




SETA

THE UN REFORM

NEW APPROACHES AND
TÜRKİYE'S PERSPECTIVE

Yücel Acer
Burhanettin Duran
Murat Yeşiltaş



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ABBREVIATIONS

ABACC:	The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials
ACLED:	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
AL:	Bangladesh Awami League
AMISOM:	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU:	Organization of African Unity
AUOSC:	African Union The Peace and Security Council
AUSAC:	African Union Social Affairs Commission
AYBÜ:	Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi (Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University)
BAPA:	The Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries
BNP:	Bangladesh Nationalist Party
BRAC:	Building Resources Across Communities (Bangladesh)
CCNR:	The Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhein
CEEAC:	The Economic Community of Central African States
CEI-UCA:	The Center for International Studies
CELAC:	The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CHT:	Chittagong Hill Tracts
CRIES:	La Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales
DPKO:	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EAC:	The East African Community
ECCAS:	The Economic Community of Central African States
ECLAC:	The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECOSOC:	Economic, Social and Cultural Council
ECOWAS:	The Economic Community of West African States
ES/NFI:	Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items
FES:	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
G-4:	Group of Four (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan)
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GRULAC:	Latin American and the Caribbean Group
ICG:	International Crisis Group
ICSLM:	International Council for Supporting Liberation Movements
IGAD:	The Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD:	The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development
IGN:	Intergovernmental Negotiations
LAC:	Latin America and the Caribbean

LASA:	Latin American Studies Association
LN:	League of Nations
MDGs:	Millennium Development Goals
MINUSTAH:	The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MOU:	Memorandum of Understanding
NAM:	The Non-Aligned Movement
NATO:	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPT:	Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NSG:	The Nuclear Suppliers Group
OCHA:	United Nations office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ORSAM:	Ortadoğu Araştırmalar Merkezi (Center for Middle Eastern Studies)
PARR:	UNHCR's Priority Areas of Return and Reintegration
SADC:	The Southern African Development Community
SC:	Security Council
SDGs:	Sustainable Development Goals
TICAD:	Tokyo International Symposium on Development in Africa
TNP:	The Non-proliferation Treaty
TTP:	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UfC:	Uniting for Consensus
ULA/AA:	United League of Arakan Army
ULİSA:	Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Stratejik Araştırmalar Enstitüsü (Institute for International Relations and Strategic Research)
UN/ECLAC:	The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean
UN:	United Nations
UNAMA:	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNASUR:	Union of South American Nations
UNCTAD:	United Nations Conference for Trade and Development
UNDAF:	UN Development Assistance Framework
UNDP:	United Nations Development Program
UNDS:	UN Development System
UNECA:	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNHCR:	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF:	UN International Children's Emergency Fund
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council
UNTSO:	The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
US:	United States
USA:	United States of America
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

INTRODUCTION

THE FALSE PROMISES OF REFORMING INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND THE UNITED NATIONS

MURAT YEŞİLTAS*

BURHANETTİN DURAN**

YÜCEL ACER***

The United Nations (UN), founded in the aftermath of World War II, stands as a central pillar of global cooperation and diplomacy, championing ideals of international peace, security, and development. Over the decades, the international system has witnessed significant transformation in the geopolitical landscape, changing nature of international issues, and global challenges. However, the UN has failed to adapt itself to these changes and create sustainable stability, peace, and global security. Obviously, this failure is not a result caused by the UN alone. After all, the UN is composed of states, that have different priorities in international politics. The main reason for the failure of the reform efforts to address the problems of the UN system is the transformation of the international system after the Cold War and the consequences of this transformation. It is not about the procedural debates and process concerning the attempt to reform the UN, rather it is an integral part of the transformation of the nature of the international system and great power competition in the post-Cold War era.

In this chapter, we aim to illuminate the transformative trajectory of the international system following the end of the Cold War. By delving into the contours of the contemporary international landscape, we endeavor to give a contextual picture for engaging in dialogues over the reform of the United Nations.

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THE FALSE PROMISE OF THE US-LED ORDER IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The American-led order in the post-Cold War era, which emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, did not deliver on its anticipated benefits or promises. The international system's promise of a more peaceful, prosperous, and cooperative international order under the US leadership was not fully realized amid various challenges and shortcomings. The liberal international order, which was re-established under the American leadership in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, lost its unipolar character to a great extent and gradually transformed into a multipolar one with more actors. However, international politics built on US centrism in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War turned into the source of a crisis for the world order. We prefer a generally accepted depiction of the phenomenon of "world order" as one of the most widely used concepts in international relations.

We generally see order as a framework used to characterize the global set of norms and rules underpinning the international balance of power and hierarchy. As such, the world order can be defined as a (institutional) structure that regulates international political, economic, and military relations and cooperation, while making it possible for these arrangements to be sustained by various norms and rules. The structure is a concept used to describe the pattern of thought and action within which actors of different characters act, but it can also be defined as a formal pattern that frames the actions and behavior of the actors.

The structure also presents a set of values and cannot be separated from the worldviews of those who construct it.¹ In other words, the balance that states, which see themselves as responsible for protecting their interests, create with each other or on their own in order to maintain their existence constitutes the international order. At this point, the first concept we come across in the short history of international politics is the "New World Order," which was created by the United States under the George W. Bush administration in 1991.²

The America-centered liberal order has failed in many respects and none of the post-Cold War strategic predictions and expectations in world politics have been realized. In other words, contrary to expectations and strategic assessments,

¹ Robert Cox, *Approaches to World Order*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1996)

² Joseph S. Nye, "What is New World Order", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (1992), pp. 83-96

the international distribution of power changed, the global democratic norms declined, and the global power competition intensified. In the post-Cold War era, US foreign policy, which assumed the responsibility of the maintenance of the liberal world order, was designed around three major strategic assumptions. The first of them was the assumption of a period of democratic deepening and expansion as liberal values triumphed in the post-Cold War era. This was built on the expectation that liberal values would spread and create a global landscape different from the Cold War, mainly due to the dissolution of the ideological center of the Soviet Union as the “other” of the West.

In fact, American foreign policy, first under Bush and then under Bill Clinton, implemented the strategy of “democratic enlargement”. It did so by formulating a US grand strategy on the “preservation of American primacy” and the containment and prevention of the rise of alternative power centers.³ According to the assumption, democracy would deepen in the West and more countries globally would democratize.

Secondly, a major strategic assumption was similarly put forward as an integral part of the “Kantian ideal” in the US foreign policy. It foresaw the increasing and deepening economic interdependence on the world stage would consequently bring sustainable stability to the international system. In reality, the idea behind this assumption was the consolidation of American unipolarity/supremacy, and the building of a new US-led international order. On the one hand, economic interdependence would increase, and the liberal economic order would expand. On the other hand, the actors that did not have the paradigm of a free-market economy that could constitute an alternative to the US would become just one of the parts of the system in this period of liberal expansion and deepening, before continuing to gather under the leadership umbrella of the US. In this assumption, it was not China’s economic rise that was feared but worried. However, the expectation was that even if China grew economically, it would not depart from the geopolitical orientation of the liberal economic order, and thus would not be able to become an alternative power to challenge the United States.

The third major strategic assumption was that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the great power competition had come to an end. The new world order would now exist under American unipolarity, with no “equal rival” capable of challenging the US. This was described by Brent Scowcroft, the national security

³ The White House *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, , January 1993, <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1993.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121210-297>

adviser to President Bush, as “standing alone at the pinnacle of power”.⁴ This portrayal presented the US with the opportunities to reshape the global system, but also with profound responsibility. Similarly, Richard Haass, then director of Policy Planning at the State Department, wrote that the goals of American foreign policy in the new era should be based on promoting global peace, prosperity, and justice by integrating other actors into new global arrangements in a way that would guarantee American supremacy and be “compatible” with its values.⁵ The real problem with this proposal, however, was the question of how to “bring into line” those who needed to be harmonized. Conversely, it was assumed that this new era would be a period in which the US would be unable to consolidate global leadership, build liberal hegemony, and ensure that alternative power centers would not have the capacity to balance the US. In other words, US global power status would create a gap with others that could never be closed. American grand strategy was designed to establish a global strategic position that would make it impossible to close this gap.

As we move to the present day, it is evident that all three of the above-mentioned strategic predictions have failed to materialize. In this context, the crisis of the American order has emerged as a result of a series of mistakes made by the US on a global scale. As a matter of fact, all three strategic assumptions of the post-Cold War period failed to consolidate the US-led liberal hegemony and make the global order more stable. On the contrary, the move to consolidate American leadership by redesigning world politics has shifted the ground of the US's existing global position, ended the project of democratic deepening and expansion, weakened the liberal international economic regime, and further destroyed the global norms that would make an “international society” possible. More importantly, instead of bringing peace, stability, and justice, the “American promise” shaped based on these assumptions has created instability, conflict, and new injustices caused by the US in different parts of the world.

One of the first crises was experienced in the projection of the deepening and enlargement of democracy and democratic norms. In this sense, the US-led unipolar order faced two problems in the context of global democracy. Firstly, the assumption that democracy would deepen within the West turned to security pol-

⁴ Stephen M. Walt, *The Hell of Good Intention: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of U.S. Primacy*, (McMillan, New York: 2018), p. 44.

⁵ Richard N. Haass, “What to do with American Primacy, *Brookings*, September 1, 1999, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-to-do-with-american-primacy/>

icies after the Sept. 11 attacks, disrupting the freedom-security balance in favor of security, and the “techniques of government” built on the new security paradigm brought about the implementation of practices that rapidly moved away from liberal values.⁶ Secondly, the doctrine of “pre-emptive war”, which functioned as a disregard for international law and norms that emerged before the unjust and illegitimate US invasion of Iraq, showed that compliance with democracy would not be possible under normal conditions, but only “by force”. Therefore, the post-Cold War assumption of deepening and broadening democratic values and practices was largely a self-fulfilling prophecy. On the contrary, with the second wave of global terrorism and the emergence of Daesh, the Western public and political landscape faced an even deeper democracy crisis than that experienced at the end of the first wave, surrendering to the discourse of anti-Islamism, xenophobia, and the far-right that spread across Europe and the globe. As a result, the American prophecy was not only wrong but also faced with a new situation that signaled the breaking of the wave of democracy at American and global levels.⁷

The second pillar of the strategic prophecy, the assumption that economic liberalization would expand and transform alternative economic power centers into “passive” actors of the system, has also been largely mistaken. At this point, the first misconception was about the nature and functioning of the liberal economy. As in other parts of the 20th century, the capitalist economic system faced three major crises after the Cold War. The first crisis was the financial crisis that started in Thailand in July 1997 and was experienced by the emerging Asian markets. The crisis turned into a global economic meltdown. The Asian crisis showed how financially fragile the markets were as they tried to integrate into the liberal economic order.

The second crisis first emerged in the US property markets in 2007 and grew into an international banking crisis with the collapse of Lehman Brothers investment banking in 2008. It then spread to Europe. The biggest impact of this crisis was that it went beyond the assumption that the state should only play a regulatory role in the liberal economic order and enabled the state to take on an “interventionist” role at the same time, disproving the first assumption. The third crisis

⁶ Didier Bigo Sergio Carrera Elspeth Guild R.B.J. Walker, *The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security*, Mid-Term Report on the Results of the CHALLENGE Project, February 2007, <http://aei.pitt.edu/7404/2/7404.pdf>

⁷ Jefy Huysmans, *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, (Routledge, London: 2006).

emerged when the new COVID-19 virus broke out in China at the end of 2019 and turned into a global pandemic. Although initially it was seen as a China-centered economic contraction, it deepened with the slowdown of real production, the service sector, the global supply chain, the international aviation sector, and the closure of national economies. Although we have not yet emerged from this crisis, it is evident that the cost of managing the crisis and getting out of the crisis is higher than the previous crises even at this stage.

The second major misconception of liberal economic expansion and deepening was that the alternative economic forces would not achieve their counter-balancing potential by conforming to the liberal order; that even if their economies grew, they would conform to global trade norms as part of the system.

In particular, China's transformation from a rising position in the global economy to a global economic powerhouse and its position at the center of the world trade network has had serious consequences for the US-led liberal order and for the US itself. First of all, while China has rapidly become one of the main players in the global market with its cheap labor, reverse engineering-imitation, and high-tech innovation, it has led to the emergence of trade deficits that are extremely difficult to close with the actors it has established trade relations. On the other hand, while China has relentlessly benefited from the free regime practices of the liberal economy, it has created an image that is far from implementing the political values of the liberal economy. Finally, by reaching an economic size that would challenge the global economic leadership of the US, China has implemented a strategy that seeks to create its own economic global network. While pursuing the strategy of transforming the Chinese economy into one of the main veins of the global economic system with the "One Road One Belt" project, it has also attempted to establish a China-led order where it has political leverage on other countries through networks built on the credit-investment equation. A system very similar to the adventure followed by the American liberal economic order.

While the outbreak of the new trade war with Donald Trump's coming to power deepened and hardened the Sino-American economic competition, the US strategy of closing the trade deficit with China by imposing high tariffs on imports through trade walls has ignited a process that has almost undermined the liberal economic order.⁸ This misconception is not limited to the US-China

⁸ Binyamin Appelbaum, "On Trade, Donald Trump Breaks With 200 Years of Economic Orthodoxy", *The New York Times*, March 10, 2016, <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/11/us/politics/-trade-donald-trump-breaks-200-years-economic-orthodoxy-mercantilism.html> (accessed on 19 August 2023)

rivalry. Rising powers have also introduced a new policy of economic interconnection, weakening American economic supremacy and creating a multi-layered global economy.

The third strategic assumption of the post-Cold War American-led international order was the assumption that global power competition had come to an end after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In reality, however, this strategic vision of the post-Cold War era did not materialize exactly as the US expected. Firstly, the global military power of the US has declined from absolute superiority to relative superiority. While Russia has returned to its old geopolitical narratives and practices since the mid-2000s, China has become a global military power with the advantage of its economic superiority and technological capabilities. However, while middle and regional powers have tended to increase their defense expenditures, they have also changed their armament patterns⁹ and pursued a policy of “strategic autonomy”¹⁰ in their foreign policies. Finally, the approach of using American military power to restrain conflicts when necessary has been largely dysfunctional. Starting with Somalia, US military interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, either unilaterally or by leading coalitions, have largely deepened instability rather than stabilizing it. In the Libyan intervention in 2011, the United States remained in the background under the conceptualization of leadership from behind and remained a bystander to the human tragedy in Syria, turning Syria into one of the testing grounds for the great power competition of the 21st century. Similarly, in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014, 2022), the US, unable to put forward an alternative strategy to Russia’s near abroad strategy and military aggression, could not go beyond a balancing policy in the face of China’s Asia-Pacific-centered geopolitical game.

The three main strategic predictions based on the “Kantian liberal universalism” of the post-Cold War era have thus failed. The democratic consolidation, liberal economic enlargement, and the vision of a non-polar world on which the American-led liberal order was based have resulted in the breakdown of the US alliance system, the weakening of international institutions, and the decline of global norms to a large extent. This has led to the emergence of a more fragmented, fragile, and multi-polar world that has taken on a new form. The coronavirus

⁹ Merve Seren, *Küresel Savunma Harcamaları ve Askeri Güç (Global Defense Spending and Military Power)*, Orion Yayınevi, 2022.

¹⁰ Ronja Kempin-Barbara Kunz, *France, Germany and the Quest for European Strategic Autonomy: Franco-German Defence Cooperation in a new era*, SWP-IFRI, (2017).

pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have caused this fragile world to face a more uncertain future.

THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND GLOBAL ANXIETY

The international crises triggered by the US-led order in the post-Cold War period have propelled the international order into a state of transformation, uncertainty, and global anxiety. The main issue is the question of the lack of understanding of the emerging nature of international order and the repositioning of the UN as the strategic pillar of the reforming sustainable international order. The new character of the international order can be defined as “multi-layered multipolarity”. It symbolizes an intricate global scenario marked by the distribution of power across multiple tiers involving diverse actors, nations, and regions. This idea postulates that power is dispersed, spanning various strata and facets within the international framework, rather than being centralized within a solitary entity or group of nations. Each layer signifies a distinct echelon of influence, and this multipolarity illustrates a varied and interwoven landscape of power dynamics on a global magnitude.¹¹ It also represents the complex nature of international politics in which different types of actors and issues have global impacts simultaneously.¹²

One of the distinctive features of the current global landscape is the lack of effective global leadership. Global leaderlessness refers to the absence of a global actor that can guide global issues and persuade other global actors to solve these problems. In addition to the lack of global leadership, another dynamic shaping the new global system is the new distribution of power. The existing international problems, the actors involved in these problems, and the characters of the actors lead to the formation of a multi-layered international political environment. Perhaps the most important feature of multi-layered multipolarity is the considerable increase in the number of rising powers and the new regionalism.¹³ Rising powers are becoming more and more essential players in shaping the world order in terms of the processes of conflict and competition they are involved in their regional for-

¹¹ Amitav Acharya, “After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order”, *Ethics & International Affairs*, 31, no. 3 (2017), pp.271-285.

¹² Burhanettin Duran, “The Future of Global Power Competition after the Coronavirus”, *Insight Turkey*, Spring 2022, Vol 22 No 2.

¹³ Muhittin Ataman, “The rise of regionalism and Türkiye”, *Daily Sabah*, July 19, 2023, <https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/columns/the-rise-of-regionalism-and-turkiye> (accessed on 20 August 2023)

eign policy activism, and their influence on the global economy. Changing security issues, the threat environment, the changing nature of international terrorism, and the rapid shift in global politics away from the axis of international norms are among the new hallmarks of the global order.

The global leadership problem manifests itself at three levels. The first of these is experienced at the level of the leaders themselves. There are many problems on a global scale. There are serious differences between the positions of leaders on many issues ranging from economy to security, from climate change to extremism, violence, discrimination, and racism. These differences delay the resolution of crises and lead to the deepening of sensitive conflicts such as Syria, Libya, Yemen, Russia, and the fight against international terrorism. In addition to divergent views, we should also consider the lack of effective leadership to take the initiative and involve other actors to find solutions to the recent problems with global implications. In addition, the domestic political priorities of the leaders cause global issues to be reduced to domestic political considerations and thus to lose their real ground, which ultimately paves the way to global populism.

The second level, where the problem of global leaderlessness is experienced, emerges in the axis of global governance and international organizations. The UN, which is a central pillar of global governance, has turned into an organization that is weak in taking an active role in international crises as a whole. The fact that the UN has failed to take any effective steps on the global pandemic, Ukraine war, global food crisis, and humanitarian assistance, taken together with other problems, further deepens the governance crisis.¹⁴ Instead of taking the initiative in managing crises, international organizations remain dysfunctional or act as a tool of geopolitical competition between countries. While the UN's position on the Palestinian issue offers notable instances in this context, its ineffective policies regarding the prevention of the Russian invasion of Ukraine serve as another textbook example.¹⁵ The UN also fails to fulfill its responsibilities in other conflict areas such as Syria, Yemen, and Libya.

The problem of governance is not limited to the UN. Other global and regional organizations are also unable to assume a proactive role in the management of in-

¹⁴ Gonca Oguz Gok and Radiye Funda Karadeniz, "The UN's legitimacy crises in global governance and the COVID-19 pandemic", in *The Crises of Legitimacy in Global Governance* (edit) Gonca Oguz Gok, Radiye Funda Karadeniz, Routledge, 2021.

¹⁵ Jeffrey Feltman, "War, peace, and the international system after Ukraine", *Brookings*, March 28, 2023, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/war-peace-and-the-international-system-after-ukraine/> (accessed on 19 August 2023)

ternational crises in their respective fields. It can be asserted that a similar criticism applies to the European Union (EU) which is another supranational organization. Instead of deciding and acting under the umbrella of the union on many issues, the EU has turned into a group of countries that take and implement decisions on a national scale. In many regional crises, the EU has not been able to form a common stance; on the contrary, member states have not hesitated to take steps to deepen the problems. In the refugee crisis centered around the Syrian issue, the EU has shown a performance far from providing leadership, while it has failed to put forward and implement a clear position on global issues. Similarly, other regional organizations like the Arab League, the African Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and numerous others encounter comparable challenges in terms of operationalizing a sustainable regional order.

Another level at which the problem of global leadership manifests itself is on the axis of states. Rather than playing an active role in solving global problems, the US has turned into an actor causing the emergence of problems and has lost its previously assumed position of “neutrality” in many international issues. China, which is one of the actors with the potential for global leadership with its population and economic indicators, also seems to have very comprehensive problems in terms of global leadership.

The second characteristic feature of the current international order is its multi-layered distribution of power. One of the first elements of this fragmented and more fragile multipolar structure is the new pattern of power distribution. To a large extent, this new model embodies some differences from previous models of power distribution. In the 19th century, the prevailing classical multipolar structure served to maintain a perfect balance between the five players within the system. In contrast, the main actors of the new multipolarity are neither only great powers nor only states. Instead, the actors of the new multi-layered multipolarity are regional organizations, transnational structures, social movements, non-state armed groups, and terrorist organizations.¹⁶

Secondly, in contrast to the 19th century, the economy has become one of the hallmarks of the international order, both much more global in scope and dense in content. Global trade and finance, global production networks, and global supply chains significantly differentiate the emerging multi-layered system from the trade-based multipolarity. Thirdly, today, the interaction generated by economic

¹⁶ Amitav Acharya, “After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order”, *Ethics & International Affairs*, 31, no. 3 (2017), pp. 271-285.

interdependence is not limited to specific geography. In addition, the multipolar structure was based on the cohesion between the European powers and was built on European diplomacy and then on European international organizations that concerned the European balance of power. The new multipolarity, on the other hand, is built on a divergence of norms in which international organizations are extended to a global level. Fifth, the main threat to classical multipolarity was inter-state territorial and conventional conflicts that could disrupt European harmony. While inter-state conflicts have diminished over time, in the new multipolarity conflicts seem to have diversified and ceased to be conventional. In today's world, the threat to states comes not from an attack by another state, but from terrorism, civil unrest, or, as in the case of Corona, from the pandemic itself.

As a result, while the unipolarity shaped on the axis of American hegemony is rapidly losing ground, the new position of the rising powers has led to the emergence of some geopolitical consequences. The first of these is the shift in the hierarchy of power from a vertical to a horizontal axis. This is a matter of power diffusion rather than power distribution. The quest for the status of the new emerging powers has both expanded and spread on the axis of economic expansion-military power consolidation and brought about the spread of power from the US monopoly to other actors and geographies. Thus, there has been a change in the regional balance of power. Secondly, with the rising powers, new sub-norms began to emerge under the universalist institutions of the liberal order. Rising powers have naturally tended to challenge the status quo and revise the dominant norms of the system to reflect their own interests and values. Thirdly, at the military level, rising powers have become stronger with geopolitical implications in their respective regions, fueling developments whose deterrence and assertive character would allow for revolt if necessary.¹⁷ The US, on the other hand, has tried to prevent the emergence of these actors, including with the use of military force, but has not been successful in this regard. Thus, the search for a new status emerging on the axis of rising powers has reinforced the multi-layered structure of the international system.¹⁸

¹⁷ Murat Yeşiltaş and Ferhat Piriñçi, "Turkey's Strategic Conduct under the Changing International System, *Insight Turkey*, Fall 2021, Volume 23 Number 4; Burhanettin Duran, "The Crisis of Liberal Order and Turkey's Response", *Insight Turkey*, Summer 2019, Vol 21, No3.

¹⁸ Ali Balci and Furkan Halit Yolcu, "The Ruling Group Survival: Why Pakistan and Hungary Move Away from the US-led Order?", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Volume 19, Issue 1, January 2023, orac026, <https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac026> (accessed on 19 August 2023)

One characteristic of the emerging new international order is the new global security architecture. The first characteristic feature of the new security architecture is experienced at the geopolitical level. The multi-layered geopolitical struggle is characterized by the fact that competition and rivalry are not limited to states. In classical multipolarity, geopolitical rivalry took place only between states and empires on economic and military issues. The competition in the new multi-layered multipolarity, on the other hand, takes place not only between states but also between different political units at the vertical level, as well as economic and military issues at the horizontal level, in a wide range from climate and health to transport and food. On the other hand, this geopolitical struggle is no longer a hierarchical geopolitical struggle and it is not only over a certain territory, a certain strait, a transit route, or a transport route. In Mackinder's classic expression, "who controls the Heartland" can no longer control the world, or in Spykman's expression, "who controls the Rimlands" can no longer control the world. In the geopolitical struggle dimension of the new security architecture, there are four layers of competition without borders. The first of these is space-scale geopolitics, the second layer is global geopolitics, the third layer is regional, and the fourth layer is a local geopolitical struggle. Although the transition between layers in the new geopolitics is directly related to power parameters, the most important aspect is that local geopolitical competition can create a global impact. One of the striking manifestations of the hyper-localization of geopolitical struggle and its global impact can be seen in the war in Syria and Ukraine.

Another feature of the global security architecture is the changing nature of war and conflict. In this sense, the form, character, and scope of war constitute the distinctive features of the security architecture of the global system. In the new global security architecture, the phenomenon of war has significantly changed its character. Factors such as actors, methods, and the nature of the war are important in the traditional war phenomenon. In the new security architecture, the change in the quality and quantity of the actors involved in the conflict comes to the fore because the state is no longer the sole actor of war. In addition, the methods and layers of warfare have changed to a great extent. In the new security architecture, there is a multi-layered battlefield. The changing nature of warfare, from hot armed conflict to psychological and hybrid warfare, has blurred the line between the state of war and the state of absence of war in the new layered period. Therefore, there is uncertainty about which situation is war and which is peace. In this sense, the concept of war in the new security

The United Nations has been facing reform proposals ever since its inception in 1945. Lengthy discussions and negotiations on the proposals have taken place in the General Assembly, but only a handful of them were ever approved. The majority of such proposals, especially touching on the composition and power of the UNSC members, remained academic brainstorming. This does not, by any means, downgrade the significance of the efforts as the UN system fails dramatically in preventing some serious global problems of protecting peace and security, as well as preventing systematic human rights violations and hunger globally. Recent years have witnessed increasing demands toward reforming the UN following striking failures, especially in protecting peace and security. This book brings together some analyses of UN reform proposals in general and some proposals that come from the states that form regional groups to reflect their commonalities and communalities in the process.

