would deliver together and how the monitoring mechanism of the electrification pledge works. The document should also include the condition that rising electricity demand be met from clean sources. In addition, the Presidency should explain at the start of the conference in which sense it uses the concept of implementation and by which indicators the outcome will be assessed. These indicators could include the outcome on the continuation of the mitigation and just transition work programmes and agreement on the functions, governance and modalities

of the just transition mechanism. Completion of the Adaptation Fund transition and the number of countries joining the electrification pledge could also be among them.

- The Zero Waste experience should be presented during the Presidency as a model that can be shared with other countries. The UN Advisory Board of Eminent Persons on Zero Waste, chaired by Emine Erdoğan, is a ready framework for sharing this experience. Türkiye has endorsed the declaration on methane from organic waste announced at COP29. The scope of the Global Methane Pledge also covers the methane from waste that this declaration addresses, and this component overlaps with the Zero Waste agenda.[205] Türkiye's joining the Pledge should be considered as a step that could be taken in the remainder of the Presidency, after the conference in Antalya.
- Türkiye should announce a national roadmap that addresses electrification together with the growth of renewable energy capacity. The share of wind and solar in the country's electricity generation reached 22 percent in 2025. Such a roadmap would provide the national counterpart of the Presidency's electrification target, and the Türkiye Emissions Trading System could be one of the foundations of this document.
- Preparations for the next update of the NDC could begin during the Presidency. Because the second global stocktake, which will begin in Antalya, will conclude in 2028, the new NDC could reflect the outcomes of this process.[206] The Climate Law and the emissions trading system and green taxonomy regulations could serve as the basis for this work. Announcing this step would show that the Presidency backs its emphasis on implementation with Türkiye's own steps.
- The even-handed position should be made visible through process management. Indicators of this position will include the distribution of the groups taking part in consultations on the political decision text and of the ministerial co-facilitators. Further indicators will be

205 "Global Methane Pledge", Global Methane Pledge, accessed October 2, 2026, https://www.globalmethanepledge.org.

206 On the conclusion of the second global stocktake in 2028, see IISD, "Daily Report for 8 June 2026". On the start of the stocktake at COP31, see "Cooperation in the Face of a Changing World", 5. For the five-year cycle, see "Paris Agreement", 19.

the composition of the second group of countries in the Climate Implementation Bridge and the bridging proposals in the Article 9 discussion. The inclusion in the Presidency's advisory boards of ministers from the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Mali, Togo, Fiji and North Macedonia, alongside nine former COP Presidents, is a step in this direction.[207] With regard to observers, regular consultation, civil society access to the monitoring mechanism of the electrification pledge, and public responses to criticism will support trust in the Presidency.

- Türkiye should work to place its skilled negotiators in co-facilitator roles. Negotiations are mainly conducted in contact groups and informal consultations, and these are run by co-facilitators proposed by the SB Chairs and approved by the Parties. These roles will also give concrete form to the even-handed position at the technical level. They will leave a lasting capacity that supports the country's negotiating strength after the Presidency.
- Presidency initiatives should be turned into lasting frameworks after the handover. Türkiye's Presidency will end in November 2027, when COP32 opens in Addis Ababa.[208] The Presidency is among the partners of the Electrify Now platform. It should be decided now who will run this platform, the electrification pledge, the Climate Implementation Bridge and the COP31 Marine Litter Action Platform after that date. Work on oceans could be turned into regional cooperation with neighbors in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The relationship with Ethiopia, which will hold the COP32 Presidency, could be turned into a handover partnership.

SB64 handed over to the COP31 Presidency an agenda whose preparation is unfinished and a defined room for maneuver. Within this room for maneuver, the Presidency has set up its own tools, announced its targets and chosen the political decision text as the tool through which it will seek the consent of the Parties. Whether the new position of Türkiye that became vis-

207 "Advisory Boards of the COP31 Presidency", COP31 Türkiye Antalya, accessed November 5, 2026, https://cop31.tr/advisory-boards. The former COP Presidents include Fabius, Mezouar, Kurtyka, Schmidt, Sharma, Shoukry, Al Jaber, Babayev and Corrêa do Lago.

208 Decision 18/CP.30, para. 6.

ible in Bonn lasts will depend on completing these tools in Antalya through even-handed process management, supporting them with national steps and sustaining them after the handover.

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REPORT

FROM BONN TO ANTALYA: SB64 Negotiations and Türkiye's COP31 Presidency Strategy

DİLEK AĞA

Türkiye is presiding over COP31, which is meeting in Antalya on November 9-20, 2026, without being a member of any negotiating group and as the only Party that was removed from the Annex II list but remains in Annex I. This report examines the SB64 sessions held in Bonn in June 2026, and the process from there to the pre-COP in the Pacific, from the perspective of this Presidency. In Bonn, progress was made on technical and institutional matters, while the core negotiations on mitigation and adaptation passed to Antalya as open agenda items. At the same session, the Presidency turned four of its thematic priorities under the Action Agenda into numerical global targets. The report treats the difference between the negotiation track, which is subject to consensus, and the voluntary implementation track as the determinant of the Presidency's room for maneuver. It discusses how Türkiye's position outside the groups can be turned into an even-handed presidency. The final section offers policy recommendations on the management of the negotiation process, support for the Presidency's agenda through national policy steps, the profile of an even-handed presidency and the period after the Presidency.

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