

REPORT

THE OTHER SIDE OF GAZA GENOCIDE

Water Resources, Agricultural Areas, and Animal Farms

MUHAMMED HÜSEYİN MERCAN, HASAN İLKBAHAR

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SUMMARY

Israel's religion-based genocide in Gaza since Oct. 7, 2023, has permanently scarred the environment and sustainable life in the Palestinian territory. This report focuses on the war's impact, provides an in-depth analysis of Israel's systematic destruction of water resources, agricultural land, and livestock infrastructure, essential for sustaining civilian life. The extent of the occupation forces' aggression to end the likelihood of sustainable life in Gaza is revealed using data from international organizations like the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Satellite Centre (UNOSAT), the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), and the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA).

The first part of the report, comprising three main sections, provides a detailed examination of the damage inflicted on Gaza's water resources and infrastructure. The second part explores the severity and destructive impact of the attacks on agricultural areas and infrastructure in Gaza, which were carried out to deepen food insecurity and the displacement of Palestinians. Finally, in

conjunction with the ongoing massacres in Gaza, it analyzes the deliberate targeting of livestock and related infrastructure with supporting evidence.

Israel, in the face of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, the Palestinian resistance's biggest challenge to date against the Zionist regime, implemented a genocidal policy. The aim was to break the resistance's power and continue its own aggressive expansionism without interruption. These massacres, legitimized by references to Jewish religious texts, targeted every living thing in Gaza, regardless of age or gender. To force the Palestinians to abandon their land, the Netanyahu government has sought to destroy all infrastructures and superstructures in Gaza. It has rendered the majority of the Strip's water resources –the lifeblood of the region – unusable through hysterical aggression, eliminating a precondition for sustainable living. Even before Oct. 7, Gaza had serious water security issues, but Israeli attacks have turned it into a major humanitarian crisis. As the genocide in Gaza continues, the findings on the damage done to the Palestinian territory's water resources and infrastructure are as follows:

- Approximately 90% of Gaza's clean water is supplied from an underground water source known as the coastal aquifer. However, excessive groundwater extraction by the occupying state has led to seawater and untreated sewage leakage into the aquifer, contaminating the source. Currently, it has a pollution rate of 97%, making it unsuitable for human use. Another water source in Gaza is the small-scale desalination plants. Before the conflict, these plants could purify approximately 37,000 cubic meters of water a day or 13 million cubic meters annually, serving approximately 35% of the Gazan population. However, these facilities are costly and energy-intensive, making them financially unsustainable. Gaza also has three separate water pipelines installed by the Israeli state-owned company, Mekorot. However, arbitrary daily water cuts and high costs make them insufficient for the Palestinians to sustain their daily lives. These factors clearly point out that Gaza had an existing water crisis even before Oct. 7.
- The enclave frequently experiences water cuts. Before Oct. 7, only 8% of its inhabitants had uninterrupted access to water, while 42.6% experienced water cuts more than once a week, and 46% at least once

a day. Mekorot's daily water cuts and the region's already scarce water resources meant Gaza's daily per capita water supply fell below the WHO's minimum standard of 100 liters per day. It must be noted that the daily per capita water supply in Gaza, before Oct. 7, was just 26.8 liters.

- The coastal enclave, already under yearslong Israeli blockade, has faced massive air and ground attacks. They significantly damaged key elements of the water infrastructure, including drinking water wells, pipelines, treatment facilities, water tankers, and distribution networks.
- After Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, the Zionist regime exacerbated the water crisis in Gaza by shutting down the Mekorot pipelines. Using water as a strategic weapon, Israel has forced Gazans to live on just 4.74 liters of water per capita a day.
- Amid a growing scarcity of clean water, the Palestinians have turned to unsafe and unreliable water
- Amid a growing scarcity of clean water, the Palestinians have turned to unsafe and unreliable water sources. As a result, epidemics have become widespread, and there has also been a significant rise in deaths due to dehydration. Cholera, diarrhea, dysentery, Hepatitis A, and polio were among the diseases caused by water scarcity and the consumption of contaminated water.
- Israeli attacks on Gaza's water infrastructure have destroyed most of its water tanks and distribution network. More than 200 of the 288 drinking water wells were targeted and rendered inoperable. Two Mekorot pipelines and three water treatment centers were also damaged.
- Ponds, mostly used in agriculture, are another essential water source affected by the attacks. As of April 30, 2025, 376 of Gaza's 469 existing ponds were damaged.
- The second part of the report presents in detail, with quantitative data, the extent of the damage Israel's genocide has inflicted on Gaza's agricultural infrastructure and agricultural lands. This section primarily focuses on post-Oct. 7 developments and examines Gaza's damaged agricultural lands, greenhouses, agricultural wells, home barns, farm

storage facilities, and agricultural warehouses. The findings of this part of the report can be summarized as follows:

- The destruction of Gaza's agricultural infrastructure, combined with Tel Aviv's obstruction of humanitarian aid deliveries to the region, has led to severe food insecurity. As a result, in the last quarter of 2024, approximately 86% of Gaza's population was in the third and higher degree of food insecurity. Projections for April 2025 estimate this rate to rise to 91%.
- Gaza has a surface area of 365 square kilometers (140.93 square miles). Its agricultural land covers 150.5 square kilometers. By March 30, 2025, more than two-thirds of the agricultural land, or around 121 square kilometers, had been destroyed.
- Analyzed on a hectare (ha) basis, Gaza's agricultural land approximately covers 12,053 ha. By April 30, 2025, nearly 12,537 ha or 83.3% of its agricultural land had been destroyed. The data also shows that at least 78.2% of the land in Khan Younis, which has the largest share of agricultural area, has been destroyed. The most severely damaged agricultural land (90.9%) is located in the north of Gaza. Additionally, 88.3% of the agricultural land in Gaza City, 82.9% in Deir al-Balah, and 74.4% in Rafah are deemed unusable.
- As of April 30, 2025, 20.6% of the damaged agricultural land was cultivated with field crops (2,588 ha), 20.2% with vegetables (2,527 ha), and 59.2% with orchards and other trees (7,422 ha).
- Before Oct. 7, Gaza had 1,305.3 ha of greenhouses. By the end of April 2025, at least 929.9 ha (71.2%) of the existing greenhouses had ceased to function.
- The biggest concentration of greenhouses in Gaza is in Khan Younis (518.9 ha) and Rafah (451.4 ha). According to data as of April 30, 2025, more than half (57.6%) of the greenhouses in Khan Younis were destroyed, while all 38 ha of greenhouses in Gaza City and the vast majority (97.2%) of the 74.8 ha of greenhouses in northern Gaza were damaged. Additionally, at least 58.4% of the greenhouses in Deir al-Balah and 86.5% in Rafah were also destroyed.

- Agricultural wells, a crucial element in sustaining agricultural production, were severely damaged. According to data as of 30 April 2025, at least 1,873 (82.8%) of the 2,261 irrigation wells in Gaza became unusable as a result of the attacks.
- Home barns, agricultural warehouses, and farm storage facilities, which are essential elements of Gaza's agricultural infrastructure, have also been targeted in the attacks. According to April 2025 data, 885 out of 1,043 home barns (84.8%), 463 out of 547 agricultural warehouses (84.6%), and 266 out of 344 farm storages (77.3%) in Gaza were rendered unusable.

The last part of the report focuses on the damage caused by the occupying army to the livestock sector and animal farms in Gaza. The damages to the farms where cattle, sheep and goats, broilers, turkeys, rabbits, pigeons, and other bird farms are located are explained in the report with relevant data. In addition, animal shelters, zoos, and stray animals were also targeted by the occupying army. The general findings regarding the massacres against animals and the damage to the livestock infrastructure are as follows:

- Based on the statements made by the Zionist regime during the genocide process, the comparison of Gazans to the Amalekite society mentioned in the Jewish holy book is an indication that the theopolitical references lie behind the occupying army's attacks on animals.
- According to data as of 30 April 2025, 346 (79.3%) of the 436 animal shelters in Gaza are unusable.
- There are 2247 animal farms in Gaza. According to the same data, at least 1867 (83%) of the 2247 farms in Gaza were destroyed as a result of the attacks.
- During the genocide, 97 out of 112 dairy farms (86.6%); 659 out of 793 sheep farms (83.1%); 30 out of 36 turkey farms (83.3%); 36 out of 38 rabbit farms (94.7%); 26 out of 34 cattle farms (76.4%); 103 out of 117 pigeon and other bird farms (88%) and finally 916 out of 1117 broiler farms (82%) were severely damaged and rendered unusable.
- It has been documented that, as part of the Zionist regime's strategy to completely depopulate Gaza and eliminate all traces of Palestinian

presence, zoos, animal shelters, horse farms, and stray animals have been deliberately targeted.

This report addresses the Gaza genocide's impact on the environment and non-human life forms. It offers an in-depth discussion of how the Netanyahu government has sought to justify its actions through references and motifs grounded in Jewish religious law. The report also demonstrates through data how the Zionist regime marginalizes Palestinians and describes them as sub-human entities, in its attempt to entirely dismantle Gaza's infrastructure and superstructure, as well as the scale of destruction it has carried out.

At this point, it is crucial to emphasize that the occupying and genocidal Israeli state poses a serious threat not only to Palestinians but also to the future of all humanity, due to the harm it inflicts on people, other living beings, and the environment.

INTRODUCTION

The people of Gaza, under an Israeli blockade for many years, have been subjected to an unprecedented genocide, with no parallel in human history, since Oct. 7, 2023. The genocide, carried out by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right cabinet as part of a strategy to annex Gaza, is a blatant example of the Zionist administration's unchecked aggression, emboldened by its exceptional status in global politics. The ongoing aggression violates all legal, humanitarian, and moral norms and principles. It will leave no sign of life in Gaza, but it is being carried out regardless in front of the eyes of the entire world.

Hamas launched Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on its own will and initiative, under the leadership of Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, to raise global awareness against Israel's deepening occupation of Palestinian territories. This event, a crucial turning point in the history of the modern Middle East, not only triggered the region's social and political fault lines but also shattered the dominant discourses and memorizations. The Al-Aqsa Flood marked a psychological and epistemological rupture, significantly transforming the Palestinian resistance movement's paradigm.

It transitioned to a new phase with the adoption of an active, effective, and collective struggle approach, realizing the biggest challenge in its history against Israel on Oct. 7.

To recover from the shock incursion, the Netanyahu government launched an unprecedented wave of attacks on Gaza. It was an effort to recover from an unprecedented blow and avoid losing the psychological and discursive edge Israel had maintained since its foundation. Israel's genocidal strategy made no distinction between military and civilian targets. It rendered the possibility of life in the city nonexistent and was repeatedly justified through religious references. Emboldened by support from Western, institutionalized democracies, Netanyahu and his administration uncompromisingly pursued their aggressive, expansionist agenda.

The Zionist leadership's strategy of massacre to achieve its "holy goals" has been reinforced by narratives like the prophecy of Isaiah and the annihilation of the Amalekites. This aggression, which should be conceptualized as "religion-centered genocide," corresponds to a pathology that calls for the destruction of not just the Palestinians in Gaza but every living creature there. By constructing a discourse grounded in dogmatic theology, the Zionist regime has brutally destroyed Gaza's infrastructure and superstructure, intending to entirely eliminate the Palestinian people's right to exist on their own land. By removing all necessary means for sustaining life in Gaza, Israel forces Palestinians into displacement, thereby creating a space where it can operate without constraint.

This report focuses on the environmental and animal-related massacres carried out during Israel's ongoing genocide and aims to reveal the extent of destruction and atrocities that have killed more than 57,000 Palestinians, regardless of their age or gender. In this respect, the report first examines the types of damage inflicted on Gaza's water infrastructure and how its population has been obstructed from access to clean water. It then presents data-supported findings on the destruction of agricultural areas and infrastructure as a result of the attacks. The final part of the report provides information on the targeting and collapse of livestock infrastructure, one of the most vital sectors for sustaining life in Gaza, as well as on the killing of animals by the Israeli army.

WATER INFRASTRUCTURE AND WATER RESOURCES

Israel's intensive air and ground attacks on Gaza following Operation Al-Aqsa Flood have targeted, among other things, the city's water infrastructure and water resources. The Netanyahu government used water as an active weapon against the Palestinians to facilitate the region's dehumanization, in line with the annexation strategy of Gaza. As part of this approach, the Zionist regime not only obstructed access to water resources for the people of Gaza but also took systematic steps to render existing sources unusable.

As a result of the attacks, Gaza's water resources were significantly destroyed, with visible humanitarian and environmental impacts. In the humanitarian context, access to clean and potable water was prevented, while in the environmental context, serious pollution occurred in existing water resources. Thus, approximately 2.3 million Gazans, who lacked access to clean and potable water, turned to various unsafe and unhealthy sources. This situation caused Palestinians, especially children, to be exposed to diseases caused by contaminated water. Building on this, this

section of the report examines the humanitarian and environmental impacts of Israel's intensified assault in Gaza following Oct. 7, 2023, focusing specifically on existing water resources and infrastructure.

To understand the nature and extent of the damage caused by Israel, it is first necessary to focus on the general condition of Gaza's existing water resources and water infrastructure before Oct. 7. One of the primary sources of freshwater in Gaza is the Coastal Aquifer¹ Basin². Starting from the Sinai Peninsula, the Coastal Aquifer extends through Gaza toward the occupied territories, drawing a line along the Eastern Mediterranean coast. The length of the Coastal Aquifer is 120 kilometers, while its width is approximately 15 kilometers.³ It is known that approximately 90% of Gaza's freshwater supply is sourced from this aquifer. However, it is difficult to say that this figure accurately reflects reality in practice. Various problems in the Coastal Aquifer prevent the full utilization of the resource. In this context, the most significant issue concerning the Coastal Aquifer is overextraction.⁴ While the annual average water extraction from the Coastal Aquifer should be around 55 million cubic meters, the amount withdrawn has reached as high as 120 million cubic meters per year, leading to a significant decline in the aquifer's water level.⁵ As a result, the gradual depletion of the water source has led to the intrusion of seawater and sewage into the aquifer, causing contamination.⁶ In this context, according to the United Nations Office for the

1 In the most general sense, "geological formations that contain almost all of the underground water and have a permeable structure" are referred to as aquifers. Aquifers, a core concept in hydrogeology, are classified into four types: unconfined, confined (or pressurized), recharge and non-recharge aquifers. In this context, the coastal aquifer basin is among the recharge aquifers and can be fed by rainwater with its permeable rock structure. For detailed definitions and types of aquifers, see Sümeyra Tekin, *Uluslararası Hukukta Sınırtaşan Akiferlere Dair Hukuki Rejim*, (On İki Levha Yayıncılık, İstanbul: 2022), pp. 15, 34-36.

2 Sümeyra Tekin, "Uluslararası Hukuk Perspektifinden Su Sorunu Özeline Filistin-İsrail İhtilafı", in *Uluslararası Hukukta Filistin Meselesi*, eds. Ali Kerem Kayhan and Ali Osman Karaoğlu, (Adalet Yayınevi, Ankara: 2023), p. 343.

3 Özden Bilen, *Ortadoğu'da Su Sorunları ve Türkiye*, 2nd Edition, (TESAV Yayınları, Ankara: 2000), p. 121.

4 It can be argued that the Zionist administration has been withdrawing water from the coastal aquifer at a very high rate and has played a significant role in depleting the resource. For detailed information, see Peter Seeberg, "Israeli Hydro-Hegemony and the Gaza War", *Middle East Policy*, Online First, (2024), p. 11.

5 Jad Isaac, "The Role of Groundwater in the Water Conflict and Resolution between Israelis and Palestinians", *International Symposium on Groundwater Sustainability (ISGWAS)*, (2006), p. 274.

6 Natasha Hall, Anita Kirschenbaum and David Michel, "The Siege of Gaza's Water", *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)*, 1 December 2024, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/siege-gazas-water>, (Accessed on 12 November 2024); Tekin, "Uluslararası Hukuk Perspektifinden Su Sorunu Özeline Filistin-İsrail İhtilafı", p. 343.

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the contamination rate in the Coastal Aquifer is 97%.⁷ According to that figure, the water source in question is not suitable for consumption.

Another critical issue regarding the Coastal Aquifer concerns the process of its remediation. For this reason, the coastal states must act jointly to carefully and thoroughly monitor and assess the condition of the aquifer. To prevent contamination in the aquifer, rainwater and other freshwater sources must replenish it.⁸ Nevertheless, the Zionist regime does not permit any efforts aimed at the remediation of the aquifer and also prevents its replenishment through rainwater. During periods of heavy rainfall, the flow of rainwater through the valleys is obstructed by the Zionist regime. Moreover, Israel goes further by blocking the surface flow of rainwater into the aquifer through the concrete walls it has constructed along Gaza's borders.⁹ As a result, since the aquifer is not naturally cleansed, the existing contamination persists. Consequently, Gazans, who are largely unable to benefit from the Coastal Aquifer, are left with only two alternative sources to meet their need for clean water.

Two different sources supply the remaining 10% of fresh water in Gaza. The first, Mekorot, an Israeli state-owned company, delivers water to Gaza through pipelines. Since 1982, it has played a significant role in the region's water management by extracting water from the Mountain Aquifer in the occupied West Bank.¹⁰ It also assumed a similar role in Gaza by transporting water from the Mountain Aquifer to Khan Younis, Deir al-Balah, and the urban center of the enclave through three different pipelines: al-Montar, Bani Suheila, and Bani Saed.¹¹ Considering that approximately 97% of the Coastal Aquifer is polluted, Gaza is heavily dependent on water supplied through the Mekorot pipelines. However, it sells water at a very high price,

7 "Study Warns Water Sanitation Crisis in Gaza May Cause Disease Outbreak and Possible Epidemic", OCHA, 16 November 2018, <http://www.ochaopt.org/content/study-warns-water-sanitation-crisis-gaza-may-cause-disease-outbreak-and-possible-epidemic>, (Accessed 27 November 2024).

8 Christopher Ward, Isabelle Learmont and Sandra Ruckstuhl, *Water Security for Palestinians and Israelis: Towards a New Cooperation in Middle East Water Resources*, (I. B. Tauris, London: 2022), p. 174.

9 Nour Mahd Ali Abu Aisha and Çağrı Koşak, "İsrail Ablukası Altındaki Gazze'de Su Krizi Yaşanıyor", Anadolu Agency, 21 March 2022.

10 Tekin, "Uluslararası Hukuk Perspektifinden Su Sorunu Özelinde Filistin-İsrail İhtilafı", p. 346.

11 *Water War Crimes: How Israel has Weaponised Water in Its Military Campaign in Gaza*, (Oxfam International Report, Oxford: 2024), p. 15.

while the company's arbitrary and frequent cutbacks¹² severely restrict Gaza residents' access to clean water.

The second source Gazans rely on for access to clean water is a series of seawater desalination plants.¹³ Three desalination plants in Gaza produce 37,000 cubic meters of clean water a day. The annual capacity of the facilities is approximately 13 million cubic meters, and around 35% of the population consumes desalinated water from the sea. At this point, it is worth noting that sea-purified water is a vital resource for the region. Notably, Israel has also made significant investments in its own seawater treatment facilities. Currently, there are five plants in Israel with an annual water treatment capacity of 585 million cubic meters.¹⁴ The Zionist regime, which obtained approximately 70%¹⁵ of domestic water consumption from seawater desalination plants until 2018, aims to increase the number of plants to seven and the domestic consumption rate to 95% by the end of 2026.¹⁶

The primary reason for the significant difference in the rate of water purification from the sea between the occupied state and Gaza is related to technological and economic capacity. In terms of technological capacity and infrastructure, the treatment plants in Gaza are relatively small-scale, whereas those in the occupying state are high-capacity, technologically advanced, and innovative facilities. In terms of economic capacity, energy resources are needed for the treatment plants to operate stably. Therefore, Gaza's economy cannot sustain such expensive facilities. As a result, the existing treatment plants are also insufficient to meet Gaza's need for clean water. Thus, the territory is mainly dependent on the very limited supply of clean water obtained from the Coastal Aquifer and the water provided by Mekorot. However, as previously mentioned, the arbitrary daily water cut-offs severely impact the Gazans' daily access to clean water.

In line with Palestinian access to clean water, data on daily water cuts in Gaza will provide a better understanding of the situation. According to PCBS data from 2020, only 8% of Palestinians in Gaza have uninter-

12 Yeşim Yüksel, "Gazze'deki Su Sıkıntısı Çevre Felaketine Dönüşebilir", Anadolu Agency, 17 October 2023.

13 Hall, Kirschenbaum and Michel, "The Siege of Gaza's Water".

14 Muhammad Emin Canik, "Orta Doğu Ülkeleri Kuraklığı Deniz Suyunu Arıtarak Aşmaya Yönelmiş", Anadolu Agency, 25 January 2023.

15 Seeberg, "Israeli Hydro-Hegemony and the Gaza War", p. 6.

16 Canik, "Orta Doğu Ülkeleri Kuraklığı Deniz Suyunu Arıtarak Aşmaya Yönelmiş".

rupted access to water, while 42.6% experience water cuts more than once a week, and 46% at least once a day. To better understand the general situation regarding water shortages in Gaza, a comparison with the West Bank is warranted. According to PCBS data from the same date, 52.6% of Palestinians in the West Bank have uninterrupted access to water, while just 1.6% experience daily water cuts. On the other hand, the rate of Palestinians who experience water cuts more than once a week corresponds to 27.7%.¹⁷ In conclusion, a comparison of water cuts in Gaza and the occupied West Bank makes apparent a significant difference between the two regions, with Palestinians in the West Bank experiencing fewer water cuts than those in Gaza.

The contamination of the Coastal Aquifer and the frequent daily interruptions in Mekorot pipelines have resulted in significantly low per capita daily water consumption in Gaza. According to PCBS data in 2022, the per capita water consumption in Gaza is 26.8 liters,¹⁸ while in the West Bank it is 82.4 liters.¹⁹ According to a report by B'Tselem, the daily per capita water consumption in Israel is reported to be 247 liters.²⁰ Considering that the daily average water consumption in European countries is 144 liters, it can be said that the amount of daily water consumption in the occupying state is approximately twice that of European countries, three times that of the West Bank, and nine times that of Gaza. On the other hand, considering that the minimum daily water consumption per capita, as determined by the WHO, is 100 liters, it is evident that the rate in Gaza is well below the WHO standards.


17 *Socio-Economic Conditions Survey 2020*, (PCBS Report, Ramallah: 2021), p. 80.

18 The per capita water availability in Gaza is generally reported to be around 80 litres per day. However, rapid population growth and the severe contamination of clean water sources -particularly the coastal aquifer- have reduced the actual per capita water consumption in the city to just 26.8 litres per day. "Gaza's Water Crisis Puts Thousands at Risk of Preventable", Anera, 8 November 2023, <https://www.anera.org/blog/gazas-water-crisis-puts-thousands-at-risk-of-preventable-death>, (Accessed 19 November 2024); "The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), and the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) Issue a Joint Press Release on the Occasion of World Water Day", Press Releases, 22 March 2022, https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/portals/_pcbs/Press-Release/Press_En_22-3-2022-Water-en.pdf, (Accessed 20 November 2024).

19 "The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), and the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) Issue a Joint Press Release on the Occasion of World Water Day".

20 *Israel's Policy of Water Deprivation in the West Bank*, (B'tselem Report: 2023), p. 6.

Graph 1. Daily Per Capital Water Availability (Litres)



Source: Prepared by the authors.

Since imposing a blockade on Gaza in 2007, the Zionist regime has obstructed Palestinians' access to water through daily supply cuts, while also inflicting severe damage on the city's water infrastructure through airstrikes during this period. In particular, the water infrastructure of the region was almost destroyed in the attacks carried out by Israeli air forces in 2008, 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2021. A total of 112 drinking water wells, thousands of meters of water pipelines, and water tankers were destroyed in the airstrikes, which the occupying state called Operation Cast Lead and lasted for approximately 23 days starting from December 2008.²¹ A report prepared by OCHA revealed that the Zionist regime's attacks in 2012 destroyed pipelines, water tankers, and drinking water wells in Khan Younis, Deir al-Balah, and northern Gaza.²² Similarly, in the 2014 attacks, 11 drinking water wells were fully destroyed, and 15 were partially destroyed. At the same time, five water tanks were destroyed and 15 were partially damaged, while 20 kilometers of water pipeline were damaged as well.²³ Finally, in the 2021 attacks, some 41 drinking water wells, seven water tanks,

²¹ "The Impact of the Israeli Offensive on the Right to Water in the Gaza Strip, February 2009", Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, 26 April 2009, <https://mezan.org/en/post/37734>, (Accessed 25 November 2024).

²² *Gaza Initial Rapid Assessment*, (UNOCHA, Gaza: 2012).

²³ *Detailed Infrastructure Damage Assessment Gaza-2014*, (UNDP, Gaza: 2014), p. 12.

and four treatment plants, as well as 70 kilometers of water distribution network, were severely damaged.²⁴

Israel's attacks on Gaza have significantly increased the water crisis in the city while visibly destroying the water infrastructure of the region. Since Oct. 7, the existing water crisis in Gaza has only deepened. Israel's Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, in a speech, declared they were "fighting human animals" in Gaza and that no water, food, or electricity would be supplied there under any circumstances.²⁵ Gallant's statements, which implied that the Zionist regime would launch a comprehensive and systematic genocide in Gaza, also meant that the Mekorot pipelines would be closed. The eventual shutdown of these pipelines has led to a severe water crisis in Gaza, the like of which is rarely seen elsewhere in the world.

By announcing that the water supply to Gaza would be cut off, Gallant openly declared to the world that Israel's genocidal Cabinet would use water as a strategic weapon. The instrumentalization of water during the genocide in Gaza has been seriously criticized by academics and U.N. experts alike. The most significant criticism came from Pedro Arrojo-Agudo, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation. According to Arrojo-Agudo, the Netanyahu government's use of water as a weapon is in clear violation of international humanitarian law and human rights. It has led to an increase in deaths due to dehydration and a rise in diseases caused by the lack of access to clean water.²⁶ He strongly emphasized in a report that the Zionist government's use of water as a weapon is not a new strategy, but is an integral part of a long-standing *apartheid*²⁷ policy against water resources and land in Gaza.²⁸

24 *Gaza 2021 Infrastructure Damage Assessment Report*, (UNDP, Gaza: 2022), p. 46.

25 "Israel Announces 'Total' Blockade on Gaza", Aljazeera, 2023.

26 "Israel Must Stop Using Water as a Weapon of War: UN Expert", United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 17 November 2023, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/11/israel-must-stop-using-water-weapon-war-un-expert>, (Accessed 25 November 2024).

27 For studies on the occupying state and *apartheid*, see Ran Greenstein, "Israel, Palestine, and Apartheid", *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 22, No. 1, (2020), pp. 73-92; Ilan Pappé, *Israel and South Africa: The Many Faces of Apartheid*, (Zed Books, London: 2015); for a study examining the water dimension of the *apartheid* policy of the occupying state, see Clemens Messerschmid, "Hydro-Apartheid and Water Access in Israel-Palestine: Challenging the Myths of Co-operation and Scarcity", in *Decolonizing Palestinian Political Economy: De-Development and Beyond, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies*, ed. Mandy Turner and Omar Shweiki, (Palgrave Macmillan UK, London: 2014), pp. 53-76.

28 Beyza Binnur Dönmez, "UN Rapporteur Says Israel's ' Militarization of Water ' Part of 'Water, Territorial Apartheid' Policy", Anadolu Agency, 17 September 2024; For a recent study on how the occupation and blockade policy of the Zionist regime against the Palestinian territories and the Palestinian people for years has created a Palestine, see Şüheda Nur Uzuntaş, *Filistin'in Görünümü: Verilerle Filistin Toplumunu*, (İLKE Rapor, İstanbul: 2024).

Another important reaction to Israel's uses of water as a strategic weapon came from a group of academics, including prominent figures in hydropolitics literature. Emphasizing that water is a fundamental human right, the authors called on the international community to urgently end the occupying state's use of water as a weapon and called on Israel to refrain from any action that would damage the water infrastructure in Gaza.²⁹

One of the most significant consequences of the use of water as a weapon during the systematic genocide that began after Oct. 7 is the substantial decrease in the daily per capita water availability in Gaza. As stated earlier, although the WHO sets the minimum daily water consumption at 100 liters, the amount determined for emergencies varies between 7.5 and 15 liters. Of this, 2.5-3 liters are for drinking and nutrition, 2-6 liters for basic hygiene needs, and 3-6 liters for cooking.³⁰ In Gaza, where a genocide is currently taking place in all its dimensions, the current figures are well below WHO standards. According to Oxfam International, the daily water allocation per capita in Gaza dropped to 4.74 liters after Oct. 7.³¹ With the WHO emergency standards in mind, the drop in Gaza's daily per capita water availability to below 7.5 liters highlights how it has been weaponized in the ongoing genocide.

In addition to preventing access to water used for daily needs, the Zionist regime has largely destroyed the territory's water infrastructure, as it had done in previous attacks. Accordingly, Gaza's drinking water infrastructure, including water wells, hygiene facilities, sewerage systems, desalination plants, and wastewater treatment plants, was targeted.³² According to an Oxfam International report based on UNOSAT data, as of April 23, 2024, approximately 63% of Gaza's water infrastructure was severely damaged or

29 Mohsen Nagheeby, "Israel's Weaponisation of Water: An Urgent Call to Provide Full Access to Water Services in Gaza", *FLOWs*, 19 October 2023; Hussam Hussein, "Stop Violation of International Water Laws in Gaza", *Nature*, Vol. 623, (2023), p. 253.

30 "Technical Notes on Drinking-Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Emergencies", World Health Organization (WHO), (July 2013), p. 2, <https://www.who.int/teams/environment-climate-change-and-health/water-sanitation-and-health/environmental-health-in-emergencies/technical-notes-on-wash-in-emergencies>, (Accessed 25 November 2024)

31 "Israel Using Water as Weapon of War as Gaza Supply Plummeted by 94%, Creating Deadly Health Catastrophe: Oxfam", Oxfam International, 17 July 2024, <https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/israel-using-water-weapon-war-gaza-supply-plummeted-94-creating-deadly-health>, (Accessed 25 November 2024).

32 Mariam Abd Hay, *The Environmental-Humanitarian Impacts of the Israel-Hamas War in Gaza*, (Arava Institute for Environmental Studies Report: 2024), p. 10.

destroyed. An updated report adds that as of June 3, 2024, the proportion of damaged or destroyed water infrastructure increased by 4.6 percentage points, reaching 67.6%.³³ The increase in the intensity of the attacks since June 2024 and the attempt of the occupying army to completely destroy Gaza's infrastructure and superstructure, especially in the north, made the situation much worse by the end of 2024.

A joint World Bank, U.N., and EU report, titled *Gaza Strip: Interim Damage Assessment*, shows that as of March 29, 2024, at least 162 drinking water wells in Gaza were damaged or destroyed in Israeli attacks. Considering that there are a total of 288 water wells in Gaza,³⁴ it is reasonable to say that more than half of these wells have been destroyed or rendered unusable. According to the same report, two water pipelines and three out of six wastewater treatment centers belonging to the Mekorot company were damaged or destroyed. Additionally, the report mentioned above states that the daily water supply in Gaza has fallen below 5%.³⁵

Another report on the environmental impact of Israel's aggression was published by the U.N. Environment Programme in June 2024. The report states that, as a result of the daily per capita water supply in Gaza ranging between 2 and 8 liters, Palestinians living under Israeli attacks have been forced to rely on unsafe water sources. As a result, agricultural irrigation wells became a major water source for Gazans. However, since agricultural irrigation wells contain brackish water, which is high in salinity, and, by their nature, include pesticides and other chemicals,³⁶ they have adversely affected human health. Diseases like cholera, diarrhea, dysentery, and Hepatitis A have become widespread in Gaza recently due to the consumption of water from agricultural irrigation wells.³⁷ Moreover, the diagnosis of polio in a 10-year-old for the first time in 25 years is a leading indicator that diseases caused by the lack of clean water and contamination are likely to increase.³⁸

33 *Water War Crimes*, pp. 17-18.

34 *Gaza Water Status Report 2017*, (Palestinian Water Authority, Newton Centre: 2018), p. 2.

35 *Gaza Strip: Interim Damage Assessment*, (WB, EU and UN, Washington DC: 2024), p. 15.

36 *Environmental Impact of the Conflict in Gaza: Preliminary Assessment of Environmental Impacts*, (UNEP Report, Kenya: 2024), p. 19.

37 "UN Says Waterborne Illnesses Spread in Gaza Due to Heat, Unsafe Water", Reuters, 12 April 2024.

38 Ahmed Nour, Abdirahim Saeed, Lamees Altalebi and Paul Cusiak, "Diseases Spread in Gaza as Sewage Contaminates Camps and Coast", BBC, 26 August 2024.

The latest report on general damage assessment for Gaza due to Israeli military attacks was published by the World Bank, the European Union, and the United Nations in February 2025. It also contains specific results regarding the water sector and water consumption in Gaza. According to the report, one out of six wastewater treatment plants in Gaza was destroyed, while the remaining five were partially damaged. The report also touches on the importance of the three Mekorot pipelines, two of which were totally destroyed.³⁹

Given that the studies, published by U.N.-affiliated bodies and institutions, date from March 2024, June 2024, and February 2025, they do not reflect the current situation on the ground. For instance, two studies reported that Israel completely or partially damaged 162 water wells. However, according to Reuters, more than 30 water wells were damaged in July alone.⁴⁰ Thus, available data shows that approximately 200 water sources have been rendered unusable. Considering Israeli aggression has continued uninterrupted since July, the actual number may be even higher.

Another important water source that has suffered from the systematic genocide inflicted on Gaza is the ponds. There are 469 ponds in the Gaza Strip.⁴¹ By Dec. 31, 2023, 36 of the existing ponds were reported to have been damaged. According to a study published by FAO, this number increased to 184 as of May 20, 2024.⁴² A later study conducted by FAO, the U.N. Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), and UNOSAT, put that number at 214 as of Sept. 1, 2024.⁴³ Finally, the latest study conducted by the same organizations put the total number of damaged ponds at 376 by April 30, 2025.⁴⁴ In light of the available data, it would be appropriate

39 Gaza and West Bank: Interim Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment, (WB, EU and UN, Washington DC: 2025), p. 37.

40 Hatem Khaled, "Destruction of Gaza Water Wells Deepens Palestinian Misery", Reuters, 30 July 2024.

41 *A Rapid Geospatial Damage Assessment of the 2023 Conflict in the Gaza Strip on Agricultural Land and Infrastructure*, (FAO Report, Rome: 2024), p. 10.


42 "Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 20 May 2024", FAO, (June 2024), <https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/0962cfac-6162-4678-a216-88551541d60b>, (Accessed 25 November 2024).

43 "Agricultural Damage Assessment in the Gaza Strip from October 7th 2023 to September 1st 2024", FAO, UNITAR and UNOSAT, (October 2024), <https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/6dff587c-451b-4afe-a56d-a707b27a1449>, (Accessed 25 November 2024).

44 "Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025", FAO, (May 2025), <https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/5395157e-fbc1-4ab0-a55b-f5de322d9372>, (Accessed 23 June 2025).

to say that at least 80.1% of the ponds in Gaza have become unusable as a result of Israeli attacks.

Graph 2. Status of Ponds in Gaza (April 2025, Percentage)



Source: Compiled by the authors based on data from FAO, UNOSAT, and UNITAR.


AGRICULTURAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND LAND

Gaza's agricultural land plays a vital role in its economy and in ensuring food security for Palestinians. A large portion of it was severely damaged in the attacks since Oct. 7. Meanwhile, the Netanyahu Cabinet's decision to prevent the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza led to famine and widespread hunger. In other words, Gaza has become a region suffering from severe "food insecurity."⁴⁵ Despite global protests drawing attention to the genocide and food insecurity in Gaza, Israeli decision-makers have continued their inhuman policies. For example, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich suggested that the death of Gazans from hunger could be considered "justified and moral." He argued that humanitarian aid should be prevented from entering

45 According to FAO, "food insecurity" is the lack of regular access to safe and nutritious food required for a person to grow and develop. "Hunger and Food Insecurity", FAO, <https://www.fao.org/hunger/en>, (Accessed 2 December 2024).

Gaza until the hostages return.⁴⁶ Considering the international reaction to Gallant’s announcement of an aid blockade on Oct. 9, 2023, followed by Smotrich’s attempt to justify the action a year later, it can be argued that the Zionist regime has effectively implemented a strategy of normalization through desensitization.⁴⁷

Graph 3. Food Insecurity in Gaza (1 April - May 2025, Percentage)



Source: “Gaza Strip: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Special Snapshot.”


According to a study published on May 12, 2025, by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), 37% of the population in Gaza was in Phase 3 of food insecurity, 44% in Phase 4, and 12% in Phase 5 (see Graph 3). According to the figures projected by the same study for the period from May 11 to Sept. 30. In 2025, the crisis stage of food insecurity is expected to decrease to 24%, the emergency stage is expected to increase to

⁴⁶ Mehmet Alaca, “İsraili Aşırı Sağcı Bakan, 2 Milyon Gazzelinin Açlıktan Ölmesinin ‘Haklı’ Olabileceği İma Etti”, Anadolu Agency, 5 August 2024.

⁴⁷ One of the most illustrative concepts describing the Zionist regime’s long-standing policies of occupation and expansionism is the “politics of normalization through desensitization”. In this regard, whenever the occupying state commits an act that constitutes a violation under international law or international humanitarian law, it initially draws criticism from many countries, particularly from the Muslim world. The state then attempts to regain favor by appearing to backtrack through certain tactical maneuvers. Following this, it proceeds with an even more radical step and again, in the face of widespread backlash, seems to retreat. However, each time the Zionist regime steps back, it does so from a more advanced position than the original starting point. In this way, it gradually normalizes its initial actions in the eyes of the international community. For further details on the politics of desensitization, see: Muhammed Hüseyin Mercan, “Operation al-Aqsa Flood: A Rupture in the History of the Palestinian Resistance and Its Implications”, *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2023), p. 85; Muhammed Hüseyin Mercan, “İsrail İstisnacılığı ve Sıradanlaşan Saldırganlık”, *Star Açık Görüş*, 8 November 2023.

54%, and the catastrophe stage is expected to decrease to 22% (see Graph 4).⁴⁸ One of the most critical indicators in this classification is that, during the April-May 2025 period, approximately 93% of the population was in Phase 3 and above. Another alarming indicator is that in the May-September 2025 period, the proportion of Palestinians in Phase 3 and above will reach approximately 100%.

Graph 4. Projected Food Insecurity in Gaza (11 May - 30 Sempember 2025, Percentage)




Source: “Gaza Strip: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Special Snapshot.”

In addition to Israel’s refusal to allow humanitarian aid into Gaza, its air and ground assaults have also damaged agricultural lands and orchards, even worsening food insecurity. To better understand the significance of the destroyed agricultural lands and orchards, it is necessary to focus on Gaza’s land cover before Oct. 7. With a total area of 365 square kilometers, Gaza’s land cover includes settlements, orchards, wasteland, greenhouses, irrigated land, barren land, and water bodies. According to a FAO report, 32.32% of Gaza’s pre-war land cover consisted of orchards, 18.21% was wasteland, and 33.22% was residential areas. In addition, 4.73% of Gaza’s remaining land cover consisted of greenhouses, 5.97% was irrigated cropland, and 5.18%

48 “Gaza Strip: IPC Acute Food Insecurity and Acute Malnutrition Special Snapshot”, Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, 12 May 2025, <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1159596/>, (Accessed 23 June 2025).

was non-irrigated (arid) land. Finally, the remaining 0.37% corresponded to the existing water bodies in Gaza (see Graph 5).⁴⁹

Graph 5. Land Cover in Gaza (2021, Percentage)



Source: Impact of the May Conflict Escalation on the Agricultural Area in the Gaza Strip, p. 14.

⁴⁹ *Impact of the May Conflict Escalation on the Agricultural Area in the Gaza Strip*, (FAO Report, Rome: 2021), p. 14.

Map 1. Settlements and Agricultural Areas in Gaza (2021)




Source: Impact of the May Conflict Escalation on the Agricultural Area in the Gaza Strip, p. 23.

Map 1 shows the land cover of Gaza. After Oct. 7, a large portion of this land cover was damaged. A damage assessment report prepared by UNITAR and UNOSAT using satellite imagery, dated March 30, 2025, showed that 121 square kilometers of agricultural land in Gaza had been destroyed.⁵⁰ A later study, dated April 30, 2025, regarding cropland damages based on ha (ha) prepared by FAO, UNITAR, and UNOSAT shows that 12,537 ha of cropland out of Gaza’s 15,053 ha have been destroyed in Israeli attacks.

50 “Occupied Palestinian Territory–Gaza Strip: Imaginary Analysis”, UNITAR and UNOSAT, 3 April 2025, <https://unosat.org/products/4072>, (Accessed 23 June 2025).

Therefore, based on the same study, it can be stated that approximately 83.3% of the agricultural cropland in Gaza has been damaged.

Graph 6. Regional Distribution of Damaged Cropland in Gaza (April 2025, Hectare)




Source: “Damage to cropland due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025”

As shown in Graph 6, southern Gaza’s Khan Younis had the largest agricultural area in the Strip. As of April 30, 2025, approximately 3291 ha of cropland, which corresponds to about 78.2% of Khan Younis’ total agricultural land, were damaged in the attacks carried out by the occupying army. Northern Gaza, on the other hand, had the highest proportion of damaged agricultural land. Approximately 90.9% of the agricultural land in this area was affected. Looking at the remaining regions, the proportion of damaged agricultural land was 88.3% in Gaza City, 82.9% in Deir al-Balah, and 74.4% in Rafah. Therefore, Rafah, which has the smallest amount of agricultural land among all areas in Gaza, suffered the least proportional damage.⁵¹

⁵¹ “Damage to cropland due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025”, FAO, UNITAR, and UNOSAT, 1 May 2025, <https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/9ea0ab94-aacb-4492-9ccc-ccddf0ed944>, (Accessed 23 June 2025).

Graph 7. Periodic Increase in Damaged Cropland in Gaza (October 2023 to March 2025, Kilometres)




Source: Compiled by the authors.⁵²

Graph 7 illustrates the periodic increase in damaged agricultural areas in the Gaza Strip. A sharp upward trend can be observed between Oct. 27 and Dec. 11, 2023. The period that saw the most rapid increase was between December 2023 and April 2024. According to satellite imagery from December 2023, a total of 34 square kilometers of agricultural land was damaged. That number increased to 81 square kilometers by April 2024. By March 2025, this figure reached 121 square kilometers. During the five months between July 28 and Dec. 30, 2024, no significant increase was recorded in the damaged agricultural area. However, this does not indicate a reduction in the attacks on Gaza. On the contrary, the expansion of territory under the control of the Israeli military, as the attacks intensified, is a contributing factor to this outcome.

52 Based on UNITAR and UNOSAT satellite image analyses dated 27 September 2023, 11 November 2023, 11 December 2023, 30 January 2024, 24 April 2024, 29 May 2024, 28 June 2024, 28 July 2024, 27 August 2024, 26 September 2024, 30 December 2024 and 30 March 2025. To access the relevant data, see <https://unosat.org>

Graph 8. Sectoral Distribution of Damaged Cropland in Gaza (April 2025, Percentage)



Source: “Damage to Cropland Categories Due to Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025”.

Another study conducted by FAO, UNITAR, and UNOSAT examines damaged croplands as of Oct. 7, 2023, on a sectoral basis. Accordingly, 61.9% of the agricultural areas damaged in the period up to May 20, 2024, were orchards and other trees, 19.7% had field crops planted, and the remaining 18.4% vegetable plantations. In numerical terms, the damaged orchards covered approximately 5,233 ha, vegetable plantations covered 1,675 ha, and field crop areas covered 1,751 ha.⁵³ In addition, as shown in Graph 8, another recent study by the same organizations indicates the sectoral distribution of agricultural land damaged in Israeli attacks as of April 30, 2025. They are as follows: orchards and other trees – 7,422 ha (59.2%); field crop areas – 2,588 ha (20.6%); and vegetable cultivation areas – 2,063 ha (20.2%).⁵⁴

Greenhouses in Gaza have also been severely damaged in Israeli attacks. According to a FAO report in 2021, approximately 4.73% of Gaza’s land cover consisted of greenhouses.⁵⁵ However, a 2024 report on the impact of Zionist attacks on the environment and agricultural areas showed that the


⁵³ “Damage to Cropland Categories Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 20 May 2024”, FAO, UNITAR, and UNOSAT, 1 June 2024, <https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/68ce9691-18c1-4e05-a8f8-09d53a88c7fb>, (Accessed 10 December 2024).

⁵⁴ “Damage to Cropland Categories Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025”, FAO, UNITAR and UNOSAT, (May 2025), <https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/15701e5c-29db-41f8-b4b2-f0d76b60bdac>, (Accessed 23 June 2025).

⁵⁵ *Impact of the May Conflict Escalation on the Agricultural Area in the Gaza Strip*, pp. 14-15.

total area covered by greenhouses had dropped to 1,276.6 ha.⁵⁶ On the other hand, a joint FAO, UNITAR, and UNOSAT study put the total greenhouse area at 1,305 ha.⁵⁷ Due to the differences in data and to avoid confusion, this report will assess the impact of Israeli attacks on greenhouses in light of the latest study.

Graph 9. Regional Distribution of Greenhouses in Gaza (2023, Hectare)



Source: “Damage to Greenhouses Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 23 April 2024”.

As shown in Graph 9, Gaza’s greenhouse areas are concentrated in Khan Younis and Rafah. Khan Yunis has approximately 519 ha of greenhouse area, while Rafah has 451 ha. On the other hand, the greenhouse areas in the urban center of Gaza and North Gaza are very limited.


Graph 10 shows the regional distribution of damaged greenhouses in Gaza. As of 30 April 2025, all greenhouses in central Gaza (100%) and the majority of greenhouses in northern Gaza (97.2%) were damaged. Besides, approximately 86.5% of the total greenhouses in Rafah were destroyed by

56 *A Rapid Geospatial Damage Assessment of the 2023 Conflict in the Gaza Strip on Agricultural Land and Infrastructure*, p. 14.

57 “Damage to Greenhouses Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 23 April 2024”, FAO, UNITAR and UNOSAT, (May 2024), <https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/63646fe1-6791-4a45-a526-25f44ab4cd57>, (Accessed 13 December 2024).

the Israeli military. Additionally, more than half of the greenhouses in Deir al-Balah and Khan Younis (58.4% and 57.6%, respectively) were destroyed.⁵⁸ Of the approximately 1,305 ha of greenhouses in the entire Gaza Strip, approximately 929.9 ha have been damaged, which amounts to roughly 71.2% of all greenhouses in the city.⁵⁹

Graph 10. Regional Distribution of Damaged Greenhouses in Gaza (April 2025, Hectare)



Source: “Damage to Greenhouses Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025”.

Agricultural wells constitute another essential element of the agricultural infrastructure damaged in Gaza as a result of the attacks by the occupying army. Before Oct. 7, there were 2,261 agricultural wells in the Gaza Strip. As of Dec. 31, 2023, 488 of these wells were damaged.⁶⁰ According to a study by FAO, the number of damaged agricultural irrigation wells increased to 1,049 as of May 20, 2024. A later study by FAO, UNITAR, and UNOSAT determined that the number increased to 1,873 over approximately


⁵⁸ “Damage to Greenhouses Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025”, FAO, UNITAR and UNOSAT, (May 2025), <https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/2230ac76-f708-4aab-a734-9337dde70adb>, (Accessed 23 June 2025).

⁵⁹ “Damage to Greenhouses Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2024”, FAO, (January 2025), <https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/5f74d78d-9abc-4612-9b78-bcb68219993f>, (Accessed 27 January 2025).

⁶⁰ “Damage to Agricultural Wells Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2023”.

18 months, from Oct. 7, 2023, to April 30, 2025.⁶¹ The same study stated that approximately 82.8% of the existing agricultural wells in Gaza were damaged as a result of Israeli attacks.⁶²

Graph 11. Regional Distribution of Damaged Agricultural Wells in Gaza (April 2025, Units)



Source: “Damage to Agricultural Wells Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2024”.

Graph 11 shows the regional distribution of agricultural wells damaged in the genocidal war. As of April 2025, at least 86.5% of the wells in northern Gaza, where the highest number of irrigation wells are located, have been destroyed. The area with the highest proportional damage to irrigation wells was Gaza City center, at 92.4%. In addition, Rafah, which has the fewest number of irrigation wells in Gaza, suffered the second-highest proportional damage, at 87.2%.

Agricultural wells are not the only components of Gaza’s agricultural infrastructure. Home barns, agricultural warehouses, and farm storage also play a significant role. Home barns are used for storing agricultural products, whereas agricultural warehouses are locations where wholesalers sell these products to the general public. Farm storage units serve a similar

61 “Damage to Agricultural Wells Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025”, FAO, UNITAR and UNOSAT, (May 2025), <https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/9c9630a7-a21a-4303-818f-445878b5bfbe>, (Accessed 23 June 2025).

62 “Damage to Agricultural Wells Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025”.

storage function, but they also contain materials and equipment used in agricultural activities.

Looking at home barns, there were 1043 of them in Gaza before Oct. 7.⁶³ Nearly 206 of these home barns were destroyed by the end of December 2023.⁶⁴ That number hit 537 as of May 20, 2024.⁶⁵ However, a recent study by FAO, UNITAR, and UNOSAT, based on data as of April 30, 2025, indicated that 885 home barns were damaged (Graph 12).⁶⁶ The latest data then shows that at least 84.8% of the existing home barns were destroyed after Oct. 7.

Before the war, Gaza had a total of 547 agricultural warehouses.⁶⁷ As of the end of October 2023, 76⁶⁸ agrarian warehouses were destroyed, while 256 agricultural warehouses were destroyed as of May 2024.⁶⁹ According to the latest study conducted by FAO, UNITAR, and UNOSAT, as of April 30, 2025, 463 agricultural warehouses were essentially unusable (Graph 12),⁷⁰ almost 84.6% of all existing warehouses in Gaza were damaged in Israeli attacks since October 2023.

⁶³ *A Rapid Geospatial Damage Assessment of the 2023 Conflict in the Gaza Strip on Agricultural Land and Infrastructure*, p. 10.

⁶⁴ “Overview of the Damage to Agricultural Land and Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2023”, FAO, (January 2024), <https://www.fao.org/geospatial/resources/detail/zh/c/1676364>, (Accessed 17 December 2024).

⁶⁵ “Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 20 May 2024”.

⁶⁶ “Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025”.


⁶⁷ *A Rapid Geospatial Damage Assessment of the 2023 Conflict in the Gaza Strip on Agricultural Land and Infrastructure*, p. 10.

⁶⁸ “Overview of the Damage to Agricultural Land and Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2023”.

⁶⁹ “Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 20 May 2024”.

⁷⁰ “Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025”.

Graph 12. Status of Home Barns, Agricultural Warehouses, and Farm Storages in Gaza (April 2025, Units)



Source: “Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as at 30 April 2025”.

The third agricultural structure in Gaza is farm storage. According to the FAO, there were 344 farm storage facilities in Gaza before 2023.⁷¹ By the end of 2023, 30 of the existing farm storages⁷² had been damaged, while by May 2024, this number had increased to 143.⁷³ According to the latest data shared by FAO, UNITAR, and UNOSAT, the number of farm storage facilities damaged until April 2025 stood at 266 (Graph 12),⁷⁴ comprising almost 77.3% of all existing farm storage facilities in Gaza.

71 *A Rapid Geospatial Damage Assessment of the 2023 Conflict in the Gaza Strip on Agricultural Land and Infrastructure*, p. 10.

72 “Overview of the Damage to Agricultural Land and Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2023”.

73 “Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 20 May 2024”.

74 “Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025”.

LIVESTOCK AND ANIMAL FARMS

Livestock breeding is one of the most vital sectors for the sustainability of Gaza's economy and food security of the Palestinian people. In the systematic and multi-layered genocide carried out by Israel to eliminate the possibility of life in Gaza and weaken the resilience of its people, livestock farms, including those for cattle, small ruminants, and poultry, were among the primary targets. In addition, stables, zoos, and various stray animals have also been significantly affected by Israeli attacks. This part of the report addresses the damage inflicted on Gaza's livestock infrastructure in the genocidal war since Oct. 7, as well as the stray animals that perished as a result of the attacks.

There is no doubt that the occupying army's targeting of Gaza's livestock sector has exacerbated food insecurity there. Air-strikes on farms and stables exerted pressure on Palestinians and led to their forced displacement. The Zionist government, which endeavored to destroy Gaza's entire livestock sector infrastructure, also acted from a theopolitical perspective. The letter sent by Prime Minister Netanyahu to the members of the army on

the eve of the ground operation holds a significant place in understanding the theopolitical context of aggression and genocide. In the letter, based on the historical narrative of the struggle against enemies who wanted to exterminate the Jews, Netanyahu emphasized that a similar war would be waged against Hamas. Constructing the discourse by combining historical and religious references, Netanyahu emphasized the theopolitical aspect of the issue by addressing his soldiers and commanders with the words, “Remember what Amalek did to you.”⁷⁵

The Amalekites, mentioned in Netanyahu’s letter, are described in the Jewish holy book, the Torah, as people who did evil to the Israelites. This is because the Amalekites tried to oppose the Israelites during their exodus from Egypt. For this reason, the Torah mentions a war between the Israelites and the Amalekites.⁷⁶ However, as narrated in the Torah, the command given by Jehovah to the Israelites was the total annihilation of the Amalekite people. In this context, in the book of 1 Samuel, Jehovah’s command is expressed as follows: “Now go and attack the Amalekites. Destroy everything that belongs to them, spare nothing. Men and women, children and infants, cattle, sheep, camels, donkeys, kill them all.”⁷⁷ When Netanyahu’s letter is evaluated in light of these verses from the Torah, it becomes clear that the occupying army aims to target every living being in Gaza.⁷⁸


75 “Letter from PM Netanyahu to Our Soldiers and Commanders in the Swords of Iron War Prime Minister’s Office”, Prime Minister’s Office, 3 November 2023, <https://www.gov.il/en/pages/spoke-pmo031123>, (Accessed 20 December 2024).

76 Mahmud Nana, *Yabudi Tarihi*, trans. D. Ahsen Batur, (Selenge Yayınları, İstanbul: 2019), p. 125.

77 “1 Samuel 15/3 Torah”, *Kutsal Kitap (Tevrat, Zebur, İncil)*, (Yeni Yaşam Yayınları, İstanbul: 2016).

78 It is observed that Netanyahu has previously used the Amalek discourse. After becoming prime minister in 2009, he visited the United States and held a meeting with American President Barack Obama regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. When Netanyahu’s deep concern about Iran’s nuclear armament was noticed, a member of his team was asked about the reason for this concern and the answer given referred to “Amalek”. See: Jeffrey Goldberg, “Israel’s Fears, Amalek’s Arsenal”, *The New York Times*, 17 May 2009.

Graph 13. Status of Animal Shelters in Gaza (April 2025, Percentage)



Source: Compiled by the authors from FAO, UNOSAT, and UNITAR data.

In line with the aforementioned economic and geopolitical perspective, firstly, the attacks of the occupying army against the animal shelters should be emphasized. Before the war, Gaza had 436 shelters, 94 of which were damaged by the end of 2023.⁷⁹ Additionally, according to FAO data as of May 2024, that number increased to 194.⁸⁰ Furthermore, a recent study conducted by FAO, UNITAR, and UNOSAT puts the number of destroyed stables in Gaza at 346 as of April 30, 2025.⁸¹ Data from last April shows that the occupying army severely damaged approximately 79.3% of the shelters in Gaza during the genocide and slaughtered a large number of animals in these shelters (Graph 13).

Table 1 presents the number of existing farms by type before Oct. 7. According to the FAO, UNITAR, and UNOSAT study, as of April 30, 2025, the occupying army's campaign of animal slaughter in Gaza had damaged 97 dairy farms, 659 sheep farms, 30 turkey farms, and 36 rabbit farms. In addition, as of the same date, 26 cattle farms, 916 broiler farms, and 103 pigeon and other bird farms were destroyed by the occupying forces (Graphs 14 and 15).⁸²

⁷⁹ *A Rapid Geospatial Damage Assessment of the 2023 Conflict in the Gaza Strip on Agricultural Land and Infrastructure*, p. 10; "Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2023", FAO, (January 2024), <https://openknowledge.fao.org/items/4e4bae47-8186-4bd5-afb-15aacd0c1237>, (Accessed 25 December 2024).

⁸⁰ "Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 20 May 2024".

⁸¹ "Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025".

⁸² "Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025".


Table 1. Number of Farms in Gaza (Units)

Type of Farms	Number of Farms
Dairy Farms	112
Sheep Farms	793
Turkey Farms	36
Rabbit Farms	38
Cattle Farms	34
Pigeon/Other Bird Farms	117
Broiler Farms	1117

Source: A Rapid Geospatial Damage Assessment of the 2023 Conflict in the Gaza Strip on Agricultural Land and Infrastructure, p. 10.


Considering the proportional distribution of the available data on animal farms, the most damaged farm type was rabbit farms. At least 94.7% of all rabbit farms were destroyed by the occupying army. After rabbit farms, pigeon and other bird farms suffered the highest percentage of damage, at 88%. However, the least damaged farm type, with a rate of 76.4%, belongs to cattle farms. On the other hand, 86.6% of dairy farms, 83.1% of sheep farms, 83.3% of turkey farms, and 82% of broiler farms lost their functions to a great extent as a result of Israeli attacks.

Graph 14. Status of Farms in Gaza (April 2025, Units)



Source: Compiled by the authors from FAO, UNOSAT, and UNITAR data.

Graph 15. Status of Sheep and Broiler Farms in Gaza (April 2025, Units)



Source: Compiled by the authors from FAO, UNOSAT, and UNITAR data.

Table 2 shows the periodic distribution of farms damaged in Israel's genocidal campaign, which caused the most damage between Feb. 16 and May 20, 2024. On the other hand, there were periods when the number of farms damaged by the attacks decreased. For instance, between Jan. 1 and Feb. 15, as well as between May 21 and Sept. 1, 2024. The main reason for this situation is the expansion of the occupying army's area of operation in Gaza and the increase in the number of controlled areas. Meaning, some of the remaining farms were taken over by the occupiers, and they were not

harmed.⁸³ However, it must be said that the occupying army continued to destroy specifically sheep and broiler farms in Gaza in the first four months of 2025. In total, the genocidal attacks rendered 1867 of the 2247 farms in Gaza unusable. As indicated in Graph 16, at least 83% of the farms in Gaza were damaged as a result of the occupying army’s attacks.

Table 2. Periodic Distribution of the Number of Damaged Farms in Gaza (7 October 2023 - 30 April 2025, Units)


	7 Oct-31 Dec 2023	1 Jan-15 Feb 2024	16 Feb-20 May 2024	21 May-1 Sep 2024	2 Sep-31 Dec 2024	1 Jan-30 April 2025	Total
Dairy	20	6	24	9	22	16	97
Sheep	149	54	194	30	75	157	659
Turkey	5	2	8	0	0	11	30
Rabbit	9	2	12	5	5	3	36
Cattle	5	0	4	2	0	15	26
Pigeon/Other Birds	29	13	33	5	5	18	103
Broiler	172	63	149	54	187	291	916

Source: Compiled by the authors from FAO, UNITAR, and UNOSAT data.⁸⁴

83 In this context, it is useful to once again refer to the Torah and the theopolitical perspective. As mentioned in this report, Jehovah had commanded the Israelites to destroy the Amalekite people entirely. However, King Saul, who set out to fulfil this divine command, acted contrary to it, thereby provoking the wrath of both Jehovah and the prophet Samuel. Although Saul and his men put the Amalekites to the sword, they brought back the sheep, cattle and livestock with them. This incident is described in 1 Samuel 15:9 as follows: “But Saul and the people spared Agag and the best of the sheep, the oxen, the fattened calves, the lambs, and all that was good, and would not utterly destroy them. All that was despised and worthless they devoted to destruction.” When this passage is considered alongside Netanyahu’s likening of the Amalekites to the Palestinians, it to some extent explains why the occupying forces did not destroy all the livestock farms under their control in Gaza. See “Torah 15/9 Torah”, *The Holy Bible (Torah, Psalms, Bible)*.

84 See also for related data. *A Rapid Geospatial Damage Assessment of the 2023 Conflict in the Gaza Strip on Agricultural Land and Infrastructure*; “Agricultural Damage Assessment in the Gaza Strip from October 7th 2023 to September 1st 2024”; “Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2023”; “Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 20 May 2024”; “Overview of the Damage to Agricultural Land and Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2023”; “Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 31 December 2024”; “Damage to Agricultural Infrastructure Due to the Conflict in the Gaza Strip as of 30 April 2025”.

Graph 16. Status of Farms in Gaza (April 2025, Percentage)



Source: Compiled by the authors from FAO, UNOSAT, and UNITAR data.

The Israeli army, which wants to dehumanize Gaza and destroy everything belonging to the Palestinians, increased the intensity of its massacre and targeted zoos, horse farms, animals in need of care in animal shelters, and stray animals as well. The fact that even these creatures, which do not play any role in the economy of Gaza and in ensuring food security in the region, are targeted by the Zionist administration reveals the dimensions of the atrocities in Gaza. For this reason, this report also includes animals subjected to slaughter.

Gaza zoos, which hosted various animal species like lions, tigers, deer, parrots, and monkeys, were among the victims of the blockade imposed by the occupying state since 2007. Due to the inability to provide the necessary medical supplies for animal care, the health of the animals was adversely affected, and their lives were ultimately ended. During the blockade period, zoos were also targeted in Israeli air raids.⁸⁵ According to the zookeepers in Gaza, these attacks have affected the psychology of the animals that survived and reduced the fertility rates of female animals, as well as the life prospects of newborns. For example, 15 lion cubs born at the Nema et-Terfihyya Zoo in Gaza died due to medical shortages. In addition, as a result of the airstrikes, many of the zoos in Gaza were damaged and eventually closed.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ "Israeli Troops Shot and Killed Zoo Animals", Gulf News, 25 January 2009, <https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/israeli-troops-shot-and-killed-zoo-animals-1.46837>, (Accessed 10 December 2024).

⁸⁶ "İsrail Ablukasının Kurbanı Olan Hayvanlar", Anadolu Agency, 14 May 2016.

To summarize, the blockade imposed by Israel has affected all living and non-living beings.

Gaza's zoos, which were severely affected by the blockade, faced starvation and dehydration after Oct. 7. A zoo in Rafah, lions and tigers were starved and dehydrated in their cages, while newborns died. Although the evacuation of the animals was on the agenda, the lack of suitable equipment to transport the animals and the team's lack of life safety due to the Israeli army's attacks prevented the evacuation.⁸⁷ Additionally, four monkeys in the Welfare Zoo lost their lives, and one monkey became severely weakened due to hunger and famine.⁸⁸

Rafah Zoo also hosted Palestinians trying to protect themselves from the attacks. Adel Gomaa, the owner of the zoo, explained the difference between the occupation air force and the animals with the following words: "Living with animals promises a much more compassionate life than that offered by warplanes."⁸⁹

Apart from the zoos, Israel also targeted horse farms in Gaza. According to Abu Sheria, an official of the Gaza Equestrian Federation, most of the existing horse farms in Gaza were destroyed. Stating that approximately 90% of the horses on the farms were slaughtered, Abu Sheria noted that the remaining horses were missing.⁹⁰ As it is understood from this, Israel continues its massacres against all things that show signs of life in Gaza without discrimination.

The occupying army also targeted street animals living in shelters and cages. The surviving animals are struggling to live amid hunger, thirst, and a lack of medical support. On the other hand, animal-borne diseases such as

87 Hosni Nedim and Ekrem Biçeroğlu, "İsrail Kuşatması Nedeniyle Refah Hayvanat Bahçesi'nde Mahsur Kalan 3 Aslan da Kurtarılmayı Bekliyor", Anadolu Agency, 25 May 2024.

88 For images of the monkey in question, see "Photos: Hunger Hits Displaced Palestinians and Animals in Gaza Zoo", Aljazeera, 4 January 2024; for photos showing the condition of other animals in zoos, see "İsrail Saldırıları Gazze'deki Hayvanat Bahçesini Olumsuz Etkiledi", Anadolu Agency, 2 January 2024.

89 Mohammed Salem and Bassam Masoud, "Hunger Hits Animals and People Alike at Gaza Zoo", Reuters, 1 January 2024.

90 Hadeel Gherbawi, "Gaza's Animals Not Spared from War, Suffer Starvation, Trauma and Diseases", Al-Monitor, 24 March 2024, <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/03/gazas-animals-not-spared-war-suffer-starvation-trauma-and-diseases>, (Accessed 11 December 2024).

rabies, echinococcus, *leishmaniasis*, malaria, and scabies have become widespread in Gaza, where many diseases are already prevalent.⁹¹

The start of an Israeli ground offensive led to the forced displacement of Sulala Animal Rescue, the only licensed animal shelter in Gaza. Sulala, which has been operating in the north of Gaza since 2006, was providing assistance and support in the feeding and treatment of approximately 400 stray animals before Oct. 7. Animal lovers, who had to leave the area, established a similar facility in Nuseirat and continue to treat and care for injured stray animals.⁹²

Various images of the massacre of animals in Gaza, which have appeared in international media, are important in understanding the extent of the atrocity. For instance, the photo of an Israeli sniper shooting a sheep wandering among abandoned and ruined buildings,⁹³ and the targeting of Gazan civilians in search of a safe zone with a horse-drawn carriage by unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), drew severe criticism.

91 Due to the possibility that stray animals in Gaza may carry diseases, the occupation army and the health ministry of the occupying state have imposed a ban on the transport of animals beyond the borders of Gaza. See Canaan Lidor, "Citing Health Concerns, Health Ministry Warns against Bringing in Pets from Gaza", *The Times of Israel*, 14 February 2024.

92 Marion Fernando, "A Gaza Shelter's Mission to Rescue Lost Pets and Stray Animals amid War", TRT World, 2024; Dana Hourany, "How Sulala Animal Rescue Shelter Saves Gaza's Petrified Pets", *The New Arab*, 13 February 2024, <https://www.newarab.com/features/how-sulala-animal-rescue-shelter-saves-gazas-petrified-pets>, (accessed 11 December 2024); Jennifer Bell, "Amid Gaza Turmoil, Volunteers Fight to Save Abandoned Pets and Lost Animals", *Al Arabiya English*, 18 July 2024, <https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2024/07/18/amid-gaza-conflict-volunteers-fight-to-save-abandoned-pets-and-lost-animals>, (Accessed 11 December 2024).

93 "Israeli Snipers Target Sheep in Gaza", *Aljazeera*, 7 February 2024.

CONCLUSION

Gaza has faced one of the most appalling massacres in human history since Oct. 7, 2023. The Netanyahu-led Israeli government has pursued a genocidal strategy, with religious references, in front of the eyes of the entire world, to make it impossible for Palestinians to live in their own land. The Zionist administration, which legitimizes massacres with inferences from the Torah and other sacred texts, increases the level of aggression in Gaza day by day without caring about any moral, legal, or humanitarian values.

The psychological trauma of Operation al-Aqsa Flood and the loss of global impunity have not only inflamed Israel's decision-makers to an unprecedented level, but also reinforced the state's traditional expansionism. Prime Minister Netanyahu and the radical members of his cabinet have continued to perpetrate war crimes, crimes against humanity, and human rights violations in Gaza, in a time-accelerating manner centered on Jewish religious law. In the process, all Gazans were targeted by elements of the occupying army with the labeling of potential threats, regardless of age and gender. While witnessing one of the greatest

atrocities in the history of humanity, a reality emerged where not only people but also everything that shows signs of life in Gaza and all infrastructure and superstructure that facilitate daily life were destroyed.

Emboldened by the international community's lack of will to stop this hysterical aggression, the Tel Aviv leadership, in response to its strategic defeat in Gaza, has chosen to deprive the territory of the means to sustain life. In particular, the association of Gazans with the people of Amalek, the ancient enemy of the Jews, has provided the Zionist leadership with a justification for its destructive attacks. The occupying army directly targeted the water wells and the water distribution network in Gaza, thus preventing Palestinians in the city from accessing clean water. Prioritizing the destruction of agricultural lands and agricultural structures, the Netanyahu administration deepened food insecurity in Gaza, forcing Palestinians to relocate, threatening them with starvation in addition to massacres. Inspired by sacred narratives, the rulers of the occupying state, who attacked Gaza's animal farms and destroyed living creatures, allowed even the animals in shelters to be targeted, revealing their intention not to leave any living, breathing creature alive in the Palestinian territory.

This report, which examines the dimensions of the genocide in Gaza from different perspectives, reveals how the Zionist regime legitimizes its aggressive expansionist strategy and massacres with religious references and motives. In this context, in addition to the massacre of Palestinians by defining them as the absolute other, the destruction of the environment and space at a level that makes the reconstruction of Gaza almost impossible has been clearly revealed in this report through the data published by international organizations and experts. At this point, it would be appropriate to emphasize that the occupying and genocidal state of Israel poses a major threat not only to the Palestinians but also to the future of all humanity due to the harm it inflicts on humans, other living beings, and the environment.

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THE OTHER SIDE OF GAZA GENOCIDE

Water Resources, Agricultural Areas, and Animal Farms

MUHAMMED HÜSEYİN MERCAN, HASAN İLKBAHAR

The present report focuses on the various dimensions of the genocide carried out by Israel with reference to religion. According to official statements, the Zionist regime has killed approximately 50,000 Palestinians and destroyed Gaza since 7 October 2023, leaving no possibility for sustainable life. The report provides a comprehensive analysis of the destruction and damage caused by the regime. The report, which is supported by data from official sources such as the FAO, UNOSAT, PCBS, and the Palestinian Water Authority, examines the other side of the genocide in Gaza. It is evident that the Netanyahu government, which is perpetrating acts of genocide against Palestinians through the use of indiscriminate violence, is also responsible for the unprecedented environmental and spatial destruction in Gaza, resulting from severe environmental damage.

The report, which examines the Tel Aviv administration's strategy of annihilation in Gaza under three different headings, first focuses on the damage caused to water resources and infrastructure. The present situation resulting from the military occupation's attacks on water wells, reservoirs, and water networks is described from a comparative perspective, based on data from before and after 7 October. The second section examines the significant damage to agricultural land and infrastructure, analysing the agricultural areas, irrigation wells and canals, and storage facilities targeted by the occupying army, as well as the impact of this damage on the food insecurity crisis, using statistical data. The concluding section of the report draws attention to the massacres perpetrated by the Zionist regime, which, with religious references serving as a focal point, sought to eradicate other living beings. In this particular context, the report discloses the occupation army's strategy of targeting animal farms in Gaza directly, thereby leading to the collapse of the city's livestock infrastructure and condemning its inhabitants to starvation. This assertion is supported by empirical data.