

REPORT

THE GÜLENIST TERROR ORGANIZATION (FETÖ) IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

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**THE GÜLENIST TERROR
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IN THE UNITED KINGDOM**

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD | 7

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY | 9

INTRODUCTION | 15

THE HISTORY OF FETÖ IN THE U.K. | 19

1990S: THE FOUNDING YEARS 21

2000S: THE PERIOD OF GROWTH 24

2013-PRESENT: THE PERIOD OF SILENCE 28

FETÖ'S NETWORKS | 33

LOBBYING NETWORK AND RELATIONS WITH POLITICIANS | 35

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL NETWORK | 45

PRESS AND MEDIA NETWORK | 51

EDUCATIONAL NETWORK | 57

FETÖ'S SOURCES OF INCOME IN THE U.K. | 63

BUSINESSES | 64

ZAKAT, ZAKAT AL-FITR, EID AL-ADHA AND OTHER DONATIONS | 65

THE U.K.'S POLICY ON FETÖ | 67

PRIOR TO THE JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT | 67

FOLLOWING THE JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT | 73

CONCLUSION | 85

APPENDICES | 87

FOREWORD

The Gülenist Terror Organization, or FETÖ, is a new generation terrorist organization that has strived for more than 40 years to infiltrate the state apparatuses in Turkey with an aim to seize political authority in the country. Having seized control of critical state institutions by engaging in a religion-based deception method (*taqiyya*), FETÖ has resorted to various means to accomplish its political goals, including terrorist actions. To that end, the group attempted to dissolve Turkey's political authority by using the judiciary and the police to organize a judicial coup on December 17 and 25, 2013, and ultimately attempted a military coup on July 15, 2016. Confronting all these attacks, the Turkish people repelled FETÖ by displaying a strong will and the determination to protect their democracy.

Turkey has so far taken various tangible steps in its fight against FETÖ and has progressed considerably in this respect. Nevertheless, FETÖ is still maintaining its anti-Turkish activities outside the country with the networks it established abroad. As a result, it has been able to conduct disinformation and black propaganda campaigns against Turkey in line with the political interests of certain Western states.

As a result, Turkey initiated a multidirectional campaign against FETÖ abroad by presenting the relevant countries with evidence of FETÖ's terrorist affiliations, its militants, and its true intentions. In addition to this, Ankara is informing the public of the relevant countries about the group's criminal offenses and antidemocratic structure.

Unfortunately, many European countries have engaged in activities that favor FETÖ militants instead of siding with Turkey's fight, thus, undermining Ankara's relations with these countries. By supporting FETÖ, Europe has clashed with its founding values. By ignoring the fact that FETÖ is an antidemocratic terrorist group that organized a deadly military coup attempt, Europe's support to FETÖ constitutes a serious contradiction with the European countries' emphasis on democracy.

Despite the prevalent support given to FETÖ across Europe, the United Kingdom adopted quite a different policy and sided with Turkey's fight against the terrorist group. For example, the U.K. Minister of State Alan Duncan paid a visit to Turkey following the coup attempt and stressed that his government was in solidarity with Ankara. Subsequent to this visit, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and Prime Minister Theresa May also visited Turkey to show the continuity of their support. Also, the former British ambassador to Ankara Richard Moore reiterated on many occasions that the group was behind the July 15 atrocities, marking London's official support to Turkey.

Yet, the British public opinion remains empathetic to FETÖ. This is due to the mainstream media's support of FETÖ and the long-standing ties of some British parliament members with organizations owned or funded by FETÖ. Similarly, Turkey has been criticizing Britain's refusal to extradite senior FETÖ operatives such as Akin İpek despite all the actions taken in this regard. The recent developments regarding the extradition case of Akin İpek can be seen as a positive sign in this regard.

In this framework, this report, which is the most comprehensive study conducted so far on FETÖ's activities and organizations in the U.K., presents a number of practical and reasonable policy recommendations to the relevant authorities.

Dr. Burhanettin Duran
SETA General Coordinator

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report focuses on the U.K. networks of the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) and on its activities in the country in the fields of education, media, economy, and civil society. It also provides an analysis of the U.K. government's approach to the group.

As a result of the field study conducted as part of the current report, it was found that FETÖ, which has organizations in around 170 countries, has organized a large-scale and complex network in the U.K. as well. The organization, which started with FETÖ leader Fethullah Gülen's visit to London in 1993, expanded its activities in a short span of time in various fields encompassing educational establishments, lobbying organizations, think tanks, media and cultural activities. During its early years, FETÖ mainly focused on the regions with a high Turkish population and spread its sphere of activities to the rest of U.K. during the 2000s. As part of FETÖ's institutionalization policy, the Anatolian Muslims Society was founded in 2004 and the Mevlana Mosque and Rumi Cultural Center were launched in 2008 to address a wider audience. In 2013, many FETÖ-affiliated organizations converged under the umbrella of Voices in Britain, following their illegal activities in Turkey. Through this consortium, FETÖ tried to create the impression in the U.K. that it pursues a transparency policy.

This study found that several names come into prominence in FETÖ's U.K. organizations. For instance, due to the reassignments following the July 15 coup attempt, İsmail Nazlı, who was previously responsible for the organization's oper-

ations in Canada, was entrusted with the operations in the U.K., taking the place of Adnan Azak. Furthermore, Özcan Keleş acts as the spokesperson of the organization and has been the face of FETÖ in public. Some other names with important positions in FETÖ's U.K. organizations include fugitive businessman Akın İpek, İsmail Mesut Sezgin, Kerim Balcı, Sadık Çınar, Selçuk Başsoy, Orhan Çaya, Ufuk Uçar, and Cengiz İnce. Aside from these names, the organization has many educational establishments operating in the U.K. such as Axis, Lighthouse, and Mentor Wise; lobbying organizations and think tanks such as the Turkey Institute, the Dialogue Society, and the Center for Hizmet Studies; a business-oriented organization named BizNet; and various foundations and centers that perform social and cultural activities on behalf of the organization.

Furthermore, FETÖ was revealed to have a considerably high income in the U.K. For instance, Koza Limited Company, which was founded by fugitive FETÖ militant Akın İpek, has a net worth above £60 million, whereas all FETÖ-owned organizations in the U.K. are estimated to hold resources corresponding to approximately £100 million. The organization derives profits from the students staying at their residences (Işık Houses) and from elementary and secondary level educational organizations, whose annual fees vary between £5,000 and £8,000. In addition, FETÖ has made a substantial profit with the *zakats* and *Eid al-adha* donations, as well as other donations collected through associations such as Anatolian Muslims and Time to Help UK.

The research conducted in this scope revealed that the British public was not adequately informed on FETÖ and its activities across the country prior to the July 15 coup attempt and, therefore, did not develop a sensitivity on the issue. Furthermore, it was observed that since FETÖ maintained its activities under the guise of “interfaith dialogue” or as an “educational movement,” a number of senior bureaucrats, politicians and party representatives in the U.K. attended the events or activities organized by FETÖ, or provided overt support to the organization, as in other countries. This situation undoubtedly stems from the fact that FETÖ represented itself during the 2000s as a legal and ideal NGO that attaches importance to education by resorting to the method of religion-based deception (*taqiyya*) – similarly to its methodology during the same years in Turkey.

This report examines the approaches of the Westminster government, the U.K. Parliament, and British media outlets following the July 15 coup attempt as well as their stance on Turkey's fight against FETÖ. Although the U.K. government hesitated to take some of the steps expected by Ankara following the

failed coup attempt, the government sided with Turkey on the night of the coup attempt and became the first Western country to condemn the coup attempt and to pay a visit to Turkey after the incidents. The Turkish public appreciated the empathy and understanding the U.K. government displayed towards Turkey in contrast to other Western countries. Most importantly, while the other EU and European countries denied FETÖ's role in the coup attempt, the U.K. government acknowledged that FETÖ organized the failed coup, which has been considered an important indication of support.

Although the U.K. government sides with Turkey concerning the issue of FETÖ, several members of the British Parliament did the exact opposite and maintained their ties with FETÖ operatives and supported the organization by joining their activities. In a report issued by the U.K. Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, it is stated that there is not sufficient evidence to recognize FETÖ as a terrorist group, which stirred an outcry among the Turkish public. In this 78-page report, no reference is made to the civilian FETÖ militants caught inside military bases, in military posts on the night of July 15, whereas the ByLock program used by FETÖ militants to secretly communicate, which is recognized as direct evidence proving FETÖ affiliation by the Turkish Court of Cassation, is mentioned only once. The misrepresentation of reality in the report led to discussions regarding the alleged lack of evidence in FETÖ-related prosecutions. Furthermore, the Turkish people have been reacting to the organization of panels and sessions by FETÖ at the British Parliament following the failed coup attempt, when hundreds were killed and thousands were injured.

Meanwhile, the U.K.-based media outlets displayed a different approach to Turkey and FETÖ following July 15. Instead of reflecting the trauma of the Turkish people as a result of the coup attempt, certain media organizations circulated FETÖ's discourses in the first hours of the coup attempt, conducted interviews with FETÖ militants, tried to denigrate Turkey's struggle, and criticized London for establishing good relations with Ankara.

Although the British government understands Turkey's concerns and exerts efforts for the continuation of the good relations, Turkey-U.K. relations, which improved - particularly after the Brexit decision -, have been threatened by several factors such as the continuation of FETÖ's activities in the U.K., the support given by a number of British politicians and parliament members to FETÖ's activities, certain media outlets' deliberate support of the organization, and most importantly, the fact that FETÖ is still not listed as a terrorist group by the U.K.

Given that Turkey-Germany relations have worsened due to Germany's FETÖ policy and the organization's lobby, the groups seeking to undermine the bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.K. might use the issue of FETÖ to that end. Unless necessary measures are taken, FETÖ's power, organizational structure, and networks in the U.K. are likely to sabotage Turkey-U.K. relations. For the welfare of the bilateral relations, which improved in many fields such as economy and defense following the Brexit decision, the U.K. government should restrict FETÖ's activities in the country, British politicians should keep their distance from FETÖ members, and media outlets should abandon their pro-FETÖ approach.

In light of the above evaluations, the following aspects must be noted for the welfare of Turkey-U.K. relations and the fight against FETÖ organizations in the U.K.:

- Although the Cabinet in London and the U.K. ambassador to Ankara consider FETÖ responsible for the coup attempt, FETÖ is still not recognized as a terrorist organization by the U.K. This undermines possible new partnerships between the two countries. FETÖ must be listed as a terrorist organization and the threat it poses to bilateral relations must be ruled out by restricting the activities of the organization on British territory.
- In order to improve the strategic relations between the U.K. and Turkey after Brexit and secure the mutual trust, senior FETÖ militants including Kerim Balcı and Akın İpek must be extradited to Turkey as requested by the Ankara. In this regard, the recent developments concerning one of the leading members of FETÖ fugitive Akın İpek's extradition to Turkey is a positive sign that the U.K. takes Turkey's concerns quite seriously.
- A joint working group must be formed by Ankara and London to examine FETÖ's organizations in the U.K. A cooperation mechanism between the Turkish Financial Crimes Investigation Council (MASAK) and the UK Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) could constitute a tangible step towards unveiling FETÖ's financial activities in the U.K.
- Members of the U.K. Parliament and political party representatives need to show support for the Turkish people and government following the coup attempt and abstain from endangering the strategic relations between the countries by acting irresponsibly on the issue of FETÖ.
- Although the report issued by the U.K. Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee acknowledges FETÖ's involvement in the coup attempt, it

does not define FETÖ as a terrorist organization. Turkey should run an effective public diplomacy, inform the British public and decision-makers on the subject, and erase the doubts concerning FETÖ by sharing further evidence.

- The British media and public must be informed that FETÖ poses a threat not only to Turkey but to all the countries where it operates – in contrast to the televised and published content by certain media organizations such as the BBC and *The Guardian* which is against Turkey and in favor of FETÖ.
- The substantial increase of FETÖ militants who fled to the U.K. by acquiring visas through enrolling in language schools entails great risks for the bilateral relations. The U.K. government must not allow FETÖ militants to reside in the country on the pretext of language education and an investigation must be initiated in this regard.

INTRODUCTION

The United Kingdom, which traditionally has good relations with Ankara and especially after Brexit, is a country where FETÖ has a considerable number of networks and organizations - although not reaching the extent of those in Germany. Since the U.K. has a high Turkish population, the organization could easily find support from Turkish people established in the country. As a result, FETÖ had the opportunity to complete its organizational structure in a short span of time, starting in 1993, and spread its activities in a great variety of areas including education, religious services, cultural activities, and lobbying works. The group managed to give the impression of being a passivist non-governmental organization and to display an impeccable image in Britain as it did in Turkey and in around 170 other countries. Furthermore, FETÖ used its educational activities as a front, which allowed the group to become a generally accepted organization in the U.K. and receive support from a number of politicians and political actors in a short time.

The organizational activities of FETÖ in Britain, which date back to the group leader Fethullah Gülen's London visit in 1993, spread all across the U.K. in a short period. During the 1990s, which corresponded to the group's founding years in the country, FETÖ focused on its educational and religious services whereas it expedited its lobbying activities and endeavored to strengthen its institutional identity by building several umbrella organizations during the 2000s, its period of growth. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and

the July 7 attacks in London, which coincided with these years, prompted the organization to adopt a new mission, namely representing “moderate Islam” and “good Muslim” ideas and images. Throughout this period, FETÖ maintained activities in the U.K. through its dialogue centers and lobbying efforts. The group embarked on a transparency policy in the U.K. following its December 17 and 25 judicial coup attempts in Turkey and expedited this policy after the July 15 coup attempt. Also, after these attempts, the group changed its foundation’s and other organizations’ administrators and adopted a policy of silence based on being less visible in public.

Generally, FETÖ’s activities in Britain share many similarities with its activities in Turkey and other countries. The group pursues a strategy of improving ties with politicians and party representatives by means of one-on-one contact and searches for more support among the Turkish diaspora. Although the U.K. government stressed that FETÖ was behind the coup attempt that killed more than 250 Turkish citizens and injured more than 2,000, some media outlets, parliament members, and political party representatives have still maintained their active support for the group, which demonstrates the extent of FETÖ’s networks within its U.K. leg.

The U.K. government’s wish to build good relations with Turkey following the Brexit decision and noteworthy approach towards the July 15 coup attempt lent impetus to Turkey-Britain relations whereas the experts observing the relations commented that a new strategic partnership is being established. However, despite the government’s clear stance against FETÖ and the statements favoring Turkey, some political groups have not been able to keep FETÖ at bay, which constitutes a threat to the welfare of the relations. Although the U.K. government’s stance against FETÖ and support to Turkey’s arguments pleased Turkish decision-makers and public, an overwhelming majority of the U.K.-based media outlets has been pursuing an editorial policy aiming to discredit Ankara’s fight against FETÖ. Aside from this, the explicit support given to the group’s activities by a number of marginal parliament members and political party representatives constitutes an impediment to the bilateral relations.

The field studies and research conducted as part of the current report indicate that the FETÖ militants who fled Turkey designated the U.K. as their leading target location after Germany. They received residence permits by enrolling in language courses provided by the terrorist group or ran various economic activities such as real estate and strived for a reorganization. Considering that the FETÖ

organizations in Germany unsettled Ankara-Berlin relations to a serious extent, the group's activities in the U.K. pose a major threat to the strategic relations between Turkey and the U.K.

Although a variety of articles, news reports and studies have been published on FETÖ, a comprehensive study on FETÖ's U.K. leg has not been conducted to date. This report aims to address this deficiency. The primary purpose of this report is to inform the two countries' public and decision-makers of the group's activities and organizational structure in order to eliminate possible threats FETÖ might pose to the Turkey-U.K. relations.

The field studies and research conducted on the subject reveal that the British public is not sufficiently informed on FETÖ, which has helped the group militants create a false image of the organization and maintain their activities without serious obstacles. Although this report has been written with the intention to inform the public, it also aims to initiate the unravelling of the true colors of the group in the U.K. Furthermore, the report intends to put cooperation mechanisms into action to prevent the expansion of the organization's networks while seeking to contribute to the bilateral relations by presenting a number of recommendations to avert possible problems.

THE HISTORY OF FETÖ IN THE U.K.

Although FETÖ's organization in Britain is not as wide-ranging and strong as in Germany, which has been FETÖ's headquarters in continental Europe, it can still be said that FETÖ enjoys an advanced organizational structure in the U.K. and has so far engaged in various activities in many regions and cities across the country. FETÖ leader Fethullah Gülen kicked off a mobilization and development period within the organization and endeavored to improve FETÖ's ties with the outside world by opening schools both inside and outside the country during the first half of the 1990s. Especially during 1993 and 1994, the organization conducted many activities both inside and outside Turkey. In this period, Gülen met with many politicians from various political parties in Turkey, visited the leaders of the parliamentary parties and organized meetings to inform people of FETÖ's schools operating abroad. In this sense, the 1990s can be regarded as FETÖ's mobilization and expansion period.¹

FETÖ's organization in the U.K. also began during this period and advanced in line with the developments in Turkey. Indeed, the creation by the group of the Journalists and Writers Foundation in Turkey in 1994, the visits Gülen paid to political parties in Turkey, and the foundation of Axis Educational Trust in the U.K. in the same year cannot be considered asunder. It is required to evaluate all these developments as components of a general strategy. Consequently, it is

1. Enes Bayraklı, "FETÖ'nün Örgütsel Kronolojisi" (FETÖ's Organizational Chronology), *FETÖ'nün Anatomisi (FETÖ's Anatomy)*, (eds.) Enes Bayraklı and Ufuk Ulutaş, (Istanbul: SETA Publications, 2017), p. 17.

crucial to note that FETÖ's efforts and activities in Turkey ran parallel to its developments abroad.

Categorizing FETÖ's history and development in the U.K. into three main periods will help us present a more comprehensive portrait of the organization in chronological order. The 1990s, which marked the founding years of the group, encompass the process in which the group strived to diversify its organizational structure and activities in the U.K. The organization continued growing, founded thousands of NGOs across the world, and made a strategic decision to start emphasizing the idea of dialogue during its period of growth, which corresponds to the 2000s. In the period starting from 2013 until the present, which can be categorized as the organization's period of silence, the organization exerted efforts to become transparent in its U.K. organizations and went underground by retreating into silence in line with the developments in Turkey. Following the July 15 coup attempt, the U.K. government adopted a clear stance against the attempted coup and explicitly stated that FETÖ was behind the atrocities.² This was the main factor determining the organization's new strategy in the country.

TABLE 1. HISTORY OF FETÖ'S STRUCTURE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Year	Organization	Scope
1993	Fetullah Gülen's London visit	Visit
1994	Axis Educational Trust	Educational and Cultural Activities
1999	Dialogue Society	Lobbying Activities
2001-2007	Stanford Hill Supplementary School	Educational and Cultural Activities
2003	Oxford Vision	Education and Foreign Language Teaching
2004	Anatolian Muslims Society	Educational and Cultural Activities
2004	London Center for Social Studies	Academic Activities
2004	Lighthouse Educational Society	Educational and Cultural Activities
2008	BizNet	Business World and Lobbying Activities
2008	Mevlana Rumi Mosque	Religious Activities
2013	Voices in Britain	Consortium
2014	Turkey Institute	Lobbying Activities
2014	Center for Hizmet Studies	Lobbying Activities
2016	Sohbet Society	Cultural Activities

2. "UK Envoy: Gülen May Be Behind Failed Coup Attempt", *Hurriyet Daily News*, July 30, 2016; "UK Knows Very Well Gülenists Were Behind July 15 Coup Attempt, Turkey Envoy Moore Says", *Daily Sabah*, July 23, 2017.

1990S: THE FOUNDING YEARS

FETÖ-owned organizations first appeared in the U.K. after Gülen's London visit in 1993. This visit is significant as it reveals the importance Gülen attached to FETÖ's U.K. leg and signifies the first groundwork FETÖ laid in the country. In fact, the visit both made FETÖ realize its potential in the U.K. and prompted Turkish and Muslim diaspora to participate in the organization under the influence of Gülen. Sanaa Banna, who has penned various articles on FETÖ, argues that the London visit in 1993 caused many communities of varying sizes to be influenced by Gülen's ideas and, thus, several communities gathered around FETÖ.³

FETÖ's organizations in the U.K. engaged in many activities in a short span of time and gained a substantial number of new members or supporters. Undoubtedly, the leading reason for this rapid improvement is the high population of Turkish immigrants in the U.K. Since the U.K. has received a considerable migration flow both from Turkey and Cyprus, FETÖ did not have any difficulty in finding proponents. The high Turkish-Muslim population in the country formed a substantial source of income for FETÖ, contributed to its rapid growth, and presented an opportunity to expand its activities by means of the diaspora.

FETÖ's *sohbet* activities, which refer to the periodic gatherings organized by the group, had a critical role in increasing and spreading FETÖ's recognition. As is widely known, these gatherings constituted the building block of FETÖ's organizational structure. *Sohbets*, which gained particular importance following Gülen's London visit, created a major field of activity for the group to strengthen its ties with Turkish communities and reach a wider audience. Banna states that these gatherings, which were organized on a weekly or monthly basis or conducted as part of a specific project, provided new opportunities of socializing and communication to FETÖ members, contributed to obtaining a new route map, and consolidated the participants' social and economic networks.⁴

As observed in various countries across the world, the organization's regional "imams" (senior operatives) are responsible for organizing *sohbet* activities in the U.K. As Özcan Keleş conveyed to the U.K. Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, he has been responsible for organizing the *sohbet* gatherings in the region.⁵ Keleş

3. Sanaa Banna, *Resource Mobilization in Gulen-Inspired Hizmet: A New Type of Social Movement*, (New York: Blue Dome Press, 2014), p. 70.

4. Banna, *Resource Mobilization in Gulen-Inspired Hizmet: A New Type of Social Movement*, p. 71.

5. "The UK's Relations with Turkey", House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Tenth Report of Session 2016-2017, <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaaff/615/615.pdf>, (Accessed on August 5, 2017).

also added that these gatherings and similar communication methods by the organization are of vital importance for finding support for the foundations and FETÖ's activities.

FETÖ chose North London as its main field and focus of activity in the U.K. The most pertinent reason for this choice is that the immigrants of Turkish and/or Muslim descent mostly reside in the north of London. According to the research, around 75 percent of the Turkish population in the U.K. resides in London.⁶ The leading London areas in terms of Turkish population include northern districts such as Enfield, Harringey, and Hackney.

As FETÖ engaged in works addressing the Turkish-Muslim diaspora during its founding years, it endeavored to be active in these geographical areas. Throughout the 2000s, the second- and third-generation Muslims of Turkish descent had become successfully integrated in British society and moved to various regions of London and the U.K. For this reason, FETÖ expanded its field of activity parallel to the residential areas of Turkish-Muslim families during the 2000s and reorganized its establishments in order to operate all across the U.K. In so doing, the organization had a chance to expand its geographical distribution and was careful not to detach itself from the Turkish diaspora.

Similarly, to its establishments across the world, the organization used the education sector as a front in the U.K. to improve its activities, increase its sources of income, and reach a wider audience in the country. In order to grow more influential in the Turkish-Muslim diaspora, it attached a special importance to the education of youth and its first official organization was formed in this field. As in Turkey, FETÖ endeavored to expand its network by addressing Turkish and/or Muslim children and youth and opened culture centers and educational courses for this target group in areas where the Turkish diaspora predominantly resided. The centers, whose offices were either rented or bought, provided education to children and youth daily.

Axis Educational Trust, the first FETÖ-owned organization operating in the U.K., was founded and started operating in 1994 following Gülen's visit to London.⁷ The trust, whose founders include the chair of the Turkish Journalists and Writers Foundation Mustafa Yeşil, appeared as a modern educational initiative by FETÖ similar to other examples in various countries. In a short span of time,

6. Ahmet Uysal, "Londra'daki Türk Nüfusun Mekansal Dağılımı" (The Spatial Distribution of the Turkish Population in London), *Marmara Coğrafya Periodical*, Issue 33, (2016), pp. 534-565.

7. "Birleşik Krallık Gülen'i 1993'te Keşfetti", *Takvim*, August 20, 2016.

numerous schools, private teaching institutions, weekend training courses, and language courses owned by the trust spread across the country.

Although a variety of educational foundations and organizations were subsequently established such as Koza Education Association and Lighthouse Educational Foundation, Axis Educational Trust has operated as an umbrella organization for FETÖ's educational activities. Accordingly, Fatih Tedik, a FETÖ militant who engaged in many activities and attended many conferences on behalf of the organization, stated that he regards "Axis Educational Trust as the most -established organization of the Gülen movement in the U.K."⁸ Tedik also pointed out that Gülen attaches a special importance to education and that the movement showed great virtue with its achievements in the field of education in the U.K.

The value FETÖ attached to education, especially abroad, including the U.K, stems from its aspiration to create the impression of an NGO which pays respect to Western principles and engages in charity works. Offering a modern training in its educational facilities offered the organization an ideal image and enabled it to maintain its activities on a legitimate ground.

Özcan Keleş, the director of the Dialogue Society (*Diyalog Toplumu*), which is a FETÖ lobbying organization in the U.K., and Yüksel Alp Aslandoğan, the chair of FETÖ's U.S.-based lobbying organization named Alliance for Shared Values, provided important information on the organization and its structure during their testimonials for a report issued by the U.K. Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee. In the testimonials, it was claimed that the organization also has an informal network in the U.K. and does not have a hierarchy.⁹ In addition, information on FETÖ's activities was given during their statements, including practices such as *sohbet* (local circles), *mütevelli heyeti* (board of trustees), *istişare* (consultative meeting), *gönüllüler* (volunteering), *abi ve ablalar* (brothers and sisters), and *himet* (donation).

The organization's financial network in Britain is similar to its structuring in Turkey and other European countries. FETÖ activities have been maintained

8. Fatih Tedik, "Motivating Minority Integration in Western Context: The Gülen Movement in the United Kingdom", *Peaceful Coexistence: Fethullah Gulen Initiatives in the Contemporary World*, (London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007), p. 234.

9. "Oral Evidence (Özcan Keleş & Yüksel Alp Aslandoğan): The UK's Relations with Turkey, HC 615", House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, November 15, 2016, <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/uks-relations-with-turkey/oral/43383.html>, (Accessed on August 10, 2017).

through the donations of Turkish communities and FETÖ-affiliated businessmen, and tuition fees coming from its educational establishments. Nevertheless, Tedik states that this financial structure might pose a challenge to FETÖ in the future especially in the U.K. Tedik points out that the leading group giving support to FETÖ in the U.K. comprises the Sunni diaspora, whereas Turkish citizens of Kurdish or Alevi descent or with secular tendencies are against the activities of the organization along with Turkish Cypriots, which might cause FETÖ some financial problems in the future. He also claims that FETÖ activities might be hindered since its income might experience fluctuations due to the fact that the Sunni groups supporting the organization consist of groups with limited social rights and amenities such as small business owners, students, and independent entrepreneurs.¹⁰

As can be seen, during the 1990s, which can be considered FETÖ's founding years in Britain, the organization focused on the subjects of education, religious services, and culture while endeavoring to strengthen its influence within the Turkish-Muslim community. It must also be noted that, in particular, FETÖ used educational activities and establishments as a front during its early years and tried to generate an impression of an ideal NGO for itself. In their statements to the U.K. Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, Özcan Keleş and Yüksel Alp Aslandoğan stated that the organization's first educational institutions abroad were established during the 1990s and the organization turned into a transnational education movement throughout these years.¹¹ Therefore, the introduction of FETÖ's activities in the U.K. under the guise of education is not a coincidence.

2000S: THE PERIOD OF GROWTH

By the 2000s, FETÖ accelerated its activities and succeeded in diversifying its scope of activity in Britain to a considerable degree. Although it was quite a new organization on British territory compared to other religious communities, it completed its foundation and organization process in a short period and strived to address a much wider audience by resorting to different methods in its activities and strategies during the 2000s. While it adopted a method of being present in Britain through educational, religious and cultural activities during the 1990s, FETÖ felt a need to institutionalize through the 2000s, which marked its period of

10. Tedik, "Motivating Minority Integration in Western Context: The Gülen Movement in the United Kingdom", p. 237.

11. "Oral Evidence (Özcan Keleş & Yüksel Alp Aslandoğan): The UK's Relations with Turkey, HC 615".

growth. To that end, the organization started focusing on lobbying and dialogue efforts aside from its educational and religious services. Accordingly, FETÖ aimed to develop close ties with the representatives of various sectors in Britain including politicians, local administrators, press members, universities, and NGOs, and thus kicked off a serious mobilization in this respect.

During this period, FETÖ exerted efforts to build contact with Muslim groups other than the Turkish diaspora and tried to develop relations with non-Muslim interest groups by opening dialogue centers. Talip Küçükcan states that such groups operating in Europe expand their networks with two methods. According to Küçükcan, the first network improvement method entails addressing a larger audience via a variety of channels, and emphasizing religious identity by using transnational networks and the local country's public sphere. The second method, he goes on to suggest, consists of running activities that address Turkish and non-Muslim communities.¹² During FETÖ's growth period in Britain, FETÖ operatives tried to improve its networks that addressed Turkish and non-Muslim communities and conducted various activities to that end by opening dialogue centers in a variety of locations. The Dialogue Society, which was established in 1999 but was mobilized and ran significant activities during the 2000s, is the product of such an endeavor and mission. Embracing a set of slogans that created a positive impression on Western societies such as establishing good relations among people of different beliefs and enabling an atmosphere of mutual respect and dialogue, this foundation constitutes the most important leg of FETÖ's rhetoric of dialogue in Britain and aims to improve and expand the organization's lobbying activities.

The September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States also contributed to the organization's growth throughout the 2000s. Having been active in many countries across the world with its educational houses, culture offices and dialogue centers, FETÖ had a chance to present itself as an antidote to radical Islam and extremism and started to represent the "good Muslim" to the Western countries. After September 11, FETÖ leader Gülen put a special emphasis in his discourses on "moderate Islam" and reiterated the importance he attached to dialogue centers. For this reason, FETÖ expedited the establishment of dialogue centers in

12. Talip Küçükcan, "The Making of Turkish-Muslim Diaspora in Britain: Religious Collective Identity in a Multicultural Public Sphere", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Issue: 24.2, (2014), pp. 243-258.

many countries including the U.K.¹³ and exerted considerable efforts to become the representative of moderate Islam by organizing activities that encouraged interfaith dialogue.

In this regard, the U.K.-based Dialogue Society and the Mevlana Mosque - Rumi Cultural Center, which were launched in the country in 2008, are of great importance. In these establishments, activities encouraging interfaith dialogue have been organized in a way to address both Muslims and non-Muslim communities. In his study on FETÖ's activities in Western countries, British sociologist Jonathan Lacey quoted a member of the Dialogue Society saying that the society not only conducts activities addressing Muslims, but most of the activities address non-Muslims while Muslims are relatively less contacted.¹⁴ Fatih Tedik, who has also penned and presented a number of studies on FETÖ, stated that aside from the commemoration of Prophet Muhammad's birthday, Christmas is also celebrated as part of the society's activities.¹⁵

These examples are noteworthy since they convey FETÖ's understanding of dialogue and show that it has tried to represent Muslims as moderate, modern and open to dialogue unlike the extremists who attacked the World Trade Center. In so doing, FETÖ had a chance to represent itself as an alternative model to radical Islam through its dialogue centers in the political and societal atmosphere prevalent in the aftermath of September 11, and seized the opportunity to expand its activities on a broader spectrum by taking on the role of representing ostensibly "good" and "moderate" Muslims in the eyes of Western countries.

Furthermore, a need to institutionalize emerged within FETÖ with the expansion and growth of the organization in Britain during the 2000s. Such a necessity arose when the periodic gatherings and other activities evolved to larger organizations addressing a growing number of people. As the number of businessmen, academics, politicians, students and tradesmen joining the organization increased, the need to institutionalize and systematize the organization soared. With this process of renewal, as stated above, FETÖ aimed to regulate its wide-ranging activities under a systematical structure and incorporate non-Turkish and non-Muslim com-

13. FETÖ has dialogue centers in many Western countries such as the United States (Niagara Foundation, Rumi Forum, Raindrop Turkish House, Institute for Interfaith Dialogue, Pacifica Institute, Gülen Institute); Belgium (Intercultural Dialogue Platform); Netherlands (*Dialogo Academie*); Germany (*Forum Für Interkulturellen Dialog e.V.*); and the United Kingdom (Dialogue Society).

14. Jonathan Lacey, "'Turkish Islam' as 'Good Islam': How the Gülen Movement Exploits Discursive Opportunities in a Post-9/11 Milieu", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Issue: 34.2, (2014), pp. 95-110.

15. Tedik, "Motivating Minority Integration in Western Context: The Gülen Movement in the United Kingdom", p. 235.

munities into its network. Therefore, it would be more accurate to read FETÖ's U.K. activities during the 2000s in this light. The Anatolian Muslims Society, which was founded in 2004 to give an institutional quality to the organization, and the Mevlana Mosque - Rumi Cultural Center, which opened in 2008, were important steps towards the above objectives. Thanks to these establishments, FETÖ solidified its organizational structure in Britain and was given the opportunity to address much wider and more diverse Muslim or non-Muslim audiences.

Especially with the establishment of the Anatolian Muslims Society in 2004, the religious services of the organization became more regular and well-organized whilst the activities gained an institutional quality. Therefore, the establishment of this foundation is considered a milestone since it enabled the collection of the activities in Britain under one umbrella and eased their coordination.¹⁶ With the Anatolian Muslims Society, a substantial increase occurred in FETÖ's activities' quality and quantity and it came to be more visible in Britain. In 2008, FETÖ bought an old Buddhist temple and turned it into a mosque and cultural center after restoring it, which is another significant development in FETÖ's history. As seen in many other European countries, mosques have a number of social and cultural functions for the Turkish or/and Muslim diaspora aside from worship such as congregating, socializing, improving relations, and coping with homesickness. In this regard, FETÖ started such an initiative to solidify its role within the diaspora and make use of the social functions of mosques. The mosque they opened also took on the mission of acting as a dialogue center, which is crucial in terms of sending out the message that it does not solely belong to Muslims but addresses non-Muslim communities as well.

Also, during the 2000s, FETÖ prioritized addressing parliament members, politicians, local administrators, and academics in Britain while actively working to increase its lobbying power. Throughout this period, the organization exerted utmost effort to gain recognition among the British elite and find more support, and eventually accomplished this objective. Between 1999 and 2009, the Dialogue Society organized a total of 465 events, ran 3,600 lobbying activities that addressed politicians, academics and businessmen, and a total of 41,600 people attended the foundation's events.¹⁷ Throughout this period,

16. Yakup Coştu, "Londra'da Türklere Ait Dini Organizasyonlar" (The Religious Organizations of the Turkish People in London), *Hitit University Theology Faculty Periodical*, Issue: 8.16, (2009), pp. 77-100.

17. "Dialogue Society's 10th Anniversary Dinner and Awards Ceremony", *Dialogue Society*, http://www.dialoguesociety.org/forthcoming/239-dialogue-societys-10th-anniversary-dinner-and-awards-ceremony.html#Wex_K1u001s, (Accessed on October 12, 2017).

the organization developed close ties with politicians and bureaucrats and established important contacts with parliament members and local administrators. In his answers to the Foreign Affairs Committee, Keleş admitted that a number of ministers and parliament members attended various FETÖ events, adding that most of their activities received support from various political organizations.¹⁸

Meanwhile, the organization endeavored to consolidate its network of academics with its lobbying activities. In this respect, they organized numerous scientific symposiums and published a great amount of periodicals and non-periodicals. Some of the publications presented FETÖ as a method to prevent terrorism in the U.K.,¹⁹ a means to contribute to the integration of Turkish people in Europe,²⁰ and a guide to understanding the lives of Muslim people in Britain on the grounds of its self-proclaimed reliable doctrines and moderate vision of Islam.²¹ As can be viewed from the contents of the publications, aside from cementing FETÖ's ties to academia, the motivation behind these symposiums and studies was to legitimize FETÖ and increase its general acceptance in society and politics by adding new dimensions to its *raison d'être*.

2013-PRESENT: THE PERIOD OF SILENCE

As of 2013, FETÖ entered a period of silence in terms of its presence in Britain. In order to prevent raising doubts in the British public following its shady actions and military coup attempt in Turkey, the organization strived to become transparent in its U.K.-based establishments and adopted a strategy of keeping a low public profile by retreating into silence. The strategy FETÖ adopted in the aftermath of the December 17 and 25 judicial coup attempts in Turkey can be explained through four main points:

18. "Oral Evidence (Özcan Keleş & Yüksel Alp Aslandoğan): The UK's Relations with Turkey, HC 615".

19. Assaf Hussain, "Terrorism in Britain and the Choice for Policy Makers: Gülen's Ideas", *Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gulen Movement*, (eds.) Louis J. Cantori, Marcia K. Hermansen and David B. Capes, (London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007), pp. 298-313.

20. Fatih Tedik, "Gülen Movement as an Integration Mechanism for Europe's Turkish and Muslim Community: Potentials and Constraints", *Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gulen Movement*, (eds.) Louis J. Cantori, Marcia K. Hermansen and David B. Capes, (London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007), pp. 230-243.

21. Paul Weller, "Robustness and Civility: Themes from Fethullah Gülen as Resource and Challenge for Government, Muslims and Civil Society in the UK", *Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gulen Movement*, (eds.) Louis J. Cantori, Marcia K. Hermansen and David B. Capes, (London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007), pp. 268-283.

- A policy of transparency regarding U.K. institutions.²²
- Changing the directors and administrators of FETÖ-owned foundations and establishments.
- Avoiding sharing news reports, visual documents and similar contents pertinent to FETÖ's activities and events.
- Removing the information previously offered on the websites of FETÖ-owned foundations and establishments.

During this period, FETÖ tried to initiate a transparency movement in order to protect its U.K.-based establishments and activities from the developments in Turkey in the aftermath of the coup attempt. To that end, the organization aimed at preventing the creation of a negative image in the British public and tried to discredit Turkey's fight against the group. For instance, FETÖ gathered all its establishments and foundations under the umbrella of a consortium named "Voices in Britain" in 2013 in order to render its activities more transparent. Although it is claimed on its website that the consortium has ten members,²³ it can be seen that a number of FETÖ-owned organizations such as the Sohbet Society are also referred to on the website. In 2015, the consortium sent a letter to various British government agencies including the Prime Minister's Office, the Home Office, and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office to inform them of FETÖ's activities in line with its transparency policy. The letter presented detailed information on FETÖ's organizational structure in Britain including the objectives of the U.K.-based FETÖ agencies, their members and subsidiaries, and the volunteers and directors of the FETÖ-linked foundations. This need to inform British authorities 22 years after FETÖ established its operations in Britain is closely related to their illegitimate acts and the coup attempt in Turkey.

Undoubtedly, it is not a coincidence that the Voices in Britain consortium was formed in the same year as the December 17 and 25 processes while the letters sent to British authorities concurred with the time when Turkey directed serious criticisms towards FETÖ's international organizations and schools and took action in this regard.²⁴ The steps and initiatives FETÖ undertook in the name of transparency must be regarded as efforts to invalidate the Turkish government's warnings to other countries regarding FETÖ and to show that the organization

22. This "policy of transparency" is used as a tool of deception and thus forms a part of the organization's religion-based deception policy.

23. "All Members", Voices in Britain, <http://www.voicesinbritain.org/?tmlmstf=allmembers>, (Accessed on September 10, 2017).

24. "Erdoğan Talimatı Verdi! İşte Paralel Yapı Okulları Eylem Planı", *Sabah*, January 28, 2015.

has a transparent and peaceful structure. For instance, in a video uploaded on YouTube by the director of the Center for Hizmet Studies İsmail Mesut Sezgin, the latter asks FETÖ militant İhsan Yılmaz about the organization's transparency efforts. Yılmaz answers as follows:

The purpose of the transparency efforts is not to find or punish the ones responsible for the past mistakes. Such an initiative does not aim to prove someone right [...] Based on the experiences in Turkey, transparency means undergoing a check-up, engaging in a self-review, and going for a renewal with these objectives in mind [...] We cannot know whether the Hizmet movement will confront problems in other countries. The movement needs to be updated, one needs to get ready for the future.²⁵

The video was uploaded with the title "Is it the right time for transparency discussions? - Hizmet talks." It can be inferred from this video that the transparency moves led to some important discussions within the organization and caused militants to question whether it was the right time to embark on such a project.

Although FETÖ represents itself as an entity pursuing a transparency policy towards the U.K. government agencies, it is still obvious that the organization is actually inclined to concealing its activities, retreating into silence, and becoming less visible in public. Particularly in the face of Turkey's fight against FETÖ in the international arena in the aftermath of the coup attempts, FETÖ-owned foundations and establishments removed the information previously presented on their websites and limited access to some of their links. Undoubtedly, this policy was adopted mainly because the British government acknowledged FETÖ's role in the July 15 coup attempt and developed closer ties with Turkey following Brexit. To give an example, although basic information on the Dialogue Society is still available in the "About Us" section of its website, the list of its members and agents, including the board of trustees, the chairman and the community directors, is not currently available even though the list could be previously viewed, and the user is redirected to the homepage when the link is clicked.²⁶ Also, on the Business Network's (BizNet) website, the organization's platform that addresses businessmen, the link that shows the member list was removed although much of the website's content is still active and even sign-up forms are available.²⁷

25. "Şeffaflık Tartışmasının Zamanı mı?-Hizmet Konuşmaları", YouTube, August 11, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rsaKNikJxKs&t=4s>, (Accessed on October 15, 2017).

26. "Trustees", Dialogue Society, <http://www.dialoguesociety.org/about-us/people/trustees.html>, (Accessed on September 12, 2017).

27. See http://www.biznet-uk.org/?page_id=219, (Accessed on September 15, 2017).

It is obvious that the member lists were removed to hide the information about the persons, organizations, and agents affiliated with FETÖ and prevent any legal action against them following the coup attempts in Turkey. In this respect, it is clear that the transparency efforts do actually constitute an instrument rather than an objective and were adopted as a tactic to create a new impression on the British authorities and public.

During its period of silence, FETÖ has maintained its activities in strict confidentiality and has avoided sharing photographs and videos on social media. Using its establishments' websites and social media effectively, FETÖ started hiding its activities in order to conceal the fact that it moves freely in the U.K. following its atrocities in Turkey. For example, the latest post on Axis Educational Trust's Facebook page was shared three months ago.²⁸ It has also been noted that the Dialogue Society has not added any news bulletins on its website since February, 2015.²⁹ As part of the research on FETÖ's organizational structure and activities in the U.K., various organizations and persons were contacted in London, who relayed that they observed a decrease in FETÖ's announcements in the country. This situation is directly related to its strategy of keeping a low profile that was kicked off with the December 17 and 25 process and continued with the July 15 coup attempt.

Another FETÖ strategy to invalidate Turkey's fight against it in the international arena has been changing the directors of their foundations and other establishments. Although the organization discharged many directors who had taken active roles in various FETÖ-owned establishments in Britain for years with an aim to renew the image of its establishments and avert Turkey's fight with new names, they could not succeed due to these establishments' long-established organic ties with FETÖ. For example, in 2014, Sadık Çınar, the Dialogue Society's Birmingham branch director, took over the director's position from Özcan Keleş, who directed the organization between 2007 and 2014. Likewise, Özcan Keleş's father, Ömer Keleş, and Ercan İçli, who were the founders and board members of the Anatolian Muslims Society that was founded on December 24, 2004, resigned four months before the July 15 coup attempt while İsmail Uzun resigned 45 days after the attempt.³⁰

28. "Axis Educational Trust", Facebook, <https://www.facebook.com/AxisEducationalTrust>, (Accessed on September 15, 2017).

29. "Newsletter", Dialogue Society, <http://www.dialoguesociety.org/news/newsletter.html>, (Accessed on September 17, 2017).

30. "Anatolian Muslim Society - Company Number: 05321218", Companies House, <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/05321218/filing-history>, (Accessed on October 5, 2017).

FETÖ also changed some names in the Axis Educational Trust. Turan Çakmak, who was assigned a number of duties within the foundation as of June 25, 2009, passed the director's chair to Selçuk Koç on January 26, 2016. Plus, the foundation reported an address change in June, 2017.³¹ FETÖ made considerable changes in the management of many of its organizations in the U.K. and followed a strategy of picking names from the new generation for directing positions while discharging the ones known for their ties to FETÖ across Britain. With this method, FETÖ evidently aimed to prevent the impairment of its U.K.-based activities under the influence of the developments in Turkey and recover the morale of the organization by refreshing the image of its organizations with new faces.

In the field study conducted in London, it was observed that FETÖ also suffered a serious crisis after its strategy of retreating into silence following the July 15 coup attempt and a large number of people severed all ties with the organization. It was also found that a great number of FETÖ militants who fled Turkey have migrated to the U.K. and have been striving to receive residence permit. Although several FETÖ-linked educational centers in North West London were closed and are no longer announcing new activities, the organization might become active again in the future unless necessary measures regarding the migration of militants are taken. The field study revealed that the FETÖ-affiliated businessmen who fled Turkey invested particularly in the real estate sector with the capital they brought from Turkey, enrolled in FETÖ's language courses to receive residence permits, and started regaining their motivation as a result of Gülen's regular messages to them. This situation poses a serious risk to Ankara-London relations since it might lead to FETÖ's reorganization and further operations in the U.K.

31. "Trustees of the Axis Educational Trust - Company Number: 06972659", Companies House, <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/06972659/filing-history>, (Accessed on October 5, 2017).

FETÖ'S NETWORKS

FETÖ's networks in the U.K. can be categorized into four main groups. These networks, all of which are interconnected and exchange personnel with one another, operate in the fields of education, media, lobbying, and social and cultural activities. They are collected under the umbrella of a shared platform named "Voices in Britain" (Voluntary Organizations to Inspire, Connect, Empower and Serve), which is controlled by the organization's *imam* responsible for the operations in the country.³² By building several networks with different agendas, FETÖ gathered them all under this platform. The platform's current reported address is the place where the FETÖ-owned *Zaman Britain* newspaper was once located. Further information on the activities of the organizations within the platform will be presented in detail in following sections of the report. It can be briefly suggested that the Anatolian Muslims Society is the organization's center for social, cultural, welfare and religious activities; the Axis Educational Trust is the main body responsible for educational activities; and the Dialogue Society is responsible for the political and lobbying activities.

32. The following are listed as members on the platform's official website: Anatolian Muslims Society, Dialogue Society, Mentor Wise, Axis Educational Trust, Fellowship Education Society, Mevlana Rumi Mosque, Light-house Education Society, Spring Education Society, Time to Help UK, The Nurture Educational, and Multicultural Society. But curiously, the official websites of Summit Educational Society and Sohbet Society also state that they are members of this platform. Even more peculiar is that Özcan Keleş, FETÖ's main spokesperson in the United Kingdom, said that this platform had six members when he was contacted by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee for the purpose of a report following the July 15 coup attempt. Based on this, one can see how the deception policy FETÖ employs in many countries and contexts, along with the organization's darker side, is not only an important threat for Turkey but also for the United Kingdom.

Mustafa Yeşil, chairman of the FETÖ-owned Journalists and Writers Foundation (GYV), has a considerable role in the institutionalization of FETÖ in Britain. Yeşil's biography reads that he took on active roles in the founding phases of a number of FETÖ-affiliated organizations in the U.K. including the London Centre for Social Studies, the Dialogue Society, the Axis Educational Trust, the Fellowship Educational Society, the Coral College for Girls, and the Koza Women's Association. Yeşil was also among the keynote speakers at the Geneva Peace Conference 2014 held by the GYV in the United Nations Office in Geneva.³³

The active members assigned by FETÖ to its U.K. activities have been incorporated in the organization through two different methods. The most common method has been integrating the FETÖ-linked students to the FETÖ network after sending them to Britain for college education as a result of exploiting the scholarship mechanisms of several institutions in Turkey such as the National Education Ministry (MEB) and the Higher Education Board (YÖK). Also, among the students who moved to the U.K. for undergraduate or postgraduate degrees utilizing their own means, FETÖ chose those who could be employed in line with FETÖ's long-term objectives and funneled them into a FETÖ establishment according to their abilities or tendencies.

The other method of enrolling operatives has been shaped through individuals residing in the U.K. for years and their children. For instance, Ömer Keleş's son Özcan Keleş, who resides in the U.K. and for whom Turkish authorities issued an arrest warrant, has been one of the key FETÖ operatives in the U.K. as he is a British citizen and represents the second generation of Turkish residents in the country. Having established close ties with many politicians, academics and journalists, Özcan Keleş also stood out in FETÖ's social and cultural activities and surprisingly gave a sermon in English in the FETÖ-owned Mevlana Mosque on July 22, 2016.³⁴ In other words, many FETÖ operatives in Britain have performed almost every task assigned to them by FETÖ regardless of their competency for the specific task.

In view of this fact, it has also been noted that although FETÖ's U.K. "imam" has been known as Adnan Azak in public, İsmail Nazlı, who was previously responsible for the organization's operations in Canada, was entrusted with this


33. "Keynote Speakers", Geneva Peace Conference, <http://www.genevapeaceconference.com/?page=SESSIONS&-content=Keynote%20Speakers>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

34. "First Sermon at Hizmet Inspired Mevlana Rumi Mosque Following Turkey's Attempted Coup", YouTube, July 23, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XUg6-zCvVTk>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

task due to the reassignments following July 15. However, actually, FETÖ's most prominent figure and representative in the U.K. has been Özcan Keleş. Keleş was among those whose opinions were included in the report issued by the U.K. Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee in the aftermath of the attempted coup. As the report is examined, it is seen that Keleş denied the negative arguments regarding FETÖ and responded to them with counter-arguments.³⁵

LOBBYING NETWORK AND RELATIONS WITH POLITICIANS

FETÖ has an expansive lobbying network in the U.K. and has developed close ties with various political and social actors of every opinion in the country. Running its lobbying activities predominantly in London, FETÖ had difficulty in operating in other English cities and the other parts of the United Kingdom, namely Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. This is mainly due to the fact that FETÖ does not have a sufficient number of qualified operatives in the U.K. and that the lobbying activities are maintained in the capital London. In relation to this, FETÖ's lobbying activities in the U.K. remained restricted to the efforts to open a space for itself across the country rather than directly affecting the government decisions.



35. For Keleş's oral statement to the Committee, see "Oral Evidence: The UK's Relations with Turkey, HC 615", House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, <http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/foreign-affairs-committee/uks-relations-with-turkey/oral/43383.pdf>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

FETÖ engages in political lobbying activities through the Dialogue Society, the Center for Hizmet Studies, the Turkey Institute, and the London Center for Social Studies, whereas the Business Network (BizNet) organization serves as FETÖ's lobbying platform focusing on the business world. The coordination among these organizations is maintained by the Dialogue Society, FETÖ's oldest lobbying functionary. Along with the aforementioned organizations, all the educational, social, cultural, and media organizations adhering to FETÖ are also indirectly responsible for promoting the terrorist organization and engaging in lobbying activities in its favor.

There is another noteworthy aspect of these organizations that are responsible for running lobbying activities on FETÖ's behalf. As the following sections of the report will indicate, FETÖ has usually employed terms like "moderate Islam", "Sufi Islam", and "dialogue" in its activities, endeavored to create a positive public image for itself by hiding behind them, and has conducted its activities in view of this factor. The most up-to-date example of this is the Noah's Pudding (aşure) event held on October 8, 2017 by the Dialogue Society and Lighthouse Education Center with the support of St. Michael East Wickham Church. Another such event was the *iftar* (evening dinner during Ramadan) program organized on June 23, 2017 by the Dialogue Society, the Fellowship Educational Society, and the Amity Educational Foundation, attended by the U.K. Coptic Orthodox Church archbishop. Considering such up-to-date instances, it becomes clear that FETÖ has been endeavoring to establish close ties with the national and local religious institutions and their functionaries in the U.K. with an aim to open a space for itself in the country. Another noteworthy aspect of these examples is the fact that Muslim formations have not participated in such "pro-dialogue" activities by FETÖ.

Furthermore, the above establishments organized visits to Turkey on a regular basis until 2013 under the pretext of academic or cultural tours. As part of the tours, they invited British politicians, journalists, academics, and activists to Turkey and showed them FETÖ-owned education and media organizations in the country. The persons working at these establishments often met with members of the House of Lords and the House of Commons and contributed to FETÖ's lobbying activities by holding meetings at their offices.

There is also another critical strategy to increase FETÖ's lobbying activities across the U.K., maintain its presence in the country, and secure itself legally. A Master's student interviewed as part of this study stated that some FETÖ militants started marrying Muslim British citizens who are generally of Indian or Pakistani descent.

The Dialogue Society

Known as FETÖ's key organization in the U.K., the Dialogue Society was established in 1999 and since then has been actively operating in many cities including London. The foundation defines its objective as uniting communities through dialogue and enhancing social harmonization. It is stated on its official website that "[i]t was founded by British Muslims of Turkish background inspired by the teachings and example of Muslim scholar and peace advocate Fethullah Gülen."³⁶ The foundation also claims that it is not a religious or ethnic organization but rather stands for democracy, human rights, the non-instrumentalization of religion in politics, equality, and freedom of speech.³⁷ The organization lays emphasis on such liberal democratic values with an aim to create a positive public image for FETÖ in the U.K.

It is curious that in the list of recommended readings presented on the foundation's official website, Gülen is included in a list featuring important thinkers of the 20th century such as Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jürgen Habermas, Emanuel Levinas, and Seyyed Hossein Nasr. Although the website does not offer any explanation regarding the criteria used for this selection, Gülen's inclusion in such an eclectic list of people representing very different schools of thought reveals that the Dialogue Society is another FETÖ project.

The foundation also states that it has offices in Oxford, Northampton, Leicester, Hull, Durham, Leeds, Manchester, Birmingham, Bristol, Southampton, and Brighton, adding that its headquarters are located in London. However, a student interviewed as part of the report said that the Dialogue Society does not have any office or building in these cities. Their reference to these offices actually mean that a number of people adhering to FETÖ are conducting activities in these cities on behalf of the foundation. It is not possible for FETÖ to open offices in all these U.K. cities and have staff in every office since the organization does not have such financial and human capital.

In addition, as conveyed by the foundation's website, the university students who are in close contact with the Dialogue Society have established student societies at their colleges to engage in lobbying activities on behalf of the foundation and FETÖ. Such student groups are listed as follows: the Perspectives Society at

36. "About Us", Dialogue Society, <http://www.dialoguesociety.org/about-us.html>, (Accessed on September 27, 2017).

37. *Corporate Brochure 2013*, (London: Dialogue Society, 1999), p. 3.

De Montfort, Keele, Leicester, and Nottingham Universities; and the Intercultural Dialogue Society at Loughborough University.³⁸

The foundation's primary agenda is to funnel people who can serve FETÖ's objectives, such as politicians, academics, journalists, and businessmen, into the organization. To that end, the Dialogue Society has organized a variety of activities such as panels, conferences and tea parties along with arranging free of charge - or for a small fee - trips to Turkey to introduce FETÖ's activities in the country. To give an example, an Istanbul trip was organized in 2008 under the coordination of the foundation director Özcan Keleş. A number of academics and researchers having affinity with FETÖ joined the trip, during which they visited a group of FETÖ-affiliated institutions including the now-defunct *Zaman* newspaper, Bank Asya, Samanyolu TV, Kimse Yok Mu (Is Anybody There) Relief Foundation, GYV, and TUSKON business association.³⁹

As the foundation's activities are examined, it is seen that they have contacted or endeavored to contact the representatives of almost every social and political group possible. It becomes obvious from the foundation's activity reports that they have organized events with people from various political circles including Baron Mohamed Sheikh and Baron Frank Judd from the House of Lords; Labour Party MPs Peter Kyle and Bill Rammell; Labour Party Leader Jeremy Corbyn; Conservative Party MP Maria Miller; and Liberal Democrat MP Chris Huhne. The motivation underlying FETÖ's contacts with different political parties is to secure the organization's position by benefiting from the previously established contacts in the case of a possible change of government.

The fact that FETÖ established contacts with the representatives of almost all the political groups in the U.K., just like they have done in the other countries, shows clearly that FETÖ poses a serious threat to U.K. politics and society. Built on lies, religion-based deception and opportunism, FETÖ has been overtly employing the aforementioned methods in the U.K.

The Dialogue Society published several academic periodicals such as *Dialogue Papers*, *Dialogue Theories I-II*, and *Journal of Dialogue Studies* and sent them to academics free of charge. By publishing articles written by leading U.K. academics in these periodicals, the foundation made a serious contribution to the

38. "Campus", Dialogue Society, <http://www.dialoguesociety.org/campus-dialogue.html>, (Accessed on September 27, 2017).

39. "Welcome Pack", Dialogue Society, <http://www.dialoguesociety.org/publications/Academic-Retreat-Pack.pdf>, (Accessed on September 10, 2017).

FETÖ lobby. Among these publications, the study titled *Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement*, which was published by Leeds Metropolitan University in 2007, has an important role. This 756-page book was written following a conference series held between October 25 and 27, 2007 in London, which was hosted and supported by a number of noteworthy organizations including the House of Lords. The book is still an important reference guide in British academia on FETÖ's global works and philosophy. Given that the majority of the people contributing to the book are academics studying in Britain, it can be said that FETÖ had the chance to publish academic material for its promotion thanks to such publications. Also, every panelist attending the conference was paid €500 and all the participants' expenses were met, which shows that FETÖ has spared no expense to achieve its targets.⁴⁰

Along with these activities, the Dialogue Society and Keele University jointly presented an MA program to funnel more academics into FETÖ.⁴¹ (Appendix 10) Students from different regions of Turkey and the U.K. enrolled in this program. FETÖ disbursed non-refundable grants to the students in the program and employed the students who could academically contribute to the organization by providing them with financial support. In other words, this program functioned as a method to find qualified members for the organization.

One of the most significant lobbying activities of the Dialogue Society in the U.K. on behalf of FETÖ has been Leeds Metropolitan University's granting an honorary PhD to Gülen for his contributions to education, peace, and intercultural dialogue in 2010. (Appendix 7) As might be expected, the initiatives of the Dialogue Society were behind this honorary degree presented to Özcan Keleş on behalf of Gülen during an official ceremony.⁴² The degree is actually not a surprise given that a number of academics including Simon Robinson, a professor of Applied and Professional Ethics at the university who played a role in granting this title to Gülen, penned studies on Gülen while the FETÖ-affiliated establishments supported these studies in return.⁴³

Another important aspect pertinent to the Dialogue Society is the misinforming e-mails it sent on April 11, 2014 to many academics across the U.K. regarding

40. Jonathan Lacey, "The Gülen Movement in Ireland: Civil Society Engagements of a Turkish Religion-Cultural Movement", *Turkish Studies*, Issue: 10.2, (2009), p. 311.

41. "MA in Dialogue Studies", Keele University, <https://www.keele.ac.uk/spire/postgraduate/madialoguestudies>, (Accessed on September 27, 2017).

42. "Fethullah Gülen Awarded Honorary Doctorate by Leeds Metropolitan University", YouTube, March 31, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MmzCqM1ieQg>, (Accessed on September 28, 2017).

43. Göksu Kök, "Fahri Doktora'nın Sırrı Ne?", *Haber Sol*, July 18, 2010.

the developments in Turkey. The e-mails sent by the Dialogue Society's Bristol branch stated that the latest developments in Turkey were alarming and that the Hizmet movement was targeted by the Turkish state, adding that the e-mail was only sent to a small group close to the movement and the recipients should feel free to forward it to others as they wish.⁴⁴ (Appendix 11)

The Turkey Institute

The Turkey Institute is another FETÖ-affiliated lobbying organization operating under the guise of a research center in the U.K. Founded in January, 2014, the institute specified its main objective as issuing political analyses and reports on Turkey and conducted activities in line with this objective.⁴⁵ Some of the activities organized by the institute at the national parliament with an aim to contribute to the FETÖ lobby are as follows:⁴⁶

- In order to present a report titled “The Management of Religion in Turkey,” a panel was held at the U.K. Parliament on December 15, 2014 with the participation of Conservative Party Enfield MP Nick de Bois.
- On January 20, 2015, a panel titled “Current Situation of Turkey’s Judicial System” was held in the U.K. Parliament.
- On March 1, 2016, a panel titled “Turkey’s Relations with the Middle East and the West” was held at the House of Lords with the participation of Conservative Party member Baroness Morris.
- On July 8, 2016, a panel titled “Turkey’s Relations with the West: The Trajectory after Davutoglu” was held at the House of Commons with the participation of fugitive Gülenist journalist Kerim Balcı and Conservative Party politician Bill Park.
- On November 1, 2017, a panel titled “Where does Turkey belong to?” was hosted by the Labour Party MP Peter Kyle at the U.K. Parliament. Academics Tahir Abbas and Katerina Dalacoura were among the panel’s speakers.

The institute, which is officially chaired by İsmail Şen today, is actually represented by Kerim Balcı, who fled to London prior to the July 15 coup attempt. The following information provided by the institute’s official website proves its affiliation with FETÖ:

44. “Akademik Karalama”, *Yeni Şafak*, April 11, 2014.

45. Tayfun Salcı, “FETÖ’nün İngiltere Yapılanması”, *Anadolu Agency*, August 4, 2016.

46. “Events”, Turkey Institute, <https://www.turkeyinstitute.org.uk/events>, (Accessed on October 25, 2017).

Turkey Institute relies on private individual donations. All funding is accounted for responsibly. Currently, the benefactors include London-based business people with a Turkish background some of whom affiliated with the Hizmet movement.⁴⁷

Currently, the institute's only activity is publishing short blog posts or live videos against Turkey, the AK Party government, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.⁴⁸

Having focused on academic studies before Balcı took control, the Turkey Institute adopted a more provocative stance under Balcı's direction. Balcı is among the key actors of FETÖ's U.K.-based organizations and his remarks in a FETÖ-backed TV program on the night of the July 15 coup attempt are still fresh in Turkey's collective memory. When President Erdoğan asked people to take to the streets against the coup attempt, Balcı said the following words that led to public indignation:

If this statement is correct, then the President is being irresponsible [...] It is a fatal mistake to ask civilians to confront armed people [...] Tonight is not the right time for resistance [...] Our people do not know anything about standing against the G3 bullet or lying on the ground. Most of them have been exempted from military service by paying an exemption tax. [...] I am calling upon our people from here. The President is making a mistake by endangering the fate of society in order to protect his own fate. Under these circumstances, what he says is not binding at all. And I do not think that he is in a position to protect his mental faculties.⁴⁹

The fact that these remarks were uttered by a FETÖ-affiliated person in a FETÖ-owned TV channel during the first moments of the coup attempt constitutes a clear answer to the question who was behind the coup attempt. The Turkish public and citizens residing in Britain resent the fact that radical FETÖ militants such as Balcı can freely move in Britain and maintain their anti-Turkey propaganda. For example, after a panel held at the House of Commons by FETÖ-owned foundations, Turkish citizens approached Balcı and expressed their anger and resentment with remarks such as "Are you the one who was shocked when Erdoğan called people to take to the streets in the night of the coup?" or "You will have to live abroad for the rest of your life."⁵⁰

47. "About", Turkey Institute, <https://www.turkeyinstitute.org.uk/about/>, (Accessed on September 28, 2017).

48. For an example written by fugitive academic Mahmut Akpınar, see Mahmut Akpınar, "Erdoğan Radicalises Tariqas and Religious Communities", Turkey Institute, June 5, 2017, <https://www.turkeyinstitute.org.uk/commentary/erdogan-radicalises-tariqas-religious-communities/>, (Accessed on September 29, 2017).

49. For the interview, see "Darbe Gecesi Fetöcü Yazar Kerim Balcı'nın Koma Durumunun Devamı...", YouTube, August 5, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0kmFeBrwke8>, (Accessed on November 3, 2017).

50. "FETÖ Tetikçisi Kerim Balcı'ya Vatandaşlar Tepki Gösterdi", *Sabah*, November 2, 2017.

Furthermore, a demonstration was held in front of the Pakistan Embassy in London under the leadership of Balcı on October 17, 2017 to protest the arrest of the Kaçmaz family due to the family's links to FETÖ by Pakistani security units. Around 20 people wore masks and chanted slogans such as "Pakistan, stop cooperating with the dictator" and "Freedom to the Kaçmaz Family." After the protest, the group left a paper bearing a header of Turkey Institute's logo in front of the embassy, which stated that they condemned Pakistan due to the arrests. (Appendix 13) As the protest showed, the FETÖ proponents and militants in Britain are still active and endeavoring to affect the country's agenda.

The Center for Hizmet Studies

The Center for Hizmet Studies is another lobbying organization founded by FETÖ in the U.K. Although it was established in 2014, the center started operating in 2015 with a focus on sharing Gülen's works with the British public and engaging in FETÖ propaganda. Run by FETÖ-affiliated academic İsmail Mesut Sezgin since its establishment,⁵¹ the center particularly draws attention with its disinformation activities regarding the measures taken in Turkey following the July 15 coup attempt.⁵²

A 48-page report titled "A Hizmet Approach to Rooting Out Violent Extremism," which was co-written by the Dialogue Society director Özcan Keleş and Center for Hizmet Studies director İsmail Mesut Sezgin, was published by the center in 2015. This report is only one of the studies exemplifying the center's activities in favor of FETÖ. The report was presented at a panel hosted by Lord Bob Maclennan at the House of Lords on January, 2016 and sent to the organizations deemed to be important by FETÖ.

Speaking at the panel, Lord Maclennan showed his overt support of the report and the center by saying that the Hizmet movement was doing wonderful work in the face of severe radical threats.⁵³ Taking the floor after Maclennan, Sezgin stated that Gülen invites Muslims to reject violence and see Islam from a holistic view, whereas Keleş remarked that it is not possible for the ones pursuing Gülen's philosophy and the Hizmet movement's practices to lean towards terrorism or extremism. Curiously, the discourse of FETÖ's academic militants in the

51. The director of the Center İsmail Mesut Sezgin's link to FETÖ becomes even more obvious considering his PhD thesis titled *Theory of Moral Responsibility in the Writings of Fethullah Gülen*.

52. Salcı, "FETÖ'nün İngiltere Yapılanması".

53. "Hizmet Hareketinin Radikalizme Karşı Çözüm Önerilerini Bütün Dünya Duymalı", *Zaman Romanya*, January 25-31, 2016.

U.K. and the practices of FETÖ militants during the attempted coup, which was organized six months after the panel, are in stark contrast to each other. Also, with such “academic” studies, FETÖ has received the support of various politicians and obtained a chance to represent itself as a key agent in the fight against radical Islamist terrorist groups.

There is also another report titled “The Turbulence between AKP and Hizmet: The African

Case,” which was penned by Erkan Toğuşlu and published in early 2017. This report argues that FETÖ has conducted significant works in Africa for years and contributed to the Turkish government to a great extent. It also criticizes the transfer of FETÖ-owned schools to the state-run Maarif Foundation, contending that the schools will be allocated to the pro-AK Party Islamist associations in the long run and that “the Turkish government may use the schools for its own political aims and in ethnic and religious clashes, just as it used Turkish Airlines to ship weapons to an African state.”⁵⁴ On March 9, 2016, an event was held at the University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) to launch the book titled *Hizmet in Africa: The Activities and Significance of the Gulen Movement*, which was written in 2015 by David H. Shinn and examines FETÖ’s schools and activities in African countries.⁵⁵ In view of this, it can be argued that the lobbying organizations owned by FETÖ have been trying to influence decision-makers in London in order to prevent the shutdown of FETÖ-owned schools.

The London Center for Social Studies

The FETÖ-affiliated London Center for Social Studies (LCSS) represents itself as a think tank and a research center without making any reference to FETÖ and Gülen. However, as the page of the LCSS in the U.K. government portal named “Companies House” is viewed, the list of contributors includes key FETÖ operative Özcan Keleş and former ambassador Tuncay Babalı, who was removed from duty due to his links to FETÖ.⁵⁶

Founded in 2004 and known for the panels, conferences and summer schools it organizes, the LCSS has around 14,000 active followers on its Linke-

54. Erkan Toguslu, *The Turbulence between AKP and Hizmet: The African Case*, (London: Center for Hizmet Studies Report, 2017), pp. 18-23.

55. “Hizmet in Africa: The Activities and Significance of the Gulen Movement”, SOAS, <https://www.soas.ac.uk/cas/events/09mar2016-hizmet-in-africa-the-activities-and-significance-of-the-gulen-movement-.html>, (Accessed on September 30, 2017).

56. “Contributors”, LCSS, <http://socialstudies.org.uk/contributors>, (Accessed on September 30, 2017).

dIn profile.⁵⁷ One of the center's most prominent projects has been maintaining the "British Integration Programme" (BIP), which is scheduled to take place between March 2018 and April 2019.⁵⁸ It is suggested that the objective of the project is to enhance understanding of British values, culture, and history through a professionally developed non-formal curricula designed for displaced (i.e. asylum seekers, refugees, forced migrants) families and children, aged between 11 and 15. The project, which can be regarded as part of FETÖ's deception policy, is among FETÖ's activities to create a positive impression on the British government. FETÖ frequently resorts to such activities and projects to demonstrate that it has been integrated into society and does not pose a threat to social values.⁵⁹

The Business Network (BizNet)

Alongside the one organizations stated above, FETÖ has another lobbying organization in the U.K., namely Business Network (BizNet), which specifically addresses the business world. Founded in 2008, the primary objective of BizNet is to enable the aggregation of FETÖ-owned businesses and the businesses run by FETÖ members. Providing investment support services to FETÖ-affiliated businessmen seeking to make investments in the U.K., BizNet has also contributed to FETÖ's lobbying activities by working in close contact with TUSKON, an umbrella organization for FETÖ-linked businessmen in Turkey.

The events so far organized by BizNet include the "Turkey-U.K. Business Forum" held on April 19, 2012 at Church House Conference Center with the participation of 260 people; a round table meeting organized on September 2, 2013 in London with the participation of Liberal Democrat Party London MP Baroness Sarah Ludford; and another round table meeting organized three days after the latter with the participation of Conservative Party MP Syed Kamall.⁶⁰

57. "London Center for Social Studies", LinkedIn, <https://www.linkedin.com/company/london-centre-for-social-studies-lcss>, (Accessed on September 30, 2017).

58. "British Integration Programme", The Big Give, <https://secure.thebiggive.org.uk/projects/view/28254>, (Accessed on September 30, 2017).

59. A PhD student contacted for the purpose of this report who had previously attended some panels and conferences organized by FETÖ's lobby groups has stated the following: "FETÖ-affiliated organizations, especially lobby groups, operating here (in London) have always refrained from using any symbols that might link them directly to Turkey such as the Turkish flag or pictures of Atatürk. The reason for this is that they want to portray themselves as being fully integrated to the country they live in. Furthermore, you can't find any news regarding the terrorist organization PKK on any media platform run by FETÖ. Lastly, FETÖ never touches the Palestinian issue to avoid drawing any negative reactions from the Israeli lobby here, which has a very strong presence."

60. "1 to 11 Round Table Discussion with Dr. Syed Kamall...", Business Network, October 1, 2013.

It is stated on the official website of BizNet that the organization has 500 members and 15,000 active followers.⁶¹ Over the course of its active years, BizNet published a periodical titled *Business Network Magazine*. A total of 24 issues of the periodical were published.⁶² The third issue of the periodical, published for January-February 2010, features an interview with Adnan Azak, who is known to be a FETÖ “imam” formerly responsible for British operations. Also, the periodical indirectly contributed to FETÖ’s lobbying activities as it was sent to national and local administrative offices free of charge. Former London Mayor and incumbent Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson and former Minister of State for Europe Chris Bryant praised the periodical and the events of BizNet.⁶³

Lastly, it must be noted that the official websites of both BizNet and *Business Network Magazine* make a direct reference to Gülen.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL NETWORK

The social and cultural network of FETÖ in the U.K. is comprised of the Anatolian Muslims Society, Time to Help UK, the Mevlana Rumi Mosque & Dialogue Centre, and the *Işık Evleri* (Houses of Light) which are still active in almost every city in Britain. The organization also has a rather inactive charity founded in Glasgow, Scotland in 2004 named “The Nurture Educational and Multicultural Society.”⁶⁴ Along with these, there is also Koza Educational Association, which prior to its name change in 2010 was called Koza Women’s Association and intended to be a women-only organization since its foundation in 2004. Through these organizations, FETÖ has aimed to maintain active social communication and interaction among its members, along with establishing connections with locals for its public relations campaigns.

The fact that the three institutions named above all have “Fore Street No. 337” in London as their official address clearly reflects the financial problems the organization is currently undergoing. The building that is currently being used as the Mevlana Rumi Mosque & Dialogue Centre is officially owned by Time to Help


61. “Welcome to Business Network”, *Business Network*, <http://www.biznet-uk.org>, (Accessed on September 30, 2017).

62. For the issues of the periodical, see “Magazines”, *Business Network*, <http://www.bnmagazine.co.uk/magazines>, (Accessed on September 30, 2017).

63. “Our Work”, *Business Magazine*, <http://www.bnmagazine.co.uk/what-we-do>, (Accessed on September 30, 2017).

64. “Ramadan Dinner Event”, The Nurture Educational and Multicultural Society, <http://thenurture.org.uk>, (Accessed on September 30, 2017).

UK. This building was previously used as a library (E.U.D.C. Lending Library 1931) and a Hindu temple.⁶⁵ Currently, its first floor is being used as a mosque, library and cafeteria, the second floor contains administrative offices, and the third and uppermost floor serve as a guesthouse. Due to the financial problems FETÖ has been experiencing after the July 15 coup attempt this building is now being used to house several of its organizations. Considering that these organizations had their own individual offices and addresses previously, the situation reflects heavily on FETÖ's current financial situation and problems.



Another point that needs to be addressed regarding the organization's social and cultural network in the U.K. is the Sohbet Society founded in late 2016. This organization, which describes itself as being dedicated to helping British Muslims develop themselves regarding their faith and helping those who are curious about Islam, is a new attempt by FETÖ to counter the gradual decline of its operations across the country and combat the accusations from the British public that the organization is very opaque regarding its inner workings.

Upon inspecting the social media accounts and websites owned by FETÖ, we can see that some of the social activities run by the organization are reading

65. "Londra'da Mevlana Merkezi", *Risale Haber*, May 9, 2009.

camps, small outdoor trips, dinners where *maklube* is commonly served, religious mentoring services, and fundraisers where donations under the name of “himmet” are collected to ensure the continuation of FETÖ’s activities.⁶⁶ The website of Sohbet Society has a video from a previous “sohbet” as an example and even a “find your nearest sohbet” button for those who are interested and wish to participate. But interestingly, the only *sohbet* circle that is shown upon pressing this button is the one in the FETÖ-owned Mevlana Mosque in London. Another notable point is that the *sohbet* in the example video on the website is one facilitated by İsmail Mesut Sezgin, director of the Centre for Hizmet Studies. Sezgin’s appearance in the video on Sohbet Society’s webpage despite the fact that he is absent among the online list of members of FETÖ’s U.K. umbrella organization Voices in Britain is a testament to FETÖ’s attempts at obscuring its inner workings.

The Anatolian Muslims Society

The Anatolian Muslims Society was founded on December 24, 2004, registered as a charity on November 17, 2006, and operates in London.⁶⁷ FETÖ considers this organization very important and its trustees include important people such as Ömer Keleş, who is currently wanted by authorities in Turkey.⁶⁸

The charity is currently directed by British citizens Sadık Çınar and İlknur Kahraman⁶⁹ and its main mission is the coordination of FETÖ-affiliated organizations such as the Mevlana Rumi Mosque & Dialogue Centre, Time to Help UK, and other charities. This charity serves as an umbrella organization that oversees and coordinates FETÖ’s social and cultural activities in the U.K.

The Mevlana Rumi Mosque & Dialogue Centre

The Mevlana Rumi Mosque & Dialogue Centre, founded in 2006 and located in Edmonton Green in North London where the Turkish population is high, began its extensive operations in 2009 and ever since has been at the center of FETÖ’s social and cultural network in the United Kingdom. The mosque was founded by

66. “What We Do”, Sohbet Society, <http://www.sohbetsociety.org/what-we-do-2>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

67. “Anatolian Muslims Society”, Open Charities, <http://opencharities.org/charities/1116869>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

68. “Gülen’in Sağ Kolu Paraları Alıp Kaçmış”, *Akşam*, October 23, 2016.

69. Persons who have to date served as directors of the foundation and their nationalities: Ömer Faruk Akyol (Turkey), Ömer Keleş (U.K.), Ramazan Kepil (Turkey), Ali Demir (Turkey), Hidayet Erbil (U.K.), Ercan İçli (U.K.), Memik Sancı (U.K.), İsmail Uzun (Belgium), İlknur Kahraman (U.K.), and Sadık Çınar (U.K.). For more information, see “Anatolian Muslims Society”, BizDb, <http://www.bizdb.co.uk/company/anatolian-muslims-society-05321218>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

the Anatolian Muslims Society in the U.K. and its website openly states that its founders were “inspired by the teachings of Fethullah Gülen.”⁷⁰

This mosque and cultural center are both a place of worship where basic religious practices are observed and a social center that provides weekend classes for students along with education programs aimed at parents.⁷¹ The establishment, which regularly organizes exhibits of traditional Turkish clothing and cuisine, also hosts weekly talks where English translations of Gülen’s books are discussed. Similarly, the library used by both the mosque and the dialogue center contains many books of FETÖ leader Gülen translated into a variety of languages, given freely to anyone upon request. In this manner, the establishment contributes to the organization’s attempts to gain new members.

The official launch of the mosque and dialogue center in 2009, the year in which it began its extensive operations, was attended by Labour Party Enfield MPs Andy Love and Joan Ryan, Enfield Mayor Eleftherios Savva, Westminster Councillor Harvey Marshall, Liberal Democrat Councillor of Haringey Fiyaz Mughal, North London Enfield Borough Commander Adrian Hanstock, Head of Islamic Studies Foundation Research and Teaching Division Mary Betül El Thoma, members of the House of Lords Lord Ted Graham and Lord Hylton along with many academics and religious leaders.⁷²

Lastly, according to news published on the online news portal *SuperHaber*, three high-ranking officers from the Turkish military who are wanted by law enforcement authorities in Turkey for participating in the July 15 coup attempt are currently residing in this building.⁷³ According to a researcher who was contacted for this report, a building that is being used both as a mosque and a house in Galler Newport and another mosque in Glasgow, Scotland that was previously a church are also currently being used to hide fugitives. According to research by the Ankara Police Department Financial Crimes Division and MASAK, the building in Glasgow was bought by FETÖ’s previous “country imam” in the U.K., Adnan Azak with funds worth €438,000 illegally acquired from FETÖ-owned Bank Asya for Axis Educational Trust where Azak is the director.⁷⁴

70. “About Mevlana Rumi Mosque”, Mevlana Rumi Mosque, <http://www.rumimosque.uk/about-us>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

71. For a detailed study on the subject, see Yakup Çoştu, “Londra’da Türklere Ait Dini Organizasyonlar” (The Religious Organizations of the Turkish People in London), *Hitit University Theology Faculty Periodical*, Issue: 8.2, (2009), p. 97.

72. “Londra’da Mevlana Merkezi”.

73. “İşte FETÖ’nün Londra Üssü”, *SuperHaber*, June 22, 2017.

74. “FETÖ, Çekilen Krediyi Kılıfına Uydurmuş”, *Haber 7*, October 14, 2017.

Time to Help UK

Time to Help UK, which is the British extension of the Kimse Yok Mu (Is Anybody There) association that used to be active in many countries around the world, is the largest and most extensive humanitarian aid organization established by FETÖ in the U.K. Hence, *Zaman Britanya* reported the following news regarding the charity in its issue dated February 22, 2014:

Time to Help UK, the partner organization of Kimse Yok Mu in Europe, has begun its operations in Britain. The opening program of the charity held in London highlighted the projects the organization is planning to implement in the nation.⁷⁵

The charity's official website states that it is an officially registered charity (No. 1160467) established in London and its main mission is to build a more prosperous and peaceful world.⁷⁶ The website also openly states that the association was founded by "volunteers inspired by the teachings of Fethullah Gülen."

The charity, which regularly organized dinners and claimed to have used the generated income to help people and institutions in need, partnered with other U.K. charities such as the Apostolic Christian Church Sheepfold, the British Red Cross, and the Kensington & Chelsea Foundation for some of its projects. FETÖ intended to increase its visibility and garner positive public perception in the country by working with well-known charities through such partnerships.

Occasionally updating its website and social media accounts with news regarding its operations, the charity currently remains active in London. The activity that so far has provided the most obvious proof that the charity is linked to FETÖ and helps finance its members has been its project titled "Grant for the Victims of the Emergency State in Turkey" started on June 12, 2017. This campaign is known to have received £4,000 in donations from 66 people as of September 19, 2017.⁷⁷

Time to Help UK, which is currently led by Gülistan Arslan, started several projects in 2017, among which are the projects for Rohingya Muslims, the victims of the Manchester attack, and victims of the Grenfell tower fire. It is noteworthy that these projects have all been launched from different addresses.

75. "İngiltere'de Time to Help", *Zaman Britanya*, February 22, 2014.

76. "About Us", Time to Help UK, <http://www.timetohelp.org.uk/about>, (Accessed on September 25, 2017).

77. For the campaign, see "Help State of Emergency Victims in Turkey", *Time to Help UK*, <http://www.timetohelp.org.uk/helpvictiminturkey>, (Accessed on September 25, 2017).

Işık Evleri (Houses of Light)

It is well known that the “houses of *hizmet* (light)” have been the most effective tool used by FETÖ to deepen the relationships between existing members and to recruit new ones. A student who was contacted for this work and who stayed in these houses before having to leave in 2013 due to his disagreements with the organization stated that the organization currently has student houses in the following cities: London, Manchester, Bristol, Cardiff, Durham, Leicester, Leeds, Newcastle, Newport, Northampton, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Kent, Hull, Birmingham, Keele, Oxford, Brighton, Basingstoke, Reading, and Cambridge. The number of these houses, where undergraduate, graduate and doctoral students who left Turkey to study in the U.K. live, is known to have steadily decreased in the period between the 2013 judicial coup attempt and the July 15 coup attempt, and increased in the following period due to the number of FETÖ members who left Turkey for Britain to escape the law.

Discussions are still regularly held in these houses, mostly regarding the current situation of the organization and projections of its future. Attendants of such discussions are continually told that the organization will once again gain its former glory. The sermons of FETÖ leader Gülen are also discussed along with plans for the organization’s future activities in the U.K. When these discussions are finished, the attendants are expected to make a donation called “*himmet*” – the donated amount can be large or small. These donations form an important part of FETÖ’s funding in all countries it operates, and due to these donations, most students staying in such houses have left and FETÖ militants who left Turkey for Britain to evade the law now occupy their positions there. As a result, these houses run by the organization have now been completely turned into “cell houses” and have become dwellings for FETÖ fugitives. The previously mentioned student also stated that those who left these houses prior to the July 15 coup attempt were completely cut off from FETÖ social circles, had their scholarships taken away, were bullied on social media, and reported to local authorities if any grounds for such a report existed.

Prior to the July 15 coup attempt, people who were not members of the organization but were curious about it, whether Muslims or not, were also invited to these houses and given English translations of FETÖ leader Gülen’s books for free. But following the coup attempt, such promotional activities have stopped as the houses have become dwellings for FETÖ fugitives and the organization does not want to reveal the identities of such people to those not affiliated with the organization.⁷⁸


78. For a study on *sohbet* activities, see Muhammed Ahmed, “Change Through *Sohbet*: Agency and Selfhood in the Gülen Movement”, *UCL Anthropology Working Papers Series*, Issue: 16, (2014).

PRESS AND MEDIA NETWORK

The press and media activities of FETÖ in the U.K. can be divided into three main categories: *Zaman Britain* (*Zaman Britanya*), connections with national media, and social media. The first and most important of these categories is the London-based *Zaman Britanya* which operated as FETÖ's main media organization in the country and was used to coordinate the entirety of their press and media activities in the U.K. *Zaman Britanya*, which was the organization's first professional attempt at establishing media operations in the U.K., began its active period in 2010 and shut down after the July 15 coup attempt. In the following period, FETÖ failed to establish another media organization due to the skeptical attitude adopted by the British government towards the organization.

Zaman Britanya made considerable contributions to FETÖ's lobbying activities by establishing connections with local and national media in the U.K. Again through *Zaman Britanya*, journalists employed by the organization were easily accredited to events organized by international institutions. After the newspaper stopped its operations, members of the organizations turned to online platforms such as YouTube and Twitter and began using them more actively.

DIAGRAM 3. FETÖ'S MEDIA AND PRESS TOOLS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM



Zaman Britanya

According to the information shared on the LinkedIn platform, *Zaman Britanya* began its publishing operations in 2010 under the name of Cosmos Media Ltd. with a long-term operation policy of publishing 20 pages in Turkish and 20 pages in English. Although the website cites the number of *Zaman Britanya* employees as being between the wide range of 11 and 50, this number is known to have slowly declined after the December 2013 judicial coup attempt, followed by the complete shutdown of press operations after a short period of

time following the July 15 coup attempt on February 7, 2017.⁷⁹ Thus, the latest content on the newspaper's official webpage is a quote from a news article from July 27, 2016.

The purpose of *Zaman Britanya*, which prior to its shutdown had been at the center of FETÖ's press and media network in London and the U.K., was to motivate members of the organization throughout the country, produce propaganda aimed at recruiting new members, convince those who were skeptical of the organization, and gain public sympathy. Yet, despite all its efforts, the organization failed to appeal to the British public due to their secular nature and fell short of its initial goals regarding the recruitment of local members to the organization. Another reason for its failure is the highly important and effective role played by news organizations such as the BBC, *The Guardian*, *The Independent* and *The Times* in the British public consciousness. Lastly, half of the followers on the newspaper's Twitter account, which used "www.zamanonline.co.uk" as its official website throughout its active publication period, have been revealed upon inspection to be empty or fake accounts.

Two distinct periods can be identified regarding the newspaper's publishing life: firstly, a pro-AK Party and pro-Turkey period from 2010 to 2013 until the violent Gezi Park Protests, followed by a slow increase in content critical of the government beginning in May 2013, the beginning date of the protests, and a 180-degree turn after the December 2013 judicial coup attempt, at which point the newspaper adopted a completely anti-Turkey, anti-Erdoğan and anti-AK Party press policy that aimed to manipulate the British public.

On May 2014, during a part of his official visit, then-Turkey Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek spoke at a panel held in the *Financial Times* building titled "Investing in Turkey" organized by the Investment, Support and Promotion Agency of Turkey (ISPAT) and *FDI Magazine*. During this event, *Zaman Britanya* representative Kadir Uysaloğlu declared on his social media accounts that he was thrown out of the building on Minister Şimşek's orders even though the records reveal that he was neither invited to the panel nor registered to attend beforehand. Even though the nature of this event was clear, *FDI Magazine* had to make an announcement (Appendix 12)⁸⁰ to clear all doubt that Uysaloğlu's claims did not reflect the truth and that they only granted access to preregistered attendees to

79. "FETÖ Avrupada Gizleniyor! Zaman Silindi, Kanttekening Oldu...", *Milliyet*, May 11, 2017.

80. "Zamandan Yine Yalan Haber", *Yeni Şafak*, May 31, 2014.

ensure the security of their guests after a parliamentary question by the Republican People's Party (CHP) deputy Sezgin Tanrıku.⁸¹ With this event, the tendency of FETÖ to lie and make false accusations whenever they deemed beneficial and regardless of their location was revealed for the first time to the British public in a very striking manner.

Zaman Britanya was sent free of charge to national and local politicians and administrators to facilitate lobbying activities. Due to a lack of widely available regular publications in Britain regarding Turkey, *Zaman Britanya* managed to become an effective monopoly in this area. But after 2013, this monopoly was destroyed following the increased activity of government agencies such as Anadolu Agency and TRT in London and following the July 15 coup attempt FETÖ media and its influence has for the most part been eliminated.

Furthermore, *Zaman Britanya* organized some of the protests against Erdoğan and the AK Party after the 2013 judicial coup attempt in London. The one that received the most attention was the silent protest organized by the representative of the newspaper Kadir Uysaloğlu in front of the Prime Ministry's building in London on December 23, 2014.⁸² However, very few people attended this protest and its effect on national and local media networks in Britain also remained very limited.

Lastly, *Zaman Britanya*, along with being a propaganda tool for FETÖ, also contributed to the organization's financing during its active period. The contributions came from annual subscriptions that cost £130 for 52 issues,⁸³ along with daily sales and ad revenue. Yet, the number of subscribers fell rapidly each day after the 2013 judicial coup attempt and by 2016 effectively dropped to zero.

Relationships with British Press

FETÖ was partially capable of influencing British public opinion through *Zaman Britanya* and considered it very important to maintain contact with the British mainstream media networks that directly affect the nation's politics and are viewed daily by millions. Among these networks, the organization put special focus and emphasis on the British Broadcasting Corporation

81. "9 Temmuz 2014, 26672 Numaralı Soru Önergesi" (Parliamentary Question No: 26672, dated July 9, 2014), The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, July 9, 2014, <http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/7/7-48079s.pdf>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

82. "Londrada Sessiz Protesto", *Olay*, December 23, 2014.

83. "Subscribe Online Today!", *Zaman UK*, <http://www.zamanonline.co.uk/subscribe.html>, (Accessed on September 25, 2017).

(BBC). Due to the wide network and audience base the BBC maintains not only in the United Kingdom but throughout the world, FETÖ made considerable efforts to build close relationships with the network's authorities and occasionally reaped the rewards of these efforts. Thus, when Gülen, who first spoke on TV in 1997 on Turkish TV channel Kanal D, decided to speak on TV again after 16 years,⁸⁴ he conveyed his messages through the BBC rather than any Turkish network.

This interview, which took place in January 2014 in Gülen's house in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania touched on a variety of high-interest subjects regarding the organization and its recent developments. Gülen, who during the course of this interview had his blood pressure measured over his coat, attempted to obscure the real purpose of the judicial coup attempt of December 2013 by claiming that the real discussion in Turkey is about corruption which the government is trying to cover up. He also claimed that he has always been an advocate of democracy. Finally, he emphasized that he has no relation to the then ongoing process against the government, has no links to Israel, and supports the reconciliation process and dialogue with the Alevis.

The main reason FETÖ chose the BBC for this interview, which was organized by the efforts of *Zaman Britanya* representative Kadir Uysaloğlu and the director of the Dialogue Society Özcan Keleş, is the BBC's aforementioned worldwide audience base, which consists of people from all social strata. Another interview with FETÖ members conducted by the media corporation was that between BBC Turkish and FETÖ prosecutor Zekeriya Öz in January 2014.

The close attention the BBC paid to FETÖ continued after the July 15 coup attempt. For example, Director of Dialogue Society Özcan Keleş along with Gauri van Gulik from Amnesty International and fugitive Bülent Mumay joined the BBC live to argue that FETÖ had nothing to do with the coup attempt on July 16, 2016, just one day after the coup attempt.⁸⁵ At a later date, Keleş and İsmail Mesut Sezgin, the director of the Center for Hizmet Studies, joined the BBC program *Hard Talk*, presented by Zeinab Badawi, in August 2017, to argue that

84. "Fetullah Gülen'den 16 yıl Sonra İlk Televizyon Röportajı", *Hürriyet*, January 27, 2014.

85. For the program, see "Victoria Derbyshire on Post-Coup Turkey and Implications for UK Communities", YouTube, July 26, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PfOgHmDjYF4>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017). On September 9, 2016, Özcan Keleş wrote a lengthy article arguing that FETÖ was not behind the July 15 coup attempt. For the article, see Özcan Keleş, "Questions We Dare Not Ask: Gülen and the Coup", <https://www.hizmetstudies.org/commentary/questions-we-dare-not-ask-gulen-and-the-coup>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

FETÖ was not behind the coup attempt.⁸⁶ Along with these, a short documentary on a FETÖ-owned school in Kenya's capital Nairobi was produced by BBC Turkish and aired in September 2016.⁸⁷

Just like the BBC, media networks that represent the liberal wing of British politics such as *The Guardian* and *The Financial Times* also publish content that is favorable to FETÖ and contain anti-Turkish sentiment, especially regarding Erdoğan. These newspapers that use titles with positive connotations such as “Leader of the Hizmet Movement” and “Islamic scholar” to describe Gülen were among the media organizations invited by Gülen to his Pennsylvania compound following the coup attempt in an effort to divert the blame from himself and his organization by using international media connections. In another effort to pander to Western audiences, Gülen bought an ad in *The Guardian* in September 8, 2014 that condemned DAESH attacks and described the latter as an “Islamic scholar, preacher and social advocate.”⁸⁸

Unlike these two newspapers and the BBC, the conservative *Times*, which is one of the few British media organizations that is skeptical regarding FETÖ, revealed their position in August 2016 via a report on a scandal they uncovered. According to an article by Hannah Lucinda Smith, who is the Turkey correspondent of the newspaper, GYV, which is one of FETÖ's institutional fronts, paid £115,994 to Conservative Party MP Sir Edward Garnier to publish a report tailored to their interests.⁸⁹ This 95-page report titled “A Report on the Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights in Turkey since December 2013,” which was finalized in July 2015, reveals upon close inspection to be openly anti-Turkish and pro-FETÖ.⁹⁰

Aside from these, the visibility of the organization in the British press has decreased since 2017. For example, some newspapers that previously published news on Gülen almost on a daily basis, did not mention Gülen's mes-

86. For the interview, see “BBC HARDtalk Ismail Sezgin Director, Centre for Hizmet Studies”, YouTube, August 14, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lga89dtl6pU>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

87. For the documentary, see “BBC Dünya Servisi, Gülen Okullarının İzini Sürdü: Nairobi'deki Bir Gülen Okulu”, YouTube, September 23, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WVZy0C8ue_g, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

88. Mustafa Köker, “Fethullah Gülen, İŞİD'i Avrupa Gazetelerinde Kinadı”, *Eurovizyon*, October 9, 2014.

89. Hannah Lucinda Smith, “MP Paid by Group Linked with Turkey Coup”, *The Times*, August 2016.

90. For the report, see Lord Woolf, Jeffrey Jowell, Edward Garnier and Sarah Palin, “A Report on the Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights in Turkey since December 2013”, One Brick Court, (June 2015), http://www.onebrickcourt.com/files/REPORT_ON_THE_RULE_OF_LAW_FINAL_FINAL_240815_27622.pdf, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

sage condemning DAESH.⁹¹ Meanwhile, Gülen made a special announcement regarding the DAESH terrorist attack in Manchester on May 22, 2017 that killed 22 people and wounded 59 via the Alliance of Shared Values, a FETÖ lobby group.

Social Media Presence: YouTube and Twitter

After the shutdown of *Zaman Britanya* following the July 15 coup attempt, FETÖ members began using social media platforms more actively. In other terms, after the newspaper stopped its operations, the members of the organization began to continue its mission online by either acting on a personal basis or within small groups. With this intention, FETÖ members share and propagate highly similar content online, especially on the video-sharing portal YouTube and social media website Twitter - each used by millions of people every day.

For example, despite joining YouTube on September 9, 2013, Hizmet Studies Director İsmail Mesut Sezgin uploaded his first video to the platform on July 20, 2017, one year after the coup attempt on July 15, 2016. In this video, he argues that FETÖ and its members are not behind the coup attempt and provides weak arguments to prove his case.⁹² Some of his arguments are that Gülen, FETÖ's leader, is and has always been an advocate of democracy and that the secular and Kemalist factions that still control the military would not allow such a coup attempt by FETÖ, which is an organization built on religious values. Curiously, despite coming up with a multitude of weak arguments throughout this video to prove that FETÖ is not behind the coup attempt, Sezgin claims in his other videos that the coup was orchestrated by Erdoğan without attempting to provide any solid evidence.

Many videos uploaded by İsmail Mesut Sezgin after this date argue that FETÖ was not behind the coup attempt and some of them feature other FETÖ members such as İhsan Yılmaz, who used to be a professor at Fatih University; Mahmut Akpınar, who was known as the organization's "imam of domestic affairs"; and Kerim Balcı, who criticized President Erdoğan on live TV for his call to the people to take to the streets on the night of the coup attempt.

91. "Fethullah Gulen's Statement of Condemnation on the Bombing in Manchester, UK", Alliance for Shared Values, <http://afsv.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Fethullah-Gulen's-Statement-of-Condemnation-on-the-Bombing-in-Manchester-UK.pdf>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

92. "Was Gulen Behind the Coup Attempt in Turkey?", YouTube, July 20, 2016, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VIsErcnaDD0>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

Two social media accounts currently actively used by the organization are the channels titled “Süzgeç” and “Videon-V10” on YouTube. These YouTube channels were created on August 19, 2017 and feature Hizmet Studies Director İsmail Mesut Sezgin and other FETÖ militants such as Kerim Balcı, Emine Eroğlu, and Erkam Tufan Aytav who are currently wanted by law enforcement agencies in Turkey. One can easily conclude upon studying these videos that they are intended to demonize the current AK Party government in Turkey and President Erdoğan by influencing public perception. Furthermore, on September 3, 2017, the official account of the Turkey Institute on Twitter shared a series of posts titled “UK Cannot Ignore Human Rights Breaches in Turkey.” However, these posts failed to mention any numbers regarding the civilian or military casualties that occurred on the night of the coup attempt.

Another social media platform heavily used by the FETÖ militants in the U.K. is Twitter. A general study of tweets by fugitive FETÖ members such as Kerim Balcı, Özcan Keleş, İsmail Mesut Sezgin, Mahmut Akpınar, Tarık Toros, Erkam Tufan Aytav, and Akın İpek allows one to easily conclude that these tweets heavily emphasize anti-Turkish and anti-Erdogan sentiments.

Lastly, many videos shared on both official pages of London-based FETÖ lobby groups and individual pages of militants working for the organization were summarily deleted following the July 15 coup attempt. Some of the links to these deleted videos can still be found on pro-FETÖ Twitter accounts; yet clicking on them reveals that they have been removed from YouTube. It is obvious that the organization felt anxious regarding the contents and connotations of these videos following the defeated coup, considering that they were uploaded and removed by the same people.

We can conclude in a final evaluation of FETÖ's media and press network in the U.K. that the organization used *Zaman Britanya* for the main portion of its activities between 2010 and 2016, and following the coup attempt of 2016, shifted its focus to social media such as YouTube and Twitter. While many of the FETÖ militants mentioned above have had their Twitter accounts blocked in Turkey, their YouTube accounts are available and can readily be viewed. Along with this, many militants continue to maintain close contact with leading British media organizations such as the BBC and *The Guardian*, as they have done since the beginning of FETÖ's activities in the U.K.

EDUCATIONAL NETWORK

FETÖ used educational institutions as an important tool in the U.K., as it did in other countries. There are three main factors behind this: Firstly, these educational activities were intended to bolster the organization's public image in the country as an NGO dedicated to providing high quality education, which would then open the doors to new strategies. Secondly, the organization intended to increase its income flow via the tuition fees received from students enrolled in its schools and the monetary support received from international and local institutions given to them on the basis of being educational institutions.

The third main reason for the organization's emphasis on educational institutions is the recruitment of the students enrolled in their schools from an early age so that they can be fully incorporated into the organization and become effective and useful contributors later on. Related to this, FETÖ also maintains close relations with the parents of students enrolled in their schools to improve the visibility of the organization. Providing tuition-free education to successful students as well as scholarships, and free room and board initially created high demand for the organization's schools. But the number of students enrolled in these schools has halved after the July 15 coup attempt and the public exposure of the organization's criminal side that ensued.

The Axis Educational Trust, founded in 1994, is the first and most important educational institution established by the organization in the U.K.⁹³ The institution enables coordination between FETÖ-affiliated primary and middle schools as well as language schools and tuition centers across the country. Its first director was Adnan Azak who has also been the "country imam" since the organization's first days in the U.K. After Azak's links to FETÖ were revealed in Turkish media, Azak left the position of director to Can Önal and the position of "country imam" to İsmail Nazlı.

When directors and teachers employed in FETÖ-affiliated educational institutions are asked about their links to Fethullah Gülen and FETÖ, they typically assert that their institutions are wholly independent, but it is possible for some individuals they employ to feel sympathy for Gülen. Despite this, most of the educational institutions affiliated to the organization openly declare that they are inspired by Gülen's teachings.

93. Fatih Tedik, "The Gülen Movement's Initiatives in Britain", Gülen Movement, <http://www.gulenmovement.com/gulen-movements-initiatives-britain.html>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

Some examples are as follows:

- From the official website of Axis Educational Trust:

Axis Educational Trust was set up by parents and teachers inspired by Fethullah Gülen's teachings that emphasize the importance of providing comprehensive and inclusive education for all children to help them achieve their full potential and take part in society.

- Description of Lighthouse Educational Society:

Lighthouse Educational Society derives its source of inspiration and motivation for its work from the teachings of Turkish Muslim scholar Fethullah Gülen. Gülen's philosophy is based on a triad of non-denominational education, dialogue and peaceful coexistence, whilst encouraging individuals to be proactive citizens within their communities.

- From the official website of Mentor Wise:

Mentor Wise is an organization whose commitment to support others through mentoring is inspired by Fethullah Gülen's teachings on social responsibility, which promotes mutual respect, empathic acceptance of the other and proactive citizenship. Fethullah Gülen is a Muslim scholar of Turkish background.

- From the official website of Fellowship Educational Society:

Fellowship Educational Society was established in 2006 by Turkish Speaking Businessman and academics resident in Southern UK who are inspired by the teachings of Muslim scholar and peace advocate Fethullah Gülen.

- From the official website of Amity Educational Foundation:

Amity Educational Foundation was set up by parents and teachers who are inspired by the teachings of Muslim scholar and peace advocate Fethullah Gülen.

FETÖ, after beginning to spin its web of educational institutions in the U.K. in 1994, began its active operations in 1999 by operating study centers described as weekend schools and in a short time increased the number of such institutions. Shortly afterwards Wisdom Primary and Secondary School, belonging to the foundation, became the first Turkish school compliant with the English curriculum in the U.K.⁹⁴ The educational institutions that are currently active in the U.K. and are operated by FETÖ are described below. (Table 2)

94. "Londra'da İlk Türk Okulu Açıldı", *Haber 7*, September 23, 2006.

TABLE 2: EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS RUN BY FETÖ IN THE UNITED KINGDOM*		
Institution Name	Description	Website
Axis Tuition Center (Saturday, Supplementary and Weekend Schools)	The institution previously operated in 40 different locations and had more than 1,000 students. Now, it only has offices in Birmingham, Chatnam, Croydon, Hendon, North Finchley, Ponders End, Walthamstow, and Welling. The institution operates as a tuition center and charges 8-22 pounds per hour.	tuitioncentres.org
Lighthouse Educational Society	Based in London and has four offices.	lhedu.org.uk
Amity Educational Foundation	Operates in East London.	amityeducation.org.uk
Koza Educational Society	One of its founders is Akın İpek. Lately, it has been incorporating the organization's other educational activities.	localgiving.org/charity/kozaedu
Wisdom Primary and Secondary School	The school has been operating as part of Axis Tuition Center since 2006, but recently changed its name to "North London Grammar School." Provides education in Turkish, English and Spanish and charges 6,000 pounds annually in tuition fees.	northlondongrammar.com
Oxford Vision	London-based international education agency opened by Adnan Azak, head of FETÖ's U.K. organization. Officially named "Niagare Education Ltd.**	oxfordvision.com
Fellowship Educational Society	Tuition center operating offices in five cities across the U.K., namely Kent, Brighton, Bristol, Basingstoke, and Reading. Operated under the name of "Fellowship Dialogue Society" between 2006 and 2011. Organized an iftar gathering with the Dialogue Society charity on June 18, 2017, which was attended by Lord Peter Field. Started a political panel series on the Brexit process in September 2017 with the Dialogue Society Charity despite being an educational institution.	fellowshippeducation.org.uk
Spring Educational Society	Operates in Birmingham and Leicester.	springeducation.org.uk
Mentor Wise	London-based education consultancy company.	mentorwise.org.uk
Summit Education Society	Education consultancy company based in Hull. It was founded in 2004 and began operations in 2005. It operated under the name "Hull Anatolian Society" from 2005 to 2013, "Anatolian Society" from 2013 to 2016, and "Summit Education Society" from 2016 to 2017.***	summiteducation.org.uk
Coral College for Girls	The all-girls school recently shut down. It operated in Bradford where many Pakistani Muslims live.	Mevcut değil
Kingston Nursery	Nursery operating in the city of Hull which has the biggest population of FETÖ members in the U.K. following London.****	kingstonnursery.org

* The information on the institutions described in this table is compiled from Anadolu Agency's report titled "FETÖ'nün İngiltere Yapılanması" (FETÖ's U.K. Structuring) and the website Voices in Britain, which is FETÖ's umbrella organization in the U.K. The "Companies House" portal run by the British government was used to check their current activity statuses.

**"Oxford Vision Eğitim Danışmanlığı Gelişiyor", Eurovizyon, March 16, 2013.

*** "Summit Education Society Ltd.", Companies House, <https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/05494709>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

**** The official Twitter account of this nursery follows the following Twitter users: Dialogue Society, Time to Help Charity, Centre for Hizmet Studies, Özcan Keleş, and İsmail Murat Sezgin.

These schools were financed by “merchant brothers” and “trustee businessmen” from Turkey in their foundation stages and as they became self-sufficient and began to generate income, their profits were directed to the organization’s other activities. However, the number of FETÖ-affiliated primary and middle schools is steadily declining. The main reason for this is the local public’s loss of trust in these schools following the July 15 coup attempt and the subsequent process.

In addition to this, FETÖ lately has begun to shift its focus from such schools to tuition centers and language schools, opening more of these across the country, especially in London and Manchester. FETÖ teachers currently wanted in Turkey are employed in these schools to provide them jobs and residence permits.

FETÖ-owned schools also enabled the organization to build relationships with politicians. For example, according to information relayed by Necip Hablemitoğlu, who wrote one of the first books critical of FETÖ, Gülen and his movement were given an award for their outstanding service to the United Kingdom and English culture by Lord Nazir Ahmed, member of the British House of Lords, due to providing English education in the schools run by the organization across the world.⁹⁵ During the award ceremony in London, Lord Ahmed praised FETÖ’s schools and declared that they had “more than 500 schools in more than 50 countries.”⁹⁶ Lord Ahmed also congratulated these schools operated by Gülen’s followers for their contributions to world peace in an award ceremony held in the House of Lords organized by the Dialogue Society Foundation, FETÖ’s main lobbying agency in the U.K., on March 16, 2000.⁹⁷ A similar remark regarding this subject was made by the ambassador of Kazakhstan to the U.K. in September 1995:

We wish to express the gratitude of the English people to you (Dialogue Society Foundation)...” and thank you for the contributions you have made to English culture through opening these schools.⁹⁸

95. Necip Hablemitoğlu, *Köstebek*, (Istanbul: Pozitif Publishing, 2017), p. 3.

96. Ergün Diler, “Gülen’in Yol Arkadaşı”, *Takvim*, May 23, 2014.

97. “House of Lords Dinner and Award Ceremony”, Dialogue Society, <http://www.dialoguesociety.org/community-engagement/100-house-of-lords-dinner-and-award-ceremony.html#.WcOw1bIjGM8>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

98. The interview was originally published in October 1995 issue of *Yeni Hayat* magazine. Quoted in Yusuf Taha, “Fethullah’ın Sözde Türk, Gerçekte CIA Okulları”, Turkish News, <http://www.turkishnews.com/tr/content/2008/07/11/fethullah-in-soz-de-turk-gercekte-cia-okullari>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

FETÖ'S SOURCES OF INCOME IN THE U.K.

FETÖ's leading sources of income in the United Kingdom are profits made through businesses run by the organization along with donations collected from members of the organization and from the public through campaigns or under the name of *zakat*, *zakat al-fitr* and *Eid al-Adha* donations. Aside from these, the organization also makes money through frequently held charity sales, book sales, and through local organizations.⁹⁹

FETÖ maintains funds worth £100 million in the United Kingdom, 60 million of which can be attributed to two companies alone:¹⁰⁰ Koza Ltd., which offers gold mining services, and Ipek Investment Ltd., an investment management company. Both were established and are run by fugitive Akin İpek, who resides in London, and his relatives. The rest of the funds are made available through the aforementioned sources of income. Akin İpek, who is one of FETÖ's biggest funders in the U.K., made a board decision on March 31, 2014 that £60 million would be transferred to Koza Ltd. established by him in London on March 24, 2014. This decision came just one day after the Turkish local elections held on March 30. However, British courts found it fraudulent that Akin İpek would be

99. The official Twitter account of Time to Help UK, which belongs to the organization, posted on January 10, 2016 that it received a donation from Grimsby Cultural Centre to support the repairs of the Mama Fauiza orphanage. See Time to Help UK, Twitter, January 10, 2016, <https://twitter.com/TIMETOHELPUK/status/686158083748413440>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

100. "Mr. Hamdi Akin İpek", Company Check, <https://companycheck.co.uk/director/918621302/MR-HAM-DIAKIN-IPEK/summary>, (Accessed on September 26, 2017).

able to gain control of a company worth £60 million through a capital contribution of merely two pounds and decided to apply a freezing order to Koza Ltd. This court decision forbid Koza Ltd. from dealing with any available funds either owned or managed by the company. The reasonable decision by the court noted that the evidence provided by Akin İpek, who tried to deceive British authorities by fraudulent conveyance, was insufficient, the transfer could not be considered a valid investment, and that the authenticity of the contract was highly suspect, concluding that the nature of the transaction was illegal.¹⁰¹

On May 23, Akin İpek was taken to court with regard to Turkey's extradition request. The Royal Court released Akin İpek in the first trial with bail amounting to 50,000 pounds, and it ruled that his passport should be confiscated so that he could not escape abroad, forbade overnight accommodation outside his house, and required that he should keep his mobile phone on 24 hours a day. It was also announced that he will be brought to court again in September and the court will decide whether to extradite him to Turkey.

Until the judicial coup attempt of December 2013, FETÖ's U.K.-based operations were heavily supported by the organization's Turkey-based operations; for example, the weekly London-based newspaper *Zaman Britanya*, which was a considerable source of profit for the organization. FETÖ, as is typical of an illegal organization, is also known to have other secret sources of income, but their existence has not yet objectively proven.

BUSINESSES

Businesses owned by FETÖ and its members must be mentioned first among the organization's income-generating mechanisms in the U.K. FETÖ owns and manages many businesses operating in the service and manufacturing sectors such as schools, study centers, language schools, and charities. These are not officially and openly linked to the organization in order to obscure their support. It was also reported by a journalist who was contacted in London on August 2017 that the financially robust members of the organization who left Turkey for the U.K. to evade the law were starting up local businesses such as real estate agencies, taxi companies, restaurants, and small grocery stores. These businesses that are affiliated with the organization are coordinated via BizNet, the Professionals Network (Pronet), and the Business Network Design Group, and have established links with other businesses unrelated to FETÖ in their own sectors.

101. "İngiltere'nin İpek Kararı: Yatırım Yok, Hile Var", *Sabah*, December 22, 2017.

Yet, educational institutions such as primary schools, middle schools, study centers and language schools are the organization's main sources of income in the United Kingdom. The annual tuition fees of these primary and middle schools vary between £5,000 and £8,000; the study centers charge students between £8 to £22 per hour; and the language schools cost between £500 and £750 per course. Combining all of these we can estimate that the organization now roughly has £4 million available through these institutions. The amount gets close to £5 million when we also consider the monetary support and donations received from international and local administrations. This potential for high profit is the main reason for FETÖ's heavy investment in the education sector.

Lastly, *Zaman Britanya*, which was a public propaganda tool employed by FETÖ between 2010 and 2016, was a partial source of income for the organization until the July 15 coup attempt. The weekly newspaper, which charged £130 for an annual subscription of 52 issues, supplied revenue to the organization via advertisement revenue and daily sales. However, the number of subscribers fell rapidly after the judicial coup attempt of December 2013 and practically dropped to zero in 2016.

ZAKAT, ZAKAT AL-FITR, EID AL-ADHA AND OTHER DONATIONS

One of FETÖ's main sources of income in the U.K., as in other countries, is donations collected from the organization's members under the name of "himmet." These donations are known to be collected from "rich businessmen" such as Akin İpek, who is currently known to reside in London. Donations are also collected after discussions (*sohbet*) held in the organization's houses as well as from people residing in these houses on top of the rent, electricity, water and internet bills they pay. Students residing in such houses who have scholarships from YÖK, MEB, Jean Monnet, Chevening, and universities are expected to donate more. These practices should be considered extortion rather than donations.

Annual donations collected under the name of *zakat*, *zakat al-fitr* and for *Eid al-Adha* that are later transferred to institutions belonging to the organization are another source of income for FETÖ. These donations form a nontrivial sum of money if we consider the *zakat*, *zakat al-fitr* and *Eid al-adha* donations collected by FETÖ-affiliated charities such as Anatolian Muslims and Time to Help (both of which accept donations in person as well as online) and alms collected via programs such as Friday prayer at Mevlana Camii and *kandil* programs. However,

a journalist contacted for this report reported that after the July 15 coup attempt the immense deterioration of trust for the organization caused a considerable decrease in these sources of income.

THE U.K.'S POLICY ON FETÖ

This section discusses the U.K.'s policy towards FETÖ in two parts: the first, concerning the period prior to the July 15 coup attempt and the second concerning the following era. The following section will examine how the U.K. behaved towards the organization during its periods of growth and silence, its policies following the July 15 coup attempt and responses to the events that transpired in Turkey, along with how Turkey's international efforts regarding the organization were received by the U.K. Within this framework, we will put particular emphasis on answering the question of whether FETÖ's coup attempts in Turkey caused a shift in the attitude displayed by the United Kingdom towards the organization.

PRIOR TO THE JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT

Prior to the July 15 coup attempt, the British public had shown little concern for FETÖ, had little idea about the many activities run by the organization across the country, and furthermore, FETÖ enjoyed open support from certain representatives of British political parties and senior bureaucrats. FETÖ's activities in certain sectors and areas were never received with skepticism, never became topics of debate and some of the organization's operations were occasionally supported by important names from the British state and parliament via their participation in FETÖ-sponsored events. The reasons for this situation undoubtedly stem from the organization's once legal status in Turkey and its success at camouflaging itself as a typical NGO.

We must put special emphasis on the relationships that existed between FETÖ and British politicians to fully examine the policies and attitude of the United Kingdom regarding FETÖ prior to the July 15 coup attempt. The reason for this is that FETÖ's standard operating policy outside Turkey has always been to please and gain the trust of actors who are part of the established political system in each country, such as politicians, through trying to establish close contacts with them. FETÖ tried to build connections with public figures from a wide spectrum of positions, political beliefs, and backgrounds - they could be, among others, representatives of political parties, parliament members, mayors, or bureaucrats with high or low positions in government institutions. FETÖ did not favor any particular political party in such attempts at establishing contacts. Many politicians from political parties that play an important role in British politics such as the Labour Party, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrat Party attended events held by the organization, openly praised it, and supported many of its activities.

FETÖ has placed special importance on activities it considered to be conducive to new networking opportunities. With this intention, the organization tried to realize its strategy of meeting and establishing connections with prominent names in British politics through the Dialogue Society. The organization's strategy was to build relationships with all possible political parties and politicians regardless of their political beliefs, stances, and backgrounds. Therefore, it put special emphasis on conferences and symposiums and under the leadership of Dialogue Society Director Özcan Keleş held stands in the annual conferences of the Labour Party in Brighton¹⁰² and the Conservative Party in Manchester¹⁰³ in 2009 with the hopes of reaching as many politicians as possible.

The 10th anniversary ceremony of the Dialogue Society held in 2009 was attended by 35 British politicians from the Cabinet and the Parliament.¹⁰⁴ The opening speeches were by Muslim Labour Party MP and Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Department for Communities and Local Government Shahid Malik; Labour Party MP and Minister of State for the Armed

102. "Labour Annual Conference: Dialogue Society Stand", Dialogue Society, <http://www.dialoguesociety.org/conference-colloquiums/256-labours-annual-conference-dialogue-society-stand.html#.Wex-zlu0O1t>, (Accessed on October 15, 2017).

103. "Conservative Annual Conference: Dialogue Society Stand", Dialogue Society, http://www.dialoguesociety.org/conference-colloquiums/257-conservative-annual-conference-dialogue-society-stand.html#.Wex_T1u-0O1t, (Accessed on October 15, 2017).

104. "Birleşik Krallık'ta Diyalog Topluluğu'nun 10. Kuruluş Yıldönümüne Çok Sayıda Milletvekili ve Lord Katıldı", *Haberler*, December 7, 2009.

Forces Bill Rammell; Conservative Party MP and Shadow Defence Minister Dr. Julian Lewis; and Liberal Democrat MP and Shadow Home Affairs Secretary Chris Huhne.¹⁰⁵ Each of these speeches heavily supported the organization and had high praise for the Dialogue Society's activities. For example, the speeches mentioned how such activities were in accordance with centuries-old British values or predicted that the society would contribute to paving the way for a more peaceful world.

Furthermore, FETÖ also employed its strategy of organizing award ceremonies in the U.K., just like it did in other European countries. Via such award ceremonies, FETÖ intended to establish links with local politicians and increase its lobbying power by giving them awards. Many local politicians and members of parliament were awarded in the Dialogue Society's 10th-year anniversary. Upon examining the list of politicians who attended the 2009 ceremony and their speeches, we can conclude that FETÖ succeeded in portraying itself as a peaceful NGO in the United Kingdom - like it did in Turkey -, labored to enlarge its network using its deception policy, and succeeded in doing so.

Especially during FETÖ's period of growth, the opening ceremonies for its institutions in the United Kingdom were heavily attended by politicians and bureaucrats due to the organization's peaceful image. For example, many important names from local politics and several members of parliament from the Labour Party attended FETÖ's opening of a mosque and culture center in the Edmonton area. A statement during this opening ceremony made by Lord Ted Graham about how the United Kingdom would be in a more peaceful state if the country had other organizations that aimed to improve the dialogue between religions and cultures like the Gülen movement exemplifies the supportive sentiment and perspective adopted by the U.K. towards the organization during this period.¹⁰⁶

An activity organized as part of United Kingdom Parliament's program titled "Peers in School" held in Wisdom School, which was FETÖ's first school in the United Kingdom that was compliant with the English curriculum, was attended by member of the House of Lords Lord Mitchell. As part of this activity, a panel intended to familiarize the students with matters regarding British politics and parliament was held.¹⁰⁷ Along with this, a symposium organized by FETÖ with contributions from Birmingham, Leeds Metropolitan and London

105. "Dialogue Society's 10th Anniversary Dinner and Awards Ceremony".

106. "Mevlana Rumi Camii ve Diyalog Merkezi Törenle Hizmetle Girdi", *Haberler*, May 8, 2009.

107. "Lord Mitchell Pays a Visit to Turkish School", *Hizmet News*, December 4, 2012.

Universities titled “Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement” was held, among other places, in the House of Lords.¹⁰⁸

As evident from the discussion above, FETÖ generally enjoyed some degree of support from many political institutions and actors in the United Kingdom, while certain members of parliament, particularly the House of Lords, had especially close relationships with FETÖ. The participation of politicians and bureaucrats representing many levels and institutions of the state in opening ceremonies held by the organization is an important fact that highlights the influence FETÖ managed to build in the country, as well as how its infiltration attempts through presenting itself as a peaceful NGO had succeeded in Britain just like in other countries. The nature of these relationships and the amount of support FETÖ enjoyed through them have also been described by the members of the organization.

During an inquiry by the Foreign Affairs Committee held after the July 15 coup attempt, Özcan Keleş answered a question directed to him by Mike Gapes regarding FETÖ’s political connections in the U.K. This answer was almost a confession. Keleş stated that despite being a very small organization in the U.K., FETÖ had some contacts with parliament members and some of its activities and ceremonies were attended by ministers and members of parliament. He also said that the organization received funding for some of its projects from the Department for Communities and Local Government in 2009 and 2010.¹⁰⁹ In order to accurately portray the image FETÖ managed to project in the country as a peaceful NGO, it is important to note the fact that official British institutions not only supported the organization through attending its anniversary and opening ceremonies but also through providing funding for its projects.

The most interesting and prominent of such political connections was with former prime minister and leader of the Labour Party Tony Blair, a relationship which merits a separate discussion. The Tony Blair Faith Foundation was founded in 2008 by Tony Blair and was an interfaith charity that came to have very close relationships with FETÖ. The foundation and FETÖ’s charities had many similarities in their missions and methods. It has been noted that the missions of schools founded by Blair, who dedicated himself to charity work and education after the end of his term as prime minister, shared many similarities with the missions of schools operated by FETÖ across the country. The institutions founded and oper-

108. “Lordlar Kamarası’nda Gülen Konferansı”, *Hürriyet*, September 17, 2009.

109. “Oral Evidence: The UK’s Relations with Turkey, HC 615”.

ated by both foundations shared a common discourse and argued that they aimed to help achieve global peace, contribute to interfaith dialogue, and prevent terrorism and extremism. Therefore, it can be concluded that the international schools established by both the Blair Foundation and FETÖ across the world served the same purpose and tried to spread the same ideas such as interfaith dialogue. These two movements came to be so close that it is claimed that the schools and educational institutions FETÖ had to shut down for a variety of reasons in certain countries were taken over by the Tony Blair Foundation.¹¹⁰

We can see this agreement of ideas and missions between FETÖ and Blair's foundation also in some of the writings authored by the foundation's employees. For example, Ian Linden, who served as senior advisor for the foundation, had many words of praise for FETÖ in his article titled "Thought-Stoppers for Policy Makers."¹¹¹ Linden, who referred to FETÖ as "hizmet" (service) in his article, argued that FETÖ represented a modern and peaceful view of Islam in accordance with the secular state model rather than a traditional view centered on the leadership of the *ulama*. Linden also stated in his article that FETÖ has "similarities in membership growth and penetration of society with the Catholic movements *Communio e Liberazione* and *Opus Dei*."

Ed Husain, another senior advisor of the Tony Blair Faith Foundation, described Fethullah Gülen as an important Muslim scholar in his *New York Times* article titled "Countering Al Qaeda's Message."¹¹² In the article, Husain stated that the works of Islamic scholars such as Gülen who stress the importance of how Muslims cannot be terrorists must be translated and popularized in Muslim countries such as Mali, Somalia and Kenya to counter the messages of terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda.

Along with the above, Tony Blair's wife Cherie Blair also attended an event held by the Dialogue Society in London on May 1, 2012 and did not hesitate to openly display her connections to the Gülenists. Cherie Blair participated in the last one of a series of seminars organized by the Dialogue Society titled "Success School" where she spoke about her journey to success with students and expressed her happiness for being featured in this program.¹¹³

110. Gürsel Tokmaklıoğlu, "Küresel FETÖ Okulları ve Geleceği", *Politik Merkez*, July 25, 2016.

111. Ian Linden, "Thought-Stoppers for Policy-Makers", Tony Blair Faith Foundation, <http://www.tonyblair-faithfoundation.org/religion-geopolitics/commentaries/opinion/thought-stoppers-policy-makers>, (Accessed on September 22, 2017).

112. Ed Husain, "Countering Al Qaeda's Message", *The New York Times*, October 8, 2013.

113. "Cherie Blair Başarı Okulu Kursunda", *Star Kıbrıs*, May 31, 2012.

In addition, an act of the United Kingdom Parliament that was prepared and became a topic of intense discussion in 2010 is also very important in explaining the policies of the U.K. towards FETÖ before the July 15 coup attempt. This act, known as “Academies Act 2010” and “Free Schools Act,” gave charities and religious groups the right to found and operate schools that are supported by the government financially. This regulation removed the necessity for private schools to comply with the national curriculum in some cases and promised them financial support from the state. Thus, many charities, foundations and religious organizations in the U.K. were given the right to operate state-funded schools. This regulation received many criticisms, to a great extent due to the extent FETÖ with its already established network of schools and educational institutions in the U.K. stood to benefit from it.¹¹⁴

A regulation similar to this was also accepted in the United States at a prior date. The law known as “Charter School” allowed FETÖ to increase its operations in the country by providing it with a wide range of opportunities. It has been stated that via the “Charter School” law, FETÖ has established an education network of roughly 140 schools in the United States and has an annual income of \$500 million.¹¹⁵ There was anxiety regarding the possibility that with the acceptance of the aforementioned regulation, FETÖ could build a network in the United Kingdom similar to the one in the United States. As of 2015, 115 religious organizations are known to have applied to be considered under the act currently in place in the United Kingdom.¹¹⁶ It is unknown whether FETÖ is included among the organizations that applied to the United Kingdom government within this context.

In conclusion, looking at the United Kingdom’s policies towards FETÖ prior to the July 15 coup attempt, we can see that the organization succeeded in portraying itself as a peaceful NGO and as a result members and representatives of local political parties did not hesitate to offer the organization their support and attend its activities. We can see that in the United Kingdom, just like in Turkey, both the public and the politicians believed FETÖ’s outward appearance as an educational organization and an NGO due to a lack of knowledge. For this reason, FETÖ charities did not experience any difficulties in accessing a variety of state

114. “Birleşik Krallık Cemaate Kapılarını Açtı”, OdaTv, <http://odatv.com/Birleşik-Krallık-cemaate-kapilarini-ac-ti-1612121200.html>, (Accessed on October 17, 2017); “Birleşik Krallık: Yeni Bütçeyle Fethullah’a Kapılar Açıldı”, *Turkish News*, <https://www.turkishnews.com/tr/content/2012/12/11/BirleşikKrallık-yeni-butceyle-fethulla-ha-kapilar-acildi>, (Accessed on October 17, 2017).

115. “FETÖ’nün ABD’deki Okul Ağı”, *Anadolu Agency*, July 27, 2016.

116. “What is the Rationale Behind Free Schools?”, *BBC*, March 9, 2015.

funds. Following the July 15 coup attempt, however, even though some politicians and members of the media still supported FETÖ, the government of the United Kingdom adopted a much more cautious policy towards the organization and understood Turkey's sensitivities regarding the issue.

FOLLOWING THE JULY 15 COUP ATTEMPT

The attitudes adopted by the government, certain members of parliament, and the media must be evaluated separately to fully examine the policies of the U.K. regarding FETÖ after the defeated coup attempt of July 15, 2016. Despite its hesitance on certain issues regarding FETÖ during this period, the London government has been highly supportive of Turkey in its official statements and the United Kingdom was the first Western country to condemn the coup attempt. Even though the British government displayed ample empathy for Turkey regarding the FETÖ issue, some members of parliament were observed adopting critical attitudes towards Turkey and retaining their connections to the members of the organization, while refusing to distance themselves from it. Meanwhile, the British media, following a much more radical policy compared to politicians and certain members of parliament, greatly supported the organization, while, especially after the July 15 coup attempt, many FETÖ arguments were embraced by the British media. Leading British media organizations received a lot of criticism from the Turkish public for publishing and airing content supportive of FETÖ both during and after the failed coup attempt of July 15.

The London Government and the July 15 Coup Attempt: A Unique Approach Among Turkey's Western Allies

The United Kingdom was the first Western country to express its support for Turkey after the July 15 coup attempt. By fully expressing the empathy and understanding Turkey expected from its allies and stating that it sided with Ankara against the coup attempt perpetrated by FETÖ, the United Kingdom displayed an approach to the situation unique among Turkey's Western allies. On July 16, the day after the coup attempt, Prime Minister Theresa May called President Erdoğan and Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson called his counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, both condemning the coup attempt. Along with this initial expression of support through telephone calls, the first official visit to Turkey from the West after the coup attempt was also from the United Kingdom. The first high profile visit to Turkey after the coup attempt was by Sir Alan Duncan, the Minister of State for

Europe and the Americas, on July 20.¹¹⁷ Richard Moore, who was U.K. ambassador to Ankara at the time, also stated on a TV broadcast that during the coup attempt he sent a text message to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu asking how he could help, offered his support to the Turkish government, stating that the British government must side with democracy and said that on the night of the coup attempt, Prime Minister May also ordered that the Turkish government must be given full support.¹¹⁸

The amount of support offered to Turkey by the London government and the approach that set it apart from other European countries regarding the failed coup attempt can also be seen from the report prepared by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.K. Parliament titled “The UK’s Relations with Turkey.” The statements of Sir Alan Duncan are especially important due to the fact that they display the attitude of the United Kingdom towards Turkey along with how well the public psychology in Turkey concerning coups is understood by the British government. The following statements by Duncan are evidence of this understanding regarding the coup attempt’s effects on Turkey:

That coup attempt is the main issue in the psyche, mentality and attitude of the Turkish government and indeed the Turkish people at the moment. ... If you don’t understand it, you’re never going to understand them or be able to have a proper relationship with them. ... Whereas everyone else was rather quick, from the comfort of their armchairs, to wag their fingers, we tried to understand exactly what the coup attempt really was. ... This singled us out, certainly from the rest of the European Union but also from many other countries. We made a distinctive stand, which was to empathize ahead of in any way criticizing, whereas others criticized straightaway and even now are very slow to empathize.¹¹⁹

The unique approach displayed by the United Kingdom towards Turkey can be even better understood from the statements made by Alan Duncan to the Foreign Affairs Committee. This approach and attitude set the London government apart from other European countries. Both the public and politicians in Turkey appreciated the efforts made by the London government to understand the sentiments of the Turkish public and the Ankara government before providing criticisms on an official level, unlike other European countries. For example, Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Şimşek stated that the United Kingdom was the

117. Sedat Aybar, “Birleşik Krallık Büyük Oyun’un Bittiğinin Farkında”, *Anadolu Agency*, August 2, 2016.

118. “Birleşik Krallık Büyükelçisi Richard Moore’dan Özel Açıklamalar-Hafta Sonu”, YouTube, July 24, 2017, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oFCEyCwlaWw>, (Accessed on September 10, 2017).

119. “The UK’s Relations with Turkey”, p. 7.

first country to offer support for Turkey after the July 15 coup attempt and said the following:

We have not forgotten the support given to us by the United Kingdom last year following the traitorous coup attempt. One of the first minister-level visits conducted after the coup attempt was from the United Kingdom, and they have been the most understanding country regarding our struggle against FETÖ. We have of course noted this situation and highly appreciate it.¹²⁰

Along with the aforementioned visits, the support given to Turkey in its struggle continued with statements from other politicians regarding FETÖ. Conservative Party MP and member of the U.K. Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee Daniel Kawczynski stated that he believes FETÖ to be behind the July 15 coup attempt and Turkey must not be left alone in its struggle against this organization. Kawczynski also expressed his belief that the silence of other European countries regarding the coup attempt caused great disappointment in Turkey, that media organizations misunderstood the meaning of the coup attempt, and did not give it the importance it deserves.¹²¹

Jack Straw, former foreign secretary of the United Kingdom, is another politician who has stated that Gülen is behind the coup attempt. Straw has stated that FETÖ was without any question involved in the coup attempt and that the organization, along with its “nice face” of schools and educational institutions, had a “very dark face” that aimed to undermine the foundations of democracy.¹²² Furthermore, in an interview with the Turkish newspaper *Hürriyet* two weeks after the coup attempt on July 30, Richard Moore, the United Kingdom’s ambassador to Ankara at the time, stated that he did not find it hard to believe the Turkish government’s claims that Gülenists were involved in the coup and that the United Kingdom would cooperate with Turkey without hesitation if provided evidence-based information of FETÖ’s activities in England. These statements are among the best examples that illustrate the stark contrast between the U.K. and other European countries in their attitudes towards FETÖ. Another statement by Richard Moore on July 23, 2017, one year after the coup attempt, that even though the trials were ongoing Gülen was undoubtedly behind the coup attempt and had a very important role within it, is another example of how clear the position of the United Kingdom is on the matter.¹²³

120. “Mehmet Şimşek: FETÖ’ye Karşı İlk Destegi Birleşik Krallık Verdi”, *En Son Haber*, July 6, 2017.

121. “İngiliz Vekilden BBC’ye 15 Temmuz Eleştirisi”, *Türkiye Haber Merkezi*, November 21, 2016.

122. Ecenur Colak, “Jack Straw: FETO Behind Coup Attempt in Turkey”, *Anadolu Agency*, March 25, 2017.

123. “Birleşik Krallık Büyükelçisi Richard Moore’dan Özel Açıklamalar-Hafta Sonu”.

FETÖ militants have been very upset at the amount of support given to Turkey by the British government both during the failed coup attempt on July 15 and the following period, and could not refrain from expressing such sentiments on a variety of platforms. This feeling of unease can easily be seen in the content FETÖ militants share in written, visual and social media platforms. For example, on the website Tr724, used as a platform to deliver FETÖ propaganda, Ahmet Dönmez in his article titled “When Will the British Intelligence Decode the Enigma of the Coup Attempt?” has stated that he fails to understand why the British government has adopted a policy supportive of Turkey when there is “obvious proof that the coup attempt was a conspiracy by the Ankara government.”¹²⁴

One of FETÖ’s high-level militants in the United Kingdom, Özcan Keleş, has expressed his discontent with the British policies and those of some other European countries in an answer to a question directed to him by a follower on social media as follows:

I have called many Western countries to adopt a harsher and more critical approach regarding the developments in Turkey but they have refused to do so. Now the situation is worse than before.¹²⁵

Patrick Cockburn, a writer for the British newspaper *The Independent*, who frequently voices arguments used by FETÖ such as claims that the failure of the July 15 coup led to the acceleration of Turkey’s Islamization and contributed to the creation of an internal political environment that President Erdoğan desired, is another name that was upset by the improvement of relations between the U.K. and Turkey, and Britain’s stance after the failed coup attempt. Cockburn has claimed in an article that Prime Minister Theresa May’s visit to Ankara despite the ongoing human rights abuses and rise of authoritarianism in Turkey illustrates “the opportunism and hypocrisy of British foreign policy.” Cockburn’s displeasure regarding the state of relations between the two countries is also highlighted by his claim that the aforementioned visit and statements may be seen as support for the events that happened after the failed coup attempt.¹²⁶

The report prepared by the United Kingdom Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee has been mostly supportive of Turkey on the FETÖ issue. The state-

124. Ahmet Dönmez, “İngiliz İstihbaratı 15 Temmuz Enigmasını Ne Zaman Çözecek?”, *TR724*, March 20, 2017.

125. This statement appears below the video Özcan Keleş uploaded following the inquiry on İpek Media. See “Turkey Analysis: İpek Media Group Takeover in Turkey in 5min”, YouTube, October 27, 2015, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dL5Cs3A4hPA&t=144s>, (Accessed on September 27, 2017).

126. Patrick Cockburn, “Theresa May’s Visit to Turkey is More Evidence of Her Desperate Search for Trading Partners to Replace the EU at Any Cost”, *Independent*, January 27, 2017.

ment that “the Turkish government has a right and responsibility to act against the suspected perpetrators of the coup attempt” included in the report shows support for Turkey in its struggle against FETÖ.¹²⁷ However, it must still be noted that despite the favorable attitude towards Turkey, the report still suffers from a lack of information regarding FETÖ. The committee, throughout the report, is very careful about not taking a stance that is directly confrontational to FETÖ, preferring a cautious attitude instead. To fully understand the attitude of the United Kingdom towards FETÖ and accurately portray the post-coup attempt policies, the aforementioned report must be examined in a separate and more detailed section.

U.K. Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee’s Report on Relations with Turkey

The report titled “The UK’s Relations with Turkey” by the U.K. Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee, published on March 25, 2017, is full of misconceptions and on many points lacks vital information regarding FETÖ despite the fact that many people with different views were contacted during the process of its writing. While the report stressed the importance of supporting Turkey in the wake of the failed coup attempt, it is obvious that in certain sections the ideas expressed were highly influenced by FETÖ militants contacted for the purpose of the report. The report examines the United Kingdom’s relations with Turkey in general terms and the third section of the report is mostly dedicated to the July 15 coup attempt. It is stated in this section concerning the coup attempt that while four different categories can be identified as having participated in the coup attempt (Gülenists, Kemalists, opportunists and unwitting participants), the perception in Turkey that Gülenists were the perpetrators of the coup attempt is not just limited to pro-government people but accepted by people from a wide spectrum of opinions, and the same situation could be seen among those contacted for the report.

Furthermore, the report also claims that there is little proof to classify FETÖ as a terrorist organization. On this issue, Lindsay Appleby states the following: “On the basis of the information that I have and on the basis of what we have looked at in the Foreign Office, it is very clear that there were lots of people identified as Gülenists who were involved in the coup. But we don’t have clear infor-

127. “Fight against FETO Receives International Support”, *The New Turkey*, September 22, 2017.

mation, or an analytical base, to assert definitively one way or another whether the organization as a whole directed the coup attempt.”¹²⁸ The report very briefly mentions the perpetrators’ confessions that prove that FETÖ was behind the coup attempt. The fact that the name of the ByLock program that was used by FETÖ members for their secret communications and found on the phones of all arrested FETÖ members is only mentioned once in the 78-page report defies understanding. Furthermore, at the time of this report’s writing, the existence of the ByLock program alone was recognized as sufficient evidence by the Turkish Court of Cassation to prove FETÖ membership.¹²⁹

The fact that the name of Adil Öksüz is entirely absent from this report raises questions regarding the report’s claim that there is little proof of FETÖ’s orchestration of the coup attempt. Adil Öksüz is known to be the right-hand man of Fethullah Gülen and can be seen sitting beside Gülen in several photos. He was one of the civilians caught in the Akıncı Air Base, which served as the headquarters of the coup attempt on the night of July 15, 2016. Many civilians like him and Kemal Batmaz were caught on military bases after the coup attempt failed, their photos were published in written and visual media yet these points are again absent from the report. For example, the links of the civilians arrested in military bases on the night of the coup attempt to FETÖ were made clear with the information the United States recently shared with the Turkish Ministry of Interior. According to the information provided by the U.S., Kemal Batmaz, one of the most important actors among the perpetrators of the coup, stated during a passport inspection on his visit to the United States on January 1, 2016 that he would be staying in Fethullah Gülen’s Pennsylvania compound during this visit.¹³⁰

A similar opinion featured in the report by Gareth Jenkins, author of the report titled *Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation*,¹³¹ which revealed FETÖ’s infiltration of the Turkish state and the purges it orchestrated through fabricated evidence. Jenkins states in the report, “Remarkably, despite months of vigorous interrogation, no convincing evidence has yet been made public about how the coup was planned or coordinated.” It is strange that Jenkins

128. “The UK’s Relations with Turkey”, p. 38.

129. “Yargıtay’dan Emsal ByLock Kararı”, *Yeni Şafak*, September 26, 2017.

130. Okan Müderrisoğlu, “FETÖ Kanıtı ABD’den Geldi”, *Fikriyat*, September 13, 2017.

131. Gareth H. Jenkins, *Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon Investigation*, (Singapore: Silk Road Paper, 2009).

would take this position regarding FETÖ's involvement in the coup attempt when he is one of the most qualified analysts regarding FETÖ's infiltration of the Turkish state, secret operations, and methods.

The fact that Jenkins, who says in his report that “over the previous 15 years, the Gülen movement had actively encouraged its members to pursue careers in the civil service, arguing that it combined secure employment with an opportunity to serve the country,” does not acknowledge the evidence regarding the July 15 coup attempt is a testament to the confusion experienced by Western analysts regarding the issue and deserves close attention. This confusion undoubtedly stems from the discourse and strategies often employed by FETÖ militants to obscure the inner workings, activities, and purposes of their organizations. For example, one such strategy that has been employed by FETÖ in the United Kingdom as well as other countries is that charities and institutions founded by members of the organization always describe themselves as being founded by people “inspired by the teachings of Fethullah Gülen” - they refuse the claim that they are controlled by any organization and state that Gülen is not involved in their administration. Evidently, this strategy was also employed by FETÖ members such as Özcan Keleş and Yüksel Alp Aslandoğan who were contacted for this report.¹³²

Such statements and strategies by FETÖ members undoubtedly intend to portray Gülen as being unrelated to – and thus not responsible for - any activities of the organizations or events that may occur. Obviously, the statements made by many civilians and military members arrested during the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey that they “were involved in the coup but are not Gülenists” also seek to serve the same purpose.¹³³

The report prepared by the FAC, on the one hand, is not courageous enough to disregard reality and objectivity to the degree that would raise objections by Turkey, and, on the other, does not fully support Turkey by portraying FETÖ as the real perpetrator of the coup and declaring it a terrorist organization. Even though it contains information that links members of FETÖ to the coup attempt, it refrains from classifying FETÖ as a terrorist organization and assigning it the blame for the coup attempt.

Whether this contradictory stance regarding FETÖ results from an actual confusion due to a lack of information or a deliberate political strategy is a ques-

132. “The UK's Relations with Turkey”, p. 30.

133. “Ben FETÖcü Değilim Diyen Kritik İsmi Öyle Para İlişkileri Çıktı ki...”, *OdaTv*, August 27, 2017.

tion that merits further thought. Recognizing FETÖ's role in the July 15 coup attempt and classifying it as a terrorist organization would require the United Kingdom to ban all of its activities in the country. This would result in a political cost which would then have to be addressed by the British government. If the former is the actual cause, meaning there indeed exists an actual confusion, Turkey must do its best to inform the British public and policy makers through public diplomacy and address the questions the British people have concerning FETÖ via sharing more information and evidence with them. But if the latter is the actual cause and the hesitance is due to political reasons, British policy makers must be informed and convinced that such a strategy of avoiding a definite stance on FETÖ, while possibly being preferable for the short term, is likely to be less favorable in the long term due to its possible impacts on the relations between Turkey and the U.K. Furthermore, it must be noted that in the conclusions and recommendations section of the report, it is stated that "the anti-Western rhetoric that is prevalent in the popular discourse in Turkey, and historic suspicions around British policy, still influence perceptions of the U.K. in Turkey."

The best example of how certain members of parliament and political party representatives in the U.K. refused to distance themselves from FETÖ and chose a discourse on the issue different from the one adopted by the British government following the July 15 coup attempt is from a debate held in the U.K. Parliament. During this debate, which was held on March 9, 2017 in the Westminster Hall of the Parliament and attended by nearly 20 MPs, Turkey's post-coup attempt policies were criticized and the British government was called to change its stance towards Turkey and adopt a tougher approach.¹³⁴ The MPs also made a decision to bring the situation in Turkey to the General Assembly of the Parliament. It is not a coincidence that this debate was secured by Labour Party MP for Enfield North Joan Ryan, who had been seen attending many of FETÖ's organizations and activities. Conservative Party MP Sir Edward Garnier, who was previously paid by FETÖ to prepare an anti-Turkey report, was another attendant of the debate.

Topics such as the discharge of civil servants following the July 15 coup attempt, the media organizations that were shut down, and the state of emergency in Turkey were discussed during the debate. The fact that such a debate could be organized by certain members of Parliament that even after the July 15 coup attempt are known for their close links to FETÖ received heavy criticism among the

134. "Birleşik Krallık Parlamentosu'ndan Hükümete Türkiye'ye Tutumunu Sertleştirme Çağrısı", *BBC Türkçe*, March 9, 2017.

Turkish public and the debate posed a serious threat to Turkey-United Kingdom relations that had so far progressed in a strategic nature. Thus, the news of this debate sparked harsh reactions among Turkey's media organizations.¹³⁵

In addition, FETÖ's U.K.-based think tank Turkey Institute organized a panel on November 1, 2017 in the Parliament titled "Where does Turkey belong to?"¹³⁶ and many important names again were in attendance. The fact that the panel was hosted by Labour Party MP Peter Kyle, who is known to have attended breakfasts organized by FETÖ in an attempt to establish connections with local politicians,¹³⁷ is clear proof that even after the July 15 coup attempt FETÖ is trying to maintain its connections to certain British MPs.

Even though the Turkish public highly appreciate the empathy of the British government concerning the July 15 coup attempt, along with former ambassador Richard Moore's personal campaign of public diplomacy, the fact that certain members of parliament and political party representatives in the U.K. are still refusing to take a clear stance on FETÖ or are even supportive of the organization's activities in Britain can influence the public opinion in Turkey in a negative manner, as the memories of the events that transpired on the night of July 15 are still fresh. Like the British government, members of parliament and political party representatives in the U.K. must also empathize with and understand the sentiments of the Turkish public and government regarding the coup attempt and subsequently avoid putting the relations between the two countries at risk by acting in an irresponsible manner regarding FETÖ.

The Stance of the British Media Following the Coup Attempt

The stance of the British media following the coup attempt regarding Turkey and FETÖ has been highly different from the one adopted by the British government. Media outlets in the United Kingdom did not attempt to understand the effects of the failed coup attempt on the Turkish public and government but rather, from the first hours of the coup attempt, chose to embrace the arguments FETÖ has tried to put into circulation and thus favor the organization's narratives. Especially the British public service broadcaster BBC acted as the spearhead for delivering anti-Turkish news and opinions following the coup attempt. For example, the below

135. "FETÖ İngiliz Parlamentosunu da Harekete Geçirdi", *Son Haberler*, March 10, 2017.

136. "Where Does Turkey Belong to?", Eventbrite, <https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/where-does-turkey-belong-to-tickets-39038304620?utm-medium=discovery&utm-campaign=social&utm-content=attendee-share&aff=estw&utm-source=tw&utm-term=listing>, (Accessed on October 25, 2017).

137. "Community Engagement Breakfast with Peter Kyle MP", Dialogue Society, March 18, 2016.

e-mail by BBC producer James Bryant sent just six days after the coup attempt, on July 21 (Appendix 14), which was leaked to social media, cast doubt on the BBC's objectivity and resulted in a considerable backlash among the Turkish public:

We are struggling to find anyone in the country who is critical of what the government is doing - we've had a lot of people in the last week speaking in favour - so we're hoping to find someone here who might be willing to speak out against the current situation. Might you be aware of anyone?¹³⁸

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu was also highly critical of this e-mail and said that the BBC appeared quite displeased due to being unable to find someone who supported the coup.¹³⁹ Such criticisms were not limited to the Turkish public but also came from the Turkish diaspora in the United Kingdom.¹⁴⁰ The BBC's search to find supporters of the coup attempt, uncovered after the e-mail was leaked, evidently bore fruit when the BBC contacted FETÖ militants in the United Kingdom. Several important FETÖ figures in the United Kingdom such as Özcan Keleş and Seval Gökçe gave interviews on the BBC just two days after this e-mail. In these interviews, they claimed that they did not feel secure, received threats, and that severe human rights abuses were going on in Turkey.¹⁴¹ Also, although the e-mail claims that people supportive of the government were featured on the BBC, Turhan Özen, head of the Union of European Turkish Democrats in the United Kingdom, claimed that after calling the BBC and saying that he wanted to express his thoughts on the coup attempt, he was given very little time to talk and immediately cut off due to his anti-coup opinions.¹⁴²

It was also observed that the BBC supported FETÖ's anti-Turkey campaign through adopting the arguments the organization tried to put into circulation in the content released on its TV broadcasts and on its website.¹⁴³ It is strange that despite the support of the British government for Turkey following the July 15 coup attempt, the BBC, in the same time period, featured FETÖ militants and their anti-Turkey discourse heavily on their broadcasts and almost became a tool

138. "BBC Email Exposes Biased Stance against Democratically Elected Government after Failed Gülenist Coup", *Daily Sabah*, July 24, 2016.

139. "Dışişleri Bakanı Çavuşoğlu'ndan BBC'ye Tepki", *TRT Haber*, July 23, 2016.

140. Büşra Akın Dinçer, "Turks in UK Slam BBC's Failed Coup Coverage", *Anadolu Agency*, July 23, 2017.

141. Phillip Kemp, "Turkey Coup Attempt: Gulen's UK Followers Threatened", *BBC*, July 23, 2016.

142. Mustafa Köker, "Turhan Özen'den Çarpıcı FETÖ Açıklamaları!", *Eurovizyon*, August 4, 2016.

143. Such news reports include Paul Kirby, "Turkey Coup Attempt: Who's the Target of Erdogan's Purge?", *BBC News*, July 20, 2016; "Turkey Coup: What is Gulen Movement and What Does It Want?", *BBC*, July 21, 2016; "Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Turkey's Pugnacious President", *BBC*, December 17, 2017; Ezgi Başaran, "Turkey Coup: Who Was Behind Turkey Coup Attempt?", *BBC*, July 16, 2016; Nick Thorpe, "Turkey Coup Attempt: Society Divided over State of Emergency", *BBC*, July 22, 2016.

for FETÖ propaganda. The aforementioned e-mail that was leaked to social media and subsequently caused a stir in Turkey is enough to summarize the position and policies of the BBC following the July 15 coup attempt.

The BBC is not the only media organization in the United Kingdom that adopted such a supportive stance for FETÖ after the July 15 coup attempt. For example, *The Economist*, one of the most popular and influential weekly newspapers in the United Kingdom, became part of this group of anti-Turkey media outlets by publishing articles with titles such as “The Sultan Survives”¹⁴⁴ and “Erdogan’s Revenge”¹⁴⁵ after the coup attempt. *The Independent*, another notable British newspaper, also showed its displeasure at the coup attempt’s failure by publishing an article titled “Erdogan Has Survived This Coup - But His Future Remains Uncertain”¹⁴⁶ on July 16, 2016. English news agency Reuters, on the other hand, visited FETÖ leader Fethullah Gülen right after the coup attempt and featured Gülen’s claims that the coup attempt was a conspiracy by the Turkish government in a news article.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, not only international but local media also supported FETÖ by conducting interviews with FETÖ members¹⁴⁸ and shared the stance of the international news networks regarding the coup attempt.

As discussed above, the British media and government adopted two very different approaches regarding FETÖ following the July 15 coup attempt. While the government tried to understand the thoughts and feelings of the Turkish public after the coup attempt, the media organizations supported the anti-Turkey campaign conducted by FETÖ members and almost became FETÖ’s propaganda platforms by featuring it heavily on visual and written media. The content published and broadcast by British media often featured talking points such as “Turkey is getting closer to being a dictatorship”, “human rights abuses”, “Islamization of Turkey”, “Turkey distancing itself from the West”¹⁴⁹ and supported narratives created by FETÖ.

144. “The Sultan Survives: In Turkey, a Failed Coup against President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan”, *The Economist*, July 15, 2016.

145. “Erdogan’s Revenge”, *The Economist*, July 23, 2016.

146. “Erdogan Has Survived This Coup - But His Future Is Still Uncertain”, *Independent*, July 16, 2016.

147. “Muslim Cleric Gulen: Coup Bid in Turkey Could Have Been Staged”, *Reuters*, July 16, 2016.

148. Andrea Downey, “They Think We Are Terrorists, They Think We Are Evil: How the Turkish Military Coup Changed the Lives of Croydon’s Gülen Community”, *Your Local Guardian*, September 28, 2016.

149. For further information on British media’s approach to the July 15 coup attempt, see İ. Numan Telci, İbrahim Efe, Tuncay Kardaş and İsmail Çağlar, *15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimi ve Batı Medyası* (July 15 Coup Attempt and the Western Media), (Istanbul: SETA Report, 2017); Muhittin Ataman and Gloria Shkurti, “Batının Darbe Sicili ve 15 Temmuz Darbe Girişimine Tepkisi” (Coup d’Etat Record of the West and Western Reaction to July 15 Coup Attempt), *Adam Akademi*, Issue: 6.2, (2016), pp. 51-73.

CONCLUSION

Although FETÖ is known to be behind the coup attempt and this fact is acknowledged by the Cabinet in London and the U.K. Ambassador to Ankara, it is still not recognized as a terrorist organization, which undermines possible new partnerships in the field of security between the two countries. Considering Berlin's FETÖ policy and its negative effects on Turkey-Germany relations, London is required to recognize FETÖ as a terrorist organization as soon as possible. In particular, then U.K. Ambassador to Ankara Richard Moore's statement suggesting that the U.K. does not recognize FETÖ as a terrorist group although it orchestrated the failed coup attempt displays the curious discrepancy in Britain's approach to the subject.

The Brexit process introduced new opportunities to the Turkey-U.K. partnership in the political, commercial, and military fields. Especially after the visa restriction imposed by the U.S. on Turkey, there has been a substantial increase in the number of Turkish students going to the U.K. for college education.¹⁵⁰ For the continuity of such positive developments and improvement of bilateral relations, London should extradite senior FETÖ operatives such as Kerim Balcı and Akın İpek as requested by Ankara.

A joint working group must be formed by Ankara and London to examine FETÖ's ties with its organizations in the U.K. A cooperation mechanism between

150. "Vize Krizi Sonrası Türk Öğrenci Rotasını İngiltere'ye Çevirdi", *Anadolu Agency*, October 12, 2017.

MASAK and UKFIU will be a tangible step towards revealing FETÖ's financial activities in the U.K.

The British media and public must be informed about the fact that FETÖ poses a threat not only to Turkey but to all the countries it operates in despite the published and televised content against Turkey and in favor of FETÖ by media organizations such as the BBC and *The Guardian*.

A legal process must be kicked off to suspend the accounts of the FETÖ militants who actively use social media to defame Turkey, and a systematic and active social media policy must be adopted against such media policies.

In the U.K., the think tanks and research centers that can contribute to the fight against FETÖ and shed light on the problems encountered by Muslims and/or Turkish people in Britain must be supported.

Strengthening the diplomatic initiatives between the countries such as the Turkey-UK Interparliamentary Friendship Group and the Turkish-British Tatlıdil will serve towards developing mutual understanding and institutionalizing dialogue mechanisms.

In order to fight FETÖ's educational network and recruitment methods on a rational ground, new schools are required to be founded in Britain in cooperation with the MEB and the Maarif Foundation.

Lastly, a comprehensive legal regulation is needed regarding language schools since there has been a substantial increase in the number of FETÖ militants who fled to Britain by receiving visas through enrolling in language courses.¹⁵¹

151. The FETÖ militants who infiltrated state institutions had long been sent to the U.K. for their language education and funneled state resources to the organization. For an example, see Saygı Öztürk, "İfadelelerde Geçen Bomba İsimler ve Pensilvanya Pijaması", *Sözcü*, October 25, 2017.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. FETÖ'S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE IN THE U.K. AND THE U.K.'S POLICY TOWARDS FETÖ

1. ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

A. ILLEGAL METHODS

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B. DONATIONS



- Himmet (donation)
- Scholarship cuts
- Time to Help UK

C. COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES

1) EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (WITHIN THE UMBRELLA OF VOICES IN BRITAIN)

- Axis Tuition Center (Saturday, Supplementary and Weekend Schools)
- Lighthouse Educational Society
- Amity Educational Foundation
- Koza Educational Society
- Wisdom Primary and Secondary School
- Oxford Vision
- Fellowship Educational Society
- Spring Educational Society
- Mentor Wise
- Summit Education Society
- Coral College for Girls
- Kingston Nursery
- Perceptum Education Limited



2) COMPANIES

3. FOUNDATIONS, ASSOCIATIONS, AND CENTERS

- Anatolian Muslims Society
- The Nurture Educational and Multicultural Society
- Mevlana Mosque and Rumi Cultural Center




4. CAMPAIGNS AND CHARITY SALES

5. FUNDS FROM LOCAL ESTABLISHMENTS


6. PRESS AND MEDIA

- *Zaman Britanya* (now-defunct)



2. FETÖ'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND LEADING FIGURES IN THE U.K.

- Fetullah Gülen (FETÖ's leader)
- Abdullah Aymaz (senior imam responsible for Europe)
- İsmail Nazlı (senior imam responsible for the U.K.)
- Adnan Azak (former senior imam responsible for the U.K.)
- Özcan Keleş (FETÖ's U.K. representative)
- Hamdi Akın İpek (owner of İpek Investment and Koza Ltd.)
- İsmail Mesut Sezgin (Hizmet Studies Director)
- Kerim Balcı (Former Director of Turkey Institute)
- Sadık Çınar (Director of Dialogue Society and Anatolian Muslims Society)
- İlknur Kahraman (Director of Dialogue Society and Anatolian Muslims Society)
- Selçuk Başsoy (Director of Dialogue Society)
- Muammer Demirpolat (Director of Dialogue Society)
- Seval Gökçe (Director of Mevlana Rumi Mosque)
- Cengiz İnce (Director of Anatolian Muslims Society)
- Selçuk Koç (Director of Axis Educational Trust)
- Can Önal (Director of Axis Educational Trust)
- Selvinaz Sezgin (Director of Axis Educational Trust)
- Ufuk Uçar (Director of London Center for Social Studies)
- Kadir Uysaloğlu (Zaman Britanya London Representative)
- İsmail Şen (Director of Turkey Institute)
- Hakan Gökçe (Director of Oxford Vision)
- Orhan Çaya (Director of Waterfall Limited)
- Ömer Keleş (Former Director of Anatolian Muslims Society)
- Ercan İçli (Former Director of Anatolian Muslims Society)
- Memik Sancı (Former Director of Anatolian Muslims Society)
- İsmail Uzun (Former Director of Anatolian Muslims Society)
- Ramazan Kepil (Former Director of Anatolian Muslims Society)
- Ömer Faruk Aykol (Former Director of Anatolian Muslims Society)
- Ali Demir (Former Director of Anatolian Muslims Society)
- Turan Çakmak (Former Director of Axis Educational Trust)
- Ali Çiftçi (Former Director of Axis Educational Trust)
- Fatih Tedik (Former Director of London Center for Social Studies)
- Hidayet Erbil (Former Director of Wisdom School)
- İlhan Gökçalp (Former Representative of Zaman Britanya)



3. LOBBYING AND PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES

- Dialogue Society
- Turkey Institute
- London Center for Social Studies
- Center for Hizmet Studies
- BizNet

4. U.K.'S POLICY TOWARDS FETÖ

- The U.K. was the first Western country to condemn the July 15 coup attempt while the U.K. government acknowledged that FETÖ orchestrated the coup attempt.
- FETÖ militants have been greatly disturbed by the U.K. government's support to Turkey during and in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt.
- It has been observed that a number of British MPs adopted a critical stance towards Turkey and could not distance themselves from FETÖ members.
- Although the report issued by the UK Parliament recognizes the FETÖ militants' involvement in the coup attempt, it still abstains from defining FETÖ as a terrorist organization.
- An overwhelming majority of the British media pursued a more radical policy compared to the government and sided with FETÖ particularly in the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt.

APPENDIX 2. 2016 YEAR-END FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF SEVERAL FETÖ-OWNED ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.K.¹⁵²

Organization	Number	Authorized Person(s)	Head Office	Total Current Assets (Pound)	Net Worth (Pound)
Koza Ltd.	08956179	Hamdi Akın İpek	Londra	67.246.084	66.217.571
Koza Educational Society	05299016	Baki Toktaş	Londra	3.884	2.310
Amity Educational Foundation	05802582	Yusuf Kar, Aydın Aktaş, Hikmet Sarı	Londra	86.955	75.045
Summit Education Society	05494709	Hasan Naş, Fatih Segmen, Ünal Önder Mustafa Kayıkçı, Savaş Konur	Manchester	8.673	115.314
Spring Educational Society	05480664	Selçuk Başsoy, İsmail Şen, Saffet Hürkan	Northampton	12.016	30.300
Dialogue Society	05385343	Özcan Keleş, İlknur Kahraman, Selçuk Başsoy, Muammer Demirpolat	Londra	21.685	5.318
Kingston Nursery	09561958	Asuman Aydın, Muhammed Aydın	Hull	1.682	12.167
Fellowship Educational Society	05782704	Mehmet Akif Dengiz, Mehmet Çabuk, Huzeyfe Borazan	Sussex	139.707	225.471
Anatolian Muslims Society	05321218	İlknur Kahraman, Sadık Çınar	Londra	57.050	40.175
Wisdom School	06596179	Hakan Gökçe, Ziya Kocabıyık, Armağan Dursun, Rustam Aliyev	Londra	252.183	6.276.083
Oxford Vision Consultancy	07006304	Mustafa Nuralp	Londra	19.579	-6.781
London Centre for Social Studies	06067817	Ufuk Uçar, Mehmet Machmout	Londra	12.948	25.629
Time to Help UK	08659663	Gülstan Arslan, İsmail Uzun, Erol Tosun	Londra	70.028	67.785
Centre for Hizmet Studies	09380017	İsmail Mesut Sezgin	Londra	550	35
TOTAL				67.933.024	73.086.422

152. The information presented in this table has been sourced and cross-checked using the "Companies House" and "Company Check" platforms. Even though FETÖ owns many other institutions and organizations, the only data available can be found on these two platforms and is presented in this table. Considering the institutions that are known to be run by FETÖ but whose accounts could not be accessed (i.e. Axis Educational Trust, Turkey Institute, Mentor Wise, and Lighthouse Educational Society), the possible organizations whose links to FETÖ have gone undetected, and the personal wealth of the members of the organization, the combined available funds of FETÖ in the United Kingdom can be estimated to be around £100 million.

APPENDIX 3. PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT STATEMENTS OF FETÖ-OWNED ORGANIZATIONS IN THE U.K. (£1000 DENOMINATED)¹⁵³

Anatolian Muslims Society (2007-2015)									
	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Income	82,064	74,475	189,703	296,077	227,866	259,9	310,4	212,9	252,5
Expence	75,143	80,138	174,700	281,346	209,916	236,2	306,8	212,6	250

Dialogue Society (2008-2016)									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Income	119,836	148,342	185,822	194,507	171,5	154,5	140	128,4	51,9
Expence	120,170	103,968	200,130	-	169,4	146,3	135,3	116,1	101,6

Lighthouse Educational Society (2008-2016)									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Income	125,573	181,551	557,233	244,416	381,629	436	308,8	286	372,3
Expence	84,540	169,199	265,204	273,259	276,312	346,4	346,4	288,5	373,7

Amity Educational Foundation (2012-2016)					
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Income	195,1	169,0	200,8	191,9	120,4
Expence	170	168,8	199,5	166,3	147,9

Koza Educational Society (2012-2015)				
	2012	2013	2014	2015
Income	133,5	129,8	86,9	85,6
Expence	132,4	116,9	86,8	85,5

Fellowship Educational Society (2008-2016)									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Income	85,695	93,915	-	53,496	92,4	178	173,4	240,3	131,7
Expence	93,679	89,589	-	35,399	44,466	76	136,2	216,7	197,7

Summit Education Society (2008-2016)									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Income	30,295	46,118	-	-	19,7	101,5	179,9	148,5	287,8
Expence	24,180	10,371	-	-	18,4	99,4	111,2	138,7	303

153. The information presented in this table has been compiled from Open Charities, UK Charity Commission and Open Corporates on October 13, 2017.

APPENDIX 6. IMAGE FEATURING GÜLEN, ALONG WITH FETÖ OPERATIVES ÖZCAN KELEŞ AND YÜKSEL ALP ASLANDOĞAN, BEFORE HIS BBC INTERVIEW




APPENDIX 7. THE HONORARY PHD GRANTED TO GÜLEN BY LEEDS METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY



APPENDIX 8. THE BANNER OF AN EVENT HELD BY ANATOLIAN SOCIETY ON NOVEMBER 1, 2015



APPENDIX 9. A QUOTE FROM THE REPORT TITLED "THE TURBULENCE BETWEEN AKP AND HIZMET: THE AFRICAN CASE", PUBLISHED BY THE CENTER FOR HIZMET STUDIES




APPENDIX 10. THE MA PROGRAM JOINTLY ORGANIZED BY THE DIALOGUE SOCIETY AND KEELE UNIVERSITY



APPENDIX 11. THE E-MAIL SENT BY THE DIALOGUE SOCIETY BRISTOL BRANCH



APPENDIX 12. FDI MAGAZINE'S ANSWER PERTINENT TO THE SITUATION OF KADIR UYSALOĞLU



APPENDIX 13. THE LETTER AND ROSES LEFT IN FRONT OF PAKISTAN'S LONDON EMBASSY BY THE TURKEY INSTITUTE



APPENDIX 14. THE E-MAIL SENT BY JAMES BRYANT

From: James Bryant <james.bryant@bbc.co.uk>

Date: Thursday, 21 July 2016 10:25

Subject: URGENT - BBC News Interview Request

Good day to you.

I'm a producer with the BBC's international TV news channel, BBC World News. We are obviously covering the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in Turkey, and the wider political situation there.

We are struggling to find anyone in the country who is critical of what the government is doing – we've had a lot of people in the last week speaking in favour – so we're hoping to find someone here who might be willing to speak out against the current situation.

Might you be aware of anyone?

We would obviously have to be certain there could be no repercussions on anyone related to any interviewee back in Turkey...

Many thanks for your time.

JB



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THE GÜLENIST TERROR ORGANIZATION (FETÖ) IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

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Having close ties with Turkey in economic, political and strategic terms, the United Kingdom is the leading European country after Germany where the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) enjoys a strong organizational structure. Due to the high Turkish population in the U.K., the organization could easily meet support and managed to complete its networking activities in a short span of time. Thus, FETÖ established a wide range of networks encompassing educational organizations, dialogue centers, relief organizations, and think tanks in the country.

Although various articles, news reports and studies have been published on FETÖ, it was noted that no comprehensive study focusing on FETÖ's U.K. organizations had been conducted to date. This report aims to fill this lacuna. The report's primary purpose is to inform the public and decision-makers of both countries about the group's activities and organizational structure in order to eliminate possible threats FETÖ might pose to Turkey-U.K. relations, which have progressed in a strategic nature particularly after Brexit.

The field studies and research conducted on the subject reveal that the British public is not sufficiently informed on FETÖ, which helped the group militants create a false image of the organization and maintain their activities without meeting serious obstacles. Although this report has been written with the intention to inform the public, it also aims to provide motivation in order to expose the true colors of the group in the U.K. It also hopes to put cooperation mechanisms into action to prevent the expansion of the organization's networks and seeks to contribute to the bilateral relations by presenting a number of recommendations to avert possible future problems between the two countries.