



REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS AND TÜRKİYE'S APPROACH

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ABSTRACT

The U.N. stands as a system primarily to prevent violence and restore peace in the international community when it is violated. However, it has mostly failed to fulfill its primary responsibility of protecting international peace and security. The proposals that the U.N. should be reformed to be more effective started early in the 1950s and intensified in the 1990s. The ongoing reform efforts have made some modest achievements but have so far failed on major issues, such as reforming the Security Council in terms of membership and voting. Türkiye feels obliged to participate in discussions and contribute to reform efforts and proposals toward better global governance. It has put forward certain principles to be followed in reforming the U.N. as well as some concrete reform proposals such as the complete removal of the veto power in the Security Council.

INTRODUCTION

Peace is such an important foundation of a community that the law exists primarily to prevent violence and protect peace in society. Anything harming the peace shakes the very fundamentals of a community. International law is no exception as it is set to protect the foundation of the international community through the prevention of violence.¹

World War II caused enormous destruction and suffering, leading eventually to the emergence of a strong hope and efforts to prevent the reoccurrence of similar destruction and humanitarian suffering. The idea to form the United Nations (U.N.) was the answer to such hope and expectations.²

The U.N. was established at the U.N. Conference on International Organization held by delegates of 51 nations who met in San Francisco, California, U.S., between April 25 and June 26, 1945. Based on the main purpose of establishing the U.N., it is evident that the U.N. stands as a system to prevent violence and restore peace in the international community when it is threatened or distorted.

For a series of reasons, however, the U.N. has mostly failed to fulfill its most fundamental task, its *raison d'être*: protecting international peace and security. Many examples of failures of the U.N. system have been experienced since its

¹ Malcolm N. Shaw. *International Law...*, p. 5.

² Evan Luard. "A History of the United Nations...", p. 17-36.

establishment, intensifying in the last decades after the demise of the Cold War.³ Bosnia, Rwanda, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Ukraine are only a few among many recent examples.⁴ The U.N. also suffered organizationally, even falling into corruption and abuses in the same cases, like the “oil for food program” and peacekeeping operation in Congo.⁵

In the case of the Security Council, the need for reform is mostly justified as inevitable to update council membership and voting in light of changes in world politics and the number of states. The huge distance between the existing membership of and voting in the Security Council and the overall number of U.N. member states is said to delegitimize the council.⁶

This analysis aims to identify the distinct aspects of the reform proposals for the U.N. and the related improvements realized so far. The second main aspect of the analysis is to summarize the proposals developed by Türkiye concerning the U.N. reforms to restore the U.N. system to function properly for the protection of international peace and security. The content in the second part covers mainly the identification of Türkiye's proposals without conducting deep analyses of them.

3 Dilek Latif. “United Nations’ Changing Role...”, p. 24.

4 See, Berdal Aral. “Enhancing the Role of the UN General Assembly...”, p. 9.

5 John C. Yoo. “Force Rules: UN Reform and...”, p. 641.

6 Ian Hurd, “Myths of Membership...”, p. 199; Justin Morris. “UN Security Council Reform...”, p. 266.

THE U.N. SYSTEM FOR PRESERVING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

THE U.N. GOALS AND PRINCIPLES

Similar to all international organizations, the U.N. has been established through the member states' institutionalized collaboration for certain purposes to be realized depending on certain common principles.

The first paragraph of Article 1 of the U.N. Charter identifies the main purpose of the U.N. as to “maintain international peace and security.” To achieve this, the U.N. will “take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.” The aim justifying the very existence of the U.N. is therefore the preservation of international peace and security. Keeping in mind the main goal of preserving international peace and security, other goals of the U.N. enumerated expressly in the Charter all relate to or support this specific fundamental goal.

To better protect the peace, the U.N. is given another goal to “bring about by peaceful means ... adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.” In relation to all of these, the U.N. also has a duty to “develop friendly relations among nations ... and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace,” as well as to “achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all.”

Finally, the U.N. is expected to be “a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.” Therefore, for all these fundamental goals, the U.N. should also be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common goals.⁷

One might wonder why the U.N. deals with many other issues from human rights to fighting against disarmament, including nuclear weapons, hunger, poverty, environmental pollution, irregular migration, the peaceful use of space and seas, international commercial and/or economic issues, and international organizations even though the U.N. was established to mainly protect international peace and security.

The Charter and the organizational structure of the U.N. were initially designed and further improved in the following years to cover such issues simply because they eventually have a deep impact on international peace and security. If the world is to be kept as a place free of violence and disturbances, the U.N. must deal with these issues and try to eradicate elements that would eventually pave the way for military conflicts and other forms of violence.

The U.N. and the member states do not have completely free leverage in attaining these goals despite their significance in the international community. The U.N. and member states should follow certain principles in achieving these goals to protect the essence of the aims. These principles are now approved as the fundamental rules of international law after a long process that started with the Westphalia peace accords in 1648.⁸

The principle of the sovereign equality of all its members, fulfilling obligations assumed by the member states under the present Charter in good faith, settling their international disputes by peaceful means, refraining from the threat or use of force in their international relations, providing the U.N. assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter and refraining from assisting any state against which the U.N. is taking preventive or enforcement action, non-intervention in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, and submitting matters to settlement under the present Charter are all principles covered by the U.N. Charter.⁹

It is imperative that not only member states but also the U.N. itself should obey and follow these principles. That is a way to further support and improve

7 For all these provisions, see Article 1 of the UN Charter.

8 Malcolm N. Shaw. *International Law*.... p. 813.

9 See, Article 2 of the UN Charter.

these principles through the work of the U.N. as these constitute the very fundamentals of today's international community and its legal system.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE PRESERVATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Every single state has a responsibility to refrain from threatening or/and the use of force in its relations with others based on both the Charter of the U.N. and general principles of international law.¹⁰ Global governance of the preservation of international peace and security, however, rests on the Security Council in particular, as outlined under the previous title.

The Security Council has 15 member states, five of them are permanent and the remaining 10 members are changed every two years.¹¹ Chapter VII of the Charter regulates the rights and responsibilities of the council for the observation of peace and security. Article 39 empowers the council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken.” Article 40 specifies that the council may make “recommendations” or decide upon the measures that are defined in Articles 41 and 42.

The collective measures stated in Article 41 cover measures not involving the use of force. These measures are “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”

If these measures prove insufficient, the measures in Article 42 could be implemented. These are “action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” as well as measures such as “demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.” The gradually intensifying nature of the measures promises effectiveness toward securing international peace.

In most cases, however, the Security Council did not function properly and could not make needed decisions due to its voting system. Despite possessing significant power and the ability to help preserve international peace and security, the council makes decisions with a majority vote of 9 out of 15; however, for a decision to pass, the five permanent member states, i.e., China, France, Russia,

¹⁰ Prohibition on use of force is a customary rule of international law as *jus cogens* rule, incumbent on every State regardless of UN membership.

¹¹ See Article 23 of the UN Charter.

the United Kingdom, and the United States, must not object.¹² Every one of these countries, therefore, has “veto power.” A proposed decision cannot pass if any of these permanent members object to it, although abstaining would not prevent a motion from passing.

¹² See Article 27 of the U.N. Charter. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

U.N. REFORM PROPOSALS AND THEIR REALIZATION

Proposals pushing for reform in the U.N. started almost immediately following its establishment.¹³ However, the U.N. reform efforts especially gained momentum in the mid-1990s. The reform proposals made in 1997 and 2002 concerned issues of management and coordination within the U.N. system. The U.S. invasion of Iraq and the oil-for-food scandal in 2003 prompted calls for more ambitious reform efforts in the overhaul of the organization.¹⁴ The proposals on reforming the Security Council have always been significant as they directly relate to the protection of international peace and security.

Most of the U.N. secretaries-general appointed since the 1950s were asked to prepare working papers or proposals on reforming the U.N. Some of these proposals were reviewed and voted on in the General Assembly. Some proposals needed the related provision of the Charter to be amended according to Article 108, which provides that amendments to the Charter shall come into force for all members when they have been adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the members of the U.N., including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

¹³ Joachim Müller, (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations: New Initiatives...*

¹⁴ Hans-Martin Jaeger. "UN Reform, Biopolitics...", p. 50.

The proposals made and/or applied so far relating to various aspects of the U.N. system mostly focused on various specific issues such as bureaucracy, efficiency, accountability, transparency, and protection of international peace and security.¹⁵ Among them, the protection of international peace and security has proved to be the most pressing one but also the most difficult one simply because it also requires the amendment of the Security Council's membership and voting.

The following subtitles take on the history of the reform proposals and their application in chronological order. The analyses are mostly narrative but also dig into the nature of, difficulties in, and conflicting approaches to reforming the U.N.

THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1950-1996

Following its establishment, some regional branches of the U.N. needed to be established to follow up on the developments of major regional issues. Starting in the 1950s, new centers as regional headquarters or headquarter districts were opened in later years in Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi Bangkok, Addis Ababa, and Santiago.

Other than expanding the branches, some of the U.N. activities became semi-independent from the Secretariat, such as the U.N. International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), which was set up in 1946.¹⁶ Peacekeeping measures were developed and the first experience came in 1948 in the Middle East and in the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan in 1950.¹⁷

As the Cold War atmosphere further escalated in the 1950s to heighten the confrontation between East-West, the Soviet Union (USSR) complained that the Secretariat's independence was not secured. The peacekeeping operations were also criticized by the USSR as being staffed with persons from NATO countries. Although demands for correcting the secretary-general's position were rejected, an agreement was reached by giving a bigger proportion of Secretariat staff posts to people from socialist countries.¹⁸

The number of U.N. member states increased rapidly in the 1960s with decolonization, most of which were from Africa and Asia. The number of member states became 118 by 1965, doubling the size from when it was founded. Eventually, the technical cooperation programs were expanded, leading to the creation of new bodies and programs, such as the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), es-

15 Joanna Apap, Amaia Garcés de los Fayos Alonso. *United Nations Reform...* p. 2.

16 Dimitris Bourantonis. *The History and Politics...* p. 92.

17 *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines...*, p. 20.

18 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle...*, p. 5.

established in 1965 for technical cooperation with developing countries.¹⁹ Towards the mid-1970s, the U.N. gradually turned into a forum for global negotiations on global issues. The establishment of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was an example of eventual developments.²⁰

The end of the Cold War was understandably a landmark in further reforming the U.N. and its activities. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was called upon to work on reforming and reinforcing the Secretariat structure, especially in the area of peacekeeping. The program “Agenda for Peace”²¹ was introduced, containing suggestions for reform in the area of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. A further development was that Boutros Boutros-Ghali reorganized the Secretariat in 1993 by establishing a series of independent units in the economic and social domains.²²

Strong criticism was made by the developing countries that the U.N. weakened the economic and social areas in favor of the security priorities of industrial countries. Eventually, the “Agenda for Development”²³ as a counterpart to the “Agenda for Peace” was introduced. Boutros Boutros-Ghali further proposed procedural and structural changes to improve the workings of the General Assembly and the Secretariat.²⁴

THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1997-2002

Organizational Reforms

The new secretary-general, Kofi Annan, served between 1997-2006 and expressed his desire to make the U.N. more efficient, more effective, and more responsive to the demands and needs of the member states. He also faced criticism from the U.S., according to which the U.N. was expected to make budget reductions, change the budget process, and rethink the peacekeeping operations to reduce the United States’ contribution.²⁵

The secretary-general went on to issue a report titled “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform,” which was later endorsed by the General

19 Dimitris Bourantonis. *The History and Politics...*, p. 92.

20 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations...*, p. 5.

21 United Nations Document: Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace...*

22 Dimitris Bourantonis. *The History and Politics...*, p. 92.

23 Boutros Boutros-Ghali “An Agenda for Development 1995....”

24 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations...*, p. 8.

25 The *Helms-Biden Reform Act* of 1999...

Assembly.²⁶ Key proposals of the report included the establishment of a position of deputy secretary-general and distinctive reductions in the posts and costs. To address more fundamental problems, the secretary-general proposed to hold a Millennium Summit and Assembly in 2000.

The Millennium Summit was convened in September 2000 and attended by 144 heads of state or government. The summit approved the Millennium Declaration,²⁷ reaffirming the organization's values and principles, promotion of peace and security, sustainable development, human rights, democracy, and good governance. The Millennium Declaration included mainly the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, achievement of universal primary education, promotion of gender equality and women's empowerment, reduction of child mortality, improvements in maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability, and developing a global partnership for development.

As far as the protection of peace is concerned, the secretary-general had convened a "blue-ribbon panel" to come up with practical and achievable prescriptions for future peace operations and recommended sweeping changes in peace-keeping strategy.²⁸

Annan introduced a second major package of reforms in September 2002, titled "Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change".²⁹ This package, which was approved by the General Assembly,³⁰ aimed at aligning the United Nations' activities with the priorities defined by the Millennium Declaration. Specific changes included public information, the budgeting and planning system, human rights, management and staff, technical cooperation, civil society, and the private sector.

In general, the reforms under the secretary-general's authority progressed more quickly than those requiring member states' approval. Since 1997, the Secretariat had implemented reforms to provide more unified leadership and coordination across departments and offices.³¹

26 United Nations document: Secretary-General, *Renewing the United Nations...*

27 United Nations document: *United Nations Millennium Declaration...*

28 The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations....

29 United Nations document: Secretary-General, *Strengthening of the United Nations...*

30 United Nations document: *Strengthening of the United Nations...*

31 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations...*, p. 13.

Security Council Reform

Since the Security Council is responsible for the preservation of the international community by protecting peace and security, the reforms of the Security Council are potentially the most important among all reform proposals concerning the U.N.

Since the number of conflicts increased dramatically with the end of the Cold War, the Security Council started to face even more expectations. As these expectations have not been properly satisfied, more states feel dissatisfied with the council's structure and decision-making process.

The council initially had 11 members in 1945, including five permanent members (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and six non-permanent members, each elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term. When the Security Council was established, the membership of the U.N. included 51 states. The number of members of the council increased to a total of 15 with the inclusion of four additional non-permanent members in 1964. At that time, membership in the U.N. had grown to more than 100.

When the membership stood at 185 in the early 1990s, most of the member states saw increasing the size of the council as an essential element for improving its representativeness and therefore legitimacy.³² It should be reiterated that any change in the size and composition of the Security Council requires an amendment to the Charter with the approval of two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly, including all the permanent members of the council.³³

The General Assembly adopted resolution 47/62 in December 1992, entitled "Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council".³⁴ Particularly the developing countries at that time emphasized the need to broaden the council's membership based on the secretary-general report containing written comments received from 75 member states.

The assembly recognized that the main reason for the review was the substantial increase in the membership of the U.N., especially of developing countries, as well as the changes in international relations. The Working Group, which was established by the General Assembly in December 1993, became the principal forum for discussion of the issue of council reform during the coming years.³⁵

³² Dimitris Bourantonis. *The History and Politics...*, p. 77.

³³ See, Article 108, p 15.

³⁴ Dimitris Bourantonis. *The History and Politics...*, p. 40.

³⁵ Bardo Fassbender, "On the Boulevard of Broken Dreams...", p. 15.

Work was organized, including issues such as voting arrangements, the veto, the size and composition of the Security Council, and other questions related to improving working methods and procedures.

What was significant here was that the five permanent members of the council were cautious about any extension of the permanent membership or any restriction on their veto power. Some support was given for a modest increase in the number of non-permanent members, as exemplified by the previous expansion in 1963. However, the said approach of the permanent members was not endorsed by either the developing countries or some industrialized nations. Germany and Japan, the most possible candidates to be permanent members, emphasized they deserved to be permanent members as they were the second and third-largest dues payers.³⁶

The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia eventually supported permanent membership for Germany and Japan and an additional three non-permanent seats for the rest of the world community in those years. This was the so-called “quick-fix” solution.³⁷ However, the Non-Aligned Movement³⁸ arose against any “quick fix” limited to Germany and Japan, labeling the move “Eurocentric” and calling for the inclusion of developing countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Egypt.

Countries seeking to become permanent members, but were not likely to be successful, such as Pakistan and Mexico, started to oppose any expansion of permanent membership, like the countries that had traditionally supported the U.N. but would not benefit from an expansion. Canada, New Zealand, Italy, and Spain were such countries. The perception among most of the countries was that increasing the number of permanent members would aggravate an elitist, anti-democratic and anachronistic system.³⁹

Italy's proposal at that time is worth mentioning. Italy was against the membership of Germany and proposed the introduction of a “special class of intermediate states” that would rotate in and out of Security Council seats. This formula was criticized for trying to introduce a third category of Security Council mem-

36 This was despite the fact that there was some domestic opposition in the aspirant countries themselves, fearing that a permanent Security Council seat might draw them into international conflicts. Malcolm N. Shaw. *International Law...*, p. 489, 587, 817.

37 Dimitris Bourantonis. *The History and Politics...*, p. 79.

38 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was formally established in the early 1960s in Belgrade, the capital of the former Yugoslavia. The first official conference of the nonaligned countries took place in September 1961, with 25 countries participating.

39 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations...* p. 16.

bership and was rejected by the aspirants to permanent membership, in particular Germany and Japan, and those permanent members that supported the claims of both countries.⁴⁰

Another significant aspect of reforming the Security Council is voting. Throughout all the discussion on this issue, all permanent members, especially the United States but occasionally China, essentially defended the veto power of the current permanent members. The permanent members argued that the veto arrangement ensured the acceptance of practically effective powers supported by the most powerful members. Proposals to accept new members into the council have also concerned their status. Japan and Germany insisted that new permanent members should have the right to veto. Italy and some other countries argued against extending the veto right to new permanent members. Nigeria, Brazil, and India argued for the granting of veto power to new permanent members.⁴¹

However, there were varying proposals, mostly supported by the Non-Aligned Movement, to limit the scope of the existing veto powers of the permanent members by limiting the scope of the veto to certain issues, such as the approval of enforcement measures under Chapter VII or other decisions involving the use of military force. There was also an approach to eliminate the veto power altogether since it was a source of conflict.⁴²

Some other important expectations in the reform of the Security Council were the efforts to increase the transparency of its operations and improve consultations with non-council members.⁴³ Dozens of countries that had contributed troops to peacekeeping operations demanded that they be consulted on council actions that affected their forces. This consultation process started in 1994.

However, disagreements persisted in 1995 and 1996 on virtually all of the main issues, namely various aspects of membership and voting. Many detailed negotiations were conducted but the existing permanent member states had made it clear that they would not accept any changes in their current status. On the other hand, the states aspiring for permanent status in the council insisted that they would not accept second-class status.⁴⁴

40 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations...* p. 16.

41 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations...* p. 16.

42 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle...*, p. 18.

43 Mariana Pimenta Oliveira Baccarini. "Informal Reform of the United Nations Security Council". *Contexto Internacional*, vol. 40(1) Jan/Apr 2018, p. 97-115, at 97.

44 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle...*, p. 18.

When the issue came in for a decision in November 1998, the General Assembly decided not to adopt any resolution or decision on the question of equitable representation or increase in the membership of the Security Council. The General Assembly's attitude was a major setback for Germany and Japan after five years of negotiations.

In April 2000, the United States expressed its willingness to consider proposals involving an increase in members to less than 21. Russia supported permanent member status for India. As an alternative to the concept of rotating non-permanent seats, Italy suggested an expansion of non-permanent seats only, as proposed by the Non-Aligned Movement as a fallback position.⁴⁵

Therefore, compared to the initial expectations, the Working Group had achieved a very moderate improvement, as is seen from the above summary. There was a deadlock on certain critical issues. The period reviewed above did not eventually yield any step forward concerning reforming the Security Council.

THE PERIOD BETWEEN 2003-2006

Content of the Proposed Reforms

The reform attempts and proposals during this period were the products of the sentiments caused basically by the September 11 attacks on U.S. cities. They therefore essentially related to security, legitimacy, and effectiveness in collective security, especially against terrorist organizations.

Although there was an initial consensus reflected through the Security Council resolutions 1368 (September 12, 2001) and 1373 (September 28, 2001), the discussed issues started to create problems among the states, especially on the scope and conditions of using military force against terrorism. As the U.N. General Assembly had repeatedly condemned retaliatory strikes, drawing the lines between self-defense and retaliation properly became a significant issue. Moreover, the very definition of who were the terrorists was an issue of disagreement.

The failure of the Security Council concerning the intervention in Iraq in 2003 left the U.N. and international system shaken. There were wide divisions among the member states on defining the threats,⁴⁶ and the division continued

45 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle...*, p. 21.

46 United Nations document: Secretary-General, *Note Transmitting Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, entitled 'A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility', A/59/565, 2 December 2004, paragraph 1.

to exist in the later examples of Rwanda Srebrenica, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Darfur (Sudan).⁴⁷

Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed out in his annual report to the General Assembly the significance of modernizing the structure according to new realities to rescue the United Nations' credibility.⁴⁸ He announced his decision to convene a "High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change," (the Panel) composed of 16 eminent persons.⁴⁹ The Panel deliberated for nearly a year and issued the report titled "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" in December 2004.

The Panel collected views from a wide range of sources, including governments, academic experts, and civil society organizations across the globe. The Panel's report was divided into five parts. Part 1 outlined the need to develop a new security consensus. The following parts covered the issues of collective security⁵⁰ and the challenge of prevention (Part 2), collective security and the use of force (Part 3), and a more effective U.N. for the 21st century (Part 4).

The Panel made many recommendations and asserted that development was the first line of defense for collective security.⁵¹ It was argued in the report that issues of security, economic development, and human freedom were indivisible. Moreover, the Panel suggested that the nature of threats had changed, recognizing no national boundaries. No state could therefore cope with the new threats alone. The report also emphasized that the U.N. had not always been equitable in its response to threats, as shown by the difference in the speed of responding to various threats and conflicts, undermining confidence in the legitimacy of the U.N.

The report also recognized that no state was expected to wait to the point where a threat, such as a nuclear attack by terrorists, became a reality. The Panel pointed to the need to amend Chapter VII to reflect a new understanding of the use of force.⁵²

47 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle...*, p. 26-27.

48 As cited in: Hans Corell, 'Reforming the United Nations', *International Organizations Law Review*, Vol.2, No. 2, 2005, pp. 373-390.

49 For the details, see, Anne-Marie Slaughter. "Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform". *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 99, No. 3 (July, 2005), pp. 619-631, at 621.

50 For this concept and its relation to U.N. reform, see, Thomas M. Franck. "Collective Security and UN Reform: Between the Necessary and the Possible." *Chicago Journal of International Law*, Vol. 6(2), 2006, p. 597.

51 See, Part II, Document 1, Synopsis.

52 David Hannay, 'Collective Security and the Use of Force', *International Organizations Law Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 367-372.

Since the mid-1990s, it had been recognized that the Charter suffered from a lack of an organ to address the challenge of helping countries, especially in the post-conflict period, for lasting peace. The High-Level Panel expressed support for the idea of the creation of a new subsidiary body of the Security Council in the area of peacebuilding.⁵³ The Panel also proposed that the U.N. should have at its disposal a small corps of senior police officers and managers (50 to 100 personnel) who could undertake mission assessments and organize the start-up of police components of peace operations.⁵⁴

Security Council Reform and the Preservation of Peace

The High-level Panel addressed two main issues for reforming the Security Council. The first one was the legitimacy of the Security Council in authorizing or endorsing the use of military force. The second was the expansion in the number of Security Council members.⁵⁵

Concerning enlargement, the Panel suggested that the Security Council should be expanded from 15 to 24 members. In fact, it recommended two models. The first model is Model A, which provided for new permanent members, six new permanent seats, and three new two-year non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas. Model B involved long-term renewable non-permanent seats. Specifically, Model B provided for a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas. Both options did not extend the veto power beyond the existing five countries.

Some members of the Panel from countries hoping for a permanent seat such as Brazil, Egypt, India, and Japan preferred the expansion of permanent membership set out in Model A. The majority of panel members, however, preferred an expansion according to Model B. The panel members did not support a change in the existing veto rights.

Realization of the Report of the High-Level Panel

The secretary-general endorsed the recommendations of the High-Level Panel and submitted its report to member states along with his comments and suggestions. The United States was satisfied with the desire of the Panel for a definition of

⁵³ See, Part II, Document 1, paragraphs 261-269.

⁵⁴ Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle...*, p. 36.

⁵⁵ Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle...*, p. 36.

terrorism, for recognizing the responsibility to protect, and for establishing a new Peacebuilding Commission reporting to the Security Council. On the issue of the use of force, the Panel's efforts to introduce a new mechanism for the sanctioning of pre-emptive wars were also appreciated.⁵⁶

When the Panel's report was considered by the General Assembly, many developing countries expressed concern that this issue was not examined more extensively but was approached only from a narrow security angle. The focus on the Security Council was seen as altering the role and authority of the General Assembly as the principal deliberative body of the U.N.

The High-level Panel's proposals were not the sole works. The secretary-general had already given the U.N. Millennium Project the duty of preparing a status report on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals within this context.

The outcome of both works was the report titled "In Larger Freedom" revealed by the secretary-general in March 2005. In the report, the secretary-general fully embraces a broad vision of collective security. The threats to peace and security in the 21st century included not just international war and conflict, but terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, and civil violence.⁵⁷

The secretary-general expressed his opinion that the principles for reform of the Security Council set out in the report of the High-Level Panel should be applied. Member states should consider both options, Models A and B, presented in the report.⁵⁸ The secretary-general did not similarly provide for the option of veto powers for new permanent members.

Britain, France, and Russia supported permanent membership for Germany, Brazil, India, and Japan. However, China and South Korea had doubts about Japan. Pakistan opposed India, and Mexico and Argentina opposed Brazil. The United States supported Japan. The expansion of permanent membership was thought to isolate several mid-sized countries, which were also among the major peacekeeping contributors such as Italy, Pakistan, Canada, Argentina, South Korea, and Spain.

Led by Italy and Pakistan, those countries formed an alliance known as the "Coffee Club," which rejected any increase in permanent membership and introduced a proposal for semi-permanent membership.⁵⁹

56 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle...*, p. 40.

57 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle...*, p. 48.

58 See, Part II, Document 3, paragraphs 167-170.

59 Dimitris Bourantonis. *The History and Politics...*, p. 71-73.

In May 2005, the United States informed Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan that it would not support their membership unless they did not demand veto power. The Group of 4 wanted veto rights. Since the existing permanent members' ratification was required for a U.N. Charter amendment to take effect, these countries preferred to first become permanent members of the Security Council and planned to consider other issues including veto power in 15 years as part of mandatory reconsideration.

Eventually, the summarized differences between the Group of 4 states and the African proposal⁶⁰ essentially blocked agreement on the suggestions for new permanent seats. This division was to the advantage of Italy and the so-called Coffee Club states, which strongly objected to the establishment of new permanent seats.

The countries that organized themselves under the slogan "Uniting for Consensus," such as Italy, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, San Marino, Spain, and Türkiye, supported a third draft resolution on Security Council reform.⁶¹ According to this proposal, the Security Council was to increase from 15 to 24 with no additional permanent seats. This was different than Italy's previous proposal in the sense that the draft resolution did not provide for the establishment of semi-permanent seats. Instead, the number of non-permanent seats would increase from 11 to 20. The new member would be divided as six seats for Africa, five seats for Asia, four seats for Latin America and the Caribbean, three seats for Western Europe and other states, and two seats for Eastern Europe.

At the world summit in September 2005 held at U.N. Headquarters in New York, the main agenda was the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but the U.N. reforms were also taken up as the summit also focused on peacekeeping, terrorism, human rights, and the reform of the Security Council.

Another significant approach that was worth mentioning during this period was that of the Non-Aligned Movement, accepted at the meeting held in June 2005, which emphasized that the use of force must not be considered the only instrument to achieve and maintain international peace and security. They proposed that force should be used only as a last resort and that the focus should also be on economic and social development. Some major countries such as the United States resisted linking political and military issues with economic and social

60 Dimitris Bourantonis. *The History and Politics...*, p. 79.

61 United Nations document: *Reform of the Security Council*, General Assembly Draft Resolution A/59/L.68, 21 July 2005.

issues as well as the idea that force should be considered as an instrument of last resort, which would constrain the leverage of the powerful states, especially the United States. These countries also supported the approach that the Peacebuilding Commission should incorporate strong Security Council supervision.⁶²

The perception of working toward a new security consensus was approved during the summit based on the recognition that many threats are interlinked, development, peace, security, and human rights are mutually reinforcing, no state can best protect itself by acting entirely alone, and that all states need an effective and efficient collective security system.⁶³ The resulting approach was, however, no different from the collective security system agreed upon 60 years ago and reaffirmed that the relevant provisions of the Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to international peace and security.⁶⁴

One of the summit's main achievements was the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission. It was also significant that the summit did not expressly link the commission with the Security Council but rather stated that the commission would operate as an intergovernmental advisory body with certain reporting obligations to the General Assembly. The commission was established with a mandate mainly focusing on post-conflict peacebuilding, not on prevention issues.⁶⁵

The summit supported the idea that reform of the Security Council was an essential element in the reform of the U.N., in general, to make it more broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus further enhance its effectiveness and legitimacy (p. 77). However, the outcome document of the summit devoted only two paragraphs to the question of Security Council reform.⁶⁶ The content of these paragraphs fell behind the agreement already reached in 1995.⁶⁷

After the summit, Japan isolated itself and did not join Germany, India, and Brazil in a new effort for a permanent seat on an expanded Security Council, following a lack of previously known U.S. support. Three members resubmitted to the General Assembly a slightly updated draft of their initial proposal to expand the council from 15 to 26 seats, with increased representation for Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In late November 2005, the United States ambassador told

62 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations: The Struggle...*, p. 70.

63 See, Part II, Document 5, paragraph 72.

64 See, Part II, Document 5, paragraph 78.

65 This is reflected in the outcome document (see Part II, Document 5, paragraphs 98–99.

66 See, Part II, Document 5, paragraphs 153–154.

67 United Nations document: *Declaration on the Occasion...*, paragraph 14.

the General Assembly that the United States would oppose an effort to expand the Security Council beyond 20 members, allowing for two or three permanent members without a veto right, and two or three non-permanent members.⁶⁸

As a last effort of this period, Japan submitted a new proposal in January 2006, which provided that Security Council membership was to be expanded to 21. The two new seats each would go to Asia and Africa, and one each to Latin America and Europe. No veto right was to be given to the new permanent members. Other elected candidates would become semi-permanent members with renewable long-term membership. The current non-permanent membership was limited to two years and was non-renewable.⁶⁹

An attempt to reform the Security Council had previously failed at the 50th anniversary of the U.N. in 2000. Almost nothing has changed since, despite the later efforts.⁷⁰ As stated, once again, the secretary-general proposed and the General Assembly disposed.⁷¹ The Security Council still had 15 members, including five permanent members and 11 non-permanent members.

THE PERIOD OF 2007-2016

Just after the start of his term in early 2007, Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon submitted a framework to the General Assembly in March 2007 for reforming the U.N., especially to restructure peacekeeping functions, better planning, faster deployment, and a more responsive process.⁷²

The secretary-general emphasized in his letter the need for a new approach to disarmament after the failures of the 2005 review conference of parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament, and the need for the new impetus for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.⁷³

The General Assembly eventually passed two decisions on the framework submitted by the secretary-general. Both texts requested the secretary-general provide more detailed reports. In its resolution on strengthening the U.N.'s peacekeeping capacity, the assembly supported the restructuring of the Department of

68 Joachim Müller. (Ed) *Reforming the United Nations...* p. 89-90.

69 For the approach of Japan, see, "Japan's Position on the United Nations Security Council for the 21st Century"

70 Thomas G. Weiss. "The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform...", pp. 147-161.

71 Edward C. Luck, "How Not to Reform the..." pp. 407-414.

72 For a review of this period, see "Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiations On Security Council Reform".

73 "General Assembly supports Ban Ki-moon's reform proposals for stronger UN".

Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), including the establishment of a new Department of Field Support. “The number of peace operations is at an all-time high with almost 100,000 personnel in the field. It appears that the figure will rise still further in 2007,” he said.⁷⁴

After several meetings of the General Assembly where views on Security Council reform were exchanged, a group of 25 member states tabled draft resolution A/61/L.69/Rev.1 in 2007⁷⁵ that called for the expansion of both permanent and non-permanent seats on the council, with better representation of the developing world. The group – which was nicknamed the “L.69 Group” because of the number that was assigned to the draft resolution – proposed adding six new permanent members. The text was never put to a vote.

The General Assembly adopted Decision 62/557 in 2008 to commence “Intergovernmental Negotiations” (IGN). Questions of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters were taken up but the reform discussions were nothing more than an oral exchange of views.

With the creation of the IGN, the aim was to have a text on which discussions could be based. The first round of the IGN was held on February 19, 2009. The General Assembly has renewed its mandate annually, and it remains the principal instrument for council reform discussions today. To date, the IGN has not been able to agree on a text to be negotiated.

Decision 62/557 laid out five key issues to be discussed during these negotiations. These were: “categories of membership to the council (i.e. permanent, non-permanent, or a third option),” “the question of the veto,” “regional representation,” “the size of an enlarged council and working methods,” and “the relationship between the council and the General Assembly.” Although these five issues are generally addressed, key groups regularly developed proposals on one or more of them.

At the 69th session of the General Assembly, member states made contributions to a framework document⁷⁶ that included a range of ideas on these five key areas of Security Council reform that came from the member states for consideration in line with Decision 62/557. A note of the IGN addressed to the president of the General Assembly warned that this document was not yet an operational text upon which negotiations could be built.

74 “General Assembly supports Ban Ki-moon’s reform proposals for stronger UN”.

75 “Question of Equitable Representation on And Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters” A/61/L.69/Rev.1, 14 September 2007.

76 President of the General Assembly (2015). Framework Document: As Populated by Member States.

In 2014, the secretary-general appointed a panel to assess U.N. operations and to suggest ways to meet the challenges that were faced by both peacekeeping and special political missions. The secretary-general also emphasized that there could be no peace without development or no development without peace and neither without respect for human rights.⁷⁷

On the other hand, the General Assembly adopted a decision on September 14, 2015, by consensus to advance efforts to reform and increase the membership of the Security Council. This decision reaffirmed the General Assembly's central role in reforming the council and intended to further develop established previous positions.

In September 2016, after noting that the two-decade-long consultation and negotiation process yielded no significant progress, the secretary-general made a plea for reforming the Security Council, saying it was imperative to deal with the rapidly deteriorating global security situation. Since the U.N. was formed in 1945, the council's structure was changed only once and it was important to reform it again to reflect the contemporary world. The secretary-general repeated that the membership of the U.N. has increased from 117 members to 193 since then. Africa and Latin America were not represented among the permanent members, just like India, Japan, and Germany, which emerged as major international players.

In that period too, India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany named themselves the G4 to lead the movement for reform and also to mutually support each other for permanent seats in an expanded council. The secretary-general noted that there was some progress in the more than 20-year-long reform process and it had now moved to the level of negotiations.

After years of attempts by Pakistan and a group of countries led by Italy to block substantive negotiations on council reforms, the General Assembly adopted a negotiating document in 2014. However, the negotiating process did not go very well after the promising start.⁷⁸

THE RECENT PERIOD (2017-PRESENT)

António Guterres, the current U.N. secretary-general, has also prepared a reform packet that is titled "Our Common Agenda: Report of the Secretary-General".⁷⁹ The secretary-general was asked to report back to the General Assembly with rec-

77 "Ban Calls for Urgent and Collective Action to Reform UN Peace Operations".

78 "High Time to Reform UN Security Council: Ban Ki-moon".

79 "Our Common Agenda-Report of the Secretary-General".

ommendations to advance the “Our Common Agenda” report. This report has been his response to this request.

He initially emphasizes that the world is at such a stage that conflicts have worsened. The purpose of the reform was meant to improve the U.N. to realize humanity’s real agenda of sustainable development goals. It was further emphasized that millions of people around the world were suffering from poverty, discrimination, violence, and exclusion that deny them their rights to the basic necessities of life: health, safety, a vaccination against disease, clean water to drink, a plate of food or a seat in a classroom.

Although the report focuses on sustainable development goals, one of the three pillars of the report is “peace and security reform.” Since the challenges are “interconnected,” peace and security are fundamentally related to the sustainable development goals.

The report has been based on three pillars: “development,” “management,” and “peace and security.” For our analysis here, it will be helpful to briefly review development and management and then focus a bit more on peace and security.

Development

The report points out that the 2030 Agenda⁸⁰ requires changes to the U.N. Development System (UNDS) for the emergence of a new generation of country teams, centered on a strategic U.N. Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)⁸¹ and led by an impartial, independent, and empowered local coordinator.

The reform measures concerning development are to ensure that the U.N. has more efficient country teams operations so that more resources are allocated to development programs and less to administrative structures. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development provides an unambiguous framework for management, oversight responsibilities, and accountability lines within the UNDS at the global, regional, and country levels.

Management

The new management concept has been put forward to enable the Secretariat to more effectively and accountably deliver on its mandates, and therefore better prepared the U.N. to confront global challenges. Management reform is about improving the

80 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development sustainabledevelopment.un.org/A/RES/70/1.

81 “United Nations Development Assistance Framework Guidance”.

U.N.'s ability to deliver on its mandates. It seeks to improve its effectiveness, enabling it to act faster with better information and be more accountable.

In 2017, the secretary-general put forward a vision for a more flexible and decentralized Secretariat in which responsibility for mandate implementation is accorded to authority to manage resources, where decisions are made at the point of the determination of mandates.

Accordingly, management reform is built on three foundation elements: decentralization of decision-making authority, simplification and streamlining of policy and processes, and strengthened accountability and transparency.

To support this new approach to management, two new departments – the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance and the Department of Operational Support – were established on January 1, 2019. They provide policy advice and operational support to the global Secretariat.

Peace and Security Reform

The U.N. peace and security mandate is at the heart of the Charter's commitment to saving succeeding generations from the horrors of war. Almost eight decades after the establishment of the U.N., this goal remains as relevant and urgent as ever. Today's conflicts cause immense human suffering. Violent conflict in recent years has drastically increased human casualties, displacement, and humanitarian needs, often reversing political, human rights, and development gains and putting the Sustainable Development Goals at risk. Moreover, the geopolitical context has become less relevant to the settlement of disputes, as deep divisions among major powers have led to catastrophic wars and contributed to a steadily declining trust in multilateralism. What the secretary-general has termed a global "trust deficit disorder" points to challenges to our collective ability to manage today's risks.

The reform proposals on the peace and security pillar have been designed to make the pillar more coherent, pragmatic, nimble, and effective to be capable of collaboration with partners across the U.N. system and outside it to prevent violent conflict. It brought together the core U.N. peace and security capacities around a single political-operational structure with regional responsibilities.

The goals of the peace and security reform are expressed as to "prioritize prevention and sustain peace," "enhance the effectiveness and coherence of peacekeeping operations and special political missions," "continue moving towards a single, integrated peace and security pillar," and "align it more closely with the development and human rights pillars to create greater coherence and cross-pillar coordination."

As far as prevention is concerned, it is emphasized that, as a result of its restructuring, the peace and security pillar can better fulfill its central role in helping to prevent violent conflict and diminish large-scale human suffering. The pillar has an overarching goal of effective conflict prevention and therefore sustaining peace. This is clearly in line with the secretary-general's call for a "surge in diplomacy for peace." With early warning capacities spreading globally, the pillar can analyze and respond quickly to the risks of outbreak or escalation of conflicts, bringing its full range of political, technical, and programmatic capacities to bear.

As far as effectiveness and coherence are concerned, it is said that a unified pillar is already enhancing the effectiveness and coherence of its field presences, from peacekeeping to special political mission-placing political solutions.

As far as the peace and security pillar is concerned, a particular emphasis is put on supporting mission transitions in settings where the U.N. is undergoing a significant reconfiguration and providing support to U.N. presence in the field through a range of capacities such as electoral assistance, mediation, rule of law and peacebuilding support. The content of the related activities is far-reaching, from women's participation to the inclusion of youth and other marginalized groups. The vision of alignment between peace and security, human rights, and development is also emphasized in this context.

Finally, certain priorities are identified as "working towards the promotion of political solutions to conflicts," "working to engage societies beyond political elites and ground our action in a deep knowledge of socio-economic, environmental, and structural aspects of the communities," "supporting effective and efficient field presences, working to maximize their impact and deliver positive change on the ground," "engaging in partnerships across the U.N. system, with member states, and with international, regional, sub-regional, and local institutions and actors," "prioritizing innovation partnerships, integrating new technologies and committing to better understanding and managing the new risks posed by technological advancements" and "relying on and investing the related U.N. staff to build a culture of mutual learning, creativity, growth, and ownership."

TÜRKİYE’S POSITION ON REFORMING THE U.N.

As one of the countries founding the U.N. in 1945, Türkiye emphasizes that the U.N. is still at the center of global governance with various purposes and certain fundamental principles.⁸² In recent years, however, Türkiye has constantly pointed out specific indications that the U.N. fails on these fundamental purposes and principles. These failures are so devastating that the international community has eventually faced deep crises not only in the economic field but also in the political and security fields.⁸³

Essentially based on this perception, Türkiye purports that U.N. reform is indispensable to making the U.N. able to properly fulfill its main duty of protecting global security.⁸⁴ With this purpose and motivation, Türkiye has been shaping and proposing its contributions to the efforts on reforming the U.N.

Türkiye further collaborates with some states like Italy⁸⁵ whose perceptions coincide with those of Türkiye on reforming the U.N. and eventually joined the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) or so-called “Coffee Club,” which was first initiated in the 1990s. The UfC was formed to stand against the proposal to increase the number of Security Council members by the so-called G4 states (Brazil, Germany,

82 Cumhurbaşkanı: Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: “Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli”,

83 Cumhurbaşkanı: Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: “Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli”,

84 “Türkiye’s Priorities for the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Current International Security Environment and the Role of the UN.”

85 “Türkiye-İtalya Üçüncü Hükümetlerarası Zirvesi’nin Ardından Ortak Bildirisi”.

India, and Japan). With Italy as the leading state, the UfC states are Italy, Türkiye, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, South Korea, Costa Rica, Spain, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, San Marino, and Indonesia.

TÜRKİYE'S PERSPECTIVE ON IMPERATIVES FOR REFORMING THE U.N.

Türkiye feels it is morally obliged to deal with U.N. reform and to make appropriate proposals based on its perception of the issue. Türkiye's commitment to carry out its responsibilities within the international community to produce a response to this deep global crisis has been officially declared many times.⁸⁶ Türkiye emphasizes that its objection is against this distorted understanding of legitimacy and its practices and cannot remain silent. Türkiye does not want to be just an observer while the international system is transforming.⁸⁷

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan underlines in his statements the need for a global society in which multilateralism is centered. If world policy is created according to the U.N.'s current structure without reforming it, humanity will face worse problems.⁸⁸ The formation should be discussed while there is still time to correct it. The establishment of a U.N. structure that is both just and strong is inevitable for the legitimacy and maintenance of the international order. Türkiye wants to support the steps to be taken in this direction.

Türkiye's perception of the reasons why the U.N. should be reformed has been expressed in recent years through various official statements. The statements constantly point to certain failures, shortcomings, ineffectiveness, and even injustices on behalf of the U.N. and its system, leading to deep global problems in various areas.

Problems such as terrorism, migration, climatic conditions, global warming, drought, injustice, and failed states are frequently referred to. The possibility of inter-state conflict was said to have increased in addition to such problems. Due to these deep problems, rising social reactions, exclusionary nationalism, and protectionism threaten the environment of international peace and stability. It's almost as if humanity is being dragged into widespread chaos.⁸⁹

86 "Türkiye's Priorities for the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Current International Security Environment and the Role of the UN."

87 "Erdoğan Reiterates Call for Reform in UN, International Organizations"; Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli",

88 "Erdoğan Reiterates Call for Reform in UN, International Organizations".

89 Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli".

Concerning the global economic problems, the gap between the north and south is said to be further deepening. The current political-economic order has failed to ensure global prosperity and has further deepened inequality.⁹⁰

Other indications of the U.N. crisis are said to be injustice, lack of transparency, and accountability. Those who make the rules do not themselves follow these rules. The U.N. Security Council is given as a striking example. It has made dozens of resolutions on Palestine with no real effect. There are also the U.N. General Assembly resolutions, most of which are not properly applied as if Israel is exempt from these fundamental rules. Similarly, the U.S. and other permanent Security Council members seem to be exempt from these rules too, considering their attitudes and actions within the U.N. framework.⁹¹

The decisions made by the U.N. Security Council should in fact reflect justice simply because it is the principal organ for the preservation of international peace and security. Decisions made without justice hurt the global conscience and destroy people's faith in the U.N.⁹²

Transparency is spelled out to be another significant defect in the U.N. system. The international community does not know what goes on behind the decisions made by various U.N. organs.⁹³ The international community did not, for example, have sufficient knowledge of who planned, why, or when the intervention in Iraq in 2003 was made. Hundreds of thousands of innocent people lost their lives, millions were displaced and left their homes.⁹⁴ A chaotic environment emerged in which terrorist organizations were flourishing.⁹⁵

Türkiye points out that accountability of the U.N. is another significant issue. Decisions made behind closed doors, especially those by the Security Council are not subjected to accountability for what happened afterward. The system is not subjected to any scrutiny by anybody such as the General Assembly.⁹⁶

Türkiye points out that the U.N.'s ineffectiveness in solving international disputes peacefully and justly is another significant problem. As emphasized, it has

90 "Erdoğan Reiterates Call for Reform in UN, International Organizations"; Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli".

91 Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli".

92 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. *Daha Adil Bir Dünya Mümkün*. p. 64-74. Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli",

93 Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli",

94 Seiji Yamada, Mary C. Smith Fawzi, Gregory G. Maskarinec, and Paul E. Farmer. "Report on the Iraq War Casualties..." pp. 401-415.

95 Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli".

96 Cumhurbaşkanı: Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli".

been clear many times that the U.N., with its current structure, cannot produce solutions for major disputes but instead only deadlocks. The permanent members of the U.N. Security Council have blocked initiatives related to controversial situations, especially if one of the permanent members is a party to a specific dispute. The system allows the permanent members to decide matters according to their own interests, rather than the interests of the international community or those of justified sides. Many such examples have been seen in cases related to the rights of Asian, Latin American, and African countries.⁹⁷

Türkiye also points to global systematic changes that lead to the political ineffectiveness or deterioration of the U.N. system.⁹⁸ Türkiye believes that the perception of “the West is superior,” proven to be a problem-generating understanding, must come to an end. The hegemony of the West, which lasted for centuries, is now over and a new international system should emerge.⁹⁹ The dominance of the U.S. following the bipolarity of the Cold War era is not destined to last since Washington cannot control the entire international system alone. The U.S. tried and failed and eventually withdrew from Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to the U.S. failures, Western democracies have surrendered to extremists and populist politics. Not only Türkiye but also many other mid-size powers have grown to the point that they no longer live in a world where there is only what the great powers prefer.¹⁰⁰

As a result, the U.N. does not reflect the new global political balance. The world's fate cannot be in the hands of five countries that try to make unjust decisions and policies concerning countries thousands of kilometers away and shape people's destinies simply based on their seats on the Security Council.¹⁰¹ The world has changed. We live neither in a bipolar world nor in a unipolar world. There are various power centers in the world. It is not right to entrust the whole world politics to five representatives of a system established according to the results of World War II.¹⁰²

The process of being a permanent member of the U.N. as one of the warring parties or one of the parties to the crisis clogs it up, and with this structure, the

97 Fahrettin Altun (Director, Directorate of Communication of Turkish Presidency) “Türkiye, BM'nin Yapısında Reform Yapılması Gerekliğini Düşünüyor”.

98 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. *Daha Adil Bir Dünya Mümkün*. p. 49-50.

99 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. *Daha Adil Bir Dünya Mümkün*. p. 55-57.

100 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. *Daha Adil Bir Dünya Mümkün*. p. 52; Cumhurbaşkanı: Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: “Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli”.

101 Cumhurbaşkanı: Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: “Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli”.

102 Cumhurbaşkanı: Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: “Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli”.

U.N. is not on the side of the weak, the aggrieved, or the just, but the five strong permanent members.¹⁰³ The 10 temporary members of the Security Council are left ineffective in almost all discussions because they say to them, “Raise your hand, lower your hand.” The 10 temporary members know that their presence there is simply a window dressing.¹⁰⁴

With this nature of membership of the Security Council, the U.N. does not, according to Türkiye, have global representation either. When it was founded after World War II, an arrangement was made by only five countries. Türkiye emphasizes that it is now a very different world. China and Russia are in the Security Council but that doesn't make the Security Council's representation any fairer.

The existing system ignores the 1.5 billion Muslims worldwide as there is not a single country from the Muslim world among the permanent members. While Europe is represented by two countries in the Security Council, there is not a single member from South America or Africa – even though the entire European population corresponds to only 5% of the world's population. The five permanent members account for only a quarter of the world's population today. The other three quarters have no names, they are not represented in any way. It is not therefore possible to say that such a system is representative.¹⁰⁵

It is a fact that Asian, Latin American, and African countries are excluded from proper representation in the U.N. Security Council. While the resolutions of the General Assembly in which all members are represented in the U.N. are not binding, the decisions made by the Security Council, which is represented by some of the members of the organization, are binding for all members of the organization.¹⁰⁶

The U.N. Security Council is not, therefore, inclusive and culturally diverse so it cannot ensure peace and tranquillity in such a diverse world. As a matter of fact, the U.N. is not effective in the preservation of peace and security. Especially in the post-Cold War period, it could not develop concrete solutions to prevent great human disasters and could not play an effective role in maintaining interna-

103 Fahrettin Altun (Director, Directorate of Communications of the Turkish Presidency) “BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin Adaletsiz ve Şeffaf Olmayan Yapısı Değişmelidir”.

104 Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın BM Genel Kurulu Açılış Konuşması üzerine Mülakat: “Daha Adil Bir Dünya İçin Uluslararası Topluma Ne Gibi Sorumluluklar Düştüğünü Genel Kurul Kürsüsünden Dile Getirdik”.

105 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. *Daha Adil Bir Dünya Mümkün*. p. 149; Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın BM Genel Kurulu Açılış Konuşması üzerine Mülakat: “Daha Adil Bir Dünya İçin Uluslararası Topluma Ne Gibi Sorumluluklar Düştüğünü Genel Kurul Kürsüsünden Dile Getirdik”.

106 Fahrettin Altun (Director, Directorate of Communications of the Turkish Presidency) “BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin Adaletsiz ve Şeffaf Olmayan Yapısı Değişmelidir”.

tional peace and security. The organization, which was helpless in preventing the human tragedy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Syria, and Kosovo in the past, has recently displayed a similar example of desperation during Russia's attacks on Ukraine.¹⁰⁷

Yet, 77 years after the end of World War II, the maintenance of international peace and security has become more relevant and urgent than ever before.¹⁰⁸ The U.N.'s credibility is diminishing in the eyes of the international community because of the failures in such a sensitive and needed period.¹⁰⁹

Based on all these concrete facts, Türkiye purports that, with its existing nature, the U.N. is not the answer to all these deep problems of the international community. Global governance mechanisms are not functioning. The increasing complexity of our modern world requires that the organization be strengthened if it is to fulfill its central role as a guarantor of global security.¹¹⁰ The U.N. system is facing a legitimacy crisis, which should somehow be corrected through reform.

PRINCIPLES AND REFORMS PROPOSED BY TÜRKİYE

Principles of Reforming the U.N.

Within the framework of its proposals for reforming the U.N., Türkiye initially proposes certain principles to be followed in shaping the reforms. These principles constitute the fundamentals of the reforms proposed by Türkiye.

The initial principle is that the aim of the reforms should not be devising a new global structure but rather reforming the U.N. itself. Türkiye still considers the U.N. the center of global governance and the most important opportunity for the international community.¹¹¹

However, urgent action must be taken at the U.N. to enable it to realize its real potential. A new U.N. should be designed to maintain international peace and security through comprehensive reform.¹¹²

107 Fahrettin Altun (Director, Directorate of Communications of the Turkish Presidency) "BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin Adaletsiz ve Şeffaf Olmayan Yapısı Değişmelidir".

108 Fahrettin Altun (Director, Directorate of Communications of the Turkish Presidency) "BM'ye 'Yeniden Yapılandırma' Çağrısı".

109 Fahrettin Altun (Director, Directorate of Communications of the Turkish Presidency) "BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin adaletsiz ve şeffaf olmayan yapısı değişmelidir".

110 "Türkiye's Priorities for the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Current International Security Environment and the Role of the UN."

111 Fahrettin Altun (Director, Directorate of Communications of the Turkish Presidency) "Türkiye, BM'nin yapısında reform yapılması gerektiğini düşünüyor".

112 Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan'ın BM Genel Kurulu Açılış Konuşması üzerine Mülakat: "Daha Adil Bir Dünya İçin Uluslararası Topluma Ne Gibi Sorumluluklar Düştüğünü Genel Kurul Kürsüsünden Dile Getirdik".

Türkiye does not prefer an open-ended or loose discussion about reform. A truly reformist stance should be taken that would radically transform the U.N. system instead of narrow national interests, and try to focus on strategic goals. Eventually, the most important topic should be determined for full focus. Türkiye considers reforms of the Security Council as the center of the U.N. reform initiatives to facilitate better functioning of international order. Reform of the U.N. system cannot be complete without a reform of the Security Council.¹¹³

The restructuring of the council should be in such a way that it represents the continents, beliefs, origins, and cultures in the most equitable and just way possible. This is vital for the establishment of global peace. It is neither moral nor fair for only five countries to decide on matters that would affect the fate of the whole world. A fair, democratic, and sustainable U.N. can only be possible by ensuring fair representation of each state and reflecting the balance of power in the international system.¹¹⁴

Better coordination between the U.N. organs is another principle to be followed in reforming the U.N. The council's interaction mechanisms with other states and actors need to be improved. In addition, increased cooperation and coordination between the council and the main U.N. bodies, such as the General Assembly and the ECOSOC, is a crucial factor for the success of the reforms for the U.N. and the Security Council. The improved coordination, cooperation, and integration within the U.N. system would help develop a better formulation of comprehensive and integrated approaches to tackle global challenges.¹¹⁵

Türkiye emphasizes the approach that should be adopted must be based on the principle of justice and equality too. The balance between justice and power should be struck. The existing system is fundamentally based only on power by dismissing justice and equality, which eventually create turbulence in preserving international peace and security. Peace and stability require a fairer, more resilient global U.N. system that reflects justice, multiculturalism, and mutual respect.¹¹⁶

113 "Türkiye's Priorities for the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Current International Security Environment and the Role of the UN."

114 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. *Daha Adil Bir Dünya Mümkün*. p. 146-149; Fahrettin Altun (Director, Directorate of Communications of the Turkish Presidency) "BM Güvenlik Konseyi'nin Adaletsiz Ve Şeffaf Olmayan Yapısı Değişmelidir."

115 "Türkiye's Priorities for the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Current International Security Environment and the Role of the UN."

116 Fahrettin Altun (Director, Directorate of Communications of the Turkish Presidency) "Türkiye, BM'nin Yapısında Reform Yapılması Gerektiğini Düşünüyor."

Concrete Reform Proposals by Türkiye

Based on these principles, Türkiye has revealed some concrete reform proposals, basically focusing on the Security Council.

It is the initial proposal of Türkiye that the U.N. General Assembly should be utilized more effectively by strengthening and making it like a world assembly. This is the way to make the U.N. inclusive, legitimate, just, and more effective in preserving international peace and security. Unless the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly is improved in favor of the General Assembly, any reform effort will not yield the expected results. The U.N. cannot otherwise fulfill the principles of fairness and functionality. It is necessary to set all other issues aside and focus on veto power and mobilize the international community around this topic.¹¹⁷

Based on this perception, the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council should be reorganized. It is imperative to make the General Assembly a legislator and the Security Council an executive. The General Assembly should be the body of the U.N. to make the binding decisions with the participation of all member states. The Security Council, on the other hand, should be the executive organ to ensure that these decisions are applied.¹¹⁸

Moreover, the Security Council must answer to the General Assembly rather than having permanent members with unlimited powers that are not held accountable by the General Assembly. The Security Council cannot be independent of the General Assembly.¹¹⁹

In this regard, Türkiye does not find it absolutely necessary to increase the number of permanent members. The concept of permanent membership is found by many to be contrary to the principle of sovereign equality, the very foundation upon which the U.N. is built. To achieve real representation and thus effectiveness, the criteria for membership should be reasonable and achievable so that most of the U.N. member states could have a seat in the Security Council. Otherwise, membership would lead to selectivity, which would in reality enable only a small number of privileged states.¹²⁰ Since the UfC supports the principle that regional

117 "UN Security Council Requires Serious Reform, Says Turkish Foreign Minister."; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. *Daha Adil Bir Dünya Mümkün*. p. 60-64.

118 Cumhurbaşkanı: Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli"; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. *Daha Adil Bir Dünya Mümkün*. p. 183-187.

119 Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli".

120 "Türkiye's Priorities for the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Current International Security Environment and the Role of the UN."

representation is significant, Türkiye similarly attaches importance to adequate regional representation as one of the criteria here.

The veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council is another focal point in Türkiye's reform proposals. The strategic step to be taken to establish the relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council must, first of all, address the veto power. No reform effort would be successful without removing the veto power altogether. Türkiye suggests that the reform should start with the abolition of veto power in the Security Council. As President Erdoğan points out occasionally, Türkiye is trying to bring the other members together and reach a consensus in this direction.¹²¹

Peacekeeping is another topic in Türkiye's reform proposals. In this context, resource generation, rapid deployment capability, safety and security, post-conflict peace building and development, cooperation with regional organizations, and the African peacekeeping capacity are the issues that require common efforts. The composition of the Peacekeeping Commission must be shaped to make it able to perform its functions effectively. In addition to countries making financial and troop contributions, countries making major civilian police contributions should be in the Peacebuilding Commission during its country-specific meetings.¹²²

Türkiye proposes that an efficient Secretariat should be held accountable by the General Assembly as the chief representative and deliberative body of the organization. Indeed, a more active Secretariat, both in size and accountability, will induce the U.N. to enhance its authority as well as its capacity to address the challenges of our time.¹²³

The ECOSOC, as one of the principal organs of the U.N., needs to be reshaped according to the immense changes that have taken place in the economic, social, environmental, and humanitarian fields during the last 60 years. The ECOSOC should be able to provide strategic guidance and analytical leadership in promoting partnerships in global policies and dialogue in economic and social fields. While focusing on links between peace and development, this becomes a real issue to be addressed in the process of reforming the U.N.

121 Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: "Dünya Değişiyor, BM Sistemi de Değişmeli"; Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. *Daha Adil Bir Dünya Mümkün*. p. 188-192.

122 "Türkiye's Priorities for the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Current International Security Environment and the Role of the UN."

123 "Türkiye's Priorities for the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Current International Security Environment and the Role of the UN."

Its role in the overall coordination of funds, programs and agencies should be strengthened to ensure coherence as well as to prevent duplication of mandates and activities.¹²⁴

124 “Türkiye’s Priorities for the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Current International Security Environment and the Role of the UN.”

CONCLUSION

Peace is the main pillar on which all necessary elements stand to form an orderly and lasting community. That is why the law primarily aims at preserving peace to prevent the community from demise and eventual collapse. The U.N. was established with the significant goal to prevent violence and restore peace in the international community. It is the Security Council that is assigned the primary responsibility and authority of preserving international peace and security.

The U.N. deals with many other issues such as human rights, hunger, poverty, environmental pollution, and irregular migration, simply because all these issues have bearing on protecting international peace and security.

Since the U.N. has mostly failed to fulfill its most fundamental task, reform proposals have been made for many decades, especially starting in the early 1990s, to make the U.N. more responsive and effective. The reform proposals made so far mostly focused on various specific issues such as bureaucracy, efficiency, accountability, transparency, and better protection of international peace and security.

Protection of international peace and security has proven to be the most pressing as well as the most difficult reform simply because it also requires the amendment of the Security Council's membership and voting.

In the period between 1950-1996 when the Cold War atmosphere was mostly dominant, the total number of U.N. members increased rapidly in the 1960s with the decolonization, leading to a demand for a more efficient U.N. The Soviet de-

mands, on the other hand, were about making the U.N. equally representative of the East and West.

The end of the Cold War was a landmark in the demands of U.N. reforms. Proposals mostly concerned reforming and enforcing the Secretariat structure, especially in the area of peacekeeping. The program called the “Agenda for Peace” was introduced containing suggestions for reform in the area of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. Boutros Boutros-Ghali further proposed procedural and structural changes to improve the function of the General Assembly and the Secretariat.

In the period between 1997-2002, reforms were proposed to make the U.N. more efficient, more effective, and more responsive to the demands and needs of member states as well as to make new budgetary regulations and reductions. The secretary-general issued a report titled “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform,” which included the establishment of the position of deputy secretary-general and distinct reductions in the posts and costs.

The General Assembly adopted the resolution of “Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council,” calling for major reform of the Security Council essentially in terms of membership and voting. The Working Group, which was established by the General Assembly in December 1993, became the principal forum for discussion of the issue of council reform. There were groups of countries arguing against each other concerning the Security Council reform.

The five permanent members of the council were against any restriction on their veto power and cautious about any extension of the permanent membership. While some permanent members eventually supported permanent membership for Germany and Japan and an additional three non-permanent seats, the Non-Aligned Movement was against any “quick fix” limited to Germany and Japan, calling for the inclusion of countries from among the developing countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Egypt. The Working Group achieved a very moderate improvement in approaches.

In the period between 2003-2006, the reform attempts and proposals were the products of the September 11 attacks. The secretary-general announced a decision to convene a “High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,” (the Panel), which eventually issued a report titled “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility.” The report announced that issues of security, economic development, and human freedom were indivisible. The Panel further pointed to the need

to amend Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter to reflect a new understanding of the use of force.

The High-level Panel took over two main issues for reforming the Security Council: The first one was the legitimacy of the Security Council in authorizing or endorsing the use of military force. The second was the expansion in the number of Security Council members. In fact, it recommended two models: Model A provided for new permanent members, six new permanent seats, and three new two-year non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas. Model B involved long-term renewable non-permanent seats, providing for a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas. Both options did not extend the veto power beyond the existing five countries.

Countries hoping for a permanent seat in the Security Council such as Brazil, Egypt, India, and Japan preferred the expansion of permanent membership set out in Model A. However, the majority of panel members preferred an expansion according to Model B. Led by Italy and Pakistan, those countries formed an alliance known as the “Coffee Club” and rejected any increase in permanent membership and introduced a proposal for a status of semi-permanent membership. The countries that organized themselves under the slogan “Uniting for Consensus” such as Italy, together with Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, San Marino, Spain, and Türkiye, supported a third draft resolution in which the Security Council was to increase from 15 to 24 with no additional permanent seats. All these attempts eventually failed.

In the period between 2007-2016, reforming the U.N. focused especially on restructuring peacekeeping functions, better planning, faster deployment, and a more responsive process. The General Assembly adopted a decision on September 14, 2015, by consensus to advance efforts to reform and increase the membership of the Security Council. This decision reaffirmed the General Assembly’s central role in reforming the council and intended to further develop established previous positions. After years of attempts by Pakistan and a group of countries led by Italy to block substantive negotiations on council reforms, the General Assembly adopted a negotiating document in 2014. However, the negotiating process did not go very well after the promising start.

In the existing period starting in 2017, the U.N. secretary-general has also prepared a reform packet, titled “Our Common Agenda: Report of the Secretary-General.” Although the report focuses on sustainable development goals,

one of the three pillars of the report is “peace and security reform.” Since the challenges are “interconnected,” peace and security are fundamentally related to sustainable development goals. The report has been based on three pillars: “development,” “management” and “peace and security.”

It is reaffirmed that the U.N. peace and security mandate is at the heart of the Charter’s commitment to peace. The reform proposals on the peace and security pillar have been designed to make the pillar more coherent, pragmatic, nimble, and effective to be capable of collaboration with partners across the U.N. system and outside it to prevent violent conflict.

Among all these developments and the framework drawn on reforming the U.N., Türkiye felt obliged to engage in the discussions and developed certain principles and concrete proposals. Türkiye joined the UfC, which was initiated in the 1990s to stand against the proposal to increase the number of Security Council members by the so-called G4 states (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan).

As far as the principles proposed by Türkiye are concerned, the initial one is that rather than creating a new international institution, the U.N. should be reformed. Firstly, the reform efforts should focus on a specific agenda rather than various fields, especially on the Security Council and the protection of peace and security. Moreover, Türkiye voices the principles that the U.N. should be more just, equal, representative, and accountable. Finally, Türkiye purports that better coordination must be established among the U.N. organs, especially among the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the ECOSOC.

Based on these principles, Türkiye has revealed some concrete reform proposals, basically focusing on the Security Council. It is the initial proposal of Türkiye that the U.N. General Assembly should be utilized more effectively by strengthening and making it like a world assembly. It is imperative to make the General Assembly a legislator and the Security Council an executive. The General Assembly should be the body of the U.N. to take the binding decisions with the participation of all member states.

Türkiye does not find it absolutely necessary to increase the number of permanent members. Moreover, to achieve real representation and effectiveness, the criteria for membership should be just, reasonable and achievable for all countries. Most U.N. member states could have an opportunity to have a seat in the Security Council.

The exiting veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council is another focal point. No reform effort would be successful without removing the veto

power altogether simply because a non-representative and unjust system stands no chance of being successful in protecting international peace and security.

Peacekeeping is another topic in Türkiye's reform proposals. Türkiye proposes that the composition of the Peacebuilding Commission should be reshaped to make it able to perform its functions effectively. Not only the countries making financial and troop contributions to the peacekeeping operations, but also those making major civilian police contributions should be in the Peacebuilding Commission.

A more active Secretariat, both in size and accountability, will enable the U.N. to enhance its authority as well as its capacity to address the challenges of our time. Türkiye proposes that an efficient Secretariat should be held accountable by the General Assembly as the chief representative and deliberative body of the organization. Finally, the ECOSOC, as one of the principal organs of the U.N., needs to be reformed according to the major changes of our time that have taken place in the economic, social, environmental, and humanitarian fields during at least the last six decades.

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REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS AND TÜRKİYE'S APPROACH

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U.N. stands as a system primarily to prevent violence and restore peace in the international community when it is violated. However, it has mostly failed to fulfill its primary responsibility of protecting international peace and security. The proposals that the U.N. should be reformed to be more effective started early in the 1950s and intensified in the 1990s. The ongoing reform efforts have made some modest achievements but have so far failed on major issues, such as reforming the Security Council in terms of membership and voting. Türkiye feels obliged to participate in discussions and contribute to reform efforts and proposals toward better global governance. It has put forward certain principles to be followed in reforming the U.N. as well as some concrete reform proposals such as the complete removal of the veto power in the Security Council.

