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• ANALYSIS

Sectoral Priorities in Türkiye-Africa Climate Cooperation at COP31

Tunç Demirtaş, Afifa A. Warsame

SECTORAL PRIORITIES IN TÜRKİYE–AFRICA CLIMATE COOPERATION AT COP31

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Considering this situation, this analysis asks how Türkiye's COP31 presidency can strengthen climate cooperation with Africa.

SUMMARY

This analysis examines how Türkiye's COP31 presidency can strengthen climate cooperation with Africa. COP31 will be held in Antalya in November 2026. Under the arrangement reached at COP30 in Belém, Türkiye will host and preside over the summit, while Australia will lead the negotiations. The conference comes at a moment when trust in global climate action is weakening and the United States has withdrawn from the UNFCCC, creating an opening for non-Western actors to shape the multilateral agenda. While Türkiye-Africa relations have deepened over three decades, climate-related issues have remained a secondary item on their agenda. The analysis identifies five priority sectors where Turkish capabilities align with African needs: renewable energy technology transfer, climate-smart agriculture, climate finance, early warning systems, and climate diplomacy. It argues that COP31 should be treated as the first stage of a two-COP process extending to COP32 in Ethiopia, and that its success should be measured not by declarations signed but by whether it produces implementable projects, designated institutions, and a credible monitoring process.

INTRODUCTION

The 31st Conference of the Parties (COP31) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will be hosted by Türkiye and take place in Antalya between 9 and 20 November 2026. The conference comes at a time when trust in global climate action is weakening, and its outcomes will mostly affect the regions that contributed least to the problem. Türkiye takes on this role while also pursuing its own green transformation and its goal of achieving net-zero emissions by 2053.¹

The world is expected to warm by around 2.8°C by the end of this century under current policies, which shows the hesitation of countries to fully commit to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.² For this reason, COP31 is expected to matter less for new promises and more for putting cooperation into practice.

COP31 is a critical step that will consolidate Türkiye's standing in global climate diplomacy. Under the arrangement reached at COP30 in Belém, Türkiye will host and preside over the summit, while Australia will lead the negotiations. Within this division of labour, Türkiye will lead the Action Agenda and shape the thematic priorities of the process. Gathering delegations from around 200

¹ "2053 Yılı İtibarıyla Net Sıfır Emisyon Hedefini Gerçekleştirmeyi Öngörüyoruz", İklim.gov.tr, 2026, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://iklim.gov.tr/2053-yili-itibariyla-net-sifir-emisyon-hedefini-gerceklestirmeyi-ongoruyoruz-haber-4173>.

² United Nations Environment Programme, "Emissions Gap Report 2025: Off Target", 4 November 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2025>.

countries, the conference offers Türkiye a broad diplomatic space in which to strengthen its bilateral and multilateral ties. The forum offers Türkiye an opportunity to explore new areas for cooperation in different fields such as climate, energy, and development. More than acting as a bridge between developed and developing countries, Türkiye can bring to the table actors that are often left at the edges of global climate talks, fostering dialogue and creating a more conducive environment for cooperative engagement. As pointed out by Minister of Environment, Urbanisation and Climate Change Murat Kurum, Türkiye will emphasize “dialogue, consensus, and action.”³

Besides this, COP31 will deepen Türkiye’s engagement with African states on climate issues specifically. Over the last three decades, Türkiye has made remarkable progress in expanding its relations with African countries from economic, political, and developmental perspectives, yet climate-related issues have remained a secondary item on the agenda of these relations. This makes COP31 particularly important for strengthening these ties and translating them into concrete cooperation. Furthermore, the hosting of COP32 in Ethiopia in 2027⁴ makes Ethiopia the fifth country in Africa to have hosted a COP meeting, following Morocco in 2001 & 2016, Kenya in 2006, South Africa in 2011, and Egypt in 2022.⁵ This back-to-back hosting presents a unique window for strengthening Africa’s role in global climate governance and for deepening their partnership with Türkiye.

Considering this situation, this analysis asks how Türkiye’s COP31 presidency can strengthen climate cooperation with Africa. It contends that while African nations have a deep and strategic relation with Türkiye, one that touches upon different sectors such as economy, security, infrastructure development, culture and diplomacy, COP31 offers a strategic opportunity to transform existing ties into a structured and sustained climate partnership. As the 2022-2026 joint Action Plan shows, Türkiye-Africa climate cooperation has already begun to concentrate on sustainable development, renewable energy, and agricultural resilience.⁶ Building on this foundation, Türkiye’s COP31 presidency is well



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3 “Türkiye Eyes COP31 as New Threshold for Climate Action”, TRT World, 12 March 2026, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.trtworld.com/article/5ba0c91a5b80>.

4 “Ethiopia’s Selection to Host COP-32 Affirms Its Commitment to Combating Climate Change”, ENA English, 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_7754508.

5 UNFCCC, “Conference of the Parties (COP)”, United Nations Climate Change, 2024, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-cop>.

6 “Africa–Türkiye Joint Action Plan 2022-2026”, adopted at the 3rd Africa–Türkiye Partnership Summit, Istanbul, 18 December 2021; see also “The 3rd Africa–Türkiye Summit Adopts Five Strategic Cooperation Areas for the Period 2022-2026”, African Union, 20 December 2021, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20211220/3rd-africa-turkiye-summit-adopts-five-strategic-cooperation-areas-period-2022>.

placed to steer climate cooperation with Africa toward more targeted, scalable, and mutually beneficial outcomes.

The first section of the analysis focuses on Africa's climate position, highlighting how African states are affected by climate change. The second section addresses the contributors to the severity of Africa's climate conditions, highlighting local problems and capacity challenges. The third section explores the most important strategic areas of Africa-Türkiye climate cooperation, such as renewable energy technology, climate-smart agriculture, climate finance, early warning systems, and climate diplomacy, underscoring how COP31 might strengthen this relationship by aligning African needs with Turkish capabilities. Finally, a conclusion outlines the challenges facing this cooperation.

CLIMATE CHALLENGES IN AFRICA

Africa is highly vulnerable to climate change, facing several environmental issues that directly affect individuals and communities across the continent. The major consequences include rising temperatures, increasingly recurrent floods, and droughts. These environmental challenges have led to the destruction of infrastructure, crops, and livestock, the spread of infectious diseases, conflicts, and displacement, contributing to Africa's economic stagnation.

Africa has warmed steadily since 1920, with average temperatures rising by approximately 0.13°C per decade, or about 1.3°C per century. While this trend aligns with global patterns, the rate of warming in Africa is faster than the global average. The warmest years on record have all occurred in the most recent decade, and the continent's average temperature was about 0.61°C higher than the 1991-2020 baseline in 2023⁷ and 0.86°C higher in 2024⁸.

The increased temperature affects a wide range of sectors, including health care, educational institutions, power supply, energy consumption, agriculture, and food security, leading to numerous mortality risks and socio-economic issues. Frequent heat waves cause power outages, which in turn hinder the use of fans and other cooling mechanisms, leading to severe health discomfort and potential health risks.⁹ Moreover, the high temperature affects the educational institutions, forcing schools to be closed, severely disrupting education and negatively impacting children's learning.¹⁰

7 "State of the Climate in Africa 2023", WMO, 2023, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://library.wmo.int/records/item/69000-state-of-the-climate-in-africa-2023>.

8 "Year-End: How Climate Change Has Impacted Africa So Far This Century", Anadolu Agency, 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/year-ender-how-climate-change-has-impacted-africa-so-far-this-century/3781058>.

9 "Heat Wave in East Africa", NASA Earth Observatory, 26 March 2024, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/images/152600/heat-wave-in-east-africa>.

10 "Heat Wave in East Africa".

In addition, extreme heat contributes to crop failures and water shortages, intensifying food insecurity and threatening the food supply in several regions. Because of this, drought remains a persistent and devastating hazard. Africa experiences recurrent, increasingly intense droughts, with significant dry events occurring every few years, most notably the 2020-2023 eastern Horn of Africa drought, described as the worst in 70 years. Since 1999, poor rainy seasons occur in East Africa every two to three years, increasing from a previous five to six-year cycle.¹¹ Droughts have disastrous results in areas whose people depend entirely on agriculture and livestock, such that the affected people are forced to migrate in search of more promising land or more hospitable living conditions. In addition to this, scarcity of water may provoke conflicts over resources, further destabilizing already fragile regions.

Flooding is another major climate-related challenge in Africa. Africa experiences damaging floods every year, with major events happening annually, particularly in East, West, and Southern Africa. While major floods are frequent, the most extreme downpours are becoming more likely, with rainfall events once considered rare in parts of Southern Africa now estimated to recur roughly once every 50 years.¹² Flood exposure in Africa has led to an increase in water-borne diseases, vector-borne diseases, and zoonotic diseases such as malaria and cholera. Floods significantly increase the number of cholera outbreaks due to the lack of sanitation and displacement.

Despite experiencing some of the most severe consequences of climate change, Africa contributes minimally to global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions, but bears the burden of climate change. Africa only contributes 3 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions. In 2020, the average per-capita carbon footprint on the continent was only about 0.95 tonnes of CO₂ equivalent, while the same figure for the United States was about 14 tonnes.¹³ This figure suggests that developed countries like the United States contributed more to global greenhouse gas emissions compared to Africa. However, Africa's carbon emissions grew by 191 percent between 1980 and 2021.¹⁴



Despite experiencing some of the most severe consequences of climate change, Africa contributes minimally to global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions, but bears the burden of climate change.

11 UNDRR, “Horn of Africa Floods and Drought, 2020-2023 – Forensic Analysis”, 17 September 2024, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.undrr.org/resource/horn-africa-floods-and-drought-2020-2023-forensic-analysis>.

12 Mogomotsi Magome, “How Climate Change Worsened Deadly Floods in Southern Africa”, Euronews, 29 January 2026, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.euronews.com/2026/01/29/deadly-floods-in-southern-africa-worsened-by-climate-change-study-shows>.

13 African Development Bank, “African Economic Outlook 2022: Highlights”, 25 May 2022, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/african-economic-outlook-2022-highlights>.

14 James Karuga, “Africa’s Climate Paradox: Low CO₂ Emissions Yet the Highest Global Deforestation Rate”, DevelopmentAid, 13 October 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.developmentaid.org/news-stream/post/200852/africas-climate-paradox>.

FACTORS BEHIND AFRICA'S CLIMATE SEVERITY

Africa's climate severity is not only a result of global emissions but is also shaped by several pressures within the continent itself. These pressures fall into two broad categories: factors that intensify the physical hazard itself, such as deforestation, mining, and armed conflict, and factors that weaken the continent's capacity to respond, such as limited finance, weak institutions, the digital divide, and corruption. Deforestation stands at the forefront of this picture. Global deforestation between 1990 and 2020 decreased significantly, falling annually from 15 million hectares (ha) in 1990-2000 to 10.2 million ha in 2015-2020. In Africa, however, no such decline occurred, and the continent recorded its highest annual deforestation between 2015 and 2020 at 4.4 million ha per year.¹⁵

The dominant driver of deforestation in Africa is agricultural activities. The annual average of forest conversion to cropland areas contains 74 percent of the total deforestation, and the conversion of forest to grassland contributed to 13.19 percent of the deforestation. In the rural areas of Africa, there is also charcoal production and wood extraction, especially where wood fuel is the primary energy source.¹⁶

Mining activities in Africa are major contributors to climate change through high greenhouse gas emissions, deforestation, and water pollution, while simultaneously being highly vulnerable to climate-driven disruptions like droughts and floods. Increased demand for minerals with poor management causes severe environmental damage and risks of stranded assets.¹⁷

Africa is also home to prolonged conflicts, hosting about 20 percent of the world's conflicts. These conflicts cause death, injury, infrastructure destruction, poverty, and forced migration, but their impact does not stop there. They also affect the environment directly. While conflicts in Africa stem from multidimensional causes, in some regions competition over water resources, farmlands, and grazing lands can deepen existing tensions. This could be understood as a result of climate change and a contributor to the severe climate situation. Conflicts can cause land degradation, heat increase, agricultural destruction, and pollution of air and water. In some conflict-affected areas, including Somalia, terrorist organisations and other non-state armed actors may damage farmland, water wells, and

15 FAO, *The State of the World's Forests 2024: Forest-Sector Innovations towards a More Sustainable Future* (FAO, 2024), accessed 31 July 2026, <https://doi.org/10.4060/cd1211en>.

16 FAO, "Turning the Tide on Deforestation in Africa", FO:AFWC/2022/4, African Forestry and Wildlife Commission Twenty-Third Session, Kinshasa, 22-26 August 2022, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/0c82891f-b699-4a7c-b937-981eb50df8ef>.

17 "Chinese Mining in West Africa: Responding to the Environmental and Social Impacts", Atlantic Council, 6 October 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/chinese-mining-in-west-africa/>.

other natural resources in order to prevent rivals or local communities from benefiting from them. Conflicts have also led to unsustainable land use practices such as illegal logging and land clearing for agriculture. Armed conflict causes habitat destruction, increased poaching, and environmental contamination because of the bombings, military debris, and demolition of targeted infrastructure.¹⁸

On the other hand, Africa faces a significant gap between its climate finance needs and the resources currently available. The continent receives only about 3 percent of global climate finance despite high vulnerability.¹⁹ Furthermore, financing clean energy projects in Africa typically comes with interest rates ranging from 15 percent to 18 percent, compared to only 2 percent to 5 percent in Europe and the United States.²⁰ These high costs reduce the commercial viability of renewable energy investments and discourage private sector participation. In addition to financial constraints, many African countries struggle with institutional preparedness. Limited technical expertise and institutional capacity often hinder countries from successfully navigating these processes. The continent faces limited technology absorption capacity. The mere “transfer of technology” is insufficient. Countries often lack the expertise and systems needed to adapt, maintain, and further develop these technologies in line with local conditions.²¹

The digital divide compounds these challenges further. With only about 37 percent of Africa’s population having access to the internet,²² the adoption of digital climate solutions, such as early warning systems, climate-smart agriculture, and data-driven resource management, is significantly constrained.²³

Corruption is another factor limiting Africa’s capacity to adapt to climate change. Studies show that there is a direct relationship between corruption and the ineffective mitigation of climate change.²⁴ In some African countries, cor-



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18 Negasi Solomon et al., “Environmental Impacts and Causes of Conflict in the Horn of Africa: A Review”, *Earth-Science Reviews* 177 (February 2018): 284-290, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.earscirev.2017.11.016>.

19 Alfred Sloley et al., “Landscape of Climate Finance in Africa 2024”, Climate Policy Initiative, 2024, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Landscape-of-Climate-Finance-in-Africa-2024.pdf>.

20 “Climate Finance Has Failed Africa Twice Over. Here’s How to Fix It”, State of the Planet, 18 March 2026, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2026/03/18/climate-finance-has-failed-africa-twice-over-heres-how-to-fix-it/>.

21 “Capacity Gaps, Not Capital, Limiting Africa’s Climate Finance Readiness”, Sustainable Stories Africa, 2026, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://sustainablestories.africa/insights-and-data/capacity-gaps-not-capital-limiting-africas-climate-finance-readiness>.

22 Chido Munyati, “Accelerating Digital Inclusion in Africa”, Brookings, 5 May 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/accelerating-digital-inclusion-in-africa/>.

23 Margareth Mollé et al., “Digital Technologies to Accelerate the Impact of Climate Smart Agriculture by Next-Generation Farmers in Africa”, *Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems* 9 (2025), <https://doi.org/10.3389/fsufs.2025.1462328>.

24 Aksel Sundström et al., “The Impact of Corruption on Climate Change Mitigation: A Review Article”, *Environmental Politics* (2026): 1-25, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2026.2621602>.

ruption and governance gaps make environmental legislation harder to enforce, weaken the sustainable management of natural resources, and limit the capacity to adapt to climate change. Sub-Saharan Africa scored 32/100 on the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index.²⁵ Some of the countries most vulnerable to climate change also face serious problems in terms of public administration capacity, transparency, and accountability. This can undermine the effective use of climate finance and the sustainability of adaptation projects.²⁶ Corruption facilitates illegal logging, deforestation, and illegal appropriation of state land, destroying critical carbon sinks. Funds intended for resilient infrastructure are often stolen or misused, leaving populations vulnerable to droughts and floods. Bribery allows companies to bypass environmental impact assessments, allowing polluting industries to operate unchecked.

To sum up, the severity of climate conditions in Africa is driven by several interconnected factors such as deforestation, mining activities, conflicts and armed groups' actions, limited climate financing, high investment costs, weak institutional capacity, low technological readiness, the digital divide, and corruption. Africa's climate severity cannot be attributed to a single factor but rather to interconnected structural and environmental challenges.

AFRICA-TÜRKİYE CLIMATE COOPERATION: STRATEGIC PRIORITIES FOR COP31

Türkiye's hosting of the 31st Conference of the Parties (COP31) is expected to have a significant implication for global climate governance and presents a valuable opportunity to enhance climate cooperation with Africa. Africa, as one of the regions that is most affected by climate change, needs to play an active role in international climate negotiations to advance mitigation and adaptation efforts and to ensure its priorities are adequately presented. In this context, COP31 offers a critical platform for Türkiye and African partners to establish new commitments and operationalize the commitments that have been made.

Sectors like renewable energy technology, climate-smart agriculture, climate finance, early warning systems, and climate diplomacy provide opportunities for Africa and Türkiye to collaborate in ways that produce real results. By leveraging their respective strengths in these priority sectors within the COP31 process,

25 "Corruption Perceptions Index 2025", Transparency International, 10 February 2026, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2025>.

26 "2024 Corruption Perceptions Index: Climate Funds at Risk of Theft as Sub-Saharan Africa Faces Some of the Highest Levels of Corruption", Transparency International, 11 February 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.transparency.org/en/press/2024-corruption-perceptions-index-climate-funds-at-risk-of-theft-as-sub-saharan-africa-faces-some-of-the-highest-levels-of-corruption>.

Africa-Türkiye climate cooperation can enter a new phase and move from declarations to concrete projects.

RENEWABLE ENERGY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Türkiye's presidency of COP31 can create a specific opportunity to embed renewable technology transfer for Africa. Africa holds an extraordinary endowment of renewable energy potential. However, it has historically lacked the manufacturing capacity, financing instruments, and grid infrastructure to exploit it, even though African leaders at the 2025 Africa Climate Summit (ACS2) called for Africa's share of global renewable energy investments to rise from a meagre 2 percent today to at least 20 percent by 2030.²⁷

Most African countries rely on fossil fuels for electricity production, with natural gas (49 percent) and coal (25 percent) dominating the energy mix, accounting for over 70 percent of total generation.²⁸ Natural gas is the fastest-growing source across the continent, although significant regional variations exist, such as heavy coal reliance in South Africa and high hydro use in Ethiopia, and high usage of diesel generators in Somalia.²⁹

Türkiye, on the other hand, is experiencing one of the boldest clean energy industrial buildouts in the developing world. Türkiye installed 1.3 GW and 1.9 GW worth of onshore wind projects in 2024 and 2025, respectively. Türkiye is among Europe's leading countries in terms of annually installed wind capacity.³⁰

The cooperation of Africa and Türkiye on renewable energy technology cannot be based on only a buyer-seller relationship since Türkiye has developed a growing domestic manufacturing base. This means Türkiye is not merely a consumer of renewable technology, but is developing the industrial capacity to produce and export it. For example, the Alaçatı Wind Power Plant became one of the first in Türkiye to be equipped with locally produced wind turbines manufactured by Aselsan, with a tower height of 100 metres and a rotor diameter of 136 metres, alongside power converters and generators also produced domestically. On the solar side, Kalyon Energy operates one of Europe's first fully integrated



leveraging their respective strengths in these priority sectors within the COP31 process, Africa-Türkiye climate cooperation can enter a new phase and move from declarations to concrete projects.

27 "PM Abiy's Africa Climate Innovation Compact, African Climate Facility Established at Conclusion of ACS2", ENA English, 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, https://www.ena.et/web/eng/w/eng_7316480.

28 "Africa", Ember, 13 April 2026, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://ember-energy.org/countries-and-regions/africa/>.

29 "Somalia Builds Renewable Energy Push to Tackle High Electricity Costs", Ecofin Agency, 2026, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.ecofinagency.com/news-industry/1301-51897-somalia-builds-renewable-energy-push-to-tackle-high-electricity-costs>.

30 "Türkiye's Wind Sector Expands Capacity and Industry Base", Windtech International, 30 March 2026, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.windtech-international.com/windtech-markets/tuerkiyes-wind-sector-expands-capacity-and-industry-base>.

solar panel production facilities, covering all production stages except the critical raw material polysilicon.³¹

African states can develop their renewable energy technology through strategic partnerships with Türkiye. Türkiye is a valuable partner in this regard, because it increased its wind and solar capacity from zero to over 35,000 megawatts in 23 years.³² What makes this experience useful for Africa is not only the speed of the change but also the policy behind it. The most powerful vehicle for turning this into structured cooperation is adapting Türkiye's YEKA (Yenilenebilir Enerji Kaynak Alanları-Renewable Energy Resource Zone) model for African contexts. YEKA bundles large-scale generation licenses with mandatory local content requirements, which have driven domestic manufacturing investment within Türkiye. Such a model could help establish local manufacturing capacity in Africa rather than simply exporting finished equipment.

The storage dimension is also growing in importance. Türkiye has allocated mandatory storage-integrated renewable licenses including 18.4 GW of wind and 14.7 GW of solar, with battery storage expected to support system stability and facilitate higher shares of variable generation.³³ This expertise in integrating storage at scale is highly transferable to African grids; despite their high solar and wind potential, most African countries struggle to manage fluctuations in their energy infrastructure, where intermittency and weak interconnection have become chronic constraints.

Pairing Türkiye's manufacturing strength with Africa's renewable energy potential, within the COP31 framework, could produce a genuinely mutual partnership — one that speeds up renewable adoption, builds local industry, and supports sustainable economic development on the African side.

CLIMATE-SMART AGRICULTURE

Agriculture sits at the intersection of every climate risk Africa faces. In 2025, more than 282 million people in Africa faced hunger.³⁴ For instance, in Somalia, by early 2026, an estimated 6.5 million people were facing acute food insecurity.³⁵ Acute food insecurity results from a combination of conflicts, economic

31 Özgür Orhangazi, "Solar and Wind Power Transition in Türkiye: An Input-Output Analysis of Growth, Employment, and Current Account Effects", UNCTAD, 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, https://unctad.org/system/files/information-document/unda2030d13-turkiye-wind-solar_en.pdf.

32 "Türkiye's Wind and Solar Investments Hit Record Capacity in 2024: Turkish Energy Minister", Anadolu Agency, 2024, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/energy/renewable/turkiye-s-wind-and-solar-investments-hit-record-capacity-in-2024-turkish-energy-minister/49079>.

33 "EPDK, Depolamalı Elektrik Üretimine Yönelik 33,1 Gigavat Kurulu Güç İçin Ön Lisans Verdi", Anadolu Agency, 27 March 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/enerjiterminali/elektrik/epdk-depolamali-elektrik-uretimine-yonelik-33-1-gigavat-kurulu-guc-icin-on-lisans-verdi/48204>.

34 "Confronting Alarming Food Insecurity Trends in Africa: An Expert's View", IFRC, September 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.ifrc.org/article/confronting-alarming-food-insecurity-trends-africa-experts-view>.

35 "Somalia: Number of People Going Hungry Nearly Doubles in a Year", United Nations Office at Geneva, 24 February 2026, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.ungeneva.org/en/news-media/news/2026/02/116166/somalia-number-people-going-hungry-nearly-doubles-year>.

instability, and severe climate events such as droughts, floods, and rising temperatures. The structural vulnerability becomes very deep. 80 percent of Africa’s freshwater is consumed for agriculture. At the same time, it is difficult to refill the aquifers after they are drained, rivers dry up without reaching the sea, and erratic rainfall increases.³⁶

Türkiye is one of the leading practitioners of precision drip irrigation technologies, which were developed for desert-like conditions that are rapidly becoming common in Africa. The expertise accumulated by the agri-tech companies of Türkiye, as well as Türkiye’s experience in dealing with water shortages in its semi-desertic regions, can easily apply to the drought-prone areas of Africa. In Somalia, for example, the use of traditional infrastructure, which mainly includes the barrages and canals that have fallen into disrepair, has led to a switch to rehabilitation projects, solar water pumps, and small-scale drought-resistant irrigation systems. Small-scale drip irrigation is also common in Somalia, but mostly due to the assistance provided by NGOs. It proves that there is a strong interest in using technology at the smallholder level. Cooperation with Türkiye at a high level could facilitate the transfer of drip irrigation technology.

At COP31, representatives from various countries and the private sector from around the globe, particularly from African countries and Türkiye, would participate. At such a conference, they could explore and even agree upon their ability to adopt smart agriculture and water management in Africa. If that happens, small, NGO-led irrigation projects could grow into larger programmes run jointly by Türkiye and African states.



Pairing Türkiye’s manufacturing strength with Africa’s renewable energy potential, within the COP31 framework, could produce a genuinely mutual partnership — one that speeds up renewable adoption, builds local industry, and supports sustainable economic development on the African side.

CLIMATE FINANCE

The Addis Ababa Declaration positioned Africa as a renewable energy hub and called for climate financing on better terms, with a particular focus on grant-based funding rather than loans that push African countries into debt. A landmark institutional moment was achieved at the 2025 Africa Climate Summit, where major financial institutions, such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), Africa50, and the Africa Finance Corporation (AFC), signed a Cooperation Framework to operationalize the Africa Green Industrialization Initiative (AGII). The AGII is designed to accelerate renewable-powered industries, expand regional value chains, and establish Africa as a global hub for sustainable trade. It prioritizes mobilizing African capital first,

³⁶ “Confronting Alarming Food Insecurity Trends in Africa”.

de-risking projects, and aligning policies to attract global investment, demonstrating African leadership in shaping the global energy transition.³⁷

Building on this emerging African-led financial architecture, Türkiye, as the host of COP31, can take on the role of a South-South industrial and investment partner. Thanks to its multidimensional relations with both developed and developing economies, Türkiye has the potential to be a reliable and complementary industrial and investment partner for African countries. COP31 offers a specific, time-bound opening for this. COP30 in Belém delivered a historic commitment to mobilize USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035 for climate action and called for adaptation finance to be at least tripled by 2035.³⁸ COP31 in Antalya now inherits the mandate to convert those Belém promises into verifiable action, with a particular focus on closing the emissions gap and fully operationalizing the loss and damage fund.

In this regard, Türkiye is uniquely positioned to convene a dedicated Africa-focused climate finance platform. Such an event would bring together African finance ministers, Turkish private sector actors, AfDB, and multilateral climate funds to populate the AGII project pipeline with concrete bankable initiatives. This approach would not only strengthen Africa-Türkiye cooperation but also provide a tangible South-South finance outcome that distinguishes it from previous COPs dominated by North-to-South financing discussions.

EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND CLIMATE RESILIENCE INFRASTRUCTURE

The mortality and displacement toll from climate events in Africa is not primarily a function of hazard severity but of warning gaps. Although many African countries have some basic meteorological monitoring capacity, nearly all of the African Union member states lack a fully functional multi-hazard early warning system containing the four pillars of disaster risk knowledge, detection and forecasting, warning dissemination, and preparedness to respond. The consequences are visible. Floods, heatwaves, and droughts forced hundreds of thousands of people from their homes across Africa, in large part because communities lacked the hours or days of advance notice that would have allowed evacuation and asset protection.

Infrastructure is being built, but slowly and with limited effect. The African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development (ACMAD) has

37 “Africa Launches Landmark Green Industrialisation Framework with \$100 Billion in New Commitments”, Africa50, 16 September 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.africa50.com/media/news/article/africa-launches-landmark-green-industrialisation-framework-with-100-billion-in-new-commitments/>.

38 United Nations Türkiye, “As Türkiye Prepares to Host COP31, a Look Back at COP30’s Key Outcomes”, 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://turkiye.un.org/en/307475-t%C3%BCrkiye-prepares-host-cop31-look-back-cop30%E2%80%99s-key-outcomes>.

inaugurated a new Continental Multi-Hazard Advisory Centre in Niger, forming a component of the African Multi-Hazard Early Warning System for Early Action, and connected with situation rooms already established in Nairobi and Addis Ababa.³⁹ These situation rooms allow relevant data to be rapidly collected, processed, and exchanged, improving disaster preparedness and early action across the continent. However, at the national level, only about 45 percent of African countries have early warning systems and many of those are still incomplete, missing the communication to the communities.⁴⁰ And the gap is not only in the institutional architecture, but also in the technical capability and data infrastructure feeding into it.

This is precisely where Türkiye’s offer is concrete and underutilized. Türkiye’s State Meteorological Service (MGM), even though it is geographically more limited than ACMAD, which brings together more than 50 national meteorological services, represents a highly advanced national system with strong operational capacity, including high forecast accuracy, extensive observation networks, and advanced technologies such as radar systems and real-time data processing. This asymmetry creates a clear opportunity for strategic cooperation. The synergy between MGM’s technological capacity and ACMAD’s broad geographical scope could produce an effective relationship that strengthens forecasting infrastructure in Africa through capacity building. Such cooperation is already emerging. As of August 2025, Volkan Mutlu Coşkun of MGM and Dr. Ousmane Ndiaye of ACMAD had already held discussions on collaboration in the domain of meteorology.⁴¹

When it comes to disaster management, there are various organizations and platforms in Africa, including the African Risk Capacity (ARC) Group and the African Union Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Unit. However, these systems remain fragmented and largely focused on after-disaster response rather than prevention.

Here, Türkiye’s AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Authority) offers an important model. Unlike many African systems, AFAD is designed to focus on both proactive risk management and reactive crisis management. Cooperation between AFAD and African institutions already exists, but such engagement has largely focused on humanitarian assistance. There is therefore sig-



Cooperation between AFAD and African institutions already exists, but such engagement has largely focused on humanitarian assistance.

39 UNDRR, “Early Warnings for All of Africa”, 2022, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.undrr.org/news/early-warnings-all-africa>.

40 United Nations Africa Renewal, “Building a Resilient Africa through Disaster Risk Reduction, Preparedness”, 31 October 2024, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://africarenewal.un.org/en/magazine/building-resilient-africa-through-disaster-risk-reduction-preparedness>.

41 Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Environment, Urbanisation and Climate Change, Turkish State Meteorological Service, 2025, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.mgm.gov.tr/FILES/Haberler/2025/21.08.2025%20ACMAD.pdf>.

nificant untapped potential to expand this into capacity-building, early warning integration, and resilience planning.

Türkiye's hosting of COP31 creates a timely opportunity to elevate this cooperation into a structured agenda, serving as a platform to launch joint Africa-Türkiye initiatives on early warning systems, including technology transfer, training programs, and data-sharing frameworks. Looking ahead to COP32, expected to be hosted in Africa, early collaboration in this domain would position both sides to shape a multi-year climate resilience strategy, moving from fragmented efforts toward coordinated, prevention-oriented systems across the continent.

CLIMATE DIPLOMACY AND MULTILATERAL POSITIONING

Climate diplomacy is the area with the highest strategic leverage, because it requires no large capital flows and no long project development cycles. It requires alignment of political positions and coordination of messaging at the moments that matter most in global climate governance.



The reduced role of the United States in climate diplomacy raises the question of which actors and coalitions will contribute more to the continuity of the multilateral process.

The United States became the first country globally to initiate the process of withdrawing from the UNFCCC on January 7, 2026, and it formally withdrew from the Paris Agreement on January 27, 2026.⁴² This development creates new uncertainty in global climate governance in terms of leadership, financing, and diplomatic coordination. In this environment, Türkiye and African states can take on a more coordinated role in supporting the functioning of the multilateral system. It also opens space for non-Western actors to assume a more prominent role in shaping the multilateral agenda. African states and Türkiye are well-positioned to step into that space, but they will be substantially more effective doing so in coordination than separately.

Africa arrives at COP31 with unusual collective diplomatic strength and a clarified agenda. African officials have been undertaking structured training in economic and climate diplomacy specifically to ensure that African negotiators enter COP31 as “influential architects” of climate and economic policy rather than as “observers.”⁴³ At COP31, Africa should advance its key priorities ahead of the 2027 African COP under Ethiopia, ensuring that the

⁴² World Resources Institute, “Statement: The United States Withdraws from the UNFCCC”, 7 January 2026, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.wri.org/news/statement-united-states-withdraws-unfccc>; UNFCCC, “Step Back from Climate Cooperation Will Hurt U.S. Economy: Statement from UN Climate Chief on U.S. Withdrawal from UNFCCC”, 8 January 2026, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://unfccc.int/news/step-back-from-climate-cooperation-will-hurt-us-economy-statement-from-un-climate-chief-on-us>.

⁴³ UNECA, “Economic and Climate Diplomacy: African Officials Equipped to Advance Continental Priorities”, 2021, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://www.uneca.org/stories/economic-and-climate-diplomacy-african-officials-equipped-to-advance-continental-priorities-0>.

continent shapes the global climate agenda during a period of geopolitical uncertainty.⁴⁴

The reduced role of the United States in climate diplomacy raises the question of which actors and coalitions will contribute more to the continuity of the multilateral process. Türkiye's position between different regions, geographically, economically, and diplomatically, aligns with Africa's need for a COP host that is genuinely committed to elevating Southern priorities rather than managing them around the edges of a Northern-dominated agenda. The incoming COP31 presidency has stated that the world is entering a decisive period for the future of climate action and that this demands concrete and resolute steps, with the presidency's focus explicitly spanning clean energy, industrialization, resilience, agriculture, and finance.

CONCLUSION AND CHALLENGES

Türkiye's upcoming COP31 presidency presents a significant opportunity to deepen cooperation between Türkiye and Africa on climate change, particularly in supporting Africa's climate risk mitigation efforts.

However, several challenges may limit the effectiveness of this cooperation. One major issue is developing cooperative projects that can be adapted to all African countries. African countries are highly diverse, with different policies, economic priorities, and levels of climate vulnerability. This makes it difficult to apply a single strategy across the continent. In addition, global competition and geopolitical interests in Africa pose another obstacle. Both major and emerging powers are actively engaged in the region, each pursuing their own strategic interests, which can complicate Türkiye's efforts to implement climate initiatives.

Another challenge is the difficulty of transferring policies directly from Türkiye to African contexts. Differences in geography, governance systems, and local community needs require tailored, context-specific solutions rather than a one-size-fits-all approach. Furthermore, risks such as weak implementation, corruption, and the presence of non-state armed groups in some regions can hinder project effectiveness. There is also the difficulty of balancing climate goals with national interests.

The central question, therefore, is not whether Türkiye and African countries possess complementary climate interests, but whether these interests can be translated into an institutional architecture capable of surviving beyond COP31. Antalya should not be treated as a stand-alone diplomatic event, but as the first stage of a two-COP process extending to COP32 in Ethiopia. A joint Türki-

⁴⁴ ISS Africa, "2026: Africa's Year to Turn Climate Ambition into Action", 2026, accessed 31 July 2026, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/2026-africa-s-year-to-turn-climate-ambition-into-action>.

ye-Africa climate cooperation mechanism, supported by clearly identified pilot countries, sector-specific working groups, measurable benchmarks, and regular progress reporting, would provide continuity between the two conferences. Rather than attempting to develop continent-wide programmes from the outset, cooperation should begin with a limited number of demonstrative projects that can later be adapted and scaled according to national conditions. The success of COP31 should therefore be measured not by the number of declarations signed, but by whether it creates implementable projects, designated institutions, financing pathways, and a credible monitoring process.

Türkiye's comparative advantage in this process will depend less on the overall volume of finance it can mobilize and more on the type of partnership it can offer. Türkiye's comparative advantage lies less in competing with other major financing actors through the same instruments than in its ability to offer a complementary partnership model that integrates renewable energy manufacturing, agricultural technology, meteorological expertise, disaster management, and project implementation. Combining these capabilities with African-led priorities and multilateral financing would allow Türkiye to avoid both a donor-recipient model and a purely commercial relationship. If COP31 can institutionalize such a model, Türkiye–Africa climate cooperation could become an example of practical South–South partnership in which technology transfer, local capacity, and shared diplomatic agency are treated as mutually reinforcing elements rather than separate policy objectives.

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Sectoral Priorities in Türkiye-Africa Climate Cooperation at COP31

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L This analysis examines how Türkiye's COP31 presidency can strengthen climate cooperation with Africa. COP31 will be held in Antalya in November 2026. Under the arrangement reached at COP30 in Belém, Türkiye will host and preside over the summit, while Australia will lead the negotiations. The conference comes at a moment when trust in global climate action is weakening and the United States has withdrawn from the UNFCCC, creating an opening for non-Western actors to shape the multilateral agenda. While Türkiye-Africa relations have deepened over three decades, climate-related issues have remained a secondary item on their agenda. The analysis identifies five priority sectors where Turkish capabilities align with African needs: renewable energy technology transfer, climate-smart agriculture, climate finance, early warning systems, and climate diplomacy. It argues that COP31 should be treated as the first stage of a two-COP process extending to COP32 in Ethiopia, and that its success should be measured not by declarations signed but by whether it produces implementable projects, designated institutions, and a credible monitoring process.



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